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    <title>China Global</title>
    <description>China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.</description>
    <copyright>2021</copyright>
    <language>en</language>
    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>China Global</title>
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    <itunes:summary>China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.</itunes:summary>
    <itunes:author>The German Marshall Fund</itunes:author>
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    <itunes:keywords>china, commerce, european union, foreign policy, global, international, relations, trade, united states</itunes:keywords>
    <itunes:owner>
      <itunes:name>The German Marshall Fund</itunes:name>
      <itunes:email>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com</itunes:email>
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    <itunes:category text="News">
      <itunes:category text="Politics"/>
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      <title>What the Iran War Means for China’s Energy Security</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most. </p>
<p>How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject.</p>
<p>Timestamps:</p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction <br>
 [01:38] China’s Energy Security Strategy<br>
 [03:54] Divergent Approaches to Energy Security in the US and China<br>
 [06:03] Beijing’s Response to Supply Chain Shocks <br>
 [09:55] Dependencies on Russian Oil & Gas<br>
 [12:33] New Lessons for Chinese Policymakers?<br>
 [15:30] Impact on Teapot Refineries and Responses<br>
 [18:37] Percentage of Chinese Oil and Gas Impacted<br>
 [22:26] Could China Buy Gas from the US?<br>
 [25:15] Potential Wins and Losses for Chinese Industries</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/what-the-iran-war-means-for-chinas-energy-security-58BFymnO</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most. </p>
<p>How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject.</p>
<p>Timestamps:</p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction <br>
 [01:38] China’s Energy Security Strategy<br>
 [03:54] Divergent Approaches to Energy Security in the US and China<br>
 [06:03] Beijing’s Response to Supply Chain Shocks <br>
 [09:55] Dependencies on Russian Oil & Gas<br>
 [12:33] New Lessons for Chinese Policymakers?<br>
 [15:30] Impact on Teapot Refineries and Responses<br>
 [18:37] Percentage of Chinese Oil and Gas Impacted<br>
 [22:26] Could China Buy Gas from the US?<br>
 [25:15] Potential Wins and Losses for Chinese Industries</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>What the Iran War Means for China’s Energy Security</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:38</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most.  

How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject.  </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On February 28th, the United States and Israel launched airstrikes on multiple sites in Iran, marking the beginning of a wider military conflict with Iran. Tehran responded with attacks on Israel, US military bases, and US allies across the Middle East and closed the Strait of Hormuz. These events have caused a major disruption in the global supply of oil and gas. China, as the world’s largest energy importer, is exposed to these disruptions, but its long-term energy security strategy has left it better prepared than most.  

How has China approached energy security, and how might the current conflict reshape this strategy? To discuss these issues, we are joined today by Dr. Erica Downs. Erica is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Her research focuses on Chinese energy markets and geopolitics, and she has published extensively on the subject.  </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>What to Expect from the Trump-Xi Summit: A Conversation with Dr. Da Wei</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will mark the first meeting between the two leaders since they agreed to a trade truce last October that ended months of escalating tensions prompted by tariffs imposed by the United States and Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports.</p>
<p>U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will meet Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris later this week to explore possible outcomes that could be announced during the Beijing summit. Planning for such a major summit usually takes place over several months, and is getting underway quite late, causing many observers to question whether anything meaningful can be achieved.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the US is distracted by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between Iran and a US-Israel coalition. To discuss the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, we're joined today by Dr. Da Wei. He is director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and professor of International Relations at Qinghua University.</p>
<p>Timestamps:</p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction<br>
 [01:40] The Status of US-China Relations<br>
 [03:07] Middle East War Impact on the Bilateral Relationship<br>
 [05:36] Rethinking the US Decline in Chinese Foreign Policy<br>
 [08:23] Chinese and US Sources of Leverage<br>
 [13:01] Beijing’s Goals for the Trump-Xi Summit<br>
 [19:52] New Language for Taiwan <br>
 [30:12] Expanding Chinese Investment in the US?  <br>
 [32:03] Potential for US-China Cooperation on Iran?<br>
 [35:54] Implications of Military Officer Purges </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/what-to-expect-from-the-trump-xi-summit-a-conversation-with-dr-da-wei-KJ5Vws4t</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will mark the first meeting between the two leaders since they agreed to a trade truce last October that ended months of escalating tensions prompted by tariffs imposed by the United States and Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports.</p>
<p>U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will meet Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris later this week to explore possible outcomes that could be announced during the Beijing summit. Planning for such a major summit usually takes place over several months, and is getting underway quite late, causing many observers to question whether anything meaningful can be achieved.</p>
<p>In the meantime, the US is distracted by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between Iran and a US-Israel coalition. To discuss the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, we're joined today by Dr. Da Wei. He is director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and professor of International Relations at Qinghua University.</p>
<p>Timestamps:</p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction<br>
 [01:40] The Status of US-China Relations<br>
 [03:07] Middle East War Impact on the Bilateral Relationship<br>
 [05:36] Rethinking the US Decline in Chinese Foreign Policy<br>
 [08:23] Chinese and US Sources of Leverage<br>
 [13:01] Beijing’s Goals for the Trump-Xi Summit<br>
 [19:52] New Language for Taiwan <br>
 [30:12] Expanding Chinese Investment in the US?  <br>
 [32:03] Potential for US-China Cooperation on Iran?<br>
 [35:54] Implications of Military Officer Purges </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>What to Expect from the Trump-Xi Summit: A Conversation with Dr. Da Wei</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:40:00</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will mark the first meeting between the two leaders since they agreed to a trade truce last October that ended months of escalating tensions prompted by tariffs imposed by the United States and Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports.
 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will meet Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris later this week to explore possible outcomes that could be announced during the Beijing summit.Planning for such a major summit usually takes place over several months, and is getting underway quite late, causing many observers to question whether anything meaningful can be achieved.
 
In the meantime, the US is distracted by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between Iran and a US-Israel coalition. To discuss the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, we&apos;re joined today by Dr. Da Wei. He is director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and professor of International Relations at Qinghua University.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>President Donald Trump is expected to visit Beijing from March 31 to April 2 for a summit with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. It will mark the first meeting between the two leaders since they agreed to a trade truce last October that ended months of escalating tensions prompted by tariffs imposed by the United States and Chinese restrictions on rare earth exports.
 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer will meet Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris later this week to explore possible outcomes that could be announced during the Beijing summit.Planning for such a major summit usually takes place over several months, and is getting underway quite late, causing many observers to question whether anything meaningful can be achieved.
 
In the meantime, the US is distracted by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East between Iran and a US-Israel coalition. To discuss the upcoming Trump-Xi summit, we&apos;re joined today by Dr. Da Wei. He is director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and professor of International Relations at Qinghua University.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China-Iran Relations: Transactional or Strategic?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is once again considering military strikes to curb Iran’s nuclear activities and missile program. China has emerged as a particularly important partner of Iran, serving as the country’s largest trade partner and one of its few sources of consistent diplomatic backing. For Beijing, the stakes in the relationship extend beyond energy security, but also include great power competition with the US and China’s broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran is close to finalizing a deal to purchase supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. </p>
<p>To unpack China-Iran relations and these recent dynamics, we are joined today by Jonathan Fulton. Jonathan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on China-GCC relations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese foreign policy. </p>
<p>This episode was recorded on February 26, 2026.  </p>
<p>Timestamps: </p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction  <br>
 [01:33] China’s Interests in Iran and Possible Reactions <br>
 [04:55] Challenges to Diversifying Oil Imports  <br>
 [09:40] Using Oil Purchases as Leverage with the US <br>
 [10:59] Frictions in the China-Iran Relationship <br>
 [12:41] Iran in China’s Middle East Strategy <br>
 [16:00] Iran–China 25-year Cooperation Program  <br>
 [21:56] China-Russia Coordination in Iran Strategy <br>
 [25:54] Tehran's Points of Leverage with Beijing and Moscow <br>
 [29:14] Potential Disruptors to the China-Iran Relationship </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 3 Mar 2026 16:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Jonathan Fulton)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-iran-relations-transactional-or-strategic-9RqxxIg6-7riO_doT</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is once again considering military strikes to curb Iran’s nuclear activities and missile program. China has emerged as a particularly important partner of Iran, serving as the country’s largest trade partner and one of its few sources of consistent diplomatic backing. For Beijing, the stakes in the relationship extend beyond energy security, but also include great power competition with the US and China’s broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran is close to finalizing a deal to purchase supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. </p>
<p>To unpack China-Iran relations and these recent dynamics, we are joined today by Jonathan Fulton. Jonathan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on China-GCC relations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese foreign policy. </p>
<p>This episode was recorded on February 26, 2026.  </p>
<p>Timestamps: </p>
<p>[00:00] Introduction  <br>
 [01:33] China’s Interests in Iran and Possible Reactions <br>
 [04:55] Challenges to Diversifying Oil Imports  <br>
 [09:40] Using Oil Purchases as Leverage with the US <br>
 [10:59] Frictions in the China-Iran Relationship <br>
 [12:41] Iran in China’s Middle East Strategy <br>
 [16:00] Iran–China 25-year Cooperation Program  <br>
 [21:56] China-Russia Coordination in Iran Strategy <br>
 [25:54] Tehran's Points of Leverage with Beijing and Moscow <br>
 [29:14] Potential Disruptors to the China-Iran Relationship </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China-Iran Relations: Transactional or Strategic?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Jonathan Fulton</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:13</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The United States is once again considering military strikes to curb Iran’s nuclear activities and missile program. China has emerged as a particularly important partner of Iran, serving as the country’s largest trade partner and one of its few sources of consistent diplomatic backing. For Beijing, the stakes in the relationship extend beyond energy security, but also include great power competition with the US and China’s broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran is close to finalizing a deal to purchase supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. 

To unpack China-Iran relations and these recent dynamics, we are joined today by Jonathan Fulton. Jonathan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on China-GCC relations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese foreign policy. 

This episode was recorded on February 26, 2026.  </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The United States is once again considering military strikes to curb Iran’s nuclear activities and missile program. China has emerged as a particularly important partner of Iran, serving as the country’s largest trade partner and one of its few sources of consistent diplomatic backing. For Beijing, the stakes in the relationship extend beyond energy security, but also include great power competition with the US and China’s broader strategic ambitions in the Middle East. There are reports that Iran is close to finalizing a deal to purchase supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles from China. 

To unpack China-Iran relations and these recent dynamics, we are joined today by Jonathan Fulton. Jonathan is a nonresident senior fellow with the Middle East Programs at the Atlantic Council and an associate professor of political science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi. His research focuses on China-GCC relations, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese foreign policy. 

This episode was recorded on February 26, 2026.  </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, east china sea, energy security, great power competition, belt and road initiative, israel, beijing, trade, united states, atlantic council, china-iran, people’s republic of china, chinese communist party, usa, iran, russia, prc, crink, xi jinping, missiles, infrastructure, economic, western liberal order, u.s., bri, mena, russia-ukraine war, donald trump, ukraine, war in ukraine, oil, weapons trade, president trump, middle east, crude oil, liberalism, us, investments, trump, military, saudi arabia, belt &amp; road initiative, china, weapons, ccp, economic security</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>If China Attacks Taiwan: China&apos;s Economic Vulnerabilities</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Today’s episode is the third in a series of three that examine the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. The report is titled, “If China Attacks Taiwan” and it is posted on GMFUS.org.  Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for the Chinese economy.</p><p>To recap, the study considered two scenarios that could take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalates into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military are killed, U.S. intervention eventually forces China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalates into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces are degraded and eventually withdraw after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.</p><p>Our guests today are Charlie Vest and Logan Wright, who co-authored the chapter on the implications for the Chinese economy of a failed operation against Taiwan. Logan is a partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s work on China’s economy and its global impact. Charlie is an associate director at Rhodium Group, where he manages corporate research and advisory work on China.</p><p>Timestamps:</p><p>[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:34] Key Takeaways: China’s Ambitions vs. Economic Realities <br />[05:41] The Escalation Dilemma in China's Decisionmaking<br />[09:56] Immediate Disruptions to Trade and FDI<br />[13:52] Gray-Zone Military Engagement and Political Pressures<br />[16:48] Could Beijing Underestimate the Costs of US Intervention? <br />[24:12] Policy Tools and Limitations for Economic Stabilization and Recovery<br />[27:19] Long-Term Economic Effects<br />[29:24] Impact of Social Instability</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Feb 2026 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/if-china-attacks-taiwan-chinas-economic-vulnerabilities-rgIejfpz</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today’s episode is the third in a series of three that examine the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. The report is titled, “If China Attacks Taiwan” and it is posted on GMFUS.org.  Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for the Chinese economy.</p><p>To recap, the study considered two scenarios that could take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalates into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military are killed, U.S. intervention eventually forces China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalates into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces are degraded and eventually withdraw after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.</p><p>Our guests today are Charlie Vest and Logan Wright, who co-authored the chapter on the implications for the Chinese economy of a failed operation against Taiwan. Logan is a partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s work on China’s economy and its global impact. Charlie is an associate director at Rhodium Group, where he manages corporate research and advisory work on China.</p><p>Timestamps:</p><p>[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:34] Key Takeaways: China’s Ambitions vs. Economic Realities <br />[05:41] The Escalation Dilemma in China's Decisionmaking<br />[09:56] Immediate Disruptions to Trade and FDI<br />[13:52] Gray-Zone Military Engagement and Political Pressures<br />[16:48] Could Beijing Underestimate the Costs of US Intervention? <br />[24:12] Policy Tools and Limitations for Economic Stabilization and Recovery<br />[27:19] Long-Term Economic Effects<br />[29:24] Impact of Social Instability</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>If China Attacks Taiwan: China&apos;s Economic Vulnerabilities</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:47</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Today’s episode is the third in a series of three that examine the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. The report is titled, “If China Attacks Taiwan” and it is posted on GMFUS.org.  Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for the Chinese economy. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios that could take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalates into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military are killed, U.S. intervention eventually forces China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalates into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces are degraded and eventually withdraw after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Our guests today are Charlie Vest and Logan Wright, who co-authored the chapter on the implications for the Chinese economy of a failed operation against Taiwan. Logan is a partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s work on China’s economy and its global impact. Charlie is an associate director at Rhodium Group, where he manages corporate research and advisory work on China. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Today’s episode is the third in a series of three that examine the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. The report is titled, “If China Attacks Taiwan” and it is posted on GMFUS.org.  Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for the Chinese economy. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios that could take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalates into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military are killed, U.S. intervention eventually forces China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalates into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces are degraded and eventually withdraw after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Our guests today are Charlie Vest and Logan Wright, who co-authored the chapter on the implications for the Chinese economy of a failed operation against Taiwan. Logan is a partner at Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s work on China’s economy and its global impact. Charlie is an associate director at Rhodium Group, where he manages corporate research and advisory work on China. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>If China Attacks Taiwan: Beijing Risks Social Instability in a Taiwan Conflict</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. </p><p>To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also US forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. </p><p>Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the US Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.</p><p>Timestamps: <br />[00:00] Introduction  <br />[02:11] Why This Matters to US Policymakers <br />[04:37] Managing Social Stability During Conflict with Taiwan  <br />[08:01] How the CCP Identifies and Suppresses Sources of Instability<br />[10:44] Social Stability Organizations and Institutions  <br />[15:06] Domestic Pressures & Potential Party Responses <br />[19:00] Estimating Public Support for Reunification <br />[23:09] Scenario 3: Protracted Conventional Conflict <br />[26:55] Lessons Learned from COVID Lockdowns <br />[31:28] Long-Term Implications for Stability Post-Conflict </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 3 Feb 2026 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/if-china-attacks-taiwan-beijing-risks-social-instability-in-a-taiwan-conflict-_ejClrXD</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. </p><p>To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also US forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. </p><p>Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the US Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation.</p><p>Timestamps: <br />[00:00] Introduction  <br />[02:11] Why This Matters to US Policymakers <br />[04:37] Managing Social Stability During Conflict with Taiwan  <br />[08:01] How the CCP Identifies and Suppresses Sources of Instability<br />[10:44] Social Stability Organizations and Institutions  <br />[15:06] Domestic Pressures & Potential Party Responses <br />[19:00] Estimating Public Support for Reunification <br />[23:09] Scenario 3: Protracted Conventional Conflict <br />[26:55] Lessons Learned from COVID Lockdowns <br />[31:28] Long-Term Implications for Stability Post-Conflict </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>If China Attacks Taiwan: Beijing Risks Social Instability in a Taiwan Conflict</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:37:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, U.S. intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the U.S. Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Today’s episode is the second in a three-part series that examines the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. In each of these episodes, we’re speaking with authors of a recently published German Marshall Fund study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs. Our podcast today focuses on the potential costs for domestic social stability. 

To recap, the study considered two scenarios occurring in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, U.S. intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties. 

Joining us today are Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi. Sheena is an associate professor at the University of Texas at Austin and visiting research faculty at the U.S. Army War College. Jake is an associate political scientist at the RAND Corporation. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>118</itunes:episode>
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      <title>If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Risks and International Costs</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Concern about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Taiwan has surged in recent years. Wargames and research studies have focused primarily on identifying gaps in US and allied capabilities with the goal of strengthening deterrence. A relatively understudied question, however, is the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. To address this gap, the German Marshall Fund led a study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs.</p><p>GMF commissioned four papers on these key areas. We considered two scenarios that could realistically take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.</p><p>The authors found that the costs to China of a failed military action against Taiwan would likely be considerable. We believe their findings are important and warrant wide dissemination. In this podcast, we’ll discuss the report’s major conclusions and implications. Then we’ll talk about the potential impact of a failed Chinese attempt to take Taiwan on China’s military capabilities and the possible international costs that Beijing could face.  Our next two China Global podcasts will examine the implications of a failed military operation against Taiwan for China’s economy and social stability.</p><p>Our guests today are Zack Cooper and Joel Wuthnow. Zack is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and lecturer at Princeton University.  Joel is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Joel’s paper and this interview reflect only his personal views and not those of the National Defense University, the Department of War, or the US government.</p><p>Timestamps: <br />[00:00] Introduction  <br />[03:22] Implications for China, the United States, and Taiwan <br />[06:31] Actions to Strengthen Deterrence  <br />[08:50] Evaluating Costs and Risks for Chinese Decisionmakers<br />[11:46] Lessons Learned for the PLA <br />[14:05] Steps to Avoid Another Attack <br />[17:14] Intensifying Frictions between Party and Military?  <br />[19:53] Anticipating US Intervention as a Military Variable <br />[22:49] Countries and Organizations Likely to Respond to China<br />[25:55] Potential Diplomatic Actions and Costs<br />[31:50] A Treaty Alliance with Taiwan <br />[34:44] Why International Costs Matter to China</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Jan 2026 13:15:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/if-china-attacks-taiwan-military-risks-and-international-costs-t8V6DNh5</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Concern about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Taiwan has surged in recent years. Wargames and research studies have focused primarily on identifying gaps in US and allied capabilities with the goal of strengthening deterrence. A relatively understudied question, however, is the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. To address this gap, the German Marshall Fund led a study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs.</p><p>GMF commissioned four papers on these key areas. We considered two scenarios that could realistically take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.</p><p>The authors found that the costs to China of a failed military action against Taiwan would likely be considerable. We believe their findings are important and warrant wide dissemination. In this podcast, we’ll discuss the report’s major conclusions and implications. Then we’ll talk about the potential impact of a failed Chinese attempt to take Taiwan on China’s military capabilities and the possible international costs that Beijing could face.  Our next two China Global podcasts will examine the implications of a failed military operation against Taiwan for China’s economy and social stability.</p><p>Our guests today are Zack Cooper and Joel Wuthnow. Zack is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and lecturer at Princeton University.  Joel is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Joel’s paper and this interview reflect only his personal views and not those of the National Defense University, the Department of War, or the US government.</p><p>Timestamps: <br />[00:00] Introduction  <br />[03:22] Implications for China, the United States, and Taiwan <br />[06:31] Actions to Strengthen Deterrence  <br />[08:50] Evaluating Costs and Risks for Chinese Decisionmakers<br />[11:46] Lessons Learned for the PLA <br />[14:05] Steps to Avoid Another Attack <br />[17:14] Intensifying Frictions between Party and Military?  <br />[19:53] Anticipating US Intervention as a Military Variable <br />[22:49] Countries and Organizations Likely to Respond to China<br />[25:55] Potential Diplomatic Actions and Costs<br />[31:50] A Treaty Alliance with Taiwan <br />[34:44] Why International Costs Matter to China</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Risks and International Costs</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:38:17</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Concern about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Taiwan has surged in recent years. Wargames and research studies have focused primarily on identifying gaps in US and allied capabilities with the goal of strengthening deterrence. A relatively understudied question, however, is the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. To address this gap, the German Marshall Fund led a study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs.

GMF commissioned four papers on these key areas. We considered two scenarios that could realistically take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.

The authors found that the costs to China of a failed military action against Taiwan would likely be considerable. We believe their findings are important and warrant wide dissemination. In this podcast, we’ll discuss the report’s major conclusions and implications. Then we’ll talk about the potential impact of a failed Chinese attempt to take Taiwan on China’s military capabilities and the possible international costs that Beijing could face.  Our next two China Global podcasts will examine the implications of a failed military operation against Taiwan for China’s economy and social stability.

Our guests today are Zack Cooper and Joel Wuthnow. Zack is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and lecturer at Princeton University.  Joel is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Joel’s paper and this interview reflect only his personal views and not those of the National Defense University, the Department of War, or the US government. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Concern about the possibility of a Chinese attack against Taiwan has surged in recent years. Wargames and research studies have focused primarily on identifying gaps in US and allied capabilities with the goal of strengthening deterrence. A relatively understudied question, however, is the potential consequences for China if a military operation against Taiwan were to fail. To address this gap, the German Marshall Fund led a study of the possible costs that China would incur across four different, but interrelated areas: the Chinese economy, the military, Chinese social stability, and international costs.

GMF commissioned four papers on these key areas. We considered two scenarios that could realistically take place in the next five years. In the first scenario, a minor skirmish escalated into a multi-week maritime blockade of Taiwan by China. Although several dozen members of the Chinese and Taiwanese military were killed, US intervention eventually forced China to de-escalate.  In the second scenario, a conflict escalated into a full-fledged invasion, with Chinese strikes on not only Taiwan but also U.S. forces in Japan and Guam. After several months of heavy fighting, Chinese forces were degraded and eventually withdrew after suffering many tens of thousands of casualties.

The authors found that the costs to China of a failed military action against Taiwan would likely be considerable. We believe their findings are important and warrant wide dissemination. In this podcast, we’ll discuss the report’s major conclusions and implications. Then we’ll talk about the potential impact of a failed Chinese attempt to take Taiwan on China’s military capabilities and the possible international costs that Beijing could face.  Our next two China Global podcasts will examine the implications of a failed military operation against Taiwan for China’s economy and social stability.

Our guests today are Zack Cooper and Joel Wuthnow. Zack is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and lecturer at Princeton University.  Joel is a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs within the Institute for National Strategic Studies at NDU. Joel’s paper and this interview reflect only his personal views and not those of the National Defense University, the Department of War, or the US government. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, multilateral, beijing, trade, united states, people’s republic of china, economics, blockades, security, chinese communist party, usa, imports, cyber, himalayan border, republic of china, bilateral, taipei, china-taiwan, taiwan strait, space, people’s liberation army, prc, xi jinping, economic, exports, u.s., g7, multilateralism, group of 7, war games, pla, taiwan, us foreign policy, international rules, us, economy, blockade, military, foreign policy, deterrence, korean peninsula, china, ccp, military invasion</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>China’s Latin America Strategy: A Collision Course with the U.S.?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Although geographically distant from Chinese shores, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy an important place in Chinese foreign policy. In the past decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the region. The main vector of Chinese involvement has been economic, including securing access to commodities such as soybeans, copper, oil, and lithium, creating markets for Chinese companies, and deepening financial ties through trade, lending, and infrastructure investment.  </p><p>On December 10, China released a new white paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, the third such document following earlier editions in 2008 and 2016. The White Paper characterizes the region as “an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalization.” Its release came on the heels of the Trump Administration’s release of its National Security Strategy, which places unprecedented emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the US seeks a region “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” highlighting the growing strategic salience of Latin America and the Caribbean in US-China competition.  </p><p>To discuss the new White Paper and the implications of China’s policies in the LAC for the United States and US-China relations, we are joined by Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He previously served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as international narcotics and law enforcement issues.</p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:07] US and China on a Collision Course? <br />[04:50] Chinese Priorities in Latin America <br />[08:33] U.S. Security Risks from Chinese Port Investments<br />[11:45] How China Uses CELAC to Advance Its Agenda<br />[14:27] How Latin Americans View China’s Growing Presence<br />[17:22] Honduras and the Republic of China<br />[21:22] How Beijing Might Address U.S. Concerns <br />[25:09] China's Reaction to US and Venezuela <br /> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Jan 2026 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-latin-america-strategy-a-collision-course-with-the-us-PnLbQjPf</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Although geographically distant from Chinese shores, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy an important place in Chinese foreign policy. In the past decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the region. The main vector of Chinese involvement has been economic, including securing access to commodities such as soybeans, copper, oil, and lithium, creating markets for Chinese companies, and deepening financial ties through trade, lending, and infrastructure investment.  </p><p>On December 10, China released a new white paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, the third such document following earlier editions in 2008 and 2016. The White Paper characterizes the region as “an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalization.” Its release came on the heels of the Trump Administration’s release of its National Security Strategy, which places unprecedented emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the US seeks a region “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” highlighting the growing strategic salience of Latin America and the Caribbean in US-China competition.  </p><p>To discuss the new White Paper and the implications of China’s policies in the LAC for the United States and US-China relations, we are joined by Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He previously served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as international narcotics and law enforcement issues.</p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:07] US and China on a Collision Course? <br />[04:50] Chinese Priorities in Latin America <br />[08:33] U.S. Security Risks from Chinese Port Investments<br />[11:45] How China Uses CELAC to Advance Its Agenda<br />[14:27] How Latin Americans View China’s Growing Presence<br />[17:22] Honduras and the Republic of China<br />[21:22] How Beijing Might Address U.S. Concerns <br />[25:09] China's Reaction to US and Venezuela <br /> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Latin America Strategy: A Collision Course with the U.S.?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:20</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Although geographically distant from Chinese shores, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy an important place in Chinese foreign policy. In the past decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the region. The main vector of Chinese involvement has been economic, including securing access to commodities such as soybeans, copper, oil, and lithium, creating markets for Chinese companies, and deepening financial ties through trade, lending, and infrastructure investment. 

On December 10, China released a new white paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, the third such document following earlier editions in 2008 and 2016. The White Paper characterizes the region as “an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalization.” Its release came on the heels of the Trump Administration’s release of its National Security Strategy, which places unprecedented emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the US seeks a region “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” highlighting the growing strategic salience of Latin America and the Caribbean in US-China competition. 

To discuss the new White Paper and the implications of China’s policies in the LAC for the United States and US-China relations, we are joined by Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He previously served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as international narcotics and law enforcement issues.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Although geographically distant from Chinese shores, Latin America and the Caribbean occupy an important place in Chinese foreign policy. In the past decade, China has significantly expanded its influence in the region. The main vector of Chinese involvement has been economic, including securing access to commodities such as soybeans, copper, oil, and lithium, creating markets for Chinese companies, and deepening financial ties through trade, lending, and infrastructure investment. 

On December 10, China released a new white paper on its relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, the third such document following earlier editions in 2008 and 2016. The White Paper characterizes the region as “an essential force in the process toward a multipolar world and economic globalization.” Its release came on the heels of the Trump Administration’s release of its National Security Strategy, which places unprecedented emphasis on the Western Hemisphere and asserts that the US seeks a region “free of hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” highlighting the growing strategic salience of Latin America and the Caribbean in US-China competition. 

To discuss the new White Paper and the implications of China’s policies in the LAC for the United States and US-China relations, we are joined by Dr. Evan Ellis. Dr. Ellis is a research professor of Latin American studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. He previously served on the Secretary of State’s policy planning staff with responsibility for Latin America and the Caribbean as well as international narcotics and law enforcement issues.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>bahamas, trade, emerging technologies, peru, people’s republic of china, partnerships, cosco, central america, cuba, republic of china, technologies, argentina, space, latam, national security strategy, exchanges, prc, ggi, global civilization initiative, space exploration, panama, honduras, chinese government, us-china relations, lac, nss, narcotics, taiwan, ports, diplomatic ties, people-to-people ties, caribbean, president trump, people-to-people diplomacy, governance, tech, mexico, ai governance, digital cooperation, celac, investments, venezuela, panama canal, global governance initiative, brazil, trump, strategic technology cooperation, sino-american relations, latin america, china, ccp, roc, south america, public diplomacy</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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      <itunes:episode>116</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Taiwan Sparks Tensions: Inside the China-Japan Dispute</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Under Japan's 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan's self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister’s head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate?</p><p>Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:07] The State of China-Japan Relations Pre-Dispute<br />[02:49] Beijing’s Reaction and Intended Audience<br />[05:42] Continuity in Takaichi’s Stance <br />[10:31] Why a Chinese Takeover of Taiwan is Existential to Japan <br />[13:03] China’s Signals and Restraint<br />[16:30] Recommendations for De-escalation<br />[19:18] Senkaku Islands Dispute in Connection to Taiwan Dispute<br />[22:04] Beijing’s Potential Claims on Okinawa<br />[24:23] View in Japan of the US Reaction<br />[26:36] Takaichi’s Support in Japan</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/taiwan-sparks-tensions-inside-the-china-japan-dispute-5H8GHjZ2</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Under Japan's 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan's self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister’s head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate?</p><p>Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Introduction<br />[02:07] The State of China-Japan Relations Pre-Dispute<br />[02:49] Beijing’s Reaction and Intended Audience<br />[05:42] Continuity in Takaichi’s Stance <br />[10:31] Why a Chinese Takeover of Taiwan is Existential to Japan <br />[13:03] China’s Signals and Restraint<br />[16:30] Recommendations for De-escalation<br />[19:18] Senkaku Islands Dispute in Connection to Taiwan Dispute<br />[22:04] Beijing’s Potential Claims on Okinawa<br />[24:23] View in Japan of the US Reaction<br />[26:36] Takaichi’s Support in Japan</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Taiwan Sparks Tensions: Inside the China-Japan Dispute</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:01</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Under Japan&apos;s 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan&apos;s self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister’s head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate? 

Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Tensions between China and Japan have spiked since November 7 when Japan’s newly elected prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, said in the Japanese parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan would be a situation threatening Japan’s survival. Under Japan&apos;s 2015 security laws, that suggests Japan&apos;s self-defense forces could be activated to respond. The following day, the Chinese consul general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted that China had no choice but to cut off the prime minister’s head. China-Japan relations have since plummeted. China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, stated that Takaichi had “crossed a red line that should not have been touched.” China has taken retaliatory actions, restricting tourism to Japan and banning imports of Japanese seafood, among other actions. Why has Beijing reacted so strongly and how far are China-Japan relations likely to deteriorate? 

Joining us today to discuss the latest episode in China-Japan relations is Professor Akio Takahara. Professor Takahara is a Distinguished Visiting Professor at Tokyo Woman’s Christian University and an Emeritus Professor at the University of Tokyo. He is also an Honorary Senior Fellow on Chinese Politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>nuclear, sanae takaichi, beijing, trade, asia, united states, president donald trump, yonaguni island, nuclear defense, economics, china reunification, china-japan, taipei, senkaku islands, takaichi, president xi jinping, xi jinping, missiles, president lai ching-te, prime minister takaichi, president xi, sino-japanese relations, lai ching-te, donald trump, japan, east asia, pm takaichi, president lai, taiwan, indo-pacific, president trump, senkaku islands disputes, nuclear deterrence, okinawa, us, tokyo, trump, diaoyu islands dispute, sino-japanese, diaoyu islands, deterrence, cross-strait relations, taiwan reunification, china, san francisco peace treaty, us-japan</itunes:keywords>
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      <itunes:episode>115</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Inside the 2025 US-China Economic and Security Commission Report: Key Findings and Recommendations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2025 annual report to Congress. The annual report’s analysis and recommendations are a crucial source of information for Congress, the executive branch, and observers of US-China relations. This year’s report includes 28 key recommendations for Congress.  </p><p>On this episode of China Global, we have two Commissioners joining us to discuss the report, Commissioner Aaron Friedberg and Commissioner Mike Kuiken. Commissioner Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-director of its Center for International Security Studies. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and previously served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.</p><p>Commissioner Kuiken is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and advisor to the Special Competitive Studies Project. He has over 20 years of experience shaping US national security policy, including 12 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee. </p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Intro<br />[1:47] China’s Role in the Axis of Autocracy<br />[03:22] Best Response from US and Allies?<br />[05:23] The Interlocking Innovation Flywheels Effect<br />[07:47] Made in China 2025 Plan: 10 Years Later<br />[10:25] Why Does Chinese Dominance Matter?  <br />[12:39] Policy Prescriptions for the US<br />[16:24] Lessons Learned from China Shock 1.0 and Preparing for 2.0<br />[21:09] Bipartisan Political Will on China Policy<br />[24:06] Taiwan as a Vital Interest to the US<br />[28:06] Assuaging Taiwanese Doubts in Congress<br />[30:17] Taiwan’s Defense Spending Debate  </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/inside-the-2025-us-china-economic-and-security-commission-report-key-findings-and-recommendations-rBLj1Jc0</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2025 annual report to Congress. The annual report’s analysis and recommendations are a crucial source of information for Congress, the executive branch, and observers of US-China relations. This year’s report includes 28 key recommendations for Congress.  </p><p>On this episode of China Global, we have two Commissioners joining us to discuss the report, Commissioner Aaron Friedberg and Commissioner Mike Kuiken. Commissioner Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-director of its Center for International Security Studies. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and previously served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.</p><p>Commissioner Kuiken is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution and advisor to the Special Competitive Studies Project. He has over 20 years of experience shaping US national security policy, including 12 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee. </p><p>Timestamps:<br />[00:00] Intro<br />[1:47] China’s Role in the Axis of Autocracy<br />[03:22] Best Response from US and Allies?<br />[05:23] The Interlocking Innovation Flywheels Effect<br />[07:47] Made in China 2025 Plan: 10 Years Later<br />[10:25] Why Does Chinese Dominance Matter?  <br />[12:39] Policy Prescriptions for the US<br />[16:24] Lessons Learned from China Shock 1.0 and Preparing for 2.0<br />[21:09] Bipartisan Political Will on China Policy<br />[24:06] Taiwan as a Vital Interest to the US<br />[28:06] Assuaging Taiwanese Doubts in Congress<br />[30:17] Taiwan’s Defense Spending Debate  </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Inside the 2025 US-China Economic and Security Commission Report: Key Findings and Recommendations</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:55</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2025 annual report to Congress. The annual report’s analysis and recommendations are a crucial source of information for Congress, the executive branch, and observers of US-China relations. This year’s report includes 28 key recommendations for Congress.  

On this episode of China Global, we have two Commissioners joining us to discuss the report, Commissioner Aaron Friedberg and Commissioner Mike Kuiken. Commissioner Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-director of its Center for International Security Studies. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and previously served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Commissioner Kuiken is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford&apos;s Hoover Institution and advisor to the Special Competitive Studies Project. He has over 20 years of experience shaping US national security policy, including 12 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has just released its 2025 annual report to Congress. The annual report’s analysis and recommendations are a crucial source of information for Congress, the executive branch, and observers of US-China relations. This year’s report includes 28 key recommendations for Congress.  

On this episode of China Global, we have two Commissioners joining us to discuss the report, Commissioner Aaron Friedberg and Commissioner Mike Kuiken. Commissioner Friedberg is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and co-director of its Center for International Security Studies. He is also a non-resident senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, counselor to the National Bureau of Asian Research, and previously served as Vice President Dick Cheney’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Commissioner Kuiken is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford&apos;s Hoover Institution and advisor to the Special Competitive Studies Project. He has over 20 years of experience shaping US national security policy, including 12 years on the Senate Armed Services Committee. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, us government, robotics, united states, ai, people’s republic of china, quantum, usa, iran, chips, russia, prc, xi jinping, north korea, trump administration, u.s., undersea cables, biotech, donald trump, sovereignty, artificial intelligence, autocracy, usg, biotechnology, taiwan, made in china 2025, axis of autocracy, economic statecraft, manufacturing, president trump, drones, us, robots, investments, electric vehicles, trump, congress, evs, automation, deterrence, cross-strait relations, china, ccp</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>The Trump-Xi Summit and Future of US-China ties</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On October 30, US President Trump and China’s leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 6 years. There was a lot at stake in this meeting for the US and China, as well as for the rest of the world. In my view, the outcome is best described as a fragile truce. The path forward for US-China relations remains uncertain – greater stability and predictability is possible, but not assured. Intense competition across several domains, especially technology, is likely.</p><p>Today’s episode focuses on the Trump-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations, featuring Mr. Dennis Wilder. Dennis is a senior fellow for the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University, where he previously served as the managing director, and assistant professor of the practice in Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service. He served on President George W. Bush’s NSC first as director for China and then as senior director for Asian Affairs. He also had a distinguished career in the CIA, where he held many positions, the last of which was senior editor of the Presidential Daily Brief. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps:</p><p>[00:00] Introduction<br />[1:57] Trump-Xi Summit: A Win for China? <br />[09:03] Fact Sheet Discrepancies <br />[14:37] Trump Administration’s China Strategy<br />[16:47] Achieving Chinese Exceptionalism<br />[19:20] China’s Confidence and Potential Instability<br />[21:26] Why No Taiwan Mention? <br />[24:48] An Inflection Point for Greater Stability? <br />[27:50] Indo-Pacific View of the US-China Relationship</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Nov 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-trump-xi-summit-and-future-of-us-china-ties-y6LOrcG0</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On October 30, US President Trump and China’s leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 6 years. There was a lot at stake in this meeting for the US and China, as well as for the rest of the world. In my view, the outcome is best described as a fragile truce. The path forward for US-China relations remains uncertain – greater stability and predictability is possible, but not assured. Intense competition across several domains, especially technology, is likely.</p><p>Today’s episode focuses on the Trump-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations, featuring Mr. Dennis Wilder. Dennis is a senior fellow for the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University, where he previously served as the managing director, and assistant professor of the practice in Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service. He served on President George W. Bush’s NSC first as director for China and then as senior director for Asian Affairs. He also had a distinguished career in the CIA, where he held many positions, the last of which was senior editor of the Presidential Daily Brief. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps:</p><p>[00:00] Introduction<br />[1:57] Trump-Xi Summit: A Win for China? <br />[09:03] Fact Sheet Discrepancies <br />[14:37] Trump Administration’s China Strategy<br />[16:47] Achieving Chinese Exceptionalism<br />[19:20] China’s Confidence and Potential Instability<br />[21:26] Why No Taiwan Mention? <br />[24:48] An Inflection Point for Greater Stability? <br />[27:50] Indo-Pacific View of the US-China Relationship</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Trump-Xi Summit and Future of US-China ties</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:44</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On October 30, US President Trump and China’s leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 6 years. There was a lot at stake in this meeting for the US and China, as well as for the rest of the world. In my view, the outcome is best described as a fragile truce. The path forward for US-China relations remains uncertain – greater stability and predictability is possible, but not assured. Intense competition across several domains, especially technology, is likely.

Today’s episode focuses on the Trump-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations, featuring Mr. Dennis Wilder. Dennis is a senior fellow for the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University, where he previously served as the managing director, and assistant professor of the practice in Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service. He served on President George W. Bush’s NSC first as director for China and then as senior director for Asian Affairs. He also had a distinguished career in the CIA, where he held many positions, the last of which was senior editor of the Presidential Daily Brief. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On October 30, US President Trump and China’s leader Xi Jinping met in Busan, South Korea. It was their first face-to-face meeting in 6 years. There was a lot at stake in this meeting for the US and China, as well as for the rest of the world. In my view, the outcome is best described as a fragile truce. The path forward for US-China relations remains uncertain – greater stability and predictability is possible, but not assured. Intense competition across several domains, especially technology, is likely.

Today’s episode focuses on the Trump-Xi summit and the future of US-China relations, featuring Mr. Dennis Wilder. Dennis is a senior fellow for the Initiative for U.S.-China Dialogue on Global Issues at Georgetown University, where he previously served as the managing director, and assistant professor of the practice in Asian studies in the School of Foreign Service. He served on President George W. Bush’s NSC first as director for China and then as senior director for Asian Affairs. He also had a distinguished career in the CIA, where he held many positions, the last of which was senior editor of the Presidential Daily Brief. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, tariffs, beijing, trade, biden administration, united states, chinese exceptionalism, people’s republic of china, economics, us-china trade war, usa, south korea, rare earth, national security, sphere of influence, rare earths, prc, xi jinping, trump administration, exports, u.s., sanctions, us-china relations, donald trump, japan, biden, minerals, president lai, trade war, taiwan, geostrategy, president trump, southeast asia, trump-xi summit, opium trade, rare earth minerals, export controls, technology, technology, fentanyl, strategy, trump, cross-strait relations, taiwan relations act, china, trump-xi, western hemisphere</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>The Fourth Plenum: Decoding China&apos;s Roadmap to 2030</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>From October 20-23, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum in Beijing, marking an important moment as the Party sets the direction for China’s development for the next five years. The session adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, endorsing Xi Jinping’s goals of high-quality development, scientific and technological self-reliance, and strengthening national security in response to rising global instabilities. The Central Committee also announced the replacement of 11 members, the highest personnel turnover since 2017 amid an ongoing anti-corruption purge in the military. </p><p>To discuss the plenum’s outcomes, we are joined by Jonathan Czin. Jonathan is a leading expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. He holds the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and is a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He previously led the intelligence community’s analysis of Chinese politics and policy making at the CIA and also spent two years as director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.  </p><p>Timestamps:  <br />[00:00] Start  <br />[01:36] Why the Fourth Plenum Matters  <br />[03:37] Key Takeaways: Policy Continuity and Political Purges  <br />[05:07] Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping’s Military Ambitions  <br />[09:23] Signals and Adjustments in Economic Planning  <br />[11:56] Previewing the 15th Five-Year Plan  <br />[13:33] Xi Jinping’s Growing Confidence  <br />[17:42] Political Messaging and Choreography  <br />[20:21] Language in the Communique: “Strategic Resolve”  <br />[22:28] What to Expect from the Xi-Trump Summit  <br />[26:38] Is Beijing Worried the Summit Could Backfire? </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-fourth-plenum-decoding-chinas-roadmap-to-2030-ScNvcXM3</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From October 20-23, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum in Beijing, marking an important moment as the Party sets the direction for China’s development for the next five years. The session adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, endorsing Xi Jinping’s goals of high-quality development, scientific and technological self-reliance, and strengthening national security in response to rising global instabilities. The Central Committee also announced the replacement of 11 members, the highest personnel turnover since 2017 amid an ongoing anti-corruption purge in the military. </p><p>To discuss the plenum’s outcomes, we are joined by Jonathan Czin. Jonathan is a leading expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. He holds the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and is a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He previously led the intelligence community’s analysis of Chinese politics and policy making at the CIA and also spent two years as director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.  </p><p>Timestamps:  <br />[00:00] Start  <br />[01:36] Why the Fourth Plenum Matters  <br />[03:37] Key Takeaways: Policy Continuity and Political Purges  <br />[05:07] Zhang Shengmin and Xi Jinping’s Military Ambitions  <br />[09:23] Signals and Adjustments in Economic Planning  <br />[11:56] Previewing the 15th Five-Year Plan  <br />[13:33] Xi Jinping’s Growing Confidence  <br />[17:42] Political Messaging and Choreography  <br />[20:21] Language in the Communique: “Strategic Resolve”  <br />[22:28] What to Expect from the Xi-Trump Summit  <br />[26:38] Is Beijing Worried the Summit Could Backfire? </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Fourth Plenum: Decoding China&apos;s Roadmap to 2030</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>From October 20-23, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum in Beijing, marking an important moment as the Party sets the direction for China’s development for the next five years. The session adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, endorsing Xi Jinping’s goals of high-quality development, scientific and technological self-reliance, and strengthening national security in response to rising global instabilities. The Central Committee also announced the replacement of 11 members, the highest personnel turnover since 2017 amid an ongoing anti-corruption purge in the military. 

To discuss the plenum’s outcomes, we are joined by Jonathan Czin. Jonathan is a leading expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. He holds the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and is a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He previously led the intelligence community’s analysis of Chinese politics and policy making at the CIA and also spent two years as director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.  </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>From October 20-23, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party held its Fourth Plenum in Beijing, marking an important moment as the Party sets the direction for China’s development for the next five years. The session adopted recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan, endorsing Xi Jinping’s goals of high-quality development, scientific and technological self-reliance, and strengthening national security in response to rising global instabilities. The Central Committee also announced the replacement of 11 members, the highest personnel turnover since 2017 amid an ongoing anti-corruption purge in the military. 

To discuss the plenum’s outcomes, we are joined by Jonathan Czin. Jonathan is a leading expert on Chinese politics and foreign policy. He holds the Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies and is a fellow in the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. He previously led the intelligence community’s analysis of Chinese politics and policy making at the CIA and also spent two years as director for China at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.  </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Power, Pressure, and Partnerships: China in Southeast Asia</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>China’s ties with Southeast Asia states are increasingly consequential for regional stability and global geopolitics. Over the past two decades, China has become the region’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment and infrastructure financing. At the same time, China growing military presence and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have caused anxiety and have prompted a number of Southeast Asian nations to seek closer security ties with the United States and other partners.  </p><p>The Trump administration’s policies of imposing tariffs, reducing foreign assistance, and implementing stricter immigration regulations have begun to erode US influence across the region, further encouraging Southeast Asian countries to rely on each other and to diversify their relationships with external partners.    </p><p>To discuss Beijing’s evolving approach to Southeast Asia and the efficacy of its policies, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Chong Ja Ian. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and US-China relations. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong><br />[00:00] Intro<br />[01:50] China’s Tools and Objectives in SEA<br />[03:02] Economic Relations with SEA<br />[05:52] Success and Failures of Beijing’s SEA Strategy<br />[07:47] Regional Media and Influence<br />[11:40] SEA Views on China: Consensus and Discord<br />[14:55] Regional Strategy Post-Trump<br />[18:22] SEA Reactions to China Taking Taiwan by Force<br />[22:40] Crisis Planning and How it Could Change<br />[24:10] Long-Term Outlooks for China-SEA Relations </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Oct 2025 15:45:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/power-pressure-and-partnerships-china-in-southeast-asia-a4Ocxe0P</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s ties with Southeast Asia states are increasingly consequential for regional stability and global geopolitics. Over the past two decades, China has become the region’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment and infrastructure financing. At the same time, China growing military presence and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have caused anxiety and have prompted a number of Southeast Asian nations to seek closer security ties with the United States and other partners.  </p><p>The Trump administration’s policies of imposing tariffs, reducing foreign assistance, and implementing stricter immigration regulations have begun to erode US influence across the region, further encouraging Southeast Asian countries to rely on each other and to diversify their relationships with external partners.    </p><p>To discuss Beijing’s evolving approach to Southeast Asia and the efficacy of its policies, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Chong Ja Ian. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and US-China relations. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong><br />[00:00] Intro<br />[01:50] China’s Tools and Objectives in SEA<br />[03:02] Economic Relations with SEA<br />[05:52] Success and Failures of Beijing’s SEA Strategy<br />[07:47] Regional Media and Influence<br />[11:40] SEA Views on China: Consensus and Discord<br />[14:55] Regional Strategy Post-Trump<br />[18:22] SEA Reactions to China Taking Taiwan by Force<br />[22:40] Crisis Planning and How it Could Change<br />[24:10] Long-Term Outlooks for China-SEA Relations </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Power, Pressure, and Partnerships: China in Southeast Asia</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:37</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s ties with Southeast Asia states are increasingly consequential for regional stability and global geopolitics. Over the past two decades, China has become the region’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment and infrastructure financing. At the same time, China growing military presence and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have caused anxiety and have prompted a number of Southeast Asian nations to seek closer security ties with the United States and other partners. 

The Trump administration’s policies of imposing tariffs, reducing foreign assistance, and implementing stricter immigration regulations have begun to erode US influence across the region, further encouraging Southeast Asian countries to rely on each other and to diversify their relationships with external partners.   

To discuss Beijing’s evolving approach to Southeast Asia and the efficacy of its policies, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Chong Ja Ian. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and US-China relations. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s ties with Southeast Asia states are increasingly consequential for regional stability and global geopolitics. Over the past two decades, China has become the region’s largest trading partner and a major source of investment and infrastructure financing. At the same time, China growing military presence and aggressive behavior in the South China Sea have caused anxiety and have prompted a number of Southeast Asian nations to seek closer security ties with the United States and other partners. 

The Trump administration’s policies of imposing tariffs, reducing foreign assistance, and implementing stricter immigration regulations have begun to erode US influence across the region, further encouraging Southeast Asian countries to rely on each other and to diversify their relationships with external partners.   

To discuss Beijing’s evolving approach to Southeast Asia and the efficacy of its policies, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Chong Ja Ian. He is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a nonresident fellow at Carnegie China. Ian’s research focuses on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and US-China relations. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Global Public Security with Chinese Characteristics</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In mid-September, while many China watchers were focused on the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese military’s annual high-level security and defense convening in Beijing, another major annual meeting was being held by the Ministry of Public Security in the Chinese city of Lianyungang (2-2-3). The Lianyungang Forum dates to 2015 but was upgraded and renamed the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in 2022 following Xi Jinping’s launch of the Global Security Initiative. This year it was attended by 2,000 participants from 120 countries, regions and international organizations. The theme was “Shaping Global Public Security Together: United Action to Tackle Diverse Threats.”  As Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong made clear in his opening speech, China is advancing an alternative to the western-led security order. </p><p>Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a leading expert on Beijing’s push to reshape the global security order and promote China as a model and global security provider to developing countries. Sheena is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and a visiting associate professor of research in Indo-Pacific security at the China Landpower Studies Center of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Relevant to this episode’s discussion, Sheena recently published a co-authored report for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Carnegie titled “<i>A New World Cop.</i>” </p><p>Timestamps:  <br />[00:00] Start <br />[02:30] The Global Security Initiative and Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy <br />[05:22] Outcomes of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum  <br />[08:50] What Do Participant Countries Gain?  <br />[12:23] How Do Recipient Countries Use Chinese Technologies?  <br />[16:12] Countries Rejecting China's Surveillance Technologies  <br />[21:49] China’s Rewriting of Global Norms <br />[28:18] Potential Policy Responses to the GSI </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/global-public-security-with-chinese-characteristics-HgpNqcIb</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In mid-September, while many China watchers were focused on the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese military’s annual high-level security and defense convening in Beijing, another major annual meeting was being held by the Ministry of Public Security in the Chinese city of Lianyungang (2-2-3). The Lianyungang Forum dates to 2015 but was upgraded and renamed the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in 2022 following Xi Jinping’s launch of the Global Security Initiative. This year it was attended by 2,000 participants from 120 countries, regions and international organizations. The theme was “Shaping Global Public Security Together: United Action to Tackle Diverse Threats.”  As Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong made clear in his opening speech, China is advancing an alternative to the western-led security order. </p><p>Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a leading expert on Beijing’s push to reshape the global security order and promote China as a model and global security provider to developing countries. Sheena is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and a visiting associate professor of research in Indo-Pacific security at the China Landpower Studies Center of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Relevant to this episode’s discussion, Sheena recently published a co-authored report for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Carnegie titled “<i>A New World Cop.</i>” </p><p>Timestamps:  <br />[00:00] Start <br />[02:30] The Global Security Initiative and Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy <br />[05:22] Outcomes of the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum  <br />[08:50] What Do Participant Countries Gain?  <br />[12:23] How Do Recipient Countries Use Chinese Technologies?  <br />[16:12] Countries Rejecting China's Surveillance Technologies  <br />[21:49] China’s Rewriting of Global Norms <br />[28:18] Potential Policy Responses to the GSI </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Global Public Security with Chinese Characteristics</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:35:55</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In mid-September, while many China watchers were focused on the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese military’s annual high-level security and defense convening in Beijing, another major annual meeting was being held by the Ministry of Public Security in the Chinese city of Lianyungang (2-2-3). The Lianyungang Forum dates to 2015 but was upgraded and renamed the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in 2022 following Xi Jinping’s launch of the Global Security Initiative. This year it was attended by 2,000 participants from 120 countries, regions and international organizations. The theme was “Shaping Global Public Security Together: United Action to Tackle Diverse Threats.”  As Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong made clear in his opening speech, China is advancing an alternative to the western-led security order. 
 
Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a leading expert on Beijing’s push to reshape the global security order and promote China as a model and global security provider to developing countries. Sheena is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and a visiting associate professor of research in Indo-Pacific security at the China Landpower Studies Center of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Relevant to this episode’s discussion, Sheena recently published a co-authored report for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Carnegie titled “A New World Cop.” </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In mid-September, while many China watchers were focused on the Xiangshan Forum, the Chinese military’s annual high-level security and defense convening in Beijing, another major annual meeting was being held by the Ministry of Public Security in the Chinese city of Lianyungang (2-2-3). The Lianyungang Forum dates to 2015 but was upgraded and renamed the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum in 2022 following Xi Jinping’s launch of the Global Security Initiative. This year it was attended by 2,000 participants from 120 countries, regions and international organizations. The theme was “Shaping Global Public Security Together: United Action to Tackle Diverse Threats.”  As Minister of Public Security Wang Xiaohong made clear in his opening speech, China is advancing an alternative to the western-led security order. 
 
Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens is a leading expert on Beijing’s push to reshape the global security order and promote China as a model and global security provider to developing countries. Sheena is an associate professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin where she directs UT’s Asia Policy Program and serves as editor-in-chief of the Texas National Security Review. She is also a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, and a visiting associate professor of research in Indo-Pacific security at the China Landpower Studies Center of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. Relevant to this episode’s discussion, Sheena recently published a co-authored report for the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace Carnegie titled “A New World Cop.” </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The Next Dalai Lama: Beijing&apos;s Bid for Control</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People’s Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China’s efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people’s struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China’s top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. </p><p>What are Beijing’s interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama’s passing? I’m delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled <i>Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet”.</i></p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong><br /><br />[00:00] Start <br />[02:08] Beijing’s Key Interests in Tibet <br />[04:06] Xi Jinping’s Approach to Tibet <br />[07:00] Internal and External Drivers of Tibet Policy <br />[08:08] Xi’s Recent Visit to Tibet <br />[11:34] Infrastructure Developments and Expansionism  <br />[15:27] Beijing’s Succession Plans and Tibetan Reactions to a Future Dalai Lama <br />[20:27] Risk of Unrest and Crackdowns <br />[25:43] Implications for Neighboring States </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-next-dalai-lama-beijings-bid-for-control-toCikBr6</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People’s Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China’s efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people’s struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China’s top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. </p><p>What are Beijing’s interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama’s passing? I’m delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled <i>Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet”.</i></p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong><br /><br />[00:00] Start <br />[02:08] Beijing’s Key Interests in Tibet <br />[04:06] Xi Jinping’s Approach to Tibet <br />[07:00] Internal and External Drivers of Tibet Policy <br />[08:08] Xi’s Recent Visit to Tibet <br />[11:34] Infrastructure Developments and Expansionism  <br />[15:27] Beijing’s Succession Plans and Tibetan Reactions to a Future Dalai Lama <br />[20:27] Risk of Unrest and Crackdowns <br />[25:43] Implications for Neighboring States </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Next Dalai Lama: Beijing&apos;s Bid for Control</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People’s Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China’s efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people’s struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China’s top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. 
 
What are Beijing’s interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama’s passing? I’m delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet”. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Since 1951, when Tibet was formally annexed into the People’s Republic of China, Tibet has been a battleground between China’s efforts to assert control and the Tibetan people’s struggle to preserve their cultural and religious identity. This past August, Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet, his second since becoming China’s top leader in 2012. Less than two months earlier, the Dalai Lama, now 90 years old, announced that his office, not China, would choose his successor when he passes. A few months before that, the Dalai Lama revealed in a memoir that he would reincarnate outside of China. The PRC insists that the next incarnation – the 15th Dalai Lama – will be born inside PRC territory and approved by the Chinese government. 
 
What are Beijing’s interests in Tibet and how has Xi Jinping pursued them since coming to power? What is likely to occur after the Dalai Lama’s passing? I’m delighted to have as my guest today Tendor Dorjee. Tendor is an adjunct assistant professor of political science at Columbia University, a senior researcher at the Tibet Action Institute, and the inaugural Stephanie G Neuman Fellow at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies. He recently co-authored an article in Foreign Affairs titled Beijing’s Dangerous Game in Tibet”. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>yarlung tsangpo dam, defense, soft power, beijing, us congress, asia, united states, tibetan plateau, people’s republic of china, political dissent, hu jintao, development, chinese communist party, tibetans, timber, dalai lama, tibet autonomous region, xizang, uyghur, stability, water, cultural uniformity, mass mobilization, cultural erasure, uprising, prc, jiang zemin, xi jinping, buddhism, u.s. congress, sinicization, infrastructure, displacement, inner mongolia, soft power exports, india, communist party of china, hegemony, dharamshala, tibetan, minerals, deng xiaoping, mongolia, autocracy, dissent, sino-tibetan relations, lhasa, culture, legitimacy, bangladesh, xinjiang-tibet railway, political repression, xinjiang, cpc, exploitation, panchen lama, religion, tibet, strategy, expansionism, himalayas, congress, dams, water resources, uyghurs, china, resources, ccp, rivers</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>The Race to AI Dominance: US and Chinese Approaches Differ</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China are locked in a race for dominance in artificial intelligence, including its applications and diffusion. American and Chinese AI firms like OpenAI and DeepSeek respectively have captured global attention and major companies like Google and Microsoft have been actively investing in AI development. While the US currently boasts world-leading AI models, China is ahead in some areas of AI research and application. With the release of US and Chinese AI action plans in July, we may be on the cusp of a new phase in US-China AI competition.</p><p>Why is AI so important for a country’s global influence? What are the strengths of China’s AI strategy? And what does China’s new AI action plan tell us about its AI ambitions? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Owen Daniels. Owen is the Associate Director of Analysis at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. His recently published article in Foreign Affairs co-authored with Hanna Dohmen -- titled <i>China’s Overlooked AI Strategy</i> -- provides insights into how Beijing is utilizing AI to gain global dominance and what the US can and should do to sustain and bolster its lead.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start <br />[02:05] US Policy Risks to Chinese AI Leadership <br />[05:28] Deepseek and Kimi’s Newest Models  <br />[07:54] US vs. China’s Approach to AI <br />[10:42] Limitations to China’s AI Strategy  <br />[13:08] Using AI as a Soft Power Tool  <br />[16:10] AI Action Plans  <br />[19:34] Trump’s Approach to AI Competition <br />[22:30] Can China Lead Global AI Governance?  <br />[25:10] Evolving US Policy for Open Models</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-race-to-ai-dominance-us-and-chinese-approaches-differ-zQJqGj_9</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China are locked in a race for dominance in artificial intelligence, including its applications and diffusion. American and Chinese AI firms like OpenAI and DeepSeek respectively have captured global attention and major companies like Google and Microsoft have been actively investing in AI development. While the US currently boasts world-leading AI models, China is ahead in some areas of AI research and application. With the release of US and Chinese AI action plans in July, we may be on the cusp of a new phase in US-China AI competition.</p><p>Why is AI so important for a country’s global influence? What are the strengths of China’s AI strategy? And what does China’s new AI action plan tell us about its AI ambitions? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Owen Daniels. Owen is the Associate Director of Analysis at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. His recently published article in Foreign Affairs co-authored with Hanna Dohmen -- titled <i>China’s Overlooked AI Strategy</i> -- provides insights into how Beijing is utilizing AI to gain global dominance and what the US can and should do to sustain and bolster its lead.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start <br />[02:05] US Policy Risks to Chinese AI Leadership <br />[05:28] Deepseek and Kimi’s Newest Models  <br />[07:54] US vs. China’s Approach to AI <br />[10:42] Limitations to China’s AI Strategy  <br />[13:08] Using AI as a Soft Power Tool  <br />[16:10] AI Action Plans  <br />[19:34] Trump’s Approach to AI Competition <br />[22:30] Can China Lead Global AI Governance?  <br />[25:10] Evolving US Policy for Open Models</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Race to AI Dominance: US and Chinese Approaches Differ</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:25</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The United States and China are locked in a race for dominance in artificial intelligence, including its applications and diffusion. American and Chinese AI firms like OpenAI and DeepSeek respectively have captured global attention and major companies like Google and Microsoft have been actively investing in AI development. While the US currently boasts world-leading AI models, China is ahead in some areas of AI research and application. With the release of US and Chinese AI action plans in July, we may be on the cusp of a new phase in US-China AI competition. 

Why is AI so important for a country’s global influence? What are the strengths of China’s AI strategy? And what does China’s new AI action plan tell us about its AI ambitions? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Owen Daniels. Owen is the Associate Director of Analysis at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. His recently published article in Foreign Affairs co-authored with Hanna Dohmen -- titled China’s Overlooked AI Strategy -- provides insights into how Beijing is utilizing AI to gain global dominance and what the US can and should do to sustain and bolster its lead. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The United States and China are locked in a race for dominance in artificial intelligence, including its applications and diffusion. American and Chinese AI firms like OpenAI and DeepSeek respectively have captured global attention and major companies like Google and Microsoft have been actively investing in AI development. While the US currently boasts world-leading AI models, China is ahead in some areas of AI research and application. With the release of US and Chinese AI action plans in July, we may be on the cusp of a new phase in US-China AI competition. 

Why is AI so important for a country’s global influence? What are the strengths of China’s AI strategy? And what does China’s new AI action plan tell us about its AI ambitions? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Owen Daniels. Owen is the Associate Director of Analysis at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council. His recently published article in Foreign Affairs co-authored with Hanna Dohmen -- titled China’s Overlooked AI Strategy -- provides insights into how Beijing is utilizing AI to gain global dominance and what the US can and should do to sustain and bolster its lead. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>After Stockholm: What&apos;s Next for US-China Trade Talks?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China wrapped up the third round of high-level trade negotiations earlier this week. American and Chinese negotiators met in Stockholm on July 28 and 29. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the talks as constructive and wide ranging. He acknowledged that an extension of the 90-day tariff pause was discussed but said that the final decision was up to President Trump.  As of today – August 1 – Trump has remained mum. The Chinese side’s readout was devoid of details, although China’s vice minister of commerce said that both countries would continue to push for an extension of the reciprocal tariffs and Chinese countermeasures.</p><p>How should we assess the dynamics in the trade talks, including the balance of leverage between Washington and Beijing? And how might the trade negotiations shape the future of the US-China relationship? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Dr. Scott Kennedy. Scott is senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[00:00] Start<br /><br />[02:06] Lessons Learned from Trump’s First Administration<br /><br />[05:20] Chinese Outlook on Future Economic Policy<br /><br />[09:28] Who’s Winning the Trade War?<br /><br />[14:30] China’s Reactions to Transshipment Provisions<br /><br />[18:18] Bessent's Rebalancing Plans <br /><br />[24:14] Challenges to Chinese Investment in the US <br /><br />[29:15] China's Trade Deal Goals</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 5 Aug 2025 16:02:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Culver, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/after-stockholm-whats-next-for-us-china-trade-talks-j4JePCDv</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China wrapped up the third round of high-level trade negotiations earlier this week. American and Chinese negotiators met in Stockholm on July 28 and 29. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the talks as constructive and wide ranging. He acknowledged that an extension of the 90-day tariff pause was discussed but said that the final decision was up to President Trump.  As of today – August 1 – Trump has remained mum. The Chinese side’s readout was devoid of details, although China’s vice minister of commerce said that both countries would continue to push for an extension of the reciprocal tariffs and Chinese countermeasures.</p><p>How should we assess the dynamics in the trade talks, including the balance of leverage between Washington and Beijing? And how might the trade negotiations shape the future of the US-China relationship? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Dr. Scott Kennedy. Scott is senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[00:00] Start<br /><br />[02:06] Lessons Learned from Trump’s First Administration<br /><br />[05:20] Chinese Outlook on Future Economic Policy<br /><br />[09:28] Who’s Winning the Trade War?<br /><br />[14:30] China’s Reactions to Transshipment Provisions<br /><br />[18:18] Bessent's Rebalancing Plans <br /><br />[24:14] Challenges to Chinese Investment in the US <br /><br />[29:15] China's Trade Deal Goals</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>After Stockholm: What&apos;s Next for US-China Trade Talks?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Culver, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:07</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The United States and China wrapped up the third round of high-level trade negotiations earlier this week. American and Chinese negotiators met in Stockholm on July 28 and 29. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the talks as constructive and wide ranging. He acknowledged that an extension of the 90-day tariff pause was discussed but said that the final decision was up to President Trump.  As of today – August 1 – Trump has remained mum. The Chinese side’s readout was devoid of details, although China’s vice minister of commerce said that both countries would continue to push for an extension of the reciprocal tariffs and Chinese countermeasures. 

How should we assess the dynamics in the trade talks, including the balance of leverage between Washington and Beijing? And how might the trade negotiations shape the future of the US-China relationship? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Dr. Scott Kennedy. Scott is senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The United States and China wrapped up the third round of high-level trade negotiations earlier this week. American and Chinese negotiators met in Stockholm on July 28 and 29. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the talks as constructive and wide ranging. He acknowledged that an extension of the 90-day tariff pause was discussed but said that the final decision was up to President Trump.  As of today – August 1 – Trump has remained mum. The Chinese side’s readout was devoid of details, although China’s vice minister of commerce said that both countries would continue to push for an extension of the reciprocal tariffs and Chinese countermeasures. 

How should we assess the dynamics in the trade talks, including the balance of leverage between Washington and Beijing? And how might the trade negotiations shape the future of the US-China relationship? To discuss these questions, we are joined by Dr. Scott Kennedy. Scott is senior adviser and trustee chair in Chinese Business and Economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.  </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Forecasting ROK President Lee Jae Myung’s China Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>South Korea and China have a complex relationship characterized by economic interdependence, strategic competition, and regional security concerns. Navigating this delicate balance has been a defining challenge for every South Korean president. Newly elected President Lee Jae Myung has assumed power at a time of increasing US-China strategic competition as well as uncertain global supply chains and growing threat from North Korea. Could this new administration mark a shift in Seoul’s approach to Beijing? Or will President Lee maintain strategies similar to that of President Yoon?</p><p>To discuss ROK-China relations, and President Lee’s approach to this intricate issue, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo. He is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy in the Brussels School of Governance. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the author of several books on the domestic affairs and foreign policy of South and North Korea. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:44] “[P]ragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests”</p><p>[05:06] State of Play for Sino-South Korean Relations</p><p>[09:56] Balancing Between the United States and China</p><p>[14:47] China Taking Advantage of US-ROK Frictions </p><p>[19:03] Economic Interdependence as a Leverage</p><p>[25:39] Xi Jinping Attending APEC South Korea 2025</p><p>[31:11] American Pressure on Allies to Protect Taiwan</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jul 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/forecasting-rok-president-lee-jae-myungs-china-policy-UsofA5rX</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>South Korea and China have a complex relationship characterized by economic interdependence, strategic competition, and regional security concerns. Navigating this delicate balance has been a defining challenge for every South Korean president. Newly elected President Lee Jae Myung has assumed power at a time of increasing US-China strategic competition as well as uncertain global supply chains and growing threat from North Korea. Could this new administration mark a shift in Seoul’s approach to Beijing? Or will President Lee maintain strategies similar to that of President Yoon?</p><p>To discuss ROK-China relations, and President Lee’s approach to this intricate issue, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo. He is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy in the Brussels School of Governance. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the author of several books on the domestic affairs and foreign policy of South and North Korea. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:44] “[P]ragmatic diplomacy centered on national interests”</p><p>[05:06] State of Play for Sino-South Korean Relations</p><p>[09:56] Balancing Between the United States and China</p><p>[14:47] China Taking Advantage of US-ROK Frictions </p><p>[19:03] Economic Interdependence as a Leverage</p><p>[25:39] Xi Jinping Attending APEC South Korea 2025</p><p>[31:11] American Pressure on Allies to Protect Taiwan</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Forecasting ROK President Lee Jae Myung’s China Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:39:23</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>South Korea and China have a complex relationship characterized by economic interdependence, strategic competition, and regional security concerns. Navigating this delicate balance has been a defining challenge for every South Korean president. Newly elected President Lee Jae Myung has assumed power at a time of increasing US-China strategic competition as well as uncertain global supply chains and growing threat from North Korea. Could this new administration mark a shift in Seoul’s approach to Beijing? Or will President Lee maintain strategies similar to that of President Yoon?

To discuss ROK-China relations, and President Lee’s approach to this intricate issue, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo. He is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy in the Brussels School of Governance. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the author of several books on the domestic affairs and foreign policy of South and North Korea. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>South Korea and China have a complex relationship characterized by economic interdependence, strategic competition, and regional security concerns. Navigating this delicate balance has been a defining challenge for every South Korean president. Newly elected President Lee Jae Myung has assumed power at a time of increasing US-China strategic competition as well as uncertain global supply chains and growing threat from North Korea. Could this new administration mark a shift in Seoul’s approach to Beijing? Or will President Lee maintain strategies similar to that of President Yoon?

To discuss ROK-China relations, and President Lee’s approach to this intricate issue, we are joined on the podcast today by Dr. Ramon Pacheco-Pardo. He is a professor of international relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy in the Brussels School of Governance. He is also an adjunct fellow with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the author of several books on the domestic affairs and foreign policy of South and North Korea. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The Israel-Iran War and China&apos;s Middle East Strategy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On June 13th, Israel launched attacks on several military and nuclear facilities in Iran, marking the beginning of a 12-day war between the two countries. The United States followed with targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power and posing a threat to regional and global stability. China’s involvement in the conflict was limited to condemning the Israeli and US use of military force and calling for de-escalation. Beijing offered only rhetorical support for Tehran. </p><p>To discuss what the Israel-Iran war reveals about China’s relationship with Iran, its evolving strategy in the Middle East, and the broader implications for US-China competition, we are joined by Yun Sun on the podcast today. Yun is a Senior Fellow, co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her recent piece in <i>The Wire China</i> entitled “How China Sees Iran’s Future” offers provides a nuanced take on Beijing’s calculus during and after the war.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:34] China’s Diplomatic Strategy Toward the Middle East</p><p>[05:00] A Limited Chinese Response and China’s Regional Role</p><p>[08:19] Chinese Perceptions of Iran’s External Strategic Blunders</p><p>[15:00] Trickling Chinese Investment into Iran</p><p>[20:10] Chinese Concerns About a Nuclearized Iran</p><p>[25:09] Implications of the Israel-Iran War for China’s Energy Security</p><p>[32:04] Trump’s Response Shaping Chinese Views of the United States </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Jul 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-israel-iran-war-and-chinas-middle-east-strategy-7GOLhpU8</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 13th, Israel launched attacks on several military and nuclear facilities in Iran, marking the beginning of a 12-day war between the two countries. The United States followed with targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power and posing a threat to regional and global stability. China’s involvement in the conflict was limited to condemning the Israeli and US use of military force and calling for de-escalation. Beijing offered only rhetorical support for Tehran. </p><p>To discuss what the Israel-Iran war reveals about China’s relationship with Iran, its evolving strategy in the Middle East, and the broader implications for US-China competition, we are joined by Yun Sun on the podcast today. Yun is a Senior Fellow, co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her recent piece in <i>The Wire China</i> entitled “How China Sees Iran’s Future” offers provides a nuanced take on Beijing’s calculus during and after the war.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:34] China’s Diplomatic Strategy Toward the Middle East</p><p>[05:00] A Limited Chinese Response and China’s Regional Role</p><p>[08:19] Chinese Perceptions of Iran’s External Strategic Blunders</p><p>[15:00] Trickling Chinese Investment into Iran</p><p>[20:10] Chinese Concerns About a Nuclearized Iran</p><p>[25:09] Implications of the Israel-Iran War for China’s Energy Security</p><p>[32:04] Trump’s Response Shaping Chinese Views of the United States </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Israel-Iran War and China&apos;s Middle East Strategy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:36:36</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On June 13th, Israel launched attacks on several military and nuclear facilities in Iran, marking the beginning of a 12-day war between the two countries. The United States followed with targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power and posing a threat to regional and global stability. China’s involvement in the conflict was limited to condemning the Israeli and US use of military force and calling for de-escalation. Beijing offered only rhetorical support for Tehran. 

To discuss what the Israel-Iran war reveals about China’s relationship with Iran, its evolving strategy in the Middle East, and the broader implications for US-China competition, we are joined by Yun Sun on the podcast today. Yun is a Senior Fellow, co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her recent piece in The Wire China entitled “How China Sees Iran’s Future” offers provides a nuanced take on Beijing’s calculus during and after the war.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On June 13th, Israel launched attacks on several military and nuclear facilities in Iran, marking the beginning of a 12-day war between the two countries. The United States followed with targeted strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power and posing a threat to regional and global stability. China’s involvement in the conflict was limited to condemning the Israeli and US use of military force and calling for de-escalation. Beijing offered only rhetorical support for Tehran. 

To discuss what the Israel-Iran war reveals about China’s relationship with Iran, its evolving strategy in the Middle East, and the broader implications for US-China competition, we are joined by Yun Sun on the podcast today. Yun is a Senior Fellow, co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center. Her recent piece in The Wire China entitled “How China Sees Iran’s Future” offers provides a nuanced take on Beijing’s calculus during and after the war.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Evolving Posture Toward the Russo-Ukrainian War</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China has never condemned the invasion, and its government and media have carefully avoided using term “Ukraine War,” opting instead to refer to the war as the “Ukraine crisis,” the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” or the “special military operation,” a term that echoes Moscow’s language. </p><p>Beijing’s approach to the Ukraine War has included support for Russia, a commitment China’s own principles, including respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a professed desire for peace.</p><p>This episode’s discussion will focus on China’s evolving posture toward the war and China’s relationship with Ukraine. Joining the podcast this episode is Dr. Vita Golod, who is a Junior Research Fellow at the A. Yu Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, and a Visiting Adjunct Instructor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.She is also the co-founder of the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:35] China’s Relationship with Ukraine Prior to Russia’s Invasion</p><p>[05:06] President Zelenskyy’s Accusations Against China </p><p>[08:20] Contemporary Ukrainian Perceptions of Relations with China </p><p>[12:14] Ukrainian Perceptions of Sino-Russian Relations</p><p>[16:25] China as a Mediator and Peacemaker</p><p>[19:06] China’s Interests in the Outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War</p><p>[21:21] What concrete steps could China take to facilitate peace? </p><p>[23:14] China’s Role in the Post-War Reconstruction of Ukraine</p><p>[28:08] The Future of Sino-Ukrainian Relations</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Vita Golod, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-evolving-posture-toward-the-russo-ukrainian-war-oJntNH2X</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China has never condemned the invasion, and its government and media have carefully avoided using term “Ukraine War,” opting instead to refer to the war as the “Ukraine crisis,” the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” or the “special military operation,” a term that echoes Moscow’s language. </p><p>Beijing’s approach to the Ukraine War has included support for Russia, a commitment China’s own principles, including respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a professed desire for peace.</p><p>This episode’s discussion will focus on China’s evolving posture toward the war and China’s relationship with Ukraine. Joining the podcast this episode is Dr. Vita Golod, who is a Junior Research Fellow at the A. Yu Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, and a Visiting Adjunct Instructor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.She is also the co-founder of the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:35] China’s Relationship with Ukraine Prior to Russia’s Invasion</p><p>[05:06] President Zelenskyy’s Accusations Against China </p><p>[08:20] Contemporary Ukrainian Perceptions of Relations with China </p><p>[12:14] Ukrainian Perceptions of Sino-Russian Relations</p><p>[16:25] China as a Mediator and Peacemaker</p><p>[19:06] China’s Interests in the Outcome of the Russo-Ukrainian War</p><p>[21:21] What concrete steps could China take to facilitate peace? </p><p>[23:14] China’s Role in the Post-War Reconstruction of Ukraine</p><p>[28:08] The Future of Sino-Ukrainian Relations</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Evolving Posture Toward the Russo-Ukrainian War</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Vita Golod, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:52</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China has never condemned the invasion, and its government and media have carefully avoided using term “Ukraine War,” opting instead to refer to the war as the “Ukraine crisis,” the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” or the “special military operation,” a term that echoes Moscow’s language. 

Beijing’s approach to the Ukraine War has included support for Russia, a commitment China’s own principles, including respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a professed desire for peace.

This episode’s discussion will focus on China’s evolving posture toward the war and China’s relationship with Ukraine. Joining the podcast this episode is Dr. Vita Golod, who is a Junior Research Fellow at the A. Yu Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, and a Visiting Adjunct Instructor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is also the co-founder of the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. China has never condemned the invasion, and its government and media have carefully avoided using term “Ukraine War,” opting instead to refer to the war as the “Ukraine crisis,” the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” or the “special military operation,” a term that echoes Moscow’s language. 

Beijing’s approach to the Ukraine War has included support for Russia, a commitment China’s own principles, including respecting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and a professed desire for peace.

This episode’s discussion will focus on China’s evolving posture toward the war and China’s relationship with Ukraine. Joining the podcast this episode is Dr. Vita Golod, who is a Junior Research Fellow at the A. Yu Krymskyi Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy Sciences of Ukraine, and a Visiting Adjunct Instructor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. She is also the co-founder of the Ukrainian Platform for Contemporary China and a board member of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Role in the India-Pakistan Clash</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On April 22, 2025, gunmen in the town of Pahalgam, located in the disputed region of Kashmir, killed 26 people—mostly Indian tourists. A four-day military clash between India and Pakistan ensued, bringing both countries to the brink of a full-blown war, before a ceasefire was reached on May 10, 2025. </p><p>During the India-Pakistan clashes, Beijing urged both sides to deescalate and called for a “political settlement through peaceful means.” But China did not play a neutral role in the conflict. Consistent with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s purported statement to his Pakistani counterpart that “China fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests,” China reportedly provided intelligence, satellite equipment, and other forms of support to Pakistan before and during the clashes.</p><p>To analyze China’s role in the conflict, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Andrew Small. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Indo-Pacific program, and author of two books on China, including “The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics,” which is now ten years old, but remains an insightful and relevant study.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:46] China’s Diplomatic Response to the India-Pakistan Clashes</p><p>[05:58] Beijing’s Offer of Playing a “Constructive Role”</p><p>[10:56] A Testing Ground for Chinese Weaponry and Equipment</p><p>[14:03] China’s Cautious Approach to Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[18:10] Military Support and the Sino-Pakistan Relationship</p><p>[23:44] Implications for Chinese Arms Exports</p><p>[26:27] Indian and Pakistani Assessments of Chinese Involvement</p><p>[30:06] Influence of US-China Rivalry on India-Pakistan Relations</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Andrew Small)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-role-in-the-india-pakistan-clash-QUF_Lpbx</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 22, 2025, gunmen in the town of Pahalgam, located in the disputed region of Kashmir, killed 26 people—mostly Indian tourists. A four-day military clash between India and Pakistan ensued, bringing both countries to the brink of a full-blown war, before a ceasefire was reached on May 10, 2025. </p><p>During the India-Pakistan clashes, Beijing urged both sides to deescalate and called for a “political settlement through peaceful means.” But China did not play a neutral role in the conflict. Consistent with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s purported statement to his Pakistani counterpart that “China fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests,” China reportedly provided intelligence, satellite equipment, and other forms of support to Pakistan before and during the clashes.</p><p>To analyze China’s role in the conflict, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Andrew Small. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Indo-Pacific program, and author of two books on China, including “The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics,” which is now ten years old, but remains an insightful and relevant study.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:46] China’s Diplomatic Response to the India-Pakistan Clashes</p><p>[05:58] Beijing’s Offer of Playing a “Constructive Role”</p><p>[10:56] A Testing Ground for Chinese Weaponry and Equipment</p><p>[14:03] China’s Cautious Approach to Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[18:10] Military Support and the Sino-Pakistan Relationship</p><p>[23:44] Implications for Chinese Arms Exports</p><p>[26:27] Indian and Pakistani Assessments of Chinese Involvement</p><p>[30:06] Influence of US-China Rivalry on India-Pakistan Relations</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Role in the India-Pakistan Clash</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Andrew Small</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:14</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On April 22, 2025, gunmen in the town of Pahalgam, located in the disputed region of Kashmir, killed 26 people—mostly Indian tourists. A four-day military clash between India and Pakistan ensued, bringing both countries to the brink of a full-blown war, before a ceasefire was reached on May 10, 2025. 

During the India-Pakistan clashes, Beijing urged both sides to deescalate and called for a “political settlement through peaceful means.” But China did not play a neutral role in the conflict. Consistent with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s purported statement to his Pakistani counterpart that “China fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests,” China reportedly provided intelligence, satellite equipment, and other forms of support to Pakistan before and during the clashes.

To analyze China’s role in the conflict, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Andrew Small. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Indo-Pacific program, and author of two books on China, including “The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics,” which is now ten years old, but remains an insightful and relevant study.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On April 22, 2025, gunmen in the town of Pahalgam, located in the disputed region of Kashmir, killed 26 people—mostly Indian tourists. A four-day military clash between India and Pakistan ensued, bringing both countries to the brink of a full-blown war, before a ceasefire was reached on May 10, 2025. 

During the India-Pakistan clashes, Beijing urged both sides to deescalate and called for a “political settlement through peaceful means.” But China did not play a neutral role in the conflict. Consistent with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s purported statement to his Pakistani counterpart that “China fully understands Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and supports Pakistan in safeguarding its sovereignty and security interests,” China reportedly provided intelligence, satellite equipment, and other forms of support to Pakistan before and during the clashes.

To analyze China’s role in the conflict, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Andrew Small. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Indo-Pacific program, and author of two books on China, including “The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics,” which is now ten years old, but remains an insightful and relevant study.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The Trajectory of US-China Relations Post-Geneva Talks</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China reached a 90-day truce in the trade war when their representatives met in Geneva in early May. Both sides agreed to temporarily roll back tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. President Trump announced that a “total reset” in US-China relations had been achieved. Beyond the hyperbole, the two sides agreed to establish a mechanism on economics and trade and launch negotiations to address trade imbalances and other problems. Whether a deal is reached, what it might look like, and what it might include, remains to be seen. The future trajectory of US-China relations, overall, is still unclear.</p><p>This episode highlights a Chinese perspective on the US-China bilateral relationship, including on the recent trade talks and the factors that will influence US-China relations going forward. Sun Chenghao, a fellow and head of the U.S.-Europe program at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), and council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:39] What does Trump want from China? </p><p>[04:29] What view does Dr. Sun hold?</p><p>[05:00] Assessing the US-China Geneva Talks</p><p>[09:21] Feasibility of a Broad US-China Trade Deal</p><p>[13:23] Implications of Trump’s “Unification” Comment</p><p>[16:46] Importance of the Strategic Channel</p><p>[20:47] Declining America, Rising China</p><p>[23:27] Shift in US Policy Toward Alliances</p><p>[27:49] The Future of US-China Relations</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 27 May 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Sun Chenghao, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-trajectory-of-us-china-relations-post-geneva-talks-sOo2dyz6</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States and China reached a 90-day truce in the trade war when their representatives met in Geneva in early May. Both sides agreed to temporarily roll back tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. President Trump announced that a “total reset” in US-China relations had been achieved. Beyond the hyperbole, the two sides agreed to establish a mechanism on economics and trade and launch negotiations to address trade imbalances and other problems. Whether a deal is reached, what it might look like, and what it might include, remains to be seen. The future trajectory of US-China relations, overall, is still unclear.</p><p>This episode highlights a Chinese perspective on the US-China bilateral relationship, including on the recent trade talks and the factors that will influence US-China relations going forward. Sun Chenghao, a fellow and head of the U.S.-Europe program at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), and council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:39] What does Trump want from China? </p><p>[04:29] What view does Dr. Sun hold?</p><p>[05:00] Assessing the US-China Geneva Talks</p><p>[09:21] Feasibility of a Broad US-China Trade Deal</p><p>[13:23] Implications of Trump’s “Unification” Comment</p><p>[16:46] Importance of the Strategic Channel</p><p>[20:47] Declining America, Rising China</p><p>[23:27] Shift in US Policy Toward Alliances</p><p>[27:49] The Future of US-China Relations</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Trajectory of US-China Relations Post-Geneva Talks</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Sun Chenghao, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:27</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The United States and China reached a 90-day truce in the trade war when their representatives met in Geneva in early May. Both sides agreed to temporarily roll back tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. President Trump announced that a “total reset” in US-China relations had been achieved. Beyond the hyperbole, the two sides agreed to establish a mechanism on economics and trade and launch negotiations to address trade imbalances and other problems. Whether a deal is reached, what it might look like, and what it might include, remains to be seen. The future trajectory of US-China relations, overall, is still unclear.

This episode highlights a Chinese perspective on the US-China bilateral relationship, including on the recent trade talks and the factors that will influence US-China relations going forward. Sun Chenghao, a fellow and head of the U.S.-Europe program at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), and council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The United States and China reached a 90-day truce in the trade war when their representatives met in Geneva in early May. Both sides agreed to temporarily roll back tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. President Trump announced that a “total reset” in US-China relations had been achieved. Beyond the hyperbole, the two sides agreed to establish a mechanism on economics and trade and launch negotiations to address trade imbalances and other problems. Whether a deal is reached, what it might look like, and what it might include, remains to be seen. The future trajectory of US-China relations, overall, is still unclear.

This episode highlights a Chinese perspective on the US-China bilateral relationship, including on the recent trade talks and the factors that will influence US-China relations going forward. Sun Chenghao, a fellow and head of the U.S.-Europe program at Tsinghua University’s Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), and council member of the Chinese Association of American Studies joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Chokehold on Critical Minerals</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Critical minerals are required for the manufacturing of electronics, aerospace equipment, medical devices, and renewable energy technologies, making them essential for a country’s economic and national security. These materials have been at the center of China’s domestic and foreign policy for many decades, and China’s ability to integrate internal industrial policies with foreign trade and investment policies has allowed them to gain dominance in the market. Meanwhile, the US has lagged behind China in terms of both access to and processing technology of critical minerals. The country has been heavily dependent on China for its critical minerals and struggles to find an alternative supplier.</p><p>China’s announcement to impose export restrictions on seven rare earth elements on April 4th has opened many conversations surrounding critical minerals, especially regarding the US and its supply chain vulnerabilities. What has China done to achieve their global dominance in the critical minerals sector, and what can the US do to address the overdependence issue they are facing today? To answer these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is a mining economist whose area of expertise is critical minerals and trade.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:13] US Dependencies on Rare Earths and Critical Minerals</p><p>[03:51] Sourcing from Latin America, Africa, and Asia</p><p>[06:28] Environmental Harm from Mining and Processing</p><p>[08:11] Deliberate Suppression of the Price of Rare Earths in the Market</p><p>[11:06] Chinese Exports Restrictions on Seven Rare Earth Elements</p><p>[14:08] US Administrations’ Approaches to Critical Minerals Vulnerability</p><p>[20:02] 2010 Fishing Boat Accident and Japan’s Response </p><p>[24:00] What might China do moving forward? </p><p>[27:42] Timeframe for the US to Catch Up to China</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 13 May 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Gracelin Baskaran, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-chokehold-on-critical-minerals-AURjXWVB</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Critical minerals are required for the manufacturing of electronics, aerospace equipment, medical devices, and renewable energy technologies, making them essential for a country’s economic and national security. These materials have been at the center of China’s domestic and foreign policy for many decades, and China’s ability to integrate internal industrial policies with foreign trade and investment policies has allowed them to gain dominance in the market. Meanwhile, the US has lagged behind China in terms of both access to and processing technology of critical minerals. The country has been heavily dependent on China for its critical minerals and struggles to find an alternative supplier.</p><p>China’s announcement to impose export restrictions on seven rare earth elements on April 4th has opened many conversations surrounding critical minerals, especially regarding the US and its supply chain vulnerabilities. What has China done to achieve their global dominance in the critical minerals sector, and what can the US do to address the overdependence issue they are facing today? To answer these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is a mining economist whose area of expertise is critical minerals and trade.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:13] US Dependencies on Rare Earths and Critical Minerals</p><p>[03:51] Sourcing from Latin America, Africa, and Asia</p><p>[06:28] Environmental Harm from Mining and Processing</p><p>[08:11] Deliberate Suppression of the Price of Rare Earths in the Market</p><p>[11:06] Chinese Exports Restrictions on Seven Rare Earth Elements</p><p>[14:08] US Administrations’ Approaches to Critical Minerals Vulnerability</p><p>[20:02] 2010 Fishing Boat Accident and Japan’s Response </p><p>[24:00] What might China do moving forward? </p><p>[27:42] Timeframe for the US to Catch Up to China</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Chokehold on Critical Minerals</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Gracelin Baskaran, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:49</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Critical minerals are required for the manufacturing of electronics, aerospace equipment, medical devices, and renewable energy technologies, making them essential for a country’s economic and national security. These materials have been at the center of China’s domestic and foreign policy for many decades, and China’s ability to integrate internal industrial policies with foreign trade and investment policies has allowed them to gain dominance in the market. Meanwhile, the US has lagged behind China in terms of both access to and processing technology of critical minerals. The country has been heavily dependent on China for its critical minerals and struggles to find an alternative supplier. 

China’s announcement to impose export restrictions on seven rare earth elements on April 4th has opened many conversations surrounding critical minerals, especially regarding the US and its supply chain vulnerabilities. What has China done to achieve their global dominance in the critical minerals sector, and what can the US do to address the overdependence issue they are facing today? To answer these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is a mining economist whose area of expertise is critical minerals and trade. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Critical minerals are required for the manufacturing of electronics, aerospace equipment, medical devices, and renewable energy technologies, making them essential for a country’s economic and national security. These materials have been at the center of China’s domestic and foreign policy for many decades, and China’s ability to integrate internal industrial policies with foreign trade and investment policies has allowed them to gain dominance in the market. Meanwhile, the US has lagged behind China in terms of both access to and processing technology of critical minerals. The country has been heavily dependent on China for its critical minerals and struggles to find an alternative supplier. 

China’s announcement to impose export restrictions on seven rare earth elements on April 4th has opened many conversations surrounding critical minerals, especially regarding the US and its supply chain vulnerabilities. What has China done to achieve their global dominance in the critical minerals sector, and what can the US do to address the overdependence issue they are facing today? To answer these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gracelin Baskaran, the director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She is a mining economist whose area of expertise is critical minerals and trade. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The China-Korea Yellow Sea Dispute</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>This episode of the China Global podcast discusses evolving disputes between China and South Korea, specifically regarding their unresolved maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. There is a long history of fishing disputes between the two countries in the Provisional Measures Zone (or PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, which is where their exclusive economic zones overlap. Although China and South Korea have engaged in negotiations over the years, they have yet to come to an agreement on their boundaries in the Yellow Sea.</p><p>Taking advantage of the persisting disagreement on delimitation of maritime borders, China has employed gray zone tactics in the Yellow Sea to expand its territorial presence in the region. In the most recent dispute, China installed a new steel structure in the PMZ, causing a maritime standoff between Chinese and Korean coast guards.</p><p>To discuss recent developments in the Yellow Sea and China’s broader gray zone tactics in the maritime realm, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Ray is also the co-host of the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast, and a 35-year veteran of the US Air Force.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:43] Strategic Significance of the Yellow Sea</p><p>[03:12] Expanding Chinese Control in the Region</p><p>[04:08] Chinese Maritime Installations </p><p>[05:20] Are these installations found in other regions?</p><p>[06:00] Gray Zone Tactics in the South China Sea </p><p>[08:20] Maritime Militia Activity in the Yellow Sea</p><p>[09:02] 2001 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement</p><p>[10:34] Testing the Waters with South Korea</p><p>[12:09] Navigating South Korean Policy Dilemmas</p><p>[13:48] Rehabilitating China’s Imagine in Korea</p><p>[15:14] Environmental Issues in Disputed Waters</p><p>[17:18] Countering Chinese Activities in the Yellow Sea</p><p>[19:40] SeaLight Tracking and Deciphering Chinese Actions</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Apr 2025 20:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Raymond Powell, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-china-korea-yellow-sea-dispute-EgPGc1Tv</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This episode of the China Global podcast discusses evolving disputes between China and South Korea, specifically regarding their unresolved maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. There is a long history of fishing disputes between the two countries in the Provisional Measures Zone (or PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, which is where their exclusive economic zones overlap. Although China and South Korea have engaged in negotiations over the years, they have yet to come to an agreement on their boundaries in the Yellow Sea.</p><p>Taking advantage of the persisting disagreement on delimitation of maritime borders, China has employed gray zone tactics in the Yellow Sea to expand its territorial presence in the region. In the most recent dispute, China installed a new steel structure in the PMZ, causing a maritime standoff between Chinese and Korean coast guards.</p><p>To discuss recent developments in the Yellow Sea and China’s broader gray zone tactics in the maritime realm, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Ray is also the co-host of the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast, and a 35-year veteran of the US Air Force.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:43] Strategic Significance of the Yellow Sea</p><p>[03:12] Expanding Chinese Control in the Region</p><p>[04:08] Chinese Maritime Installations </p><p>[05:20] Are these installations found in other regions?</p><p>[06:00] Gray Zone Tactics in the South China Sea </p><p>[08:20] Maritime Militia Activity in the Yellow Sea</p><p>[09:02] 2001 Korea-China Fisheries Agreement</p><p>[10:34] Testing the Waters with South Korea</p><p>[12:09] Navigating South Korean Policy Dilemmas</p><p>[13:48] Rehabilitating China’s Imagine in Korea</p><p>[15:14] Environmental Issues in Disputed Waters</p><p>[17:18] Countering Chinese Activities in the Yellow Sea</p><p>[19:40] SeaLight Tracking and Deciphering Chinese Actions</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The China-Korea Yellow Sea Dispute</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Raymond Powell, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:22:41</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>This episode of the China Global podcast discusses evolving disputes between China and South Korea, specifically regarding their unresolved maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. There is a long history of fishing disputes between the two countries in the Provisional Measures Zone (or PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, which is where their exclusive economic zones overlap. Although China and South Korea have engaged in negotiations over the years, they have yet to come to an agreement on their boundaries in the Yellow Sea.
 
Taking advantage of the persisting disagreement on delimitation of maritime borders, China has employed gray zone tactics in the Yellow Sea to expand its territorial presence in the region. In the most recent dispute, China installed a new steel structure in the PMZ, causing a maritime standoff between Chinese and Korean coast guards.
 
To discuss recent developments in the Yellow Sea and China’s broader gray zone tactics in the maritime realm, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Ray is also the co-host of the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast, and a 35-year veteran of the US Air Force.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>This episode of the China Global podcast discusses evolving disputes between China and South Korea, specifically regarding their unresolved maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. There is a long history of fishing disputes between the two countries in the Provisional Measures Zone (or PMZ) of the Yellow Sea, which is where their exclusive economic zones overlap. Although China and South Korea have engaged in negotiations over the years, they have yet to come to an agreement on their boundaries in the Yellow Sea.
 
Taking advantage of the persisting disagreement on delimitation of maritime borders, China has employed gray zone tactics in the Yellow Sea to expand its territorial presence in the region. In the most recent dispute, China installed a new steel structure in the PMZ, causing a maritime standoff between Chinese and Korean coast guards.
 
To discuss recent developments in the Yellow Sea and China’s broader gray zone tactics in the maritime realm, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ray Powell, the Director of SeaLight, a maritime transparency project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. Ray is also the co-host of the Why Should We Care About the Indo-Pacific podcast, and a 35-year veteran of the US Air Force.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s View on Escalation and Crisis Management</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>As China’s military capabilities expand, US-China frictions intensify, and regional tensions increase, concern is on the rise that a potential crisis, either accidental or deliberate, could take place that could spiral out of control. </p><p>If a crisis arises with China, leaders may want to de-escalate and prevent a wider conflict. To do so, they will need to understand how China thinks about crisis management and escalation.</p><p>The guest for this episode has dug into the writings of PLA strategists and authoritative PRC sources as well as Western scholarship to assess how China views military escalation and how the US and other countries can accurately predict and interpret PRC signal in crisis scenarios.</p><p>Lyle Morris is a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security at the Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. His recently published paper is titled “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:37] Methodology and Authoritative Chinese Sources</p><p>[04:17] PLA Theories and Concepts of Managing Escalation</p><p>[06:00] Controlling All Facets of Military Escalation</p><p>[10:28] Doctrine of Seizing the Initiative</p><p>[15:21] First Use of Force and a Reluctance to Use Force</p><p>[19:37] American and Chinese Considerations of Misperception</p><p>[25:46] Utility of US-China Tabletop Exercises</p><p>[28:33] Predicting a Taiwan Contingency</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Lyle Morris, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-view-on-escalation-and-crisis-management-IPAB2HdM</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As China’s military capabilities expand, US-China frictions intensify, and regional tensions increase, concern is on the rise that a potential crisis, either accidental or deliberate, could take place that could spiral out of control. </p><p>If a crisis arises with China, leaders may want to de-escalate and prevent a wider conflict. To do so, they will need to understand how China thinks about crisis management and escalation.</p><p>The guest for this episode has dug into the writings of PLA strategists and authoritative PRC sources as well as Western scholarship to assess how China views military escalation and how the US and other countries can accurately predict and interpret PRC signal in crisis scenarios.</p><p>Lyle Morris is a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security at the Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. His recently published paper is titled “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:37] Methodology and Authoritative Chinese Sources</p><p>[04:17] PLA Theories and Concepts of Managing Escalation</p><p>[06:00] Controlling All Facets of Military Escalation</p><p>[10:28] Doctrine of Seizing the Initiative</p><p>[15:21] First Use of Force and a Reluctance to Use Force</p><p>[19:37] American and Chinese Considerations of Misperception</p><p>[25:46] Utility of US-China Tabletop Exercises</p><p>[28:33] Predicting a Taiwan Contingency</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s View on Escalation and Crisis Management</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Lyle Morris, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:01</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>As China’s military capabilities expand, US-China frictions intensify, and regional tensions increase, concern is on the rise that a potential crisis, either accidental or deliberate, could take place that could spiral out of control. 

If a crisis arises with China, leaders may want to de-escalate and prevent a wider conflict. To do so, they will need to understand how China thinks about crisis management and escalation.

The guest for this episode has dug into the writings of PLA strategists and authoritative PRC sources as well as Western scholarship to assess how China views military escalation and how the US and other countries can accurately predict and interpret PRC signal in crisis scenarios.

Lyle Morris is a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security at the Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. His recently published paper is titled “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States.”
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>As China’s military capabilities expand, US-China frictions intensify, and regional tensions increase, concern is on the rise that a potential crisis, either accidental or deliberate, could take place that could spiral out of control. 

If a crisis arises with China, leaders may want to de-escalate and prevent a wider conflict. To do so, they will need to understand how China thinks about crisis management and escalation.

The guest for this episode has dug into the writings of PLA strategists and authoritative PRC sources as well as Western scholarship to assess how China views military escalation and how the US and other countries can accurately predict and interpret PRC signal in crisis scenarios.

Lyle Morris is a Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security at the Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. His recently published paper is titled “China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States.”
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Digital Governance in the Indo-Pacific</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of China’s Digital Silk Road, which has become an increasingly crucial component of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy project: the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, China has massively expanded its digital infrastructure investment across the globe. Accompanying the investment has been the diffusion of China’s digital governance norms and standards in recipient states. Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been at the forefront of this stretching Chinese digital influence landscape. The conflation between digital development cooperation and digital governance norms adoption has far-reaching implications that need to be better understood and addressed. </p><p>To discuss the issue, Michael Caster joins host Bonnie Glaser. Caster is the Head of Global China Programmeat ARTICLE 19, an NGO that advances freedom of opinion and expression. His organization has published two reports examining China's Digital Silk Road. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:30] Understanding China’s Digital Silk Road </p><p>[05:57] China’s Digital Governance Norms</p><p>[10:16] China’s Digital Footprints Abroad</p><p>[16:07] Attractiveness of Chinese Digital Solutions</p><p>[18:56] Role of High-Tech Companies in Digital Governance</p><p>[21:44] Assessing the Effectiveness of China’s Digital Governance</p><p>[23:14] State-Driven Surveillance and Censorship</p><p>[27:39] China’s BeiDou Navigation System </p><p>[31:09] How should governments respond to these normative shifts? </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 1 Apr 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Michael Caster, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-digital-governance-in-the-indo-pacific-qG_XxG4q</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of China’s Digital Silk Road, which has become an increasingly crucial component of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy project: the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, China has massively expanded its digital infrastructure investment across the globe. Accompanying the investment has been the diffusion of China’s digital governance norms and standards in recipient states. Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been at the forefront of this stretching Chinese digital influence landscape. The conflation between digital development cooperation and digital governance norms adoption has far-reaching implications that need to be better understood and addressed. </p><p>To discuss the issue, Michael Caster joins host Bonnie Glaser. Caster is the Head of Global China Programmeat ARTICLE 19, an NGO that advances freedom of opinion and expression. His organization has published two reports examining China's Digital Silk Road. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:30] Understanding China’s Digital Silk Road </p><p>[05:57] China’s Digital Governance Norms</p><p>[10:16] China’s Digital Footprints Abroad</p><p>[16:07] Attractiveness of Chinese Digital Solutions</p><p>[18:56] Role of High-Tech Companies in Digital Governance</p><p>[21:44] Assessing the Effectiveness of China’s Digital Governance</p><p>[23:14] State-Driven Surveillance and Censorship</p><p>[27:39] China’s BeiDou Navigation System </p><p>[31:09] How should governments respond to these normative shifts? </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Digital Governance in the Indo-Pacific</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Michael Caster, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:36</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of China’s Digital Silk Road, which has become an increasingly crucial component of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy project: the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, China has massively expanded its digital infrastructure investment across the globe. Accompanying the investment has been the diffusion of China’s digital governance norms and standards in recipient states. Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been at the forefront of this stretching Chinese digital influence landscape. The conflation between digital development cooperation and digital governance norms adoption has far-reaching implications that need to be better understood and addressed. 

To discuss the issue, Michael Caster joins host Bonnie Glaser. Caster is the Head of Global China Programme at ARTICLE 19, an NGO that advances freedom of opinion and expression. His organization has published two reports examining China&apos;s Digital Silk Road. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of China’s Digital Silk Road, which has become an increasingly crucial component of Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy project: the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, China has massively expanded its digital infrastructure investment across the globe. Accompanying the investment has been the diffusion of China’s digital governance norms and standards in recipient states. Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been at the forefront of this stretching Chinese digital influence landscape. The conflation between digital development cooperation and digital governance norms adoption has far-reaching implications that need to be better understood and addressed. 

To discuss the issue, Michael Caster joins host Bonnie Glaser. Caster is the Head of Global China Programme at ARTICLE 19, an NGO that advances freedom of opinion and expression. His organization has published two reports examining China&apos;s Digital Silk Road. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Nuclear Weaponry and China’s Approach of Strategic Substitution</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear weapons have changed the nature of modern warfare and exerted a profound impact on international politics. The Cold War logic of nuclear deterrence maintains that nuclear-armed states will not attack one another because of fear of massive retaliation, or mutually assured destruction. By this logic, nuclear weapons promote stability and can prevent war.</p><p>At the same time, however, nuclear weapons created a new dilemma. That is: “How can a state achieve its political objectives through military force without triggering a catastrophic nuclear exchange?”</p><p>This is a dilemma faced by all countries, especially nuclear powers. States have responded differently to this dilemma. What is China’s answer to this strategic dilemma? What has Beijing been doing to gain strategic leverage? How should we evaluate the success of China’s approach so far?</p><p>These issues are the subject of a new book titled <i>Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information Age Weapons in International Security</i>. The author, Fiona Cunningham, joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. Fiona is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. She is also a Faculty Fellow at Perry World House and affiliated with the Center for the Study of Contemporary China and the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:59] How do countries cope with the limited war dilemma?</p><p>[04:00] China’s Approach of Strategic Substitution</p><p>[07:24] Adoption of this Third Approach</p><p>[11:23] Utilizing Information-Age Weapons</p><p>[15:49] From Brinksmanship to Calibrated Escalation</p><p>[21:21] Understanding China’s No First Use Posture</p><p>[26:27] Following China’s Model </p><p>[30:42] An American Response</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2025 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Fiona Cunningham)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/nuclear-weaponry-and-chinas-approach-of-strategic-substitution-i24H9UW4</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear weapons have changed the nature of modern warfare and exerted a profound impact on international politics. The Cold War logic of nuclear deterrence maintains that nuclear-armed states will not attack one another because of fear of massive retaliation, or mutually assured destruction. By this logic, nuclear weapons promote stability and can prevent war.</p><p>At the same time, however, nuclear weapons created a new dilemma. That is: “How can a state achieve its political objectives through military force without triggering a catastrophic nuclear exchange?”</p><p>This is a dilemma faced by all countries, especially nuclear powers. States have responded differently to this dilemma. What is China’s answer to this strategic dilemma? What has Beijing been doing to gain strategic leverage? How should we evaluate the success of China’s approach so far?</p><p>These issues are the subject of a new book titled <i>Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information Age Weapons in International Security</i>. The author, Fiona Cunningham, joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. Fiona is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. She is also a Faculty Fellow at Perry World House and affiliated with the Center for the Study of Contemporary China and the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:59] How do countries cope with the limited war dilemma?</p><p>[04:00] China’s Approach of Strategic Substitution</p><p>[07:24] Adoption of this Third Approach</p><p>[11:23] Utilizing Information-Age Weapons</p><p>[15:49] From Brinksmanship to Calibrated Escalation</p><p>[21:21] Understanding China’s No First Use Posture</p><p>[26:27] Following China’s Model </p><p>[30:42] An American Response</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Nuclear Weaponry and China’s Approach of Strategic Substitution</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Fiona Cunningham</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:36:13</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Nuclear weapons have changed the nature of modern warfare and exerted a profound impact on international politics. The Cold War logic of nuclear deterrence maintains that nuclear-armed states will not attack one another because of fear of massive retaliation, or mutually assured destruction. By this logic, nuclear weapons promote stability and can prevent war.

At the same time, however, nuclear weapons created a new dilemma. That is: “How can a state achieve its political objectives through military force without triggering a catastrophic nuclear exchange?”

This is a dilemma faced by all countries, especially nuclear powers. States have responded differently to this dilemma. What is China’s answer to this strategic dilemma? What has Beijing been doing to gain strategic leverage? How should we evaluate the success of China’s approach so far?

These issues are the subject of a new book titled Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information Age Weapons in International Security. The author, Fiona Cunningham, joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. Fiona is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. She is also a Faculty Fellow at Perry World House and affiliated with the Center for the Study of Contemporary China and the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Nuclear weapons have changed the nature of modern warfare and exerted a profound impact on international politics. The Cold War logic of nuclear deterrence maintains that nuclear-armed states will not attack one another because of fear of massive retaliation, or mutually assured destruction. By this logic, nuclear weapons promote stability and can prevent war.

At the same time, however, nuclear weapons created a new dilemma. That is: “How can a state achieve its political objectives through military force without triggering a catastrophic nuclear exchange?”

This is a dilemma faced by all countries, especially nuclear powers. States have responded differently to this dilemma. What is China’s answer to this strategic dilemma? What has Beijing been doing to gain strategic leverage? How should we evaluate the success of China’s approach so far?

These issues are the subject of a new book titled Under the Nuclear Shadow: China’s Information Age Weapons in International Security. The author, Fiona Cunningham, joins host Bonnie Glaser for this episode. Fiona is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. She is also a Faculty Fellow at Perry World House and affiliated with the Center for the Study of Contemporary China and the Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics at the University of Pennsylvania.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Middle East Strategy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In the past decade, China has ramped up its engagement in the Middle East, a region which is far from China geographically, but carries growing importance in China’s foreign policy. Economically, China is the biggest importer of the Middle East oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested heavily in the region under the Belt and Road Initiative with an emphasis on physical and digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, 5G connectivity, submarine optic cables, and security information systems.  Diplomatically, China played a role in brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two longstanding regional rivals. Beijing has also been instrumental in expanding the BRICS multilateral mechanism to include four Middle East countries. </p><p>Securing access to vital natural resources is a key driver of Beijing’s intensified engagement in the Middle East. But China’s interests are broader and encompass economic, geopolitical and strategic considerations.</p><p>To further discuss China’s interests and evolving role in the Middle East, <strong>Michael Schuman</strong> joins host Bonnie Glaser. Michael is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub of the Atlantic Council and an author and journalist with more than 25 years of on-the-ground experience in Asia.  He is the co-author of a recently published report by the Atlantic Council titled <i>China’s Middle East policy shift from ‘hedging’ to ‘wedging.</i>’</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:06] China’s Interest in the Middle East</p><p>[04:23] Evaluating China’s Strategy of “Wedging” </p><p>[06:51] Evaluating China’s Position of Neutrality</p><p>[10:17] Factors Driving China’s Middle Eastern Strategy </p><p>[13:46] Chinese Bilateral and Multilateral Engagement </p><p>[16:08] China’s Energy Ties with the Middle East</p><p>[19:41] Implications for the United States</p><p>[24:19] Limits to Chinese Engagement </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 4 Mar 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Michael Schuman, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-middle-east-strategy-iWuww_MB</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the past decade, China has ramped up its engagement in the Middle East, a region which is far from China geographically, but carries growing importance in China’s foreign policy. Economically, China is the biggest importer of the Middle East oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested heavily in the region under the Belt and Road Initiative with an emphasis on physical and digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, 5G connectivity, submarine optic cables, and security information systems.  Diplomatically, China played a role in brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two longstanding regional rivals. Beijing has also been instrumental in expanding the BRICS multilateral mechanism to include four Middle East countries. </p><p>Securing access to vital natural resources is a key driver of Beijing’s intensified engagement in the Middle East. But China’s interests are broader and encompass economic, geopolitical and strategic considerations.</p><p>To further discuss China’s interests and evolving role in the Middle East, <strong>Michael Schuman</strong> joins host Bonnie Glaser. Michael is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub of the Atlantic Council and an author and journalist with more than 25 years of on-the-ground experience in Asia.  He is the co-author of a recently published report by the Atlantic Council titled <i>China’s Middle East policy shift from ‘hedging’ to ‘wedging.</i>’</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:06] China’s Interest in the Middle East</p><p>[04:23] Evaluating China’s Strategy of “Wedging” </p><p>[06:51] Evaluating China’s Position of Neutrality</p><p>[10:17] Factors Driving China’s Middle Eastern Strategy </p><p>[13:46] Chinese Bilateral and Multilateral Engagement </p><p>[16:08] China’s Energy Ties with the Middle East</p><p>[19:41] Implications for the United States</p><p>[24:19] Limits to Chinese Engagement </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Middle East Strategy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Michael Schuman, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In the past decade, China has ramped up its engagement in the Middle East, a region which is far from China geographically, but carries growing importance in China’s foreign policy.  Economically, China is the biggest importer of the Middle East oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested heavily in the region under the Belt and Road Initiative with an emphasis on physical and digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, 5G connectivity, submarine optic cables, and security information systems.  Diplomatically, China played a role in brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two longstanding regional rivals. Beijing has also been instrumental in expanding the BRICS multilateral mechanism to include four Middle East countries. 

Securing access to vital natural resources is a key driver of Beijing’s intensified engagement in the Middle East. But China’s interests are broader and encompass economic, geopolitical and strategic considerations.

To further discuss China’s interests and evolving role in the Middle East, Michael Schuman joins host Bonnie Glaser. Michael is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub of the Atlantic Council and an author and journalist with more than 25 years of on-the-ground experience in Asia.  He is the co-author of a recently published report by the Atlantic Council titled “China’s Middle East policy shift from ‘hedging’ to ‘wedging.’”  
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In the past decade, China has ramped up its engagement in the Middle East, a region which is far from China geographically, but carries growing importance in China’s foreign policy.  Economically, China is the biggest importer of the Middle East oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested heavily in the region under the Belt and Road Initiative with an emphasis on physical and digital infrastructure, including telecommunications, 5G connectivity, submarine optic cables, and security information systems.  Diplomatically, China played a role in brokering a deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two longstanding regional rivals. Beijing has also been instrumental in expanding the BRICS multilateral mechanism to include four Middle East countries. 

Securing access to vital natural resources is a key driver of Beijing’s intensified engagement in the Middle East. But China’s interests are broader and encompass economic, geopolitical and strategic considerations.

To further discuss China’s interests and evolving role in the Middle East, Michael Schuman joins host Bonnie Glaser. Michael is a nonresident senior fellow at the Global China Hub of the Atlantic Council and an author and journalist with more than 25 years of on-the-ground experience in Asia.  He is the co-author of a recently published report by the Atlantic Council titled “China’s Middle East policy shift from ‘hedging’ to ‘wedging.’”  
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China and the Rising Global South</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Global South is a term that covers a broad swath of developing countries and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. It is a grouping of over 130 heterogenous countries that is pushing to enhance its voice in global decision making. </p><p>China, which self-identifies as a leader of the developing world, has a long history of engaging with the developing world. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deepened its ties with Global South countries through economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.  Meanwhile, developed countries from the wealthier and more industrialized Global North are stepping up efforts to counter Chinese influence and win support from Global South countries.  </p><p>What are China’s interests in the Global South?  What are the key strategies and tactics that Beijing utilizes to influence and engage with those countries? How have countries in the Global South responded to China’s influence?  And how will intensified Sino-American rivalry impact developing countries in the future? </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Senior Research Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan (NIDS).  He is the co-author of the recently published report titled “The Rising Global South and China.” </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:55] Resurgent Interest in the Global South </p><p>[04:28] Engaging Developing Countries</p><p>[06:51] Economic Tools and Mechanisms to Exert Influence</p><p>[08:55] Motivation for Expanding Military Presence </p><p>[12:33] Perceptions of China in the Global South </p><p>[15:07] Why does China’s involvement in the Global South matter? </p><p>[17:39] US-China Competition Impacting the Global South</p><p>[19:00] India, Brazil, and Other Rising Powers</p><p>[20:35] Tokyo’s Concerns Over China’s Influence </p><p>[22:41] Response to Increased Attention Paid to Developing Countries</p><p>[24:37] China’s Reaction to the Trump Administration </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-and-the-rising-global-south-rwdTxRy_</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Global South is a term that covers a broad swath of developing countries and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. It is a grouping of over 130 heterogenous countries that is pushing to enhance its voice in global decision making. </p><p>China, which self-identifies as a leader of the developing world, has a long history of engaging with the developing world. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deepened its ties with Global South countries through economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.  Meanwhile, developed countries from the wealthier and more industrialized Global North are stepping up efforts to counter Chinese influence and win support from Global South countries.  </p><p>What are China’s interests in the Global South?  What are the key strategies and tactics that Beijing utilizes to influence and engage with those countries? How have countries in the Global South responded to China’s influence?  And how will intensified Sino-American rivalry impact developing countries in the future? </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Senior Research Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan (NIDS).  He is the co-author of the recently published report titled “The Rising Global South and China.” </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:55] Resurgent Interest in the Global South </p><p>[04:28] Engaging Developing Countries</p><p>[06:51] Economic Tools and Mechanisms to Exert Influence</p><p>[08:55] Motivation for Expanding Military Presence </p><p>[12:33] Perceptions of China in the Global South </p><p>[15:07] Why does China’s involvement in the Global South matter? </p><p>[17:39] US-China Competition Impacting the Global South</p><p>[19:00] India, Brazil, and Other Rising Powers</p><p>[20:35] Tokyo’s Concerns Over China’s Influence </p><p>[22:41] Response to Increased Attention Paid to Developing Countries</p><p>[24:37] China’s Reaction to the Trump Administration </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China and the Rising Global South</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:28</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Global South is a term that covers a broad swath of developing countries and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. It is a grouping of over 130 heterogenous countries that is pushing to enhance its voice in global decision making. 

China, which self-identifies as a leader of the developing world, has a long history of engaging with the developing world. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deepened its ties with Global South countries through economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.  Meanwhile, developed countries from the wealthier and more industrialized Global North are stepping up efforts to counter Chinese influence and win support from Global South countries.   

What are China’s interests in the Global South?  What are the key strategies and tactics that Beijing utilizes to influence and engage with those countries? How have countries in the Global South responded to China’s influence?  And how will intensified Sino-American rivalry impact developing countries in the future?  

To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Senior Research Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan (NIDS).  He is the co-author of the recently published report titled “The Rising Global South and China.” 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Global South is a term that covers a broad swath of developing countries and emerging economies in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Oceania. It is a grouping of over 130 heterogenous countries that is pushing to enhance its voice in global decision making. 

China, which self-identifies as a leader of the developing world, has a long history of engaging with the developing world. Under Xi Jinping, Beijing has deepened its ties with Global South countries through economic investment, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.  Meanwhile, developed countries from the wealthier and more industrialized Global North are stepping up efforts to counter Chinese influence and win support from Global South countries.   

What are China’s interests in the Global South?  What are the key strategies and tactics that Beijing utilizes to influence and engage with those countries? How have countries in the Global South responded to China’s influence?  And how will intensified Sino-American rivalry impact developing countries in the future?  

To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Masaaki Yatsuzuka, Senior Research Fellow at the China Division of the Regional Studies Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan (NIDS).  He is the co-author of the recently published report titled “The Rising Global South and China.” 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Ambitious Civilian Space Program</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Space, once a distant destination, has become yet another battleground for great power competition.  Since the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the country has been pursuing a series of ambitious space programs aimed to build up its space capacity as an essential element of its comprehensive national power.  In recent years, under the Xi Jinping regime, Beijing has significantly increased its investment in its civilian space program efforts. It has a plan to send Chinese Taikonauts to the Moon before the US can return.  As the US-China strategic competition continues to heighten, it is vital to assess China’s space policy and its role in China’s grand strategy. </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dean Cheng, senior advisor to the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a nonresident fellow with George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. Dean focuses on China’s space program, Chinese military doctrine, and “dual-use” issues associated with China’s scientific and technical enterprises.  He also recently published a book titled <i>China and the New Moon Race.</i></p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamp</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:54] Space Race 2.0</p><p>[03:27] Space in China’s Grand Strategy</p><p>[05:27] Achievements of China’s Space Program</p><p>[07:18] Similarities and Differences in China’s Approach</p><p>[09:14] Nature of Public-Private Cooperation in China</p><p>[12:42] Implications of Landing on the Moon</p><p>[15:30] A Chinese Incident in Space</p><p>[17:00] International Lunar Research Station </p><p>[18:50] Responses to China’s Space Ambitions</p><p>[21:03] Problems in the US-China Civilian Space Race</p><p>[23:20] Stars and Stripes on Mars</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 4 Feb 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dean Cheng, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-ambitious-civilian-space-program-OP_Z3OEu</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Space, once a distant destination, has become yet another battleground for great power competition.  Since the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the country has been pursuing a series of ambitious space programs aimed to build up its space capacity as an essential element of its comprehensive national power.  In recent years, under the Xi Jinping regime, Beijing has significantly increased its investment in its civilian space program efforts. It has a plan to send Chinese Taikonauts to the Moon before the US can return.  As the US-China strategic competition continues to heighten, it is vital to assess China’s space policy and its role in China’s grand strategy. </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dean Cheng, senior advisor to the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a nonresident fellow with George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. Dean focuses on China’s space program, Chinese military doctrine, and “dual-use” issues associated with China’s scientific and technical enterprises.  He also recently published a book titled <i>China and the New Moon Race.</i></p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamp</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:54] Space Race 2.0</p><p>[03:27] Space in China’s Grand Strategy</p><p>[05:27] Achievements of China’s Space Program</p><p>[07:18] Similarities and Differences in China’s Approach</p><p>[09:14] Nature of Public-Private Cooperation in China</p><p>[12:42] Implications of Landing on the Moon</p><p>[15:30] A Chinese Incident in Space</p><p>[17:00] International Lunar Research Station </p><p>[18:50] Responses to China’s Space Ambitions</p><p>[21:03] Problems in the US-China Civilian Space Race</p><p>[23:20] Stars and Stripes on Mars</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Ambitious Civilian Space Program</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dean Cheng, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:30</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Space, once a distant destination, has become yet another battleground for great power competition.  Since the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the country has been pursuing a series of ambitious space programs aimed to build up its space capacity as an essential element of its comprehensive national power.  In recent years, under the Xi Jinping regime, Beijing has significantly increased its investment in its civilian space program efforts. It has a plan to send Chinese Taikonauts to the Moon before the US can return.  As the US-China strategic competition continues to heighten, it is vital to assess China’s space policy and its role in China’s grand strategy. 
 
To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dean Cheng, senior advisor to the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a nonresident fellow with George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. Dean focuses on China’s space program, Chinese military doctrine, and “dual-use” issues associated with China’s scientific and technical enterprises.  He also recently published a book titled China and the New Moon Race.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Space, once a distant destination, has become yet another battleground for great power competition.  Since the early days of the People’s Republic of China, the country has been pursuing a series of ambitious space programs aimed to build up its space capacity as an essential element of its comprehensive national power.  In recent years, under the Xi Jinping regime, Beijing has significantly increased its investment in its civilian space program efforts. It has a plan to send Chinese Taikonauts to the Moon before the US can return.  As the US-China strategic competition continues to heighten, it is vital to assess China’s space policy and its role in China’s grand strategy. 
 
To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dean Cheng, senior advisor to the China program at the U.S. Institute of Peace and a nonresident fellow with George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute. Dean focuses on China’s space program, Chinese military doctrine, and “dual-use” issues associated with China’s scientific and technical enterprises.  He also recently published a book titled China and the New Moon Race.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Beijing&apos;s Approach Toward a Second Trump Presidency</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>When this episode goes live four days from now, Donald Trump will have been sworn in as the 47th president of the United States, after having served as the 45th president from 2017 to 2021.</p><p>Many countries around the world are closely watching to identify changes in US policy and assess their impact. China is one of those countries. As presidential candidate Donald Trump threatened to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the United States. He also proposed revoking China’s Most Favored Nation trading status and banning China from buying US farmland. He pledged to curtail Chinese espionage and theft of intellectual property. On some occasions Trump praised Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and predicted that they would get along very well. In the past few months, Trump and Xi have been in communication through their representatives.</p><p>What approach will Beijing take toward Trump’s presidency this time around? Is China in a stronger or weaker position than it was in during Trump’s first term? What is the likely trajectory of US-China relations in the coming four years?</p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:00] Lessons Beijing Learned from Trump’s First Term </p><p>[04:11] Perceptions on the Balance of Economic Power </p><p>[07:30] China’s Reaction to American Tariffs</p><p>[09:39] China Hurting the United States without Hurting Itself</p><p>[11:48] Starting Anew with the Trump Administration </p><p>[13:38] An Early US-China Meeting</p><p>[16:46] An Inverse Bilateral Relationship </p><p>[18:56] China Helping with the War in Ukraine</p><p>[25:18] Chinese Use of Force Against Taiwan </p><p>[29:22] US Alliances Under the Trump Administration</p><p>[35:00] What worries Evan Medeiros in the US-China relationship?</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2025 22:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Evan Medeiros, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/beijings-approach-toward-a-second-trump-presidency-SwNw6gGj</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When this episode goes live four days from now, Donald Trump will have been sworn in as the 47th president of the United States, after having served as the 45th president from 2017 to 2021.</p><p>Many countries around the world are closely watching to identify changes in US policy and assess their impact. China is one of those countries. As presidential candidate Donald Trump threatened to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the United States. He also proposed revoking China’s Most Favored Nation trading status and banning China from buying US farmland. He pledged to curtail Chinese espionage and theft of intellectual property. On some occasions Trump praised Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and predicted that they would get along very well. In the past few months, Trump and Xi have been in communication through their representatives.</p><p>What approach will Beijing take toward Trump’s presidency this time around? Is China in a stronger or weaker position than it was in during Trump’s first term? What is the likely trajectory of US-China relations in the coming four years?</p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:00] Lessons Beijing Learned from Trump’s First Term </p><p>[04:11] Perceptions on the Balance of Economic Power </p><p>[07:30] China’s Reaction to American Tariffs</p><p>[09:39] China Hurting the United States without Hurting Itself</p><p>[11:48] Starting Anew with the Trump Administration </p><p>[13:38] An Early US-China Meeting</p><p>[16:46] An Inverse Bilateral Relationship </p><p>[18:56] China Helping with the War in Ukraine</p><p>[25:18] Chinese Use of Force Against Taiwan </p><p>[29:22] US Alliances Under the Trump Administration</p><p>[35:00] What worries Evan Medeiros in the US-China relationship?</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Beijing&apos;s Approach Toward a Second Trump Presidency</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Evan Medeiros, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:37:03</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>When this episode goes live four days from now, Donald Trump will have been sworn in as the 47th president of the United States, after having served as the 45th president from 2017 to 2021.

Many countries around the world are closely watching to identify changes in US policy and assess their impact. China is one of those countries. As presidential candidate Donald Trump threatened to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the United States. He also proposed revoking China’s Most Favored Nation trading status and banning China from buying US farmland. He pledged to curtail Chinese espionage and theft of intellectual property. On some occasions Trump praised Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and predicted that they would get along very well. In the past few months, Trump and Xi have been in communication through their representatives.

What approach will Beijing take toward Trump’s presidency this time around? Is China in a stronger or weaker position than it was in during Trump’s first term? What is the likely trajectory of US-China relations in the coming four years?

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>When this episode goes live four days from now, Donald Trump will have been sworn in as the 47th president of the United States, after having served as the 45th president from 2017 to 2021.

Many countries around the world are closely watching to identify changes in US policy and assess their impact. China is one of those countries. As presidential candidate Donald Trump threatened to impose 60% tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the United States. He also proposed revoking China’s Most Favored Nation trading status and banning China from buying US farmland. He pledged to curtail Chinese espionage and theft of intellectual property. On some occasions Trump praised Chinese leader Xi Jinping, and predicted that they would get along very well. In the past few months, Trump and Xi have been in communication through their representatives.

What approach will Beijing take toward Trump’s presidency this time around? Is China in a stronger or weaker position than it was in during Trump’s first term? What is the likely trajectory of US-China relations in the coming four years?

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies at Georgetown University. He served seven years in President Obama’s NSC first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Status and Trajectory of India-China Relations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a deadly clash along their disputed border in the Ladakh region. It was the deadliest confrontation since the 1962 war. Subsequently, bilateral ties between India and China deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. In recent months, however, China-India ties have begun to thaw.</p><p>Last October, India and China struck a border patrol deal. Indian Prime Minister Modi and China’s leader Xi Jinping subsequently met at the BRICS summit in Kazan—their first meeting in five years. That was followed by a round of talks by their top officials just a few weeks ago.</p><p>To discuss the status and trajectory of India-China relations, including how the second Trump presidency and other geopolitical developments are likely to influence that relationship, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:45] October 2024 Border Patrol Deal</p><p>[06:40] Impetus for Stabilizing the Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[10:50] Assessment of Wang Yi-Ajit Doval Meeting </p><p>[15:26] Reviving Confident-Building Measures (CBMs)</p><p>[20:30] Overstating the Thaw in Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[25:54] Bilateral Trade Volume and Economic Relations</p><p>[31:58] India-China Relations Moving Forward</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 7 Jan 2025 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Tanvi Madan, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/status-and-trajectory-of-india-china-relations-Xf4yqWJp</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a deadly clash along their disputed border in the Ladakh region. It was the deadliest confrontation since the 1962 war. Subsequently, bilateral ties between India and China deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. In recent months, however, China-India ties have begun to thaw.</p><p>Last October, India and China struck a border patrol deal. Indian Prime Minister Modi and China’s leader Xi Jinping subsequently met at the BRICS summit in Kazan—their first meeting in five years. That was followed by a round of talks by their top officials just a few weeks ago.</p><p>To discuss the status and trajectory of India-China relations, including how the second Trump presidency and other geopolitical developments are likely to influence that relationship, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:45] October 2024 Border Patrol Deal</p><p>[06:40] Impetus for Stabilizing the Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[10:50] Assessment of Wang Yi-Ajit Doval Meeting </p><p>[15:26] Reviving Confident-Building Measures (CBMs)</p><p>[20:30] Overstating the Thaw in Sino-Indian Relations</p><p>[25:54] Bilateral Trade Volume and Economic Relations</p><p>[31:58] India-China Relations Moving Forward</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Status and Trajectory of India-China Relations</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Tanvi Madan, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:38:20</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a deadly clash along their disputed border in the Ladakh region. It was the deadliest confrontation since the 1962 war. Subsequently, bilateral ties between India and China deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. In recent months, however, China-India ties have begun to thaw.

Last October, India and China struck a border patrol deal. Indian Prime Minister Modi and China’s leader Xi Jinping subsequently met at the BRICS summit in Kazan—their first meeting in five years. That was followed by a round of talks by their top officials just a few weeks ago.

To discuss the status and trajectory of India-China relations, including how the second Trump presidency and other geopolitical developments are likely to influence that relationship, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War.” 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In June 2020, Indian and Chinese forces engaged in a deadly clash along their disputed border in the Ladakh region. It was the deadliest confrontation since the 1962 war. Subsequently, bilateral ties between India and China deteriorated to their lowest level in decades. In recent months, however, China-India ties have begun to thaw.

Last October, India and China struck a border patrol deal. Indian Prime Minister Modi and China’s leader Xi Jinping subsequently met at the BRICS summit in Kazan—their first meeting in five years. That was followed by a round of talks by their top officials just a few weeks ago.

To discuss the status and trajectory of India-China relations, including how the second Trump presidency and other geopolitical developments are likely to influence that relationship, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Tanvi Madan. Tanvi is a senior fellow in the Center for Asia Policy Studies in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped U.S.-India Relations During the Cold War.” 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Chinese Perspectives on Military Uses of AI</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In China’s 14th Five-Year Plan that spans from 2021 to 2025, priority was assigned to development of emerging technologies that could be both disruptive and foundational for the future. China is now a global leader in AI technology and is poised to overtake the West and become the world leader in AI in the years ahead. Importantly, there is growing evidence that AI-enabled military capabilities are becoming increasingly central to Chinese military concepts for fighting future wars.</p><p>A recently released report provides insights on Chinese perspectives on military use of AI. Published by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), the report illustrates some of the key challenges Chinese defense experts have identified in developing and fielding AI-related technologies and capabilities. </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the author of this report, Sam Bresnick, who is a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s CSET focusing on AI applications and Chinese technology policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>TimestampsB</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:33] Impetus for the Georgetown CSET Report</p><p>[03:34] China’s Assessment of the Impacts of AI and Emerging Technologies</p><p>[06:32] Areas of Debate Among Chinese Scholars</p><p>[09:39] Evidence of Progress in the Military Application of AI</p><p>[12:13] Lack of Trust Amongst Chinese Experts in Existing Technologies</p><p>[14:25] Constraints in the Development and Implementation of AI</p><p>[18:20] Chinese Expert Recommendations for Mitigating AI Risk</p><p>[23:01] Implications Taken from Discussions on AI Risk</p><p>[25:14] US-China Areas of Discussion on the Military Use of AI</p><p>[28:50] Unilateral Steps Toward Risk Mitigation</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Dec 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Samuel Bresnick, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinese-perspectives-on-military-uses-of-ai-nj_inhV_</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In China’s 14th Five-Year Plan that spans from 2021 to 2025, priority was assigned to development of emerging technologies that could be both disruptive and foundational for the future. China is now a global leader in AI technology and is poised to overtake the West and become the world leader in AI in the years ahead. Importantly, there is growing evidence that AI-enabled military capabilities are becoming increasingly central to Chinese military concepts for fighting future wars.</p><p>A recently released report provides insights on Chinese perspectives on military use of AI. Published by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), the report illustrates some of the key challenges Chinese defense experts have identified in developing and fielding AI-related technologies and capabilities. </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the author of this report, Sam Bresnick, who is a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s CSET focusing on AI applications and Chinese technology policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>TimestampsB</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:33] Impetus for the Georgetown CSET Report</p><p>[03:34] China’s Assessment of the Impacts of AI and Emerging Technologies</p><p>[06:32] Areas of Debate Among Chinese Scholars</p><p>[09:39] Evidence of Progress in the Military Application of AI</p><p>[12:13] Lack of Trust Amongst Chinese Experts in Existing Technologies</p><p>[14:25] Constraints in the Development and Implementation of AI</p><p>[18:20] Chinese Expert Recommendations for Mitigating AI Risk</p><p>[23:01] Implications Taken from Discussions on AI Risk</p><p>[25:14] US-China Areas of Discussion on the Military Use of AI</p><p>[28:50] Unilateral Steps Toward Risk Mitigation</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Chinese Perspectives on Military Uses of AI</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Samuel Bresnick, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:33</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In China’s 14th Five-Year Plan that spans from 2021 to 2025, priority was assigned to development of emerging technologies that could be both disruptive and foundational for the future. China is now a global leader in AI technology and is poised to overtake the West and become the world leader in AI in the years ahead. Importantly, there is growing evidence that AI-enabled military capabilities are becoming increasingly central to Chinese military concepts for fighting future wars.
A recently released report provides insights on Chinese perspectives on military use of AI. Published by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), the report illustrates some of the key challenges Chinese defense experts have identified in developing and fielding AI-related technologies and capabilities. 

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the author of this report, Sam Bresnick, who is a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s CSET focusing on AI applications and Chinese technology policy. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In China’s 14th Five-Year Plan that spans from 2021 to 2025, priority was assigned to development of emerging technologies that could be both disruptive and foundational for the future. China is now a global leader in AI technology and is poised to overtake the West and become the world leader in AI in the years ahead. Importantly, there is growing evidence that AI-enabled military capabilities are becoming increasingly central to Chinese military concepts for fighting future wars.
A recently released report provides insights on Chinese perspectives on military use of AI. Published by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), the report illustrates some of the key challenges Chinese defense experts have identified in developing and fielding AI-related technologies and capabilities. 

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the author of this report, Sam Bresnick, who is a Research Fellow at Georgetown’s CSET focusing on AI applications and Chinese technology policy. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Implementation of the Global Security Initiative in Southeast and Central Asia</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (<i>GSI</i>) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. </p><p>More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings. </p><p>Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:53] Objectives of China’s Global Security Initiative </p><p>[04:22] GSI as an Additive or a Replacement</p><p>[07:21] Fieldwork in Southeast and Central Asia</p><p>[12:06] Concerns about China’s Intentions and Influence</p><p>[15:24] GSI Initiatives and Sources of Funding</p><p>[19:58] GSI and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</p><p>[23:55] Moscow’s View of GSI </p><p>[29:27] Implications of GSI for the United States</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 4 Dec 2024 22:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Bates Gill)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-implementation-of-the-global-security-initiative-in-southeast-and-central-asia-F0zzOCv3</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (<i>GSI</i>) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. </p><p>More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings. </p><p>Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:53] Objectives of China’s Global Security Initiative </p><p>[04:22] GSI as an Additive or a Replacement</p><p>[07:21] Fieldwork in Southeast and Central Asia</p><p>[12:06] Concerns about China’s Intentions and Influence</p><p>[15:24] GSI Initiatives and Sources of Funding</p><p>[19:58] GSI and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation</p><p>[23:55] Moscow’s View of GSI </p><p>[29:27] Implications of GSI for the United States</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Implementation of the Global Security Initiative in Southeast and Central Asia</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Bates Gill</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:36:03</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. 

More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings. 

Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s push to revise the international security order entered a new phase with the launch of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in April 2022. A few months after Xi Jinping proposed GSI, host Bonnie Glaser did a podcast episode with Manoj Kewalramani to discuss the drivers behind GSI and analyze the initial statements outlining its content. 

More than 2 ½ years have elapsed since then, and scholars have begun to investigate how China is implementing GSI in various regions around the world. A new report from the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) examines how GSI is being operationalized and received in two priority regions of Chinese foreign policy: mainland Southeast Asia and Central Asia. The study draws on field research in both regions. The report is titled “China’s Global Security Initiative Takes Shape in Southeast and Central Asia.” The report has three authors: Bates Gill, Carla Freeman and Alison McFarland. Bonnie Glaser is joined by Bates Gill for this episode to discuss the report’s findings. 

Bates is a senior fellow with the National Bureau of Asian Research, a Senior Associate Fellow with the Royal United Services Institute, and associated with USIP.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Interest in an Expanded BRICS</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).</p><p>As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:37] Behind the Creation of BRICS</p><p>[04:08] BRICS+ in China’s Foreign Policy Objectives</p><p>[06:20] Domination of China in BRICS+</p><p>[09:13] Russian and Chinese Interest in BRICS+</p><p>[14:16] China and the Expansion of BRICS</p><p>[18:07] Noteworthiness of the Kazan Declaration</p><p>[21:10] Possibility of a BRICS Currency</p><p>[28:11] BRICS+ and U.S. Policy Under Donald Trump</p><p>[30:26] Responding to BRICS+ and a Multipolar World</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 20 Nov 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Alexander Gabuev, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-interest-in-an-expanded-brics-xcXkcTuA</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).</p><p>As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:37] Behind the Creation of BRICS</p><p>[04:08] BRICS+ in China’s Foreign Policy Objectives</p><p>[06:20] Domination of China in BRICS+</p><p>[09:13] Russian and Chinese Interest in BRICS+</p><p>[14:16] China and the Expansion of BRICS</p><p>[18:07] Noteworthiness of the Kazan Declaration</p><p>[21:10] Possibility of a BRICS Currency</p><p>[28:11] BRICS+ and U.S. Policy Under Donald Trump</p><p>[30:26] Responding to BRICS+ and a Multipolar World</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Interest in an Expanded BRICS</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Alexander Gabuev, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:35:56</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).

As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The BRICS+ summit was held in the Russian city of Kazan this past October. The original BRICS comprised four countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The first meeting that they held was in 2009. South Africa joined in 2011. BRICS has now grown to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. The recent summit also invited 13 countries to the group as partner states. Countries that have expressed interest in joining BRICS include Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand (which is a U.S. treaty ally), and Turkey (which is a member of NATO).

As countries in the Global South flock to form an increasingly significant geopolitical bloc in which China has assumed a leading role, it is important to understand how BRICS+ fits into China’s foreign policy strategy and the role that the BRICS mechanism is likely to play going forward. To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center which is based in Berlin. His research focuses on Chinese and Russian foreign policy. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Assessing Drivers and Progress in China’s Climate Policies</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.</p><p>In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:57] China’s Approach to Addressing Climate Change</p><p>[04:26] Considerations Behind China’s Climate Policy </p><p>[07:37] Doubling Down on Coal Domestically</p><p>[10:34] Evaluating China’s Progress Toward Carbon Neutrality</p><p>[14:42] Security and China’s Climate Change Policy</p><p>[19:13] China’s International Climate Cooperation</p><p>[22:45] US-China Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action </p><p>[30:27] The Green Belt and Road Initiative</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 5 Nov 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Michael Davidson, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/assessing-drivers-and-progress-in-chinas-climate-policies-rAqRsVaR</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.</p><p>In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:57] China’s Approach to Addressing Climate Change</p><p>[04:26] Considerations Behind China’s Climate Policy </p><p>[07:37] Doubling Down on Coal Domestically</p><p>[10:34] Evaluating China’s Progress Toward Carbon Neutrality</p><p>[14:42] Security and China’s Climate Change Policy</p><p>[19:13] China’s International Climate Cooperation</p><p>[22:45] US-China Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action </p><p>[30:27] The Green Belt and Road Initiative</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Assessing Drivers and Progress in China’s Climate Policies</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Michael Davidson, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:52</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.
 
In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China is the world’s largest energy consumer and carbon emitter, accounting for one-third of global CO2 emissions. One of its biggest sources of emissions is coal, which plays a central role in China’s economy. At the same time, however, China is the world’s leading supplier of renewable energy, largely due to significant government investments in green technologies, including solar manufacturing, batteries, and minerals. In September 2020, China’s leader Xi Jinping announced the goal of achieving peak CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.” This ambitious pledge, if realized, will be an important step in global efforts to limit global warming.
 
In the past few years, the increasingly competitive and fraught relationship between the United States and China has spilled into the climate domain, threatening the potential for both countries to work together to address climate change. That is the topic of a recent commentary co-authored by Margaret Pearson and Michael Davidson. The paper is titled, “Where are the US and China on addressing climate change?”, and it can be found on the Brookings Institution website. In this episode of China Global, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with one of the authors, Michael Davidson, who is an assistant professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy and the Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering Department of the Jacobs School of Engineering at the University of California San Diego.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Deciphering China&apos;s Nuclear Modernization</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. </p><p>In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.</p><p>To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Episode Highlights</strong></p><p>[1:55] Key identifiable changes in China’s nuclear forces </p><p>[3:49] China’s nascent nuclear triad </p><p>[6:51] The drivers of China’s nuclear expansion </p><p>[11:00] The recent ICBM test and its implications </p><p>[14:50] How China might use its nuclear weapons </p><p>[18:43] Will China change its nuclear declaratory policy</p><p>[24:59] How China’s relationship with Russia could shape Beijing’s calculous </p><p>[27:45] How the U.S. and its allies should respond  </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Oct 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/deciphering-chinas-nuclear-modernization-61v_76lv</link>
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      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. </p><p>In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.</p><p>To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”</p><p> </p><p><strong>Episode Highlights</strong></p><p>[1:55] Key identifiable changes in China’s nuclear forces </p><p>[3:49] China’s nascent nuclear triad </p><p>[6:51] The drivers of China’s nuclear expansion </p><p>[11:00] The recent ICBM test and its implications </p><p>[14:50] How China might use its nuclear weapons </p><p>[18:43] Will China change its nuclear declaratory policy</p><p>[24:59] How China’s relationship with Russia could shape Beijing’s calculous </p><p>[27:45] How the U.S. and its allies should respond  </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Deciphering China&apos;s Nuclear Modernization</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/5c1086ab-b966-4516-8e06-a31167352a58/2f4ed2d5-2bef-4993-95c7-0e6ebab0fd47/3000x3000/china-global-itunes-01.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:36</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 

In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.

To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>For many years, China’s nuclear doctrine was widely described as “minimum nuclear deterrence,” which essentially means that it relied on a limited number of nuclear weapons to deter an adversary from attacking. China’s authoritative defense white papers asserted that China sought to maintain a lean, effective and credible deterrent force, was committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, pursued a defensive nuclear strategy and would never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country. 

In recent years, however, China has begun to expand and modernize its nuclear forces. Beijing is not transparent about its nuclear arsenal or its doctrine, however, which creates uncertainty for the United States and its allies.

To help us decipher Beijing’s rapid nuclear expansion, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver, a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and a former CIA senior intelligence officer. He is a co-author of a recent report published by the Atlantic Council titled “Adapting US Strategy to Account for China’s Transformation into a Peer Nuclear Power.”
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Understanding China Through Chinese Intellectual Debates</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled <i>The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People</i>, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. </p><p>To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:22] Significance of Intellectual Debates in China</p><p>[04:31] Gauging the Candor of Interview Responses</p><p>[06:35] Who are the China solutionists? </p><p>[08:25] Examining the “Great Changes” Taking Place</p><p>[11:52] Strengthening China’s Discourse Power</p><p>[15:22] Where is China successfully shaping narratives?</p><p>[18:05] China on the Defense or Offense</p><p>[22:36] Rising East, Declining West</p><p>[28:49] Responding to Chinese Discourse in the Global South</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Oct 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Alicja Bachulska, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/understanding-china-through-chinese-intellectual-debates-YPUeei2l</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled <i>The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on Power, Progress, and People</i>, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. </p><p>To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:22] Significance of Intellectual Debates in China</p><p>[04:31] Gauging the Candor of Interview Responses</p><p>[06:35] Who are the China solutionists? </p><p>[08:25] Examining the “Great Changes” Taking Place</p><p>[11:52] Strengthening China’s Discourse Power</p><p>[15:22] Where is China successfully shaping narratives?</p><p>[18:05] China on the Defense or Offense</p><p>[22:36] Rising East, Declining West</p><p>[28:49] Responding to Chinese Discourse in the Global South</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Understanding China Through Chinese Intellectual Debates</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Alicja Bachulska, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:41</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on  Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. 
 
To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>There are many writings by Western scholars on Chinese foreign as well as domestic policy. Yet few have ventured to analyze the internal intellectual debates in China that, either partly or significantly, shape Chinese policymaking. A recent book from the European Council on Foreign Relations titled The Idea of China: Chinese Thinkers on  Power, Progress, and People, intends to fill that gap. Written by Alicja Bachulska, Mark Leonard, and Janka Oertel, the book presents some of the leading Chinese perspectives on a range of contemporary global as well as domestic issues. 
 
To help us further understand Chinese thinking and its significance, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Alicja Bachulska, one of the co-authors of the book and a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China and Africa: 2024 FOCAC Outcomes</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.</p><p>To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation </p><p>[03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa </p><p>[06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships</p><p>[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South </p><p>[13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit</p><p>[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa</p><p>[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities </p><p>[27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Sep 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Paul Nantulya, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-and-africa-2024-focac-outcomes-8lq5y_5K</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.</p><p>To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:38] History of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation </p><p>[03:56] FOCAC and Chinese Interests in Africa </p><p>[06:46] Africa in China’s Hierarchy of Relationships</p><p>[10:28] Sino-American Competition in the Global South </p><p>[13:20] Takeaways from the Recent FOCAC Summit</p><p>[18:27] Chinese Military Assistance in Africa</p><p>[24:27] FOCAC Engagement with Non-Governmental Entities </p><p>[27:52] African Perceptions of the Efficacy of FOCAC</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China and Africa: 2024 FOCAC Outcomes</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Paul Nantulya, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:34</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.
 
To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation, or FOCAC, was established in 2000 as a platform for facilitating multilateral cooperation between the People’s Republic of China and countries in Africa. A FOCAC summit is held every three years and is the occasion to issue joint declarations and a three-year China-Africa program plan. The 2024 FOCAC took place in Beijing from September 4th to September 6th under the theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future.” Heads of state and delegations from 53 African countries attended the forum, which made it the largest diplomatic event held by China this year.
 
To discuss the recent FOCAC meeting and Chinese interests in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Paul Nantulya who is Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at National Defense University. His research interests center on African security issues, and China-Afro-Asia engagements.  
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Engagement with New Caledonia</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.</p><p>A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.</p><p>To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia</p><p>[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement </p><p>[07:22] Expansion of the International United Front </p><p>[11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia</p><p>[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia</p><p>[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations</p><p>[25:29] China’s Relationship with France</p><p>[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Sep 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Anne-Marie Brady)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-engagement-with-new-caledonia-5kU8kUn6</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.</p><p>A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.</p><p>To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[01:46] Introduction to New Caledonia</p><p>[04:20] China’s Interest and Involvement </p><p>[07:22] Expansion of the International United Front </p><p>[11:48] Manifestation Within New Caledonia</p><p>[16:22] The Belt and Road Initiative in New Caledonia</p><p>[21:34] Establishing Diplomatic Relations</p><p>[25:29] China’s Relationship with France</p><p>[28:29] Recommendations for Outside Powers and Others</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Engagement with New Caledonia</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Anne-Marie Brady</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:37</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.
 
A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.
 
To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>New Caledonia is a French territory comprising dozens of islands in the South Pacific. It possesses 25% of world’s nickel resources, a mineral critical in the development of weaponry. Several referenda on full independence from France have been held, but none have passed. In recent years, China has paid growing attention to the region, and New Caledonia is one of its targets of interest.
 
A new report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), titled “When China knocks at the door of New Caledonia,” explains China’s interests, intentions, and activities in New Caledonia. It calls for greater attention to the territory and makes recommendations for the US and other regional actors to address the growing Chinese interference.
 
To discuss Beijing’s approach to New Caledonia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Anne-Marie Brady, Professor of Political Science at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand. She specializes in Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy, polar politics, China-Pacific politics, and New Zealand foreign policy. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The Role of the Foreign Ministry in Shaping Chinese Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.</p><p>Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is <i>pushing and driving</i> it" (114).</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? </p><p>[04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? </p><p>[08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation</p><p>[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia</p><p>[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA </p><p>[20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department</p><p>[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication</p><p>[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned</p><p>[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book</p><p>[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Aug 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-role-of-the-foreign-ministry-in-shaping-chinese-policy-hUf2Zt2O</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.</p><p>Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is <i>pushing and driving</i> it" (114).</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:57] What questions was the book seeking to address? </p><p>[04:29] What do observers get wrong about China’s foreign ministry? </p><p>[08:22] China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Policy Formulation</p><p>[13:30] Characteristics of Chinese Diplomacy in Southeast Asia</p><p>[16:50] Relationship Between the Chinese MFA and PLA </p><p>[20:10] The Role of the International Liaison Department</p><p>[22:22] Interview Example from Dylan’s Publication</p><p>[25:04] Policy Implications and Lessons to be Learned</p><p>[28:43] Changes Since the Publication of the Book</p><p>[32:15] Predictions for the Future of the China MFA</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Role of the Foreign Ministry in Shaping Chinese Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:36:09</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.

Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it&quot; (114).

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Most observers of China’s relations with the world maintain that China’s foreign policy started becoming more assertive beginning in the 2010s. The label “wolf warrior diplomacy” was coined by Western media to describe the aggressive language used by Chinese diplomats. The term “wolf warrior” comes from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 and describes a more combative approach used by many Chinese diplomats, especially in social media and in interviews.

Explanations for China’s increased diplomatic assertiveness vary, ranging from rising military and economic might to the personal leadership style of General Secretary Xi Jinping. A recently published book titled “China’s Rising Foreign Ministry,” investigates the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in shaping and implementing Chinese foreign policy. In the words of a Southeast Asian diplomat who was interviewed by the book’s author, “China has a bigger international influence in the last five years—and it is the PRC foreign ministry that is pushing and driving it&quot; (114).

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the book’s author Dylan Loh Ming Hui, Assistant Professor of Public Policy and Global Affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Southeast Asian regionalism, and Asian conceptions of the international order. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, cadre, belt and road initiative, beijing, united states, washington, harris, people’s republic of china, agenda, government, influence, politburo, global, campaign, qin gang, state department, usa, thinktank, yang jiechi, malaysia, ecosystem, department of state, material, election, western, liu jianchao, people’s liberation army, prc, xi jinping, foreign affairs, symbolism, diplomacy, canberra, mfa, foreign ministry, bri, donald trump, pla, symbolic, australia, kuala lumpur, singapore, wang yi, leadership, scholar, domestic politics, west, investment, embassy, chinese, ambassador, gmf, wolf warrior, chargés d&apos;affaires, consulate, interview, diplomat, southeast asia, dignitary, american, book, us, technology, international relations, economy, assertiveness, power, nanyang, aggression, academics, trump, policy, liaison, social media, democracy, military, german marshall fund, foreign policy, consul general, asean, kamala harris, china, resources, ccp, academia, publication, liberal</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>Drivers of China’s Policy Toward Second Thomas Shoal</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.</p><p>In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.</p><p>Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.</p><p>To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? </p><p>[05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? </p><p>[08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation</p><p>[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal</p><p>[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty</p><p>[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene</p><p>[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement </p><p>[25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal</p><p>[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict</p><p>[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 8 Aug 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Feng Zhang, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/drivers-chinas-policy-toward-sts-ZPboD4pV</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.</p><p>In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.</p><p>Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.</p><p>To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[00:00] Start</p><p>[02:31] Why is the South China Sea so important to China? </p><p>[05:30] Has China overstepped in the South China Sea? </p><p>[08:54] Reasons for Deepening Sino-Filipino Confrontation</p><p>[12:05] Beijing’s Reaction to a Reinforced Second Thomas Shoal</p><p>[13:30] Beijing’s Perception of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty</p><p>[16:44] Miscalculating American Willingness to Intervene</p><p>[21:32] Beijing-Manila Provisional Agreement </p><p>[25:00] Chinese Deadline for the Philippines vis-à-vis the Second Thomas Shoal</p><p>[27:38] Gauging the Risk of Escalation or Conflict</p><p>[30:25] Stabilizing and Resolving the Second Thomas Shoal Issue</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Drivers of China’s Policy Toward Second Thomas Shoal</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Feng Zhang, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:12</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.

To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The waters, as well as the rocks, reefs and submerged shoals of the South China Sea are a major source of friction in East Asia. In recent months, tensions have flared between two of the claimants – China and the Philippines – over Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged feature in the Spratly Islands, which the Chinese call Ren Ai Jiao. In 1999, the Philippines intentionally grounded a Philippine Navy transport vessel called the Sierra Madre on the reef and since then the outpost has been manned by a small contingent of marines.

In 2016, an arbitral tribunal established under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea ruled that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation located within the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines and therefore sovereignty belongs to the Philippines. No other country can legitimately claim sovereignty over the feature or the waters around it. Beijing doesn’t recognize the ruling, even though it was legally binding on both China and the Philippines.

Late last year, Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels began aggressively interfering with the Philippines’ routine missions to deliver supplies to the Filipino forces on the Sierra Madre. On several occasions, Chinese ships have used high-pressure water cannons and rammed Filipino boats. The most serious confrontation took place in mid-June, when the Chinese used axes and knives to damage multiple Philippine vessels. A Filipino navy sailor lost his thumb in the skirmish. Negotiations between Beijing and Manila in early July produced a provisional arrangement, and the Philippines subsequently successfully conducted a resupply operation. It is uncertain whether the understanding will hold, however, since Beijing and Manila publicly disagree about what has been agreed upon.

To discuss the situation at Second Thomas Shoal and China’s approach to the South China Sea, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Zhang Feng, a visiting scholar at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, international relations theory, and international relations in East Asia. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>war, united states of america, escalation, hainan, sierra madre, de-escalation, administration, indonesia, defense, beijing, occupation, asia, united states, washington, marcos, people’s republic of china, gray zone, law, influence, security, fishing, usa, great power, domestic, republic of china, malaysia, legal, taipei, maritime, taiwan strait, navy, geoeconomics, hegemon, duterte, analysis, mission, prc, submarines, unclos, conflict, xi jinping, resupply, foreign affairs, infrastructure, marines, pressure, grey zone, un, law of the sea, diplomacy, treaty, south china sea, puppet, second thomas shoal, jakarta, hegemony, kuala lumpur, sovereignty, president, island, agreement, taiwan, energy, national, chinese, indo-pacific, manila, crisis, militia, friction, hedging, shangri-la, credibility, american, current events, fight, politics, us, international relations, geopolitics, exclusive economic zone, ships, territory, distrust, strategy, filipino, military, resolve, resolution, eez, militarization, asean, dispute, china, philippines, rubicon, united nations, nation, claimant</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>Takeaways from the 24th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. </p><p>This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. </p><p>This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO</p><p>[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO</p><p>[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy</p><p>[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit</p><p>[09:46] Implementation of Agreements</p><p>[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting</p><p>[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination</p><p>[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill</p><p>[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine</p><p>[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO</p><p>[20:26] Tensions Between China and India</p><p>[21:29] New SCO Member States</p><p>[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building </p><p>[25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (The German Marshall Fund)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/takeaways-from-the-24th-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-summit-sqeaCAd6</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. </p><p>This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. </p><p>This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:39] Shifting Focus of the SCO</p><p>[03:32] Enlargement of the SCO</p><p>[05:25] SCO and China’s Foreign Policy</p><p>[07:22] July 2024 SCO Summit</p><p>[09:46] Implementation of Agreements</p><p>[11:38] Sino-Russian Sideline Meeting</p><p>[13:09] Sino-Russian Competition or Coordination</p><p>[15:14] Sino-Belarussian Joint Military Drill</p><p>[16:56] SCO and the War in Ukraine</p><p>[19:04] Controversial Issues in the SCO</p><p>[20:26] Tensions Between China and India</p><p>[21:29] New SCO Member States</p><p>[23:07] SCO and Chinese Institution Building </p><p>[25:40] The impact of SCO: Why does it matter?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Takeaways from the 24th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>The German Marshall Fund</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:09</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. 

This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. 

This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and security forum led by Russia and China. And on July 4, 2024, the 24th summit of the SCO was convened in Astana, Kazakhstan. The summit resulted in the Astana Declaration that reaffirmed cooperation among the member states. 

This year’s summit was particularly notable due to Belarus’s accession as the SCO’s first European member state and the tenth member of the SCO. The continuous enlargement of the SCO seems indicative of the organization’s shifting role, evolving from a regional cooperative forum to a broader, perhaps counter-western bloc. 

This episode will focus on China’s strategy in the SCO, its intentions, and its objectives. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eva Seiwert, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Her research interests include China-Russia relations, China’s central Asian relations, and China’s behavior in international organizations. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>81</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Quantum Computing in US-China Competition</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. </p><p><br />Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:00] What is quantum computing?</p><p>[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition</p><p>[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses</p><p>[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors</p><p>[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration</p><p>[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency</p><p>[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain</p><p>[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce</p><p>[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 9 Jul 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Sam Howell, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/quantum-computing-in-us-china-competition-u60lobfW</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. </p><p><br />Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:00] What is quantum computing?</p><p>[04:10] Quantum Computing in US-China Competition</p><p>[05:58] American and Chinese Strengths and Weaknesses</p><p>[09:36] Possibility of Working with Other Actors</p><p>[11:56] Status of US-China Scientific Collaboration</p><p>[14:30] Chinese Technological Self-Sufficiency</p><p>[17:58] Building a Quantum Technology Supply Chain</p><p>[22:05] Fostering a Quantum Technology Workforce</p><p>[25:52] Key Variables of US-China Competition</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Quantum Computing in US-China Competition</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Sam Howell, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. 

Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Quantum computing uses quantum mechanics to perform fast and complex calculations. It is often defined as a disruptive technology and is among the advanced technologies at the forefront of US-China competition. Although the US has been in the lead in the development and applications of quantum technology, China is making rapid strides. Earlier this year, China’s independently developed quantum computer, Origin Wukong, named after the Monkey King (a famous character from Chinese mythology) made the country the third in the world to develop this state-of-the-art machine. 

Quantum computing has many potential applications, including financial modeling, artificial intelligence, scientific research, as well as in defense areas, such as undersea warfare and military communications networks. A new report from the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), titled “The Quest for Qubits: Assessing U.S.-China Competition in Quantum Computing” explains the quantum strategies being pursued by the US and China. It makes recommendations for the US to strengthen its position in its competition with China in quantum computing.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by the report’s author, Sam Howell, an adjunct associate fellow, with the Technology and National Security program at CNAS. Her research interests include quantum information science, semi-conductor STEM workforce issues, and the use of emerging technologies to enhance human performance. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Reviving the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit and Putin’s Visit to Pyongyang</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. </p><p>What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?</p><p>To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism</p><p>[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit</p><p>[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement</p><p>[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood</p><p>[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation</p><p>[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations</p><p>[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jun 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/reviving-the-trilateral-summit-CrJh8G0S</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. </p><p>What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?</p><p>To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:18] Reestablishing the Trilateral Leadership Mechanism</p><p>[06:14] Outcomes and Deliverables of the Trilateral Summit</p><p>[10:37] 2019 Chengdu Denuclearization Agreement</p><p>[13:38] China’s Import Ban on Japanese Seafood</p><p>[18:07] China on US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Cooperation</p><p>[23:58] Warming Russian-North Korean Relations</p><p>[29:30] Would Xi Jinping express his concerns with Vladimir Putin?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Reviving the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit and Putin’s Visit to Pyongyang</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:30</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. 

What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?

To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On May 27th, China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea concluded their Ninth Trilateral Summit in Seoul. Leaders of the three countries resumed their highest-level annual meetings for the first time in over four years. At the conclusion of the meeting, they issued a joint declaration that includes six priority areas of cooperation, ranging from sustainable development to economic collaboration and trade. 

What were Beijing’s interests and motivations in reviving this trilateral mechanism?

To discuss China’s participation in the trilateral summit, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yun Sun, a Senior Fellow and Co-director of the East Asia program and Director of the China program at the Stimson Center in Washington.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China-Russia Trade Relations and the Limits of Western Sanctions</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. </p><p>Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. </p><p>To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.” </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:00] China’s Economic Support of Russia </p><p>[05:29] Areas of Success for Western Sanctions</p><p>[07:11] A Surge in Chinese Exports After the Invasion of Ukraine </p><p>[09:54] Chinese Playbook for Circumventing Sanctions</p><p>[13:36] Chinese Provision of Crucial Materials</p><p>[15:17] Incentive to Capture the Russian Energy Market</p><p>[19:17] Impact of Western Industrial Policies on Sino-Russian Trade </p><p>[20:20] Possibility of Increased Sanctions to Deter China</p><p>[23:24] China’s Toolbox of Retaliatory Measures </p><p>[26:48] Plateauing Economic Support for Russia</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (The German Marshall Fund)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-russia-trade-relations-and-the-limits-of-western-sanctions-cWRHqc0Q</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. </p><p>Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. </p><p>To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.” </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:00] China’s Economic Support of Russia </p><p>[05:29] Areas of Success for Western Sanctions</p><p>[07:11] A Surge in Chinese Exports After the Invasion of Ukraine </p><p>[09:54] Chinese Playbook for Circumventing Sanctions</p><p>[13:36] Chinese Provision of Crucial Materials</p><p>[15:17] Incentive to Capture the Russian Energy Market</p><p>[19:17] Impact of Western Industrial Policies on Sino-Russian Trade </p><p>[20:20] Possibility of Increased Sanctions to Deter China</p><p>[23:24] China’s Toolbox of Retaliatory Measures </p><p>[26:48] Plateauing Economic Support for Russia</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China-Russia Trade Relations and the Limits of Western Sanctions</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>The German Marshall Fund</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:34</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. 

Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. 

To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.” 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin concluded a two-day visit to China for his 43rd meeting with Xi Jinping. Based on public readouts, Putin emphasized the economic benefits that the Sino-Russian partnership could bring to both countries. Economic integration between Russia and China has accelerated dramatically, with total trade between them reaching $240 billion US dollars in 2023. Beijing’s decision to increase trade with Moscow after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has kept the Russian economy afloat. 

Western sanctions have failed to cripple Russia’s economy or its war effort. After the European Union halted the import of Russian oil, China stepped in and has since become Russia’s top energy buyer. Moreover, China has become Russia’s top goods supplier, having surged its sales of machine tools, microelectronics, and other technology that Moscow uses to produce weaponry in its ongoing war with Ukraine. 

To discuss China’s trade with Russia, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Yanmei Xie. Yanmei is a Geopolitics Analyst at Gavekal Research, where she analyzes the implications of rising geopolitical and geoeconomic risks on trade, investments, and supply chains. Yanmei recently published a report on China’s economic support for Russia, which was titled “How China Keeps Russia in Business.” 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>78</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Xi Jinping and China&apos;s Techno-Industrial Drive</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.</p><p>Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:43] Historical Narrative Informing China’s Belief in Techno-Industrial Policy</p><p>[03:47] How does China’s own history fit into this narrative?</p><p>[06:36] Evidence that Xi Jinping Believes in a Technological Revolution</p><p>[09:37] How does China assess the global balance of power?</p><p>[12:26] Three Premises Behind China’s Techno-Industrial Drive</p><p>[14:08] Influence of Intensifying US-China Technology Competition</p><p>[17:12] Acceleration of New Quality Productive Forces</p><p>[19:32] Skepticism of China’s Strategy</p><p>[26:43] Chinese Intellectuals Writing on Techno-Industrial Policy</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Tanner Greer, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/xi-jinping-and-chinas-techno-industrial-drive-_5_QQgGV</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.</p><p>Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:43] Historical Narrative Informing China’s Belief in Techno-Industrial Policy</p><p>[03:47] How does China’s own history fit into this narrative?</p><p>[06:36] Evidence that Xi Jinping Believes in a Technological Revolution</p><p>[09:37] How does China assess the global balance of power?</p><p>[12:26] Three Premises Behind China’s Techno-Industrial Drive</p><p>[14:08] Influence of Intensifying US-China Technology Competition</p><p>[17:12] Acceleration of New Quality Productive Forces</p><p>[19:32] Skepticism of China’s Strategy</p><p>[26:43] Chinese Intellectuals Writing on Techno-Industrial Policy</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Xi Jinping and China&apos;s Techno-Industrial Drive</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Tanner Greer, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:17</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.

Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history. 

</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s rate of economic growth has slowed markedly in recent years. According to Chinese government statistics, the economy grew by 5.2% in 2023. There are numerous challenges: weak consumer confidence, mounting local government debt, and a real estate market that used to fuel the economy, but is now in a prolonged downturn.

Many economists, including some in China, advocate that the government stimulate consumer spending. It is clear, however, that Xi Jinping is pursuing a different strategy. And this was quite clear when Chinese Premier Li Qiang delivered the Government Work Report last March.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tanner Greer, who argued in a recent article published in Foreign Policy and in his blog, The Scholar’s Stage, that Xi Jinping and the Politburo believe that science and technology are the answer to China’s problems. To quote from the article: “the central task of the Chinese state is to build an industrial and scientific system capable of pushing humanity to new technological frontiers.” Tanner is the director of the Center for Strategic Translation. As a journalist and researcher, his writing focuses on world politics and history. 

</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Expanding Ties with Latin America and the Caribbean</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2024/05/03/china-caribbean-united-states-antigua-belt-road-diplomacy-debt-chinese-xi-jinping-rivalry-1891668.html">Newsweek</a> published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.</p><p>The <a href="https://americasquarterly.org/article/why-the-u-s-and-china-suddenly-care-about-a-port-in-southern-chile/">Americas Quarterly</a> reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.</p><p>And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.</p><p>To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by <a href="https://sipa.fiu.edu/people/staff/profiles/jack-gordon-institute/leland-lazarus.html">Leland Lazarus</a>. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. </p><p><strong>Editorial Correction: Regarding the statement on the price of Huawei's equipment, it is approximately 30% cheaper than Nokia or Ericcson, rather than one-third the price. </strong></p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:30] China’s Interest in LAC Countries</p><p>[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries</p><p>[07:23] China’s Investment in Energy Development</p><p>[09:39] Huawei’s Penetration into LAC Countries</p><p>[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing’s Regional Strategy</p><p>[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space</p><p>[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries</p><p>[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC? </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 May 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Leland Lazarus, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-expanding-ties-with-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-Eeezwrj5</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/2024/05/03/china-caribbean-united-states-antigua-belt-road-diplomacy-debt-chinese-xi-jinping-rivalry-1891668.html">Newsweek</a> published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.</p><p>The <a href="https://americasquarterly.org/article/why-the-u-s-and-china-suddenly-care-about-a-port-in-southern-chile/">Americas Quarterly</a> reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.</p><p>And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.</p><p>To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by <a href="https://sipa.fiu.edu/people/staff/profiles/jack-gordon-institute/leland-lazarus.html">Leland Lazarus</a>. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. </p><p><strong>Editorial Correction: Regarding the statement on the price of Huawei's equipment, it is approximately 30% cheaper than Nokia or Ericcson, rather than one-third the price. </strong></p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:30] China’s Interest in LAC Countries</p><p>[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries</p><p>[07:23] China’s Investment in Energy Development</p><p>[09:39] Huawei’s Penetration into LAC Countries</p><p>[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing’s Regional Strategy</p><p>[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space</p><p>[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries</p><p>[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC? </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Expanding Ties with Latin America and the Caribbean</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Leland Lazarus, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.

The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.

And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In the past few weeks, China’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.

The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.

And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China’s mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.

To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Illiberal Effects of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for FDI often receive less attention. Does Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.</p><p>To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:38] Evolution of Chinese Foreign Investment Strategies</p><p>[04:48] Chinese Firms Undertaking Foreign Direct Investment</p><p>[09:16] Impacts of Chinese FDI: Five Dimensions </p><p>[18:17] Reasons Why Chinese Firms are Viewed with Suspicion</p><p>[21:06] Impacts of Chinese FDI Projects in Europe</p><p>[24:59] Evidence of Chinese FDI Exerting Political Influence</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Apr 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Jan Knoerich, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/illiberal-effects-of-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-PLjrnZKU</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for FDI often receive less attention. Does Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.</p><p>To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:38] Evolution of Chinese Foreign Investment Strategies</p><p>[04:48] Chinese Firms Undertaking Foreign Direct Investment</p><p>[09:16] Impacts of Chinese FDI: Five Dimensions </p><p>[18:17] Reasons Why Chinese Firms are Viewed with Suspicion</p><p>[21:06] Impacts of Chinese FDI Projects in Europe</p><p>[24:59] Evidence of Chinese FDI Exerting Political Influence</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Illiberal Effects of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jan Knoerich, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:09</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for foreign direct investment (FDI) often receive less attention. Does Chinese FDI have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.

To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Biden administration maintains that China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and the power to do so. One part of China’s economic statecraft toolkit involves state-directed investments through high profile projects in the Belt and Road Initiative which are funded by loans through Chinese development banks. But the role and impact of Chinese companies that provide equity funding for foreign direct investment (FDI) often receive less attention. Does Chinese FDI have illiberal effects on recipient countries. And is this goal part of China’s economic statecraft and foreign policy strategy.

To address these questions and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Jan Knoerich. He is the author on a chapter of Chinese FDI on the recent Oxford publication “Rising Power, Limited Influence”, a collection of essays on the effects of Chinese investment in Europe. Dr. Knoerich is a senior lecturer on the Chinese economy for the Lau China Institute at King’s College in London. He is an expert on the Chinese economy, FDI, and international investment law and policy. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Article 23: Implications for Hong Kong</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. </p><p>This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.</p><p>To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:47] Understanding PRC Definitions Used in Article 23</p><p>[03:37] Why was Article 23 passed now?</p><p>[05:23] Compressed Timeline for Unanimous Approval</p><p>[09:05] Shift in Risk Assessment for Multinational Corporations</p><p>[12:03] Precedents for Targeting Diaspora Communities</p><p>[14:17] Reactions to Article 23 from the International Community</p><p>[15:54] What are some concrete actions that could be taken to signal concern?</p><p>[17:55] Do the PRC and Hong Kong care about international perceptions?</p><p>[19:36] Implementation of Article 23 Moving Forward</p><p>[21:28] Passage of Additional Security Legislature</p><p>[22:57] Forecast for the Future of Hong Kong</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 16 Apr 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Eric Y.H. Lai, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/article-23-implications-for-hong-kong-a24TE1ON</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. </p><p>This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.</p><p>To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:47] Understanding PRC Definitions Used in Article 23</p><p>[03:37] Why was Article 23 passed now?</p><p>[05:23] Compressed Timeline for Unanimous Approval</p><p>[09:05] Shift in Risk Assessment for Multinational Corporations</p><p>[12:03] Precedents for Targeting Diaspora Communities</p><p>[14:17] Reactions to Article 23 from the International Community</p><p>[15:54] What are some concrete actions that could be taken to signal concern?</p><p>[17:55] Do the PRC and Hong Kong care about international perceptions?</p><p>[19:36] Implementation of Article 23 Moving Forward</p><p>[21:28] Passage of Additional Security Legislature</p><p>[22:57] Forecast for the Future of Hong Kong</p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Article 23: Implications for Hong Kong</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Eric Y.H. Lai, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:25:29</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. 

This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.

To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>When Hong Kong was handed over to China by the United Kingdom 1997, the city was given a mini-Constitution called the “Basic Law.” Article 23 of the Basic Law states that Hong Kong shall enact laws of its own to prohibit various national security offenses. The law did not pass, however, and was scrapped after mass protests in 2003. And in 2020, the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) imposed a separate national security law on Hong Kong, citing the city’s delay in acting on Article 23. 

This year on March 19th, Article 23 was passed unanimously by the city’s parliament and it came into effect just days later. The law covers five types of crime: treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny, theft of state secrets, and espionage, sabotage, and external interference. Critics say that Article 23 could lead to even further erosions of civil liberties in Hong Kong.

To discuss Article 23 and its implications, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Eric Yan-ho Lai. Dr. Lai is a Research Fellow at the Georgetown Center for Asian Law, an Associate Fellow at the Hong Kong Studies Hub of the University of Surrey, and a member of the Asian Civil Society Research Network. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Transatlantic Perspectives on China: Consensus and Divergence</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. </p><p>Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. </p><p>The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:46] Why did you pursue this research on transatlantic mechanism?</p><p>[03:24] Importance of Agreeing on an Endgame</p><p>[06:30] Consensus and Divergence between the US and Europe</p><p>[10:10] De-risking: One Word, Many Meanings </p><p>[15:00] Transatlantic Discussions on European and Indo-Pacific Security</p><p>[18:40] Can a regional division of labor strategy work?</p><p>[22:13] China, the Multilateral System, and Global Norms</p><p>[27:00] Tensions Between EU Multilateralism and Transatlantic Consensus</p><p>[31:10] What are the next steps for Chatham House?</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 2 Apr 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Ben Bland, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/transatlantic-perspectives-on-china-consensus-and-divergence-xU44B5Ut</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. </p><p>Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. </p><p>The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:46] Why did you pursue this research on transatlantic mechanism?</p><p>[03:24] Importance of Agreeing on an Endgame</p><p>[06:30] Consensus and Divergence between the US and Europe</p><p>[10:10] De-risking: One Word, Many Meanings </p><p>[15:00] Transatlantic Discussions on European and Indo-Pacific Security</p><p>[18:40] Can a regional division of labor strategy work?</p><p>[22:13] China, the Multilateral System, and Global Norms</p><p>[27:00] Tensions Between EU Multilateralism and Transatlantic Consensus</p><p>[31:10] What are the next steps for Chatham House?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Transatlantic Perspectives on China: Consensus and Divergence</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Ben Bland, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:17</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 

Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. 

The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In the past decade, policy toward China has hardened on both sides of the Atlantic. Governments and publics across Europe and in the United States view Xi Jinping as implementing more repressive policies domestically and more aggressive policies abroad. The US and most capitals in Europe see Beijing as seeking to revise the international order in ways that would be disadvantageous to democracies. They agree on the need for de-risking and to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. 

Yet, despite the alignment in transatlantic assessments, cooperation on China remains limited. A new paper by experts from Chatham House and RUSI, leading think tanks in the United Kingdom, analyzes why transatlantic mechanisms have made slow progress, focusing on three domains: economics; security; and the multilateral system and global norms. The paper also offers ways to strengthen cooperation going forward. 

The title of the report is “Transatlantic China Policy: In Search of an Endgame?” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by one of its authors, Ben Bland who is the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House. His research focuses on the nexus of politics, economics, and international relations in Southeast Asia, as well as China’s growing role in the broader region and the contours of US–China strategic competition. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China&apos;s Diplomacy in the Israel-Hamas War and Red Sea Crisis</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. </p><p>At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:36] China’s Statement on Palestine at the International Court of Justice</p><p>[08:20] Why is China indirectly supporting Hamas despite its relations with Israel?</p><p>[12:11] Effectiveness of China’s Narrative Critical of America and the West</p><p>[16:54] Israel, Palestine, and China’s Diplomatic Calculus</p><p>[20:12] China’s Hesitance to Counter the Houthis in the Red Sea</p><p>[25:15] Does China have leverage over Iran, and if so, will they use it?</p><p>[29:59] Circumstances for Deeper Chinese Involvement</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Mar 2024 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Ahmed Aboudouh, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-diplomatic-calculus-in-the-middle-east-hUnXAJeS</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. </p><p>At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:36] China’s Statement on Palestine at the International Court of Justice</p><p>[08:20] Why is China indirectly supporting Hamas despite its relations with Israel?</p><p>[12:11] Effectiveness of China’s Narrative Critical of America and the West</p><p>[16:54] Israel, Palestine, and China’s Diplomatic Calculus</p><p>[20:12] China’s Hesitance to Counter the Houthis in the Red Sea</p><p>[25:15] Does China have leverage over Iran, and if so, will they use it?</p><p>[29:59] Circumstances for Deeper Chinese Involvement</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Diplomacy in the Israel-Hamas War and Red Sea Crisis</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Ahmed Aboudouh, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:41</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. 
At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. 
Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On a previous episode of the China Global Podcast, we discussed Beijing’s position on the conflict in Gaza during the early days following Hamas’ attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023. Today, we discuss one of the conflict’s spillover effects– the attacks on cargo and trade ships transiting the Red Sea by the Houthis, an Iranian-backed Shia group governing parts of Yemen. While the Chinese-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran was as the beginning of a “wave of reconciliation” in the region by China’s foreign minister Wang Yi, the resurgence of violence since October 7th has proven that prediction to be overly optimistic. 
At face value, disruptions of global trade may seem to run counter to Chinese interests, but Beijing’s hesitance to become more deeply involved in the crisis may tell us something about China’s calculations in this crisis. It may also show the limits of Chinese influence in the region. 
Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Ahmed Aboudouh. Ahmed is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Program at Chatham House, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council, and heads the China Studies research unit at the Emirates Policy Center. His research focuses on China’s rising influence in the Middle East and North Africa region, Gulf geopolitics, and the effects of China-US competition worldwide. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Mapping China&apos;s Influence in Myanmar&apos;s Crisis</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. </p><p>China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. </p><p>For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:07] China’s Interest in the Myanmar Conflict</p><p>[05:48] China’s Engagement with Parties in Myanmar</p><p>[12:48] Impact of China’s Brokered Ceasefires </p><p>[20:30] Credibility of China in Southeast Asia</p><p>[25:15] Myanmar in the US-China Relationship</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 5 Mar 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Jason Tower, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/mapping-chinas-influence-in-myanmars-crisis-OwCMhJkk</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. </p><p>China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. </p><p>For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:07] China’s Interest in the Myanmar Conflict</p><p>[05:48] China’s Engagement with Parties in Myanmar</p><p>[12:48] Impact of China’s Brokered Ceasefires </p><p>[20:30] Credibility of China in Southeast Asia</p><p>[25:15] Myanmar in the US-China Relationship</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Mapping China&apos;s Influence in Myanmar&apos;s Crisis</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jason Tower, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:59</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. 

China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. 

For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On February 1st 2021, the Tatmadaw, or Myanmar military began a coup d’etat against the democratically-elected government, which was led by the National League for Democracy (or NLD) just before elected officials from the November 2020 elections could be sworn in. Since then, Myanmar has been largely controlled by a military junta, who continue to struggle against multiple ethnically-aligned armies dispersed throughout the country. Some countries in the region have refused to recognize the junta, but the People’s Republic of China called the coup simply a “major cabinet reshuffle” and accelerated their military trade with the junta while decrying Western sanctions on the country as escalatory measures, even going so far as to veto a security council resolution condemning the coup alongside Russia. 

China’s approach to relations with Myanmar since the coup have been evolving swiftly, especially since the recent Operation 1027, a large offensive staged by the ethnic armed forces coalition known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance on October 27th 2023. The losses by the junta during the operation revealed their control of the country to be more tenuous than Beijing might have expected and exemplify the complex factors going into China’s decision-making approach to the conflict. 

For this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jason Tower, the country director for the Burma program at the United States Institute for Peace. Tower has over 20 years of experience working in conflict and security issues in China and Southeast Asia, including analysis on cross-border investments, conflict dynamics, and organized crime in the region. He worked previously in Beijing and is a former Fulbright research student and Harvard-Yenching fellow. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Flashpoints in the US-China Relationship</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on <i>Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace</i>, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.</p><p>There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.</p><p>This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:07] Revisiting the Thucydides Trap </p><p>[03:53] Why was China fascinated by this concept? </p><p>[05:26] Reasons for the Risk of War Increasing</p><p>[06:33] The US-China Cold War and its Characteristics</p><p>[09:03] China’s Gray-Zone Activities </p><p>[10:53] Where has China’s gray-zone strategy been the most successful? </p><p>[12:37] Unifying Taiwan with China through Gray-Zone Activities</p><p>[14:42] Chinese Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s</p><p>[16:17] China’s Ambitions in the International Arena</p><p>[17:40] Future Overseas Operations of the PLA <br /><br /> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Feb 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/flashpoints-in-the-us-china-relationship-P9_tUuSc</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on <i>Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace</i>, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.</p><p>There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.</p><p>This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:07] Revisiting the Thucydides Trap </p><p>[03:53] Why was China fascinated by this concept? </p><p>[05:26] Reasons for the Risk of War Increasing</p><p>[06:33] The US-China Cold War and its Characteristics</p><p>[09:03] China’s Gray-Zone Activities </p><p>[10:53] Where has China’s gray-zone strategy been the most successful? </p><p>[12:37] Unifying Taiwan with China through Gray-Zone Activities</p><p>[14:42] Chinese Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s</p><p>[16:17] China’s Ambitions in the International Arena</p><p>[17:40] Future Overseas Operations of the PLA <br /><br /> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Flashpoints in the US-China Relationship</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:22:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.

There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.

This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF. 

</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.

There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China’s national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China’s gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.

This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF. 

</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference: Implications for PRC Foreign Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.</p><p>Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:32] Historical Significance of Foreign Affairs Work Conference</p><p>[07:09] Xi’s Key Messages from the Conference in December</p><p>[11:10] Xi’s Concept of the Community of Common Destiny</p><p>[15:26] Major Country Diplomacy in Chinese Foreign Policy</p><p>[20:03] China’s Diplomacy Going Forward</p><p>[23:07] Xi’s Speech to Chinese Ambassadors</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Feb 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Neil Thomas, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-central-foreign-affairs-work-conference-implications-for-prc-foreign-policy-du07H6jl</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.</p><p>Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:32] Historical Significance of Foreign Affairs Work Conference</p><p>[07:09] Xi’s Key Messages from the Conference in December</p><p>[11:10] Xi’s Concept of the Community of Common Destiny</p><p>[15:26] Major Country Diplomacy in Chinese Foreign Policy</p><p>[20:03] China’s Diplomacy Going Forward</p><p>[23:07] Xi’s Speech to Chinese Ambassadors</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference: Implications for PRC Foreign Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Neil Thomas, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:42</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.
 
Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.
 
Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On December 27 and 28, 2023, the Communist Party of China held the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs. This was the sixth such meeting – the first one was held way back in 1971. This Foreign Affairs Work Conference was the third held under Xi Jinping’s leadership, with earlier meetings held in 2014 and 2018.
 
Xi delivered a major speech at the Work Conference, which marks the most comprehensive expression yet of his more activist approach to PRC diplomacy. The speech provides valuable insights into Xi’s assessment of the global balance of power, his vision of the international order, and his views of the role of Chinese diplomacy.
 
Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Neil Thomas, a Fellow for Chinese Politics at Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis, where he studies elite politics, political economy, and foreign policy. Previously, he was a Senior Analyst for China and Northeast Asia at Eurasia Group. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states of america, defense, beijing, united states, hu jintao, security, chinese communist party, usa, nixon, jiang, prc, united front, jiang zemin, xi jinping, history, foreign affairs, kissinger, state, indo-pacific region, richard nixon, mao, deng, diplomacy, henry kissinger, donald trump, deng xiaoping, sovereignty, xi, leadership, domestic politics, chinese, ambassador, governance, american, politics, us, economy, trump, policy, mao zedong, foreign policy, china, party, international, ccp, hu</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>Beijing’s Response to Taiwan’s Election</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.</p><p>Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference. </p><p>This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Time Stamps</strong></p><p>[01:56] Interpreting Beijing’s Statements</p><p>[03:40] Views of the State Security Ministry</p><p>[04:38] Poaching Taiwan’s Diplomatic Ally Nauru</p><p>[06:53] Threat of Tariff Imposition</p><p>[08:37] Impact of Woodside Summit on Beijing’s Response</p><p>[10:02] What role do the Chinese want the Americans to play?</p><p>[11:13] Assessing the Efficacy of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan</p><p>[13:40] Unofficial American Delegation Visiting Taiwan</p><p>[15:02] Post-Election Comment from President Biden</p><p>[16:26] Clarifying the US One-China Policy</p><p>[19:48] Xi Jinping’s Statements to Biden about Taiwan</p><p>[23:14] Is reunification a legacy issue for Xi Jinping?</p><p>[24:49] What are the most important variables moving forward?</p><p>[27:00] China and Peaceful Unification</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Jan 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Rick Waters, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/beijings-response-to-taiwans-election-3_usaNQk</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.</p><p>Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference. </p><p>This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Time Stamps</strong></p><p>[01:56] Interpreting Beijing’s Statements</p><p>[03:40] Views of the State Security Ministry</p><p>[04:38] Poaching Taiwan’s Diplomatic Ally Nauru</p><p>[06:53] Threat of Tariff Imposition</p><p>[08:37] Impact of Woodside Summit on Beijing’s Response</p><p>[10:02] What role do the Chinese want the Americans to play?</p><p>[11:13] Assessing the Efficacy of Chinese Policy Toward Taiwan</p><p>[13:40] Unofficial American Delegation Visiting Taiwan</p><p>[15:02] Post-Election Comment from President Biden</p><p>[16:26] Clarifying the US One-China Policy</p><p>[19:48] Xi Jinping’s Statements to Biden about Taiwan</p><p>[23:14] Is reunification a legacy issue for Xi Jinping?</p><p>[24:49] What are the most important variables moving forward?</p><p>[27:00] China and Peaceful Unification</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Beijing’s Response to Taiwan’s Election</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Rick Waters, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:18</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.

Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference.  

This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On January 13, 2024, voters in Taiwan elected the DPP’s Lai Ching-te the next president of Taiwan. Lai won 40% of the votes–a plurality, but not a majority. In his acceptance speech, Lai pledged to safeguard Taiwan from continuing threats and intimidation from China. He also said that he has an important responsibility to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and reiterated a statement that the current president, Tsai Ing-wen, made 8 years ago: that he would act in accordance with the Republic of China constitutional order.

Beijing expected that Lai would win and was therefore well prepared. The statement, issued by the Taiwan Affairs Office shortly after the final tally was announced, emphasized that the election result would not change the trend of cross-Strait relations and said that reunification remained inevitable. It also warned against Taiwan independence and foreign interference.  

This episode focuses on China’s perspectives on the election and its likely reaction going forward. Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Rick Waters, who is managing director of Eurasia Group’s China practice. He has served 27 years as a career diplomat, most recently as the inaugural head of the State Department’s Office of China Coordination and Deputy Secretary of State for China and Taiwan.
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>68</itunes:episode>
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      <title>How Domestic Politics are Shaping US-China Relations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. </p><p>Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: "The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations" and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:14] Influence of Domestic Politics in the US and China</p><p>[03:32] Differences between US and Chinese Domestic Politics</p><p>[05:19] Weakening of Historical Forces for Stability</p><p>[08:35] Most Important Driver of Change to America’s China Policy</p><p>[13:34] Xi Jinping Shaping Domestic Politics in China</p><p>[19:38] Reversing the Downward Trend in US-China Relations</p><p>[21:44] Close Connections between Domestic and Foreign Politics</p><p>[24:49] Biden and Xi as Leaders in the Bilateral Relationship</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 9 Jan 2024 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/how-domestic-politics-are-shaping-us-china-relations-9rxxuLqJ</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. </p><p>Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: "The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations" and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:14] Influence of Domestic Politics in the US and China</p><p>[03:32] Differences between US and Chinese Domestic Politics</p><p>[05:19] Weakening of Historical Forces for Stability</p><p>[08:35] Most Important Driver of Change to America’s China Policy</p><p>[13:34] Xi Jinping Shaping Domestic Politics in China</p><p>[19:38] Reversing the Downward Trend in US-China Relations</p><p>[21:44] Close Connections between Domestic and Foreign Politics</p><p>[24:49] Biden and Xi as Leaders in the Bilateral Relationship</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>How Domestic Politics are Shaping US-China Relations</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:49</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. 

Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: &quot;The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations&quot; and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>This episode covers the role of US and Chinese domestic politics in the US-China relationship. There are many drivers of US-China strategic competition, and domestic politics is among them, and has become increasingly important, though it has not been well researched and analyzed in recent years. One reason for the lack of analysis on Chinese politics is that since Xi Jinping became China’s top leader in 2012, domestic politics in China has become even more of black box than previously. 

Bonnie is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, who has recently published a pathbreaking study that seeks to update the understanding of political forces in China and the United States that are influencing the bilateral relationship. Medeiros is one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese foreign policy. He is the Penner Family Chair in Asia studies and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in US-China Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The report we will discuss today is titled: &quot;The New Domestic Politics of US-China Relations&quot; and was published by the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis where Evan is a senior fellow for foreign policy. During the Obama administration, Evan was on the NSC staff, first as director for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, and then as special assistant to the president and Senior Director for Asia. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Balancing Assurances and Threats in the Case of Taiwan: A conversation with Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.</p><p>Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.</p><p>Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.</p><p>Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Dec 2023 21:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonny Lin, Thomas Christensen, Jessica Chen Weiss, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/balancing-assurances-and-threats-in-the-case-of-taiwan-a-conversation-with-bonnie-glaser-jessica-chen-weiss-and-thomas-christensen-Qqq7AJ8K</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.</p><p>Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.</p><p>Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.</p><p>Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Balancing Assurances and Threats in the Case of Taiwan: A conversation with Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonny Lin, Thomas Christensen, Jessica Chen Weiss, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:41:21</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.

Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.

Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.

Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.

</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>This podcast episode is a joint and cross-over episode between the CSIS ChinaPower Podcast and the German Marshall Fund’s China Global Podcast. We are joined by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen to discuss their recently released article titled “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence.” The authors underline the article’s key point, that assurances, alongside threats, are an integral part of effective deterrence. They emphasize that in order for deterrence to work, the threat of punishment must be not only credible but also conditional. Finally, the authors outline what actions each of the three actors- the U.S., China, and Taiwan- should take to effectively convey assurances to one another.

Ms. Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the German Marshall Fund’s Indo-Pacific program. She is also a nonresident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, and a senior associate with the Pacific Forum. She was previously senior adviser for Asia and the director of the China Power Project at CSIS. Ms. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and U.S. policy for more than three decades.

Dr. Jessica Chen Weiss is a professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies in the Department of Government at Cornell University. She was previously an assistant professor at Yale University and founded the Forum for American/Chinese Exchange at Stanford University. Formerly, Dr. Weiss served as senior advisor to the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. State Department on a Council on Foreign Relations Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars.

Dr. Thomas Christensen is a professor of Public and International Affairs and Director of the China and World Program at Columbia University. Prior to this, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus is on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security.

</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[01:39] EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit</p><p>[05:13] Impact of the War in Ukraine on EU-China Relations</p><p>[07:29] How could China alleviate concerns in Europe? </p><p>[09:33] De-risking in the European Union</p><p>[15:27] Proportionate and Precise Economic Security</p><p>[18:27] How similar are EU and US perceptions of China?</p><p>[22:13] The EU’s Stance on Taiwan</p><p>[26:19] How can EU contribute to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?</p><p>[27:21] Outcomes of the Biden-Xi Summit</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2023 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Gunnar Wiegand, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/eu-china-relations-on-the-eve-of-the-24th-bilateral-summit-jtZ03H66</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[01:39] EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit</p><p>[05:13] Impact of the War in Ukraine on EU-China Relations</p><p>[07:29] How could China alleviate concerns in Europe? </p><p>[09:33] De-risking in the European Union</p><p>[15:27] Proportionate and Precise Economic Security</p><p>[18:27] How similar are EU and US perceptions of China?</p><p>[22:13] The EU’s Stance on Taiwan</p><p>[26:19] How can EU contribute to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?</p><p>[27:21] Outcomes of the Biden-Xi Summit</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>EU-China Relations on the Eve of the 24th Bilateral Summit</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Gunnar Wiegand, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Early next month, the European Union and China are set to hold the 24th bilateral summit. The last EU-China summit was held via video conference in April 2022. It took place against the background of China’s countermeasures to EU sanctions on human rights, Chinese economic coercion and trade measures against the single market, and most importantly, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine and Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the invasion. Earlier this year, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s multifaceted policy approach towards China, which is based on the judgment that China is simultaneously a partner, a competitor, and a systemic rival. However, that balancing act is getting more and more difficult.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Mr. Gunnar Wiegand, who has recently retired from the post of Managing Director for Asia and the Pacific at the European External Action Service, which he held for 7 ½ years. He is now a visiting professor at the College of Europe and the Paris School of International Affairs, and as of November 1, 2023, he has joined GMF’s Indo-Pacific program as a visiting distinguished fellow. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Response to the Israel-Hamas War</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.</p><p>While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.</p><p>To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:25] China’s Past Relationships with Israel and Palestine</p><p>[03:43] Reaction to the Chinese Response </p><p>[05:06] China’s Interests in Supporting Palestine</p><p>[09:06] China’s Reaction to the Death of Chinese Citizens</p><p>[10:55] Benefits of a Wider Conflict for China </p><p>[15:02] Comparisons to the War in Ukraine</p><p>[17:54] China as a Mediator for the War</p><p>[20:55] Antisemitism in Chinese Society</p><p>[25:35] Outcome of the War for China</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 7 Nov 2023 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Tuvia Gering, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-response-to-the-israel-hamas-war-RfCntVun</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.</p><p>While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.</p><p>To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.</p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane & Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[02:25] China’s Past Relationships with Israel and Palestine</p><p>[03:43] Reaction to the Chinese Response </p><p>[05:06] China’s Interests in Supporting Palestine</p><p>[09:06] China’s Reaction to the Death of Chinese Citizens</p><p>[10:55] Benefits of a Wider Conflict for China </p><p>[15:02] Comparisons to the War in Ukraine</p><p>[17:54] China as a Mediator for the War</p><p>[20:55] Antisemitism in Chinese Society</p><p>[25:35] Outcome of the War for China</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Response to the Israel-Hamas War</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Tuvia Gering, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.

While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.

To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane &amp; Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On the morning of October 07, 2023, Hamas launched an unprovoked attack from the Gaza Strip, indiscriminately killing more than 1,400 Israeli and foreign nationals. Over 200 civilians, including women and children, were taken to Gaza as hostages. IN response to this attack, as well as subsequent attacks launched from Lebanon and Syria, Israel began an unprecedented bombing campaign of Gaza and targeted Hezbollah and Syrian government military positions. The conflict is unlikely to end soon and may spread.

While the conflict itself demands global attention, the focus of this podcast is Chinese foreign and security policy. This discussion focuses on China’s response to the war, China’s relations with Palestine and Israel, and the actions that Beijing might take in the coming weeks and months that could help defuse the conflict or cause it to worsen.

To date, China has not condemned Hamas. Instead, it has criticized what it calls Israel’s disproportionate military response and the “collective punishment of the Gazan people.” Moreover, it has trumpeted its position as an unbiased potential mediator and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of a two-state solution.

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Tuvia Gering, who, like many Israelis, has been activated to defend his country. Gering is a leading expert on China and its relations with the Middle East. In his civilian capacity, he is a researcher at the Diane &amp; Guilford Glazer Foundation’s Israel-China Policy Center at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv and a nonresident fellow for the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>China’s Military Diplomacy and its Quest for Bases Abroad</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.</p><p>The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.</p><p>Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:20] Introduction to Military Diplomacy</p><p>[04:36] Three Objectives of Chinese Military Diplomacy</p><p>[06:15] China’s Regions of Interest</p><p>[08:48] Gauging the Success of China’s Military</p><p>[11:46] Beijing’s Broader Geo-Political Strategy</p><p>[13:47] Challenges Posed to US Interests</p><p>[15:53] Military Installations Versus Commercial Ports</p><p>[17:20] Potential Chinese Presence in Cambodia </p><p>[19:27] Potential Chinese Presence in Equatorial Guinea </p><p>[21:41] Beijing’s Assessment of their Military Diplomacy</p><p>[23:33] Recommendations for a US Response</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Oct 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Kristen Gunness, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-military-diplomacy-and-its-quest-for-bases-abroad-0Aq2jkBs</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.</p><p>The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.</p><p>Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission. </p><p> </p><p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:20] Introduction to Military Diplomacy</p><p>[04:36] Three Objectives of Chinese Military Diplomacy</p><p>[06:15] China’s Regions of Interest</p><p>[08:48] Gauging the Success of China’s Military</p><p>[11:46] Beijing’s Broader Geo-Political Strategy</p><p>[13:47] Challenges Posed to US Interests</p><p>[15:53] Military Installations Versus Commercial Ports</p><p>[17:20] Potential Chinese Presence in Cambodia </p><p>[19:27] Potential Chinese Presence in Equatorial Guinea </p><p>[21:41] Beijing’s Assessment of their Military Diplomacy</p><p>[23:33] Recommendations for a US Response</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Military Diplomacy and its Quest for Bases Abroad</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Kristen Gunness, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:50</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.

The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.

Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On August 1, 2017, China official opened its first overseas military base in the East African nation of Djibouti. The base, constructed to provide logistical support to the Chinese navy’s counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia, marked a major step toward Xi Jinping’s goal of constructing a world class military by the middle of the century.

The US Defense Department has just released its annual China Military Power Report, and that says that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) probably has also considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries around the world (in addition to Djibouti): Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan. To expand its global footprint, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will need to cultivate good relations with potential host countries. China’s military diplomacy is likely aimed at achieving that objective among others.

Today’s discussion focuses on the key features and goals of China’s military diplomacy and its quest for additional military installations – or what the Chinese call “strategic strongpoints.” Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Kristin Gunness, a senior policy researcher at the RAND Corporation. She previously served as the Director of the Navy Asia Pacific Advisory Group at the Pentagon, advising the Chief of Naval Operations on security and foreign policy trends in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Chinese naval and gray zone warfare capabilities. Earlier this year, Kristin testified on China’s overseas military diplomacy and its implications for American interests at a hearing convened by the US Economic and Security Review Commission. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>The Philippines-China Row Heats Up</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. </p><p>Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways.  </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is <i>The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery</i>. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:36] Changes in Sino-Phillipine Relations</p><p>[09:05] Tensions Between the Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine Ships</p><p>[14:23] Pushing Back Against China</p><p>[20:55] China, the Philippines, and the Warship</p><p>[25:05] Future Relations with China</p><p>[29:30] The Philippines and a Taiwan Strait Conflict</p><p> </p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Oct 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Richard Heydarian, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-philippines-china-row-heats-up-IouLgeOY</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. </p><p>Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways.  </p><p>Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is <i>The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery</i>. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:36] Changes in Sino-Phillipine Relations</p><p>[09:05] Tensions Between the Chinese Coast Guard and Philippine Ships</p><p>[14:23] Pushing Back Against China</p><p>[20:55] China, the Philippines, and the Warship</p><p>[25:05] Future Relations with China</p><p>[29:30] The Philippines and a Taiwan Strait Conflict</p><p> </p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>The Philippines-China Row Heats Up</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Richard Heydarian, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:46</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. 

Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways.  

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On this episode of the China Global podcast, the relationship between the Philippines and China, and some of the flashpoints therein (especially in the maritime realm), will be discussed. 

Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has pursued a strategy of “being a friend to all and an enemy to none.” He has tried to maintain close economic ties with China, signing 14 cooperation agreements when he visited Beijing last January, including an updated Belt and Road Initiative memorandum. He secured over $22 billion in investment and trade deals. But the maritime disputes between the Philippines and China are becoming more contentious, and Manila is pushing back against Chinese pressure in new ways.  

Host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Richard Heydarian to analyze the bilateral relationship and especially the maritime flashpoints. Heydarian is a columnist at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a Senior Lecturer at the University of the Philippines, and a policy adviser. His most recent book is The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China, and the New Global Struggle for Mastery. 
</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>62</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Unpacking China’s New Standard Map</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard <a href="https://events.trustifi.com/api/o/v1/click/6509a39045b5a0154f6ea7cc/fff1a4/665345/699109/b96cec/081f46/19c766/f7cc9b/c7b81d/e8666a/ef542d/85972d/627493/9a11d6/1f4096/1d247f/87da2e/c13dd3/8dccf5/eba953/724395/958ff0/a51951/f35117/3a8fed/a5d646/1fdf78/35d8f1/cbb3fb/9745cc/df2650/8d1f63/cf333a/7e044e/f86254/67781a/6f0878/613749/fb825b/82eabb/55f3b2/6670c3/c27009/e1da4e/bbdabf/370ac6/997d2b/c40672/7d7e92/0e4007/fc5dfe/ca7e78/ef9f33/3712c5/de138b/47aaf1/b681c1/05578b/05ac75/8dfb58/936d3e/ad784f/0d7c7b/fd9e59/03873a/1b5514/04cd8a/81ef73/2703e5/b2bdef/7af210/1bdb37/a18b4a/7071ea/d95d99/d9c82f/551103/a0f04e/46e265/ffbcfe/bb9e1d/8925a2/2d0da4/b51edf/dae99c/1571d3/0ab5f7/73a73e/f1999b/4a2041/4f3a00/0d4dd9" target="_blank">map</a>,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? </p><p>To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:29] How does this map differ from previous ones?</p><p>[04:44] Interagency Coordination on Release</p><p>[05:51] Reaction of the Chinese Foreign Ministry </p><p>[08:12] Significance of the Timing of the Release</p><p>[11:32] Protests Against the Map’s Release</p><p>[15:09] Portrayal of the South China Sea</p><p>[19:35] Ambiguity of Beijing’s Claims </p><p>[23:44] Territorial Claims Along the Sino-Russian Border</p><p>[26:58] Lasting Impact of the Map</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Sep 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Collin Koh Swee Lean, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/unpacking-chinas-new-standard-map-IItuvfzo</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard <a href="https://events.trustifi.com/api/o/v1/click/6509a39045b5a0154f6ea7cc/fff1a4/665345/699109/b96cec/081f46/19c766/f7cc9b/c7b81d/e8666a/ef542d/85972d/627493/9a11d6/1f4096/1d247f/87da2e/c13dd3/8dccf5/eba953/724395/958ff0/a51951/f35117/3a8fed/a5d646/1fdf78/35d8f1/cbb3fb/9745cc/df2650/8d1f63/cf333a/7e044e/f86254/67781a/6f0878/613749/fb825b/82eabb/55f3b2/6670c3/c27009/e1da4e/bbdabf/370ac6/997d2b/c40672/7d7e92/0e4007/fc5dfe/ca7e78/ef9f33/3712c5/de138b/47aaf1/b681c1/05578b/05ac75/8dfb58/936d3e/ad784f/0d7c7b/fd9e59/03873a/1b5514/04cd8a/81ef73/2703e5/b2bdef/7af210/1bdb37/a18b4a/7071ea/d95d99/d9c82f/551103/a0f04e/46e265/ffbcfe/bb9e1d/8925a2/2d0da4/b51edf/dae99c/1571d3/0ab5f7/73a73e/f1999b/4a2041/4f3a00/0d4dd9" target="_blank">map</a>,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? </p><p>To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:29] How does this map differ from previous ones?</p><p>[04:44] Interagency Coordination on Release</p><p>[05:51] Reaction of the Chinese Foreign Ministry </p><p>[08:12] Significance of the Timing of the Release</p><p>[11:32] Protests Against the Map’s Release</p><p>[15:09] Portrayal of the South China Sea</p><p>[19:35] Ambiguity of Beijing’s Claims </p><p>[23:44] Territorial Claims Along the Sino-Russian Border</p><p>[26:58] Lasting Impact of the Map</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Unpacking China’s New Standard Map</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Collin Koh Swee Lean, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:59</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard map,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? 

To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In late August, China’s Ministry of Natural Resources released its new “standard map,” which includes not only Taiwan, but also parts of the maritime zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. It also includes land that China disputes with India—and even some Russian territory. To publicize the map and China’s claims, Beijing launched a “national map awareness publicity week,” as it has for map releases in recent years. China’s map release is an annual event, which can happen at any time. So why now? And what does the map tell us about Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping? 

To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Collin Koh who is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based in Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has research interests on naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific, focusing on Southeast Asia. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>61</itunes:episode>
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      <title>BRICS in China&apos;s Foreign Policy Agenda</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.</p><p>How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? </p><p>To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:45] What has BRICS achieved? </p><p>[05:33] China Driving the BRICS Agenda</p><p>[08:35] Where does BRICS fit into China’s foreign policy agenda? </p><p>[10:53] Why has BRICS refrained from endorsing BRI?</p><p>[12:53] Outcomes of Johannesburg Summit</p><p>[15:18] Criteria for Expanding BRICS Membership</p><p>[18:19] Potential for BRICS Disrupting the International Order</p><p>[23:52] China as a Developing Country</p><p>[26:56] Will we see any breakthroughs with BRICS? </p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Sep 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Colleen Cottle, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/brics-in-chinas-foreign-policy-Uk8tb3hG</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.</p><p>How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? </p><p>To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:45] What has BRICS achieved? </p><p>[05:33] China Driving the BRICS Agenda</p><p>[08:35] Where does BRICS fit into China’s foreign policy agenda? </p><p>[10:53] Why has BRICS refrained from endorsing BRI?</p><p>[12:53] Outcomes of Johannesburg Summit</p><p>[15:18] Criteria for Expanding BRICS Membership</p><p>[18:19] Potential for BRICS Disrupting the International Order</p><p>[23:52] China as a Developing Country</p><p>[26:56] Will we see any breakthroughs with BRICS? </p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="29846603" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/5575d821-fb35-4782-906c-343805555126/audio/57619b58-14f4-4b2b-81f8-0c304ab985c4/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>BRICS in China&apos;s Foreign Policy Agenda</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Colleen Cottle, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:05</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
  
How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? 

To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In 2001, Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill coined the term “BRIC” to describe the fast-growing economies that he predicted would collectively dominate the global economy by 2050. The BRIC countries he was referring to were Brazil, Russia, India, and China. After a series of high-level meetings that included officials from the four countries, the BRIC grouping was founded in 2009. The following year, South Africa joined, and the name became “BRICS”. Last month, the fifteenth BRICS summit was held in Johannesburg. In addition to the leaders of the five core countries, representatives from more than 60 countries attended, and six were officially invited to join the club: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
  
How does the BRICS serve China’s foreign policy objectives? And is this expansion a major win for Xi Jinping? Is BRICS likely to become a global grouping of authoritarian countries that poses a challenge to the G-7 group of democracies – and is that what Beijing wants? 

To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Colleen Cottle, deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, she spent over a dozen years at the Central Intelligence Agency where she worked on East and South Asia. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>global south, markets, belt and road initiative, indonesia, beijing, asia, united states, economics, development, world bank, iran, world trade organization, g-7, russia, south africa, argentina, sphere of influence, international order, prc, xi jinping, economic, g20, international monetary fund, g7, market, america, sanctions, india, bri, uruguay, global power, imf, autocracy, brics, g-20, multipolarity, oecd, energy, johannesburg, indo-pacific, bangladesh, global domestic product, middle east, finance, emerging economies, developing countries, wto, north africa, politics, us, power, political, breton woods, autocratic governments, brazil, human rights, gdp, china, ccp</itunes:keywords>
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      <itunes:episode>60</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Shakeup in PLA Rocket Force</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar. </p><p>The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. </p><p>What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario? </p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:58] Unpacking the Shakeup </p><p>[04:19] Launch-on-Warning Posture</p><p>[05:34] Rooting out Corruption</p><p>[09:00] Concerns of Loyalty </p><p>[10:40] Inexperienced Leadership</p><p>[14:58] Naval Leadership of Rocket Force</p><p>[17:32] Viability of Invading Taiwan</p><p>[19:06] System for Military Governance</p><p>[21:38] Nuclear Force Development</p><p>[29:00] US-China Nuclear Dialogue  </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 29 Aug 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Phillip Saunders, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/shakeup-in-pla-rocket-force-QAWxxtDi</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar. </p><p>The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional. </p><p>What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario? </p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense.</p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:58] Unpacking the Shakeup </p><p>[04:19] Launch-on-Warning Posture</p><p>[05:34] Rooting out Corruption</p><p>[09:00] Concerns of Loyalty </p><p>[10:40] Inexperienced Leadership</p><p>[14:58] Naval Leadership of Rocket Force</p><p>[17:32] Viability of Invading Taiwan</p><p>[19:06] System for Military Governance</p><p>[21:38] Nuclear Force Development</p><p>[29:00] US-China Nuclear Dialogue  </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Shakeup in PLA Rocket Force</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Phillip Saunders, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:16</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar.   

The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional.  

What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario?  

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Earlier this summer, there was an unexpected shakeup in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force. Commander Li Yuchao was removed along with his deputy Liu Guangbin and a former deputy Zhang Zhenzhong. All three men are reportedly under investigation for disciplinary violations by the Central Military Commission’s anti-corruption unit. Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin, former deputy commander of the navy, as head of the Rocket Force, and Xu Xiesheng, from the air force as political commissar.   

The PLA’s Rocket Force, established on January 1, 2016, is the successor to the Second Artillery Corps. It has responsibility for China’s growing arsenal of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, both nuclear and conventional.  

What is the significance of this reshuffle in the PLA’s most sensitive branch? What implications do the appointments of new commanders from other parts of the military have for PLA readiness and preparations for a Taiwan invasion scenario?  

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Phillip Saunders, Director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. Dr. Saunder’s most recent publication is a study he conducted with David Logan on the drivers of China’s nuclear force development. The views he expresses today are his own and do not represent the National Defense University or the US Department of Defense. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>war, nuclear, united states, transparency, rocket, chinese communist party, corruption, loyalty, army, navy, nuclear strike, naval, people’s liberation army, prc, xi jinping, icbm, communication, pla, purge, legal system, taiwan, nationalism, crisis, politics, us, contingency, political, nuclear missile, military, commissar, china, ccp, transparent</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>59</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Centrality of Artificial Intelligence in US-China Competition</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. </p><p>To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01 :37] Centrality of AI in US-China Competition</p><p>[04 :21] China’s Strengths and Weaknesses</p><p>[06 :20] Progress in the Field of AI</p><p>[09 :54] Reducing the Risk of Military AI Accidents</p><p>[13 :37] Discussing AI with the Chinese Government</p><p>[16 :11] Biden Administration’s Export Controls on AI</p><p>[21 :31] Reducing Dependency on the West</p><p>[24 :15] Collaborating on AI Regulation</p><p>[27 :25] Who will spearhead the next Technological Revolution?</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 15 Aug 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Gregory Allen, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/centrality-of-artificial-intelligence-in-us-china-competition-d8Wzr9te</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. </p><p>To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01 :37] Centrality of AI in US-China Competition</p><p>[04 :21] China’s Strengths and Weaknesses</p><p>[06 :20] Progress in the Field of AI</p><p>[09 :54] Reducing the Risk of Military AI Accidents</p><p>[13 :37] Discussing AI with the Chinese Government</p><p>[16 :11] Biden Administration’s Export Controls on AI</p><p>[21 :31] Reducing Dependency on the West</p><p>[24 :15] Collaborating on AI Regulation</p><p>[27 :25] Who will spearhead the next Technological Revolution?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Centrality of Artificial Intelligence in US-China Competition</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Gregory Allen, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:52</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. 

To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Technology is the focus of the intensifying competition between the United States and China, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) is at the core. China views AI as a means to gain a strategic advantage over the United States and its allies. It intends to use AI to build a world-class military. Beijing also views AI as an enabler of surveillance and repression that can help to bolster its illiberal model of governance. China’s national AI strategy calls for a vast expansion of AI in manufacturing, governance, and national defense, with China becoming a global leader in the field by 2030 through multiple AI technology innovations and personnel training centers. 

To discuss this topic, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Gregory Allen, director of the Wadhwani Center for AI and Advanced Technologies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Before joining CSIS, he was the director of strategy and policy at the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, where he oversaw development and implementation of the DOD’s AI Strategy, drove policy and human capital reforms to accelerate the DOD’s adoption of AI, and developed mechanisms for AI governance and ethics. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>beijing, trade, united states, washington, coercion, ai, department of defense, chips, semiconductor, people’s liberation army, prc, state of the art, xi jinping, csis, infrastructure, technological revolution, sanctions, telecommunications, computers, pla, biden, artificial intelligence, software, investment, europe, gmf, export, american, dependency, export controls, us, technology, dod, trump, policy, military, foreign policy, competition, china</itunes:keywords>
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      <itunes:episode>58</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China’s Role in Critical Mineral Supply Chains</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals">list of 50 critical minerals</a>. </p><p>China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security.</p><p> </p><p>Time Stamps</p><p>[01:51] Vulnerabilities and Risks of Overdependence </p><p>[07:07] Development of a Domestic Mining Industry </p><p>[12:42] Environmental Hazards of Processing Raw Minerals </p><p>[18:30] Impact of Export Controls on Gallium and Germanium</p><p>[22:53] Diversifying Sources of Rare Earth Imports</p><p>[26:38] The Critical Raw Materials Act</p><p>[29:58] The Mineral Security Partnership</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 2 Aug 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Abigail Wulf, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-role-in-critical-mineral-supply-chains-zTKf_j4q</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a <a href="https://www.usgs.gov/news/national-news-release/us-geological-survey-releases-2022-list-critical-minerals">list of 50 critical minerals</a>. </p><p>China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Securing America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security.</p><p> </p><p>Time Stamps</p><p>[01:51] Vulnerabilities and Risks of Overdependence </p><p>[07:07] Development of a Domestic Mining Industry </p><p>[12:42] Environmental Hazards of Processing Raw Minerals </p><p>[18:30] Impact of Export Controls on Gallium and Germanium</p><p>[22:53] Diversifying Sources of Rare Earth Imports</p><p>[26:38] The Critical Raw Materials Act</p><p>[29:58] The Mineral Security Partnership</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Role in Critical Mineral Supply Chains</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Abigail Wulf, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:57</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a list of 50 critical minerals.  

China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Security America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Critical minerals are non-fuel minerals or mineral materials essential to the economic or national security of the U.S. They have no viable substitutes yet face a high risk of supply chain disruption. Critical minerals are used for many different purposes, including the production of advanced electronics, weapons systems, manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge medical devices. They are indispensable for the transition to low-carbon energy sources. Last year, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior, with the aid of the U.S. Geological Survey, published a list of 50 critical minerals.  

China dominates global critical mineral supply chains, accounting for approximately 60% of world-wide production and 85% of processing capacity. However, the U.S. and several European countries are taking steps to build out their own ability to mine, process, and manufacture critical minerals. To discuss the implications of China’s role in critical mineral supply chains and the responses of the U.S. and its partners, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Abigail Wulf, vice president and director of the Ambassador Alfred Hoffman Jr. Center for Critical Minerals Strategy at Security America’s Future Energy (SAFE), a non-profit advancing transformative transportation technology to enhance energy security.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>canada, critical raw materials act, energy security, markets, inflation reduction act, restrictions, ira, united states, european union, radioactive, private sector, battery, development, security, demand, rare earth, national security, germany, supply, pandemic, demand signal, russia, recycling, tax incentives, rare earths, opec, semiconductor, prc, department of energy, environmentally friendly, supply chains, economic, exports, waste water, magnets, climate change, industrial revolution, germanium, mining, fossil fuel, industry, silicon, environmental protection agency, sanctions, semiconductors, belgium, india, materials, japan, geology, expertise, minerals, ukraine, clean energy, eu, lithium, batteries, oil, energy, europe, solar cell, export quota, solar cells, magnet, geologic, hazardous waste, us, economy, gallium, supply chain, radioactivity, mineral security partnership, doe, fossil fuels, advanced technology, recycle, critical minerals, environment, extraction, zero emission, competition, china, epa</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>57</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Interpreting China’s New Foreign Relations Law</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>A new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” </p><p>To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:15] Impetus for the Foreign Relations Law</p><p>[02:47] Centralized and Unified Leadership of Foreign Relations</p><p>[04:27] China and Reforming the International Order</p><p>[09:20] How might China use the foreign relations law?</p><p>[11:03] Insurance Against International Courts</p><p>[12:31] Targeting a Domestic Audience</p><p>[15:10] Expected Policy Changes in China</p><p>[17:30] Applicability of the Law in Cross-Strait Relations</p><p>[21:57] Forecasting Chinese Use of Lawfare</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Jul 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Mortiz Rudolf, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/interpreting-chinas-new-foreign-relations-law-TqGTXLVG</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Summary</strong></p><p>A new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” </p><p>To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order.</p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:15] Impetus for the Foreign Relations Law</p><p>[02:47] Centralized and Unified Leadership of Foreign Relations</p><p>[04:27] China and Reforming the International Order</p><p>[09:20] How might China use the foreign relations law?</p><p>[11:03] Insurance Against International Courts</p><p>[12:31] Targeting a Domestic Audience</p><p>[15:10] Expected Policy Changes in China</p><p>[17:30] Applicability of the Law in Cross-Strait Relations</p><p>[21:57] Forecasting Chinese Use of Lawfare</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Interpreting China’s New Foreign Relations Law</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Mortiz Rudolf, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:25:20</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>A new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” 

To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>A new Foreign Relations Law took effect in China on July 1, 2023 that formalizes Chinese Communist Party leadership in all foreign policy matters. It puts China’s security and development interests and global rise at the center of its engagement with the world. The new law has been widely interpreted as providing a legal basis for Beijing’s struggle against what it says is a strategy of containment by the United States and its allies, and against foreign interference and sanctions, as well as what is calls America’s “long-arm jurisdiction.” 

To discuss the Foreign Relations Law, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Moritz Rudolf, a Research Scholar in Law and Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, where he focuses on the implications of China’s rise for the international legal order.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>foreign relations, beijing, united states, washington, law, development, security, extraterritoriality, russia, communism, space, prc, xi jinping, communist, westernization, america, un, sanctions, diplomacy, ukraine, taiwan, containment, chinese, capacity building, developing countries, xinjiang, us, cybere, lawfare, policy, human rights, modernization, international law, china, ccp, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>56</itunes:episode>
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      <guid isPermaLink="false">2d5b2169-94de-4258-b0ef-4b5f6fce79e1</guid>
      <title>US-China Relations Following Blinken’s Beijing Visit</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked.  </p><p>Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:45] US-China Relations at this Juncture</p><p>[05:10] Deterioration of US-China Relations</p><p>[08:30] Analysis of Secretary Blinken’s Visit</p><p>[10:40] Principles Guiding US-China Relations</p><p>[13:16] Is agreement on principles a precondition for progress?</p><p>[13:48] Is the US-China relationship dominated by competition?</p><p>[16:45] Top-Down Pressure to Deny Competition</p><p>[18:30] Displacing the United States</p><p>[19:50] Where Blinken’s Visit Fell Short</p><p>[22:48] Putting a Floor Under the Relationship</p><p>[24:46] Interpreting Evolving Sino-Russian Relations</p><p>[28:15] China’s Initial Reaction to the War in Ukraine</p><p>[29:24] Forecast for US-China Relations                                                                                 </p><p>[31:57] Incentives for Stability</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 4 Jul 2023 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/us-china-relations-following-blinkens-beijing-visit-S_6TmmQR</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked.  </p><p>Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? </p><p>To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:45] US-China Relations at this Juncture</p><p>[05:10] Deterioration of US-China Relations</p><p>[08:30] Analysis of Secretary Blinken’s Visit</p><p>[10:40] Principles Guiding US-China Relations</p><p>[13:16] Is agreement on principles a precondition for progress?</p><p>[13:48] Is the US-China relationship dominated by competition?</p><p>[16:45] Top-Down Pressure to Deny Competition</p><p>[18:30] Displacing the United States</p><p>[19:50] Where Blinken’s Visit Fell Short</p><p>[22:48] Putting a Floor Under the Relationship</p><p>[24:46] Interpreting Evolving Sino-Russian Relations</p><p>[28:15] China’s Initial Reaction to the War in Ukraine</p><p>[29:24] Forecast for US-China Relations                                                                                 </p><p>[31:57] Incentives for Stability</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>US-China Relations Following Blinken’s Beijing Visit</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked.  

Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? 

To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Relations between the United States and China have slid to their lowest point since the 1970s. After President Biden and Xi Jinping met in November 2022, they instructed their senior officials to initiate a process to stabilize the relationship. Before much headway could be made, however, China sent a surveillance balloon to the west coast of the United States that ended up loitering over sensitive military sites and then flew across the entire country before being shot down by the US. Secretary of State Blinken postponed his planned visit to China. Acrimony and distrust spiked.  

Several months later, the US and China decided to try again. Blinken visited Beijing from June 18-19, and had meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office Director Wang Yi, and State Councilor and Foreign Minister Qin Gang. What is the trajectory of the bilateral relationship after the visit? Is it possible to stabilize ties and resume dialogue mechanisms and some forms of cooperation, or is further deterioration of relations more likely? 

To discuss these issues, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Evan Medeiros, the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies. During the Obama administration, Evan served for six years on the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>intercept, elections, united states, blinken, covid, putin, russia, stability, balloon, fonops, prc, xi jinping, pla, biden, ukraine, russian, domestic politics, taiwan, containment, chinese, indo-pacific, apec, american, us, mil-mil, competition, risk, china, philippines</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>55</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China&apos;s Unprofessional Intercept in the Taiwan Strait</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters.</p><p>How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels?</p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:50] Freedom of the High Seas </p><p>[03:21] Joint Freedom of Navigation Operations</p><p>[03:52] Statement by the US Indo-Pacific Command</p><p>[04:46] Statement by Defense Minister Li Shangfu</p><p>[06:49] History of Dangerous Maneuvering by the Chinese</p><p>[07:41] Trigger for the Recent Dangerous Maneuver</p><p>[09:13] Chinese Adherence to International Law</p><p>[10:19] Signaling Intentions in a Safe and Legal Manner</p><p>[12:03] Aftermath of a Hypothetical Collision at Sea</p><p>[14:44] Is the US Goading China into Conflict?</p><p>[17:38] Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters</p><p>[19:24] Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea</p><p>[20:27] The US and the Convention on the Law of the Sea</p><p>[21:51] Interactions with Chinese Experts and Professionals</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jun 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Peter Dutton, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-unprofessional-intercept-in-the-taiwan-strait-BDXtp9bZ</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters.</p><p>How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels?</p><p>To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion. </p><p> </p><p><strong>Timestamps</strong></p><p>[01:50] Freedom of the High Seas </p><p>[03:21] Joint Freedom of Navigation Operations</p><p>[03:52] Statement by the US Indo-Pacific Command</p><p>[04:46] Statement by Defense Minister Li Shangfu</p><p>[06:49] History of Dangerous Maneuvering by the Chinese</p><p>[07:41] Trigger for the Recent Dangerous Maneuver</p><p>[09:13] Chinese Adherence to International Law</p><p>[10:19] Signaling Intentions in a Safe and Legal Manner</p><p>[12:03] Aftermath of a Hypothetical Collision at Sea</p><p>[14:44] Is the US Goading China into Conflict?</p><p>[17:38] Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters</p><p>[19:24] Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea</p><p>[20:27] The US and the Convention on the Law of the Sea</p><p>[21:51] Interactions with Chinese Experts and Professionals</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="24195377" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/bce590cd-a636-4a26-93c2-da2eb0f777fc/audio/f65df34c-1ca3-49aa-9528-00ee90e77ce5/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Unprofessional Intercept in the Taiwan Strait</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Peter Dutton, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:25:12</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters. 

How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels? 

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On June 3, 2023, there was a near-collision between a US and a PRC destroyer in the Taiwan Strait. According to a statement issued by US Indo-Pacific Command, a US Navy destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon, and a Canadian warship were conducting a routine south to north Taiwan Strait transit through waters where high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply. The Luyang III, a People’s Liberation Army destroyer, overtook the Chung-Hoon on her port side and crossed her bow at 150 yards. The US warship maintained course and slowed to 10 knots to avoid a collision. US Indo-Pacific Command stated that the actions of the Chinese destroyer violated the maritime Rules of the Road of safe passage in international waters. 

How dangerous was this incident? Why do US warships sail in these waters, and do they do so in accordance with international law? And what steps should be taken to ensure that accidents do not take place between US and Chinese naval vessels? 

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Peter Dutton, professor of international law in the Stockton Center for International Law at the US Naval War College and an Adjunct Professor of Law at New York University School of Law. His research focuses on international law of the sea, Chinese views of sovereignty and international law, and China’s maritime expansion. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>canada, united states, ussr, cues, high seas, maritime, taiwan strait, navy, mcca, people&apos;s liberation army, prc, unclos, soviet union, un, south china sea, cold war, japan, pla, taiwan, us, people&apos;s republic of china, fonop, international law, china, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>54</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Evolving Switzerland-China Relations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[01:50] Switzerland’s Policy toward China Today</p><p>[03:48] Changes in Swiss-Chinese Relations</p><p>[06:03] Switzerland’s 2021 China Strategy</p><p>[08:17] Areas of Economic Cooperation</p><p>[11:05] Switzerland’s Relationship with Taiwan</p><p>[14:45] Switzerland’s One China Policy</p><p>[17:32] Contending with Human Rights Issues</p><p>[18:55] Huawei’s Presence in Switzerland</p><p>[20:56] China’s Influence in Switzerland</p><p>[23:42] Forecast of Swiss-Chinese Relations</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Jun 2023 12:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Simona Grano, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/evolving-switzerland-china-relations-41zyrXoL</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[01:50] Switzerland’s Policy toward China Today</p><p>[03:48] Changes in Swiss-Chinese Relations</p><p>[06:03] Switzerland’s 2021 China Strategy</p><p>[08:17] Areas of Economic Cooperation</p><p>[11:05] Switzerland’s Relationship with Taiwan</p><p>[14:45] Switzerland’s One China Policy</p><p>[17:32] Contending with Human Rights Issues</p><p>[18:55] Huawei’s Presence in Switzerland</p><p>[20:56] China’s Influence in Switzerland</p><p>[23:42] Forecast of Swiss-Chinese Relations</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Evolving Switzerland-China Relations</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Simona Grano, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:50</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Switzerland was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950. China is Switzerland’s third most important trading partner, with a free trade agreement that has been in effect since 2014. Since 2018, their senior foreign affairs officials have held an annual strategic dialogue. The Chair of Swiss financial services giant UBS Group has described Swiss businesses as “very pro-China.” Since the launch of their bilateral stock exchange agreement last year, Chinese companies have raised more shares in Zurich than it has in the United States.
 
But there is also growing friction in the Swiss-Chinese relationship. In its recently released China Strategy, Switzerland called out the PRC’s increasing “authoritarian tendencies,” and cited China’s human rights violations. At the same time, Switzerland’s relations with Taiwan are expanding against Beijing’s wishes. In February, the Swiss parliament sent a delegation to Taiwan, where they were received by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.  

What’s driving these changes in Swiss-Chinese relations? With its democratic values and open economy, how does Bern reconcile its principle of neutrality with the challenges posed by Beijing?    

To discuss evolving ties between Switzerland and China, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Simona Grano, Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich. Her latest co-edited book is titled, China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers&apos; Strategic Choices.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Switzerland was one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1950. China is Switzerland’s third most important trading partner, with a free trade agreement that has been in effect since 2014. Since 2018, their senior foreign affairs officials have held an annual strategic dialogue. The Chair of Swiss financial services giant UBS Group has described Swiss businesses as “very pro-China.” Since the launch of their bilateral stock exchange agreement last year, Chinese companies have raised more shares in Zurich than it has in the United States.
 
But there is also growing friction in the Swiss-Chinese relationship. In its recently released China Strategy, Switzerland called out the PRC’s increasing “authoritarian tendencies,” and cited China’s human rights violations. At the same time, Switzerland’s relations with Taiwan are expanding against Beijing’s wishes. In February, the Swiss parliament sent a delegation to Taiwan, where they were received by Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen.  

What’s driving these changes in Swiss-Chinese relations? With its democratic values and open economy, how does Bern reconcile its principle of neutrality with the challenges posed by Beijing?    

To discuss evolving ties between Switzerland and China, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Simona Grano, Senior Lecturer and Director of the Taiwan Studies Project at the University of Zurich. Her latest co-edited book is titled, China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers&apos; Strategic Choices.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>belt and road initiative, trade, united states, bern, european union, coercion, huawei, economics, free trade agreement, switzerland, taipei, uighurs, prc, swiss, supply chains, bri, espionage, eu, taiwan, europe, chinese, taiwanese, fta, xinjiang, politics, us, business, tibet, human rights, uyghurs, competition, china, independence</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>53</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China&apos;s Rise in the Global Digital Space</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[01:30] Sinocentric Order in the Digital Sphere</p><p>[06:51] China’s Digital Silk Road </p><p>[09:35] Global Rise of Chinese Digital Platforms</p><p>[11:57] The Strength of Chinese Digital Platforms</p><p>[14:04] The Digital Sector and Government Partnership</p><p>[16:53] Dominance of Western Digital Platforms</p><p>[19:08] Pros and Cons of Banning TikTok </p><p>[21:08] Chinese Crackdown of the Digital Sector</p><p>[23:27] Looking Forward in the Digital Space</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 May 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Peter Raymond, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-rise-in-the-global-digital-space-i_WU74nJ</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[01:30] Sinocentric Order in the Digital Sphere</p><p>[06:51] China’s Digital Silk Road </p><p>[09:35] Global Rise of Chinese Digital Platforms</p><p>[11:57] The Strength of Chinese Digital Platforms</p><p>[14:04] The Digital Sector and Government Partnership</p><p>[16:53] Dominance of Western Digital Platforms</p><p>[19:08] Pros and Cons of Banning TikTok </p><p>[21:08] Chinese Crackdown of the Digital Sector</p><p>[23:27] Looking Forward in the Digital Space</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="27553679" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/6a8c6c21-5375-4d07-bc14-496f53114ed1/audio/057fc40f-7138-4ec6-a76f-2cd61c4e72bd/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Rise in the Global Digital Space</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Peter Raymond, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:42</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In a speech delivered in 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said, “Efforts should be made to build our country into a cyber power.” Under national strategies such as Building Digital China, the Digital Silk Road, and China Standards 2035, Beijing seeks not only the digital transformation of the nation but also aspires to play a leading role in the global digital order. 

How should we understand Beijing’s ambition to become a cyber superpower and have digital sovereignty? What is China’s role in the global digital space today and how do Chinese digital platforms advance China’s influence?

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Peter Raymond, a nonresident senior associate with the economics program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has a 30-year career of service at the intersection of the public and private sectors of infrastructure and financial services. He is author of a recently released CSIS report titled, “Re-platformed Planet? Implications of the Rise and Spread of Chinese Platform Technologies.” </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In a speech delivered in 2014, Chinese leader Xi Jinping said, “Efforts should be made to build our country into a cyber power.” Under national strategies such as Building Digital China, the Digital Silk Road, and China Standards 2035, Beijing seeks not only the digital transformation of the nation but also aspires to play a leading role in the global digital order. 

How should we understand Beijing’s ambition to become a cyber superpower and have digital sovereignty? What is China’s role in the global digital space today and how do Chinese digital platforms advance China’s influence?

To discuss these questions, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Peter Raymond, a nonresident senior associate with the economics program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has a 30-year career of service at the intersection of the public and private sectors of infrastructure and financial services. He is author of a recently released CSIS report titled, “Re-platformed Planet? Implications of the Rise and Spread of Chinese Platform Technologies.” </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>it, information technology, belt and road initiative, beijing, internet governance, united states, huawei, digital silk road, free speech, technology standards, tiktok, internet, xi jinping, infrastructure, un, alibaba, shein, bri, digital space, cyber sovereignty, ecommerce, digital platforms, dsr, privacy, facebook, censorship, emerging economies, surveillance, google, us, generative ai, tencent, zte, china, apps, united nations, regulation</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>52</itunes:episode>
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      <guid isPermaLink="false">2f2763ab-8f5a-48a8-bc14-3b4dcc513868</guid>
      <title>China&apos;s Role in Developing Country Debt Restructuring</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:01] China and International Bailout Activities</p><p>[04:33] China and the G20 Common Framework</p><p>[07:34] Debt Service Suspension Initiative</p><p>[09:42] Definition of a “Haircut” in Finance</p><p>[10:00] IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings</p><p>[12:37] Beijing’s Demands for Write-Downs</p><p>[16:18] Japan, India, and France Establishing a Creditors Committee</p><p>[18:43] Chinese Participation in the Paris Club</p><p>[22:08] Role of Geopolitical Competition in Debt Relief</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 9 May 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Jeremy Mark, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-role-in-developing-country-debt-restructuring-fwMvmL3e</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:01] China and International Bailout Activities</p><p>[04:33] China and the G20 Common Framework</p><p>[07:34] Debt Service Suspension Initiative</p><p>[09:42] Definition of a “Haircut” in Finance</p><p>[10:00] IMF and World Bank Spring Meetings</p><p>[12:37] Beijing’s Demands for Write-Downs</p><p>[16:18] Japan, India, and France Establishing a Creditors Committee</p><p>[18:43] Chinese Participation in the Paris Club</p><p>[22:08] Role of Geopolitical Competition in Debt Relief</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="26162293" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/802cd86c-08ef-4993-a015-14b3772a2c1d/audio/adbd4e69-da36-4f08-86c3-8308e1263167/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Role in Developing Country Debt Restructuring</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jeremy Mark, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, 60% of low-income countries are now in or at high risk of debt distress, double the number in 2015. Zambia defaulted on its public debt two years ago. Sri Lanka, Ghana, Ethiopia and Pakistan have already defaulted or are on the cusp of doing so. In all these cases, China is a significant creditor. China’s lending of projects in other countries between 2000 and 2017 totaled more than $800 billion. In the past five years, Beijing’s lending has tapered off, but it has left a trail of unsustainable debt. 

China’s role in sovereign debt restructuring is under scrutiny and criticism. Beijing has been reluctant to participate in multilateral debt restructuring unless the World Bank and other regional development banks also agree to write down their own loans. The World Bank dismisses that demand, arguing that development bank financing already comes with low interest rates and does not add significantly to a country’s debt burden.

What is China’s approach to debt relief and should it be doing more? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jeremy Mark, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, who writes on developing country debt and US-China issues. He worked in Asia for The Wall Street Journal early in his career and as a communications specialist for the International Monetary Fund for over two decades, where he was responsible for its communications in Africa and Asia. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, 60% of low-income countries are now in or at high risk of debt distress, double the number in 2015. Zambia defaulted on its public debt two years ago. Sri Lanka, Ghana, Ethiopia and Pakistan have already defaulted or are on the cusp of doing so. In all these cases, China is a significant creditor. China’s lending of projects in other countries between 2000 and 2017 totaled more than $800 billion. In the past five years, Beijing’s lending has tapered off, but it has left a trail of unsustainable debt. 

China’s role in sovereign debt restructuring is under scrutiny and criticism. Beijing has been reluctant to participate in multilateral debt restructuring unless the World Bank and other regional development banks also agree to write down their own loans. The World Bank dismisses that demand, arguing that development bank financing already comes with low interest rates and does not add significantly to a country’s debt burden.

What is China’s approach to debt relief and should it be doing more? To discuss these topics and more, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Jeremy Mark, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, who writes on developing country debt and US-China issues. He worked in Asia for The Wall Street Journal early in his career and as a communications specialist for the International Monetary Fund for over two decades, where he was responsible for its communications in Africa and Asia. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>developing country, beijing, united states, washington, lending, world bank, debt, debt trap, janet yellen, bailout, zambia, dssi, sovereign debt restructuring, pakistan, g20, international monetary fund, g7, india, common framework, japan, imf, international development, paris club, geopolitics, loan, strategic competition, sri lanka, france, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>51</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China’s Industrial Policy and Semiconductors</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:14] China’s Implementation of Industrial Policy</p><p>[05:20] Industrial Policy to Achieve Foreign Policy Objectives</p><p>[08:02] Influence of Strategic Competition on Industrial Policy</p><p>[10:42] Efficacy of Chinese Industrial Policies</p><p>[14:17] Semiconductor Subsidies and Export Controls</p><p>[19:06] Chinese Countermeasures to Export Controls</p><p>[22:39] Assessment of U.S. Policy</p><p>[25:58] Forecast of Competition on Advanced Technologies</p><p>[29:50] Balance of Centralization and Adaptation</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Apr 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (John Lee, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-industrial-policy-and-semiconductors-IG_1LaOj</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Timestamps</p><p>[02:14] China’s Implementation of Industrial Policy</p><p>[05:20] Industrial Policy to Achieve Foreign Policy Objectives</p><p>[08:02] Influence of Strategic Competition on Industrial Policy</p><p>[10:42] Efficacy of Chinese Industrial Policies</p><p>[14:17] Semiconductor Subsidies and Export Controls</p><p>[19:06] Chinese Countermeasures to Export Controls</p><p>[22:39] Assessment of U.S. Policy</p><p>[25:58] Forecast of Competition on Advanced Technologies</p><p>[29:50] Balance of Centralization and Adaptation</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="30584163" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/5fa0e55a-edfa-44e9-bc3a-f098c9c3d88c/audio/7c174648-5332-4fdd-849d-5af33505d040/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Industrial Policy and Semiconductors</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>John Lee, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:51</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s use of industrial policies is neither new nor unique, but only in the last decade has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided systematic support to frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and communications. President Xi Jinping announced in 2015 a “Made in China 2025” plan whose aim is Chinese global dominance in 20 key sectors including information technology, green energy technology, and semiconductors. Since then, the CCP has become increasingly involved in private-sector innovation to build Chinese self-sufficiency in cutting-edge technologies. The CCP does not reveal official data on state subsidies but estimates of expenditures range from 1.7% to 4.9% of GDP, far surpassing any other nation’s spending on industrial policy. Yet the success of these costly measures is at best uneven, especially in the crucial semiconductor sector, where China’s design and manufacturing challenges are now compounded by US-led export controls.

To discuss Chinese industrial policies and their overlap with Chinese foreign policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with John Lee, director of East West Futures, a political and risk consultancy that focuses on China. Lee is also a researcher with the Leiden Asia Center and has worked for the Australian Department of Defense, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Lee’s research focuses on China’s semiconductor-related industries, cyberspace governance, and the future of telecommunications networks.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s use of industrial policies is neither new nor unique, but only in the last decade has the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) provided systematic support to frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, robotics, and communications. President Xi Jinping announced in 2015 a “Made in China 2025” plan whose aim is Chinese global dominance in 20 key sectors including information technology, green energy technology, and semiconductors. Since then, the CCP has become increasingly involved in private-sector innovation to build Chinese self-sufficiency in cutting-edge technologies. The CCP does not reveal official data on state subsidies but estimates of expenditures range from 1.7% to 4.9% of GDP, far surpassing any other nation’s spending on industrial policy. Yet the success of these costly measures is at best uneven, especially in the crucial semiconductor sector, where China’s design and manufacturing challenges are now compounded by US-led export controls.

To discuss Chinese industrial policies and their overlap with Chinese foreign policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with John Lee, director of East West Futures, a political and risk consultancy that focuses on China. Lee is also a researcher with the Leiden Asia Center and has worked for the Australian Department of Defense, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Mercator Institute for China Studies. Lee’s research focuses on China’s semiconductor-related industries, cyberspace governance, and the future of telecommunications networks.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>ymtc, industrial policy, big fund, prc, technology policy, xi jinping, semiconductors, export controls, industrial espionage, dual use technology, foreign policy, china, ccp</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>50</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Decoding the Vocabulary of Chinese Foreign Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Time Stamps</p><p>[01:39] Background of The Decoding China Dictionary</p><p>[04:30] Democracy with Chinese Characteristics</p><p>[06:34] Differing Interpretations of International Law</p><p>[08:32] Freedom of Religion Versus Freedom of Religious Belief</p><p>[10:28] Foreign Aid and China as a Developing Country</p><p>[12:01] Security in Chinese Parlance</p><p>[13:55] Transparency and its Uses in China</p><p>[16:19] Historic Revisionism and Domestic Policy</p><p>[18:39] Historic Revisionism and Foreign Policy</p><p>[19:44] Promotion of Chinese Interpretations Internationally</p><p>[23:52] Importance of Understanding Chinese Terminology</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Apr 2023 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Malin Oud, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/decoding-the-vocabulary-of-chinese-foreign-policy-Zk_4nm9G</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Time Stamps</p><p>[01:39] Background of The Decoding China Dictionary</p><p>[04:30] Democracy with Chinese Characteristics</p><p>[06:34] Differing Interpretations of International Law</p><p>[08:32] Freedom of Religion Versus Freedom of Religious Belief</p><p>[10:28] Foreign Aid and China as a Developing Country</p><p>[12:01] Security in Chinese Parlance</p><p>[13:55] Transparency and its Uses in China</p><p>[16:19] Historic Revisionism and Domestic Policy</p><p>[18:39] Historic Revisionism and Foreign Policy</p><p>[19:44] Promotion of Chinese Interpretations Internationally</p><p>[23:52] Importance of Understanding Chinese Terminology</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="25001307" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/7725c280-55d3-4ddc-9230-706acca4329c/audio/5ea7c813-fb1e-4764-8c7e-f58bbbce0de8/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Decoding the Vocabulary of Chinese Foreign Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Malin Oud, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:02</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The terminology of international relations is important to understand, but that task is challenging because shared definitions of key words do not always exist. China’s government and party-state actors, for example, often interpret terms in ways that differ from the American and European understanding of them. Chinese concepts of democracy, rule of law, and human rights are not those of the West. As Beijing seeks to inject its norms into the international order and lead global governance reform, knowing the differences is important.  

To discuss these topics, Bonnie is joined by Malin Oud, director of the Stockholm office of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, where she also heads the institute’s China program. Oud has worked on human rights and sustainable development in China in various capacities for more than 20 years, and was based in Beijing from 2000 to 2009. Two years ago, Malin co-authored The Decoding China Dictionary. In early March, she co-edited the dictionary’s second edition, which includes 26 terms. It is an invaluable resource for understanding Chinese foreign and domestic policies. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The terminology of international relations is important to understand, but that task is challenging because shared definitions of key words do not always exist. China’s government and party-state actors, for example, often interpret terms in ways that differ from the American and European understanding of them. Chinese concepts of democracy, rule of law, and human rights are not those of the West. As Beijing seeks to inject its norms into the international order and lead global governance reform, knowing the differences is important.  

To discuss these topics, Bonnie is joined by Malin Oud, director of the Stockholm office of the Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, where she also heads the institute’s China program. Oud has worked on human rights and sustainable development in China in various capacities for more than 20 years, and was based in Beijing from 2000 to 2009. Two years ago, Malin co-authored The Decoding China Dictionary. In early March, she co-edited the dictionary’s second edition, which includes 26 terms. It is an invaluable resource for understanding Chinese foreign and domestic policies. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>g77, security, domestic policy, universal values, negotiation, prc, xi jinping, rule of law, legitimacy, terminology, international relations, religion, common values, democracy, foreign policy, international system, china, historic revisionism, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>49</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China&apos;s Role in the US Fentanyl Crisis</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[02:10] Chinese Government Awareness of Illicit Domestic Narcotics</p><p>[05:30] China’s Scheduling of Fentanyl in 2019</p><p>[06:40] Difference Between Scheduling and Banning</p><p>[09:50] Lack of Cooperation Between China and Mexico </p><p>[14:18] Chinese Counternarcotics Cooperation in Southeast Asia</p><p>[19:04] Possible Steps for China</p><p>[22:56] A Looming Fentanyl Crisis in China?</p><p>[25:43] Multilateral Approach to Counternarcotics</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Mar 2023 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Vanda Felbab-Brown, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-role-in-the-us-fentanyl-crisis-3nxzjepC</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[02:10] Chinese Government Awareness of Illicit Domestic Narcotics</p><p>[05:30] China’s Scheduling of Fentanyl in 2019</p><p>[06:40] Difference Between Scheduling and Banning</p><p>[09:50] Lack of Cooperation Between China and Mexico </p><p>[14:18] Chinese Counternarcotics Cooperation in Southeast Asia</p><p>[19:04] Possible Steps for China</p><p>[22:56] A Looming Fentanyl Crisis in China?</p><p>[25:43] Multilateral Approach to Counternarcotics</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="27185144" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/dee48d82-fa5e-4233-83d2-f2f3ec655a85/audio/2cd64f71-bf81-42f8-b94e-367cf0e585b8/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Role in the US Fentanyl Crisis</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Vanda Felbab-Brown, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:19</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Overdoses on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are the leading cause of death for Americans under the age of 45. China was for years the world’s primary source of fentanyl, but that changed when the country, in 2019, effectively banned fentanyl exports to the United States, a move that the Trump administration hailed. The celebration, unfortunately, was premature. Chinese chemical and shipping companies began instead selling precursor chemicals for manufacturing fentanyl to Mexican drug cartels, which subsequently smuggled the illicit material into the United States.

Beijing denies that it is the cause of the US fentanyl crisis and blames the US pharmaceutical industry’s power and American social problems.

US-China cooperation on counternarcotics efforts yielded results in the past, but such collaboration is constantly in flux. The two countries’ law enforcement agencies, for example, conducted joint investigations that led to convictions of fentanyl traffickers in 2019. But despite that success, China suspended, in the wake of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, bilateral cooperation in, among other critical areas, counternarcotics activity. The Biden administration is eager to restart cooperation to curb the fentanyl trade.

To discuss China’s role in the fentanyl crisis, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a foreign policy senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Felbab-Brown is also director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors and co-director of the Brookings series “The Opioid Crisis in America: Domestic and International Dimensions”. Her book, Narco Noir: Mexico’s Cartels, Cops, and Corruption, will be released in January 2025.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Overdoses on fentanyl and other synthetic opioids are the leading cause of death for Americans under the age of 45. China was for years the world’s primary source of fentanyl, but that changed when the country, in 2019, effectively banned fentanyl exports to the United States, a move that the Trump administration hailed. The celebration, unfortunately, was premature. Chinese chemical and shipping companies began instead selling precursor chemicals for manufacturing fentanyl to Mexican drug cartels, which subsequently smuggled the illicit material into the United States.

Beijing denies that it is the cause of the US fentanyl crisis and blames the US pharmaceutical industry’s power and American social problems.

US-China cooperation on counternarcotics efforts yielded results in the past, but such collaboration is constantly in flux. The two countries’ law enforcement agencies, for example, conducted joint investigations that led to convictions of fentanyl traffickers in 2019. But despite that success, China suspended, in the wake of former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan, bilateral cooperation in, among other critical areas, counternarcotics activity. The Biden administration is eager to restart cooperation to curb the fentanyl trade.

To discuss China’s role in the fentanyl crisis, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a foreign policy senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology. Felbab-Brown is also director of the Initiative on Nonstate Armed Actors and co-director of the Brookings series “The Opioid Crisis in America: Domestic and International Dimensions”. Her book, Narco Noir: Mexico’s Cartels, Cops, and Corruption, will be released in January 2025.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>meth, asia, united states, triad, cartel, synthetic opioids, trafficking, america, narcotics, opioid crisis, southeast asia, methamphetamine, counternarcotics, analogues, mexico, drug abuse, precursor, fentanyl, heroin, strategic competition, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>48</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China and Australia</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[02:16] The 14 Grievances</p><p>[05:56] Canberra's New Rhetoric</p><p>[07:54] Self-Censorship</p><p>[11:12] Decision Making Tightrope</p><p>[13:00] Darwin Port Lease</p><p>[14:00] Foreign Investment Review Board</p><p>[18:00] AUKUS Announcement in Washington</p><p>[20:13] Australia and the Quad</p><p>[23:19] Within the Albanese Government</p><p>[27:05] Australia on Taiwan</p><p>[31:21] America's China Policy</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Mar 2023 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Benjamin Herscovitch, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-and-australia-4_VWtrXG</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[02:16] The 14 Grievances</p><p>[05:56] Canberra's New Rhetoric</p><p>[07:54] Self-Censorship</p><p>[11:12] Decision Making Tightrope</p><p>[13:00] Darwin Port Lease</p><p>[14:00] Foreign Investment Review Board</p><p>[18:00] AUKUS Announcement in Washington</p><p>[20:13] Australia and the Quad</p><p>[23:19] Within the Albanese Government</p><p>[27:05] Australia on Taiwan</p><p>[31:21] America's China Policy</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="35297314" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/6286f1f8-31f7-4b82-b9a4-d67c87b78a5d/audio/e5472ba3-2171-4a82-9aba-bc64c47b53e6/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China and Australia</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Benjamin Herscovitch, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/9cecf284-dd88-44ed-8cba-1d889f66a8cb/12a48e1a-509e-4649-9494-e4f242dfd8fc/3000x3000/cg-main-thumbnail.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:36:46</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Two and a half years after China imposed trade restrictions on more than one dozen Australian products, bilateral trade may be returning to normal as the diplomatic thaw between Canberra and Beijing gains momentum. Chinese trade bans on products like coal, lime, lobster, timber, and barley were imposed after former Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in September 2020. 

Relations began to warm this past November when Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met at the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Since then, there have been meetings between the two countries’ foreign ministers and a virtual meeting between trade ministers. Early this year, China resumed coal imports from Australia, and some speculate the coal ban may soon be lifted completely. In another sign of warming ties, the Australian government approved a 1.38 billion US dollars Chinese investment in an iron ore joint venture, which is the largest Chinese investment in Australia since 2019. 

So, what explains China’s sudden about face in its approach to Canberra? What does China seek to gain in return if anything? And is Canberra likely to moderate its approach toward Beijing to sustain the positive momentum?

To discuss China’s new approach to Australia, the motivating factors behind it, and the potential future course of China-Australia relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Benjamin Herscovitch, a research fellow at the Australian National University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance and National Security College, whose research focuses on China’s economic statecraft and Australia-China relations. He is also the writer of Beijing to Canberra and Back, a fortnightly newsletter on Substack, that analyzes Australia-China ties. Previously, he was an analyst and policy officer in Australia’s Department of Defence. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Two and a half years after China imposed trade restrictions on more than one dozen Australian products, bilateral trade may be returning to normal as the diplomatic thaw between Canberra and Beijing gains momentum. Chinese trade bans on products like coal, lime, lobster, timber, and barley were imposed after former Prime Minister Scott Morrison called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 in September 2020. 

Relations began to warm this past November when Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese met at the G-20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia. Since then, there have been meetings between the two countries’ foreign ministers and a virtual meeting between trade ministers. Early this year, China resumed coal imports from Australia, and some speculate the coal ban may soon be lifted completely. In another sign of warming ties, the Australian government approved a 1.38 billion US dollars Chinese investment in an iron ore joint venture, which is the largest Chinese investment in Australia since 2019. 

So, what explains China’s sudden about face in its approach to Canberra? What does China seek to gain in return if anything? And is Canberra likely to moderate its approach toward Beijing to sustain the positive momentum?

To discuss China’s new approach to Australia, the motivating factors behind it, and the potential future course of China-Australia relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Benjamin Herscovitch, a research fellow at the Australian National University’s School of Regulation and Global Governance and National Security College, whose research focuses on China’s economic statecraft and Australia-China relations. He is also the writer of Beijing to Canberra and Back, a fortnightly newsletter on Substack, that analyzes Australia-China ties. Previously, he was an analyst and policy officer in Australia’s Department of Defence. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>beijing, trade, united states, iron, security, coal, taiwan strait, wolf-warrior, xi jinping, america, darwin port, diplomacy, canberra, scott morrison, aukus, australia, anthony albanese, taiwan, economic coercion, parliament, quad, investments, strategy, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>47</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <title>US-China Competition in Africa</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[02:28] China’s Objectives & Success in Africa</p><p>[06:02] China’s Political Model & Engaging Political Elites</p><p>[12:27] China-Africa Support at the UN</p><p>[14:47] Declining Chinese Investments</p><p>[16:04] Public Opinion and US-Chinese Competition</p><p>[22:19] Debt Strains on Relations</p><p>[25:45] Chinese Propaganda in Africa </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Joshua Eisenman, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/us-china-competition-in-africa-s3wYcG90</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[02:28] China’s Objectives & Success in Africa</p><p>[06:02] China’s Political Model & Engaging Political Elites</p><p>[12:27] China-Africa Support at the UN</p><p>[14:47] Declining Chinese Investments</p><p>[16:04] Public Opinion and US-Chinese Competition</p><p>[22:19] Debt Strains on Relations</p><p>[25:45] Chinese Propaganda in Africa </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="28258881" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/e5460b1a-b08b-4878-b5a7-3fe700952ffe/audio/3f60e951-646a-4218-85aa-bb7b6d356494/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>US-China Competition in Africa</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Joshua Eisenman, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/9cecf284-dd88-44ed-8cba-1d889f66a8cb/2a79ce15-f455-478e-bc85-7dc2bd7e0242/3000x3000/cg-main-thumbnail.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:26</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s newly appointed foreign minister,  Qin Gang, upheld a 33-year tradition by making his first trip since taking office to Africa. Gang visited Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, Benin, and Egypt. Chinese President Xi Jinping has prominently elevated the continent as a foreign policy priority and himself traveled there ten times between 2014 and 2020. 

After Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment in Africa surged, peaking at $28.4 billion in 2016. For 2020 the figure was only $1.9 billion, lowered, in part, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, changing Chinese priorities, and African governments’ difficulties repaying Chinese loans.  

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden’s administration has deepened US engagement with Africa. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited in January. A month before that, Biden hosted 49 African leaders at the United States-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC. He announced then that he will visit sub-Saharan  Africa later this year, the first trip there by a US president in a decade. 

To discuss China’s interests and US-China competition in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joshua Eisenman, associate professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Eisenman’s research focuses on China’s development and its relations with the Global South, particularly Africa. His forthcoming book, &quot;China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement,&quot; co-authored with Ambassador David Shinn, will be available this summer.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s newly appointed foreign minister,  Qin Gang, upheld a 33-year tradition by making his first trip since taking office to Africa. Gang visited Ethiopia, Angola, Gabon, Benin, and Egypt. Chinese President Xi Jinping has prominently elevated the continent as a foreign policy priority and himself traveled there ten times between 2014 and 2020. 

After Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment in Africa surged, peaking at $28.4 billion in 2016. For 2020 the figure was only $1.9 billion, lowered, in part, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, changing Chinese priorities, and African governments’ difficulties repaying Chinese loans.  

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden’s administration has deepened US engagement with Africa. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and US Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield visited in January. A month before that, Biden hosted 49 African leaders at the United States-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC. He announced then that he will visit sub-Saharan  Africa later this year, the first trip there by a US president in a decade. 

To discuss China’s interests and US-China competition in Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joshua Eisenman, associate professor of politics at the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame. Eisenman’s research focuses on China’s development and its relations with the Global South, particularly Africa. His forthcoming book, &quot;China’s Relations with Africa: A New Era of Strategic Engagement,&quot; co-authored with Ambassador David Shinn, will be available this summer.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>propaganda, belt and road initiative, united states, debt, pandemic, africa, engagement, prc, un, bri, covid-19, investment, us, strategy, competition, china, ccp, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>46</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">d7196ac5-6106-4190-82ea-3f4591347492</guid>
      <title>Chinese Surveillance Balloon</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[00:00] Topic and Guest Introduction</p><p>[02:31] Information Collection Capabilities</p><p>[07:25] Chinese Motivations</p><p>[10:40] Reaction to Shot Down Balloon</p><p>[13:59] Mil-Mil Dialogue</p><p>[16:59] Leverage Over China</p><p>[19:15] Guidance from Past Incidents</p><p>[22:08] Risk Reduction Measures</p><p>[24:47] Balloon Incident and Xi Jinping</p><p>[27:32] Wartime Use of Balloons</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2023 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinese-surveillance-balloon-EZlIqwcT</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[00:00] Topic and Guest Introduction</p><p>[02:31] Information Collection Capabilities</p><p>[07:25] Chinese Motivations</p><p>[10:40] Reaction to Shot Down Balloon</p><p>[13:59] Mil-Mil Dialogue</p><p>[16:59] Leverage Over China</p><p>[19:15] Guidance from Past Incidents</p><p>[22:08] Risk Reduction Measures</p><p>[24:47] Balloon Incident and Xi Jinping</p><p>[27:32] Wartime Use of Balloons</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="31082613" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/5e513e0e-bc52-42cf-8433-581aa7399942/audio/968a630a-fd60-4204-a183-6b952a11e617/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Chinese Surveillance Balloon</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/9cecf284-dd88-44ed-8cba-1d889f66a8cb/5f6f0e22-2ed8-4788-a17f-a772a00e9c66/3000x3000/china-global-twitter-02.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:22</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On January 28 , just days before US Secretary of State Antony  Blinken was due to travel to Beijing, a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon carrying a payload the size of three buses entered the US Air Defense Identification Zone north of the Aleutian Islands. It drifted eastward, over Alaska and Canada, before reaching the continental United States. Officials in Washington claim that the balloon’s entry into US airspace, not to mention its loitering over sensitive military installations in Montana, violated American sovereignty and international law. US President Joe  Biden, advised that the balloon posed no immediate threat and that shooting it down over land risked harm to civilians and property, ordered the military to end the balloon’s meanderings once it reached the Atlantic Ocean. Blinken’s trip was postponed. 
  
The Chinese expressed regret about the intrusion, maintaining that the vessel was a weather balloon that had gone off course. Beijing also condemned the decision to shoot it down, saying the act was a “clear overreaction and a serious violation of international practice”.  The Chinese indicated that they reserved the right to respond. 

To discuss China’s intelligence operations and the implications of the surveillance balloon for US-China relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with retired Senior Intelligence Officer John Culver. He worked at the Central Intelligence Agency for 35 years analyzing East Asian affairs, including those related to China and the People’s Liberation Army. From 2015 to 2018, he was the National Intelligence Council’s national intelligence officer  for East Asia. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On January 28 , just days before US Secretary of State Antony  Blinken was due to travel to Beijing, a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon carrying a payload the size of three buses entered the US Air Defense Identification Zone north of the Aleutian Islands. It drifted eastward, over Alaska and Canada, before reaching the continental United States. Officials in Washington claim that the balloon’s entry into US airspace, not to mention its loitering over sensitive military installations in Montana, violated American sovereignty and international law. US President Joe  Biden, advised that the balloon posed no immediate threat and that shooting it down over land risked harm to civilians and property, ordered the military to end the balloon’s meanderings once it reached the Atlantic Ocean. Blinken’s trip was postponed. 
  
The Chinese expressed regret about the intrusion, maintaining that the vessel was a weather balloon that had gone off course. Beijing also condemned the decision to shoot it down, saying the act was a “clear overreaction and a serious violation of international practice”.  The Chinese indicated that they reserved the right to respond. 

To discuss China’s intelligence operations and the implications of the surveillance balloon for US-China relations, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with retired Senior Intelligence Officer John Culver. He worked at the Central Intelligence Agency for 35 years analyzing East Asian affairs, including those related to China and the People’s Liberation Army. From 2015 to 2018, he was the National Intelligence Council’s national intelligence officer  for East Asia. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>reconnaissance, balloongate, united states, national security, department of defense, montana, shot down, balloon, xi jinping, spy, chinese, american, surveillance, dod, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>45</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">0c481de4-d31a-4c41-86b2-ad0b9f96a88d</guid>
      <title>China and North Korea</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[01:59] Xi’s Relationship with Kim Jong-un</p><p>[05:12] 1961 Treaty on Friendship</p><p>[09:48] Chinese Economic Assistance</p><p>[12:33] Impact of US-DPRK Negotiations</p><p>[16:02] Sino-American Divergence on North Korea</p><p>[21:05] A Seventh Nuclear Test</p><p>[25:30] South Korean Nuclear Deterrence</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 1 Feb 2023 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-and-north-korea-VJNwVNtO</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[01:59] Xi’s Relationship with Kim Jong-un</p><p>[05:12] 1961 Treaty on Friendship</p><p>[09:48] Chinese Economic Assistance</p><p>[12:33] Impact of US-DPRK Negotiations</p><p>[16:02] Sino-American Divergence on North Korea</p><p>[21:05] A Seventh Nuclear Test</p><p>[25:30] South Korean Nuclear Deterrence</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="28641314" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/f9daf3fc-7f7e-419b-a780-31635b6cc6cb/audio/7e359001-38a7-4a7a-9394-8c1eca02500e/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China and North Korea</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Yun Sun</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:50</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>“As close as lips and teeth.” So described Mao Zedong China’s relationship with North Korea, the only country with which, since 1961, China has a mutual defense treaty. But many sources of bilateral friction exist, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s close relationship with South Korea. 

Recent regional and global developments are now causing China to adjust its policy toward North Korea. The war in Ukraine may be driving the two countries closer together, as evidenced by Beijing’s veto last May of a draft UN Security Council resolution aimed at tightening sanctions against Pyongyang. This was the first time China wielded its veto on the issue. Since 2006, the Security Council approved ten similar resolutions unanimously. Given China’s new stance, how would it respond if North Korea conducts a nuclear test in the coming months? 

To discuss China’s evolving policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Yun Sun, a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program, and director of the China Program, at the Stimson Center.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>“As close as lips and teeth.” So described Mao Zedong China’s relationship with North Korea, the only country with which, since 1961, China has a mutual defense treaty. But many sources of bilateral friction exist, including North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s close relationship with South Korea. 

Recent regional and global developments are now causing China to adjust its policy toward North Korea. The war in Ukraine may be driving the two countries closer together, as evidenced by Beijing’s veto last May of a draft UN Security Council resolution aimed at tightening sanctions against Pyongyang. This was the first time China wielded its veto on the issue. Since 2006, the Security Council approved ten similar resolutions unanimously. Given China’s new stance, how would it respond if North Korea conducts a nuclear test in the coming months? 

To discuss China’s evolving policy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Yun Sun, a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Program, and director of the China Program, at the Stimson Center.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>nuclear, united states, south korea, national security, weapons testing, north korea, sanctions, china, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>44</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <title>China’s Shifting Foreign Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:42] Xi Jinping’s Public Diplomacy at the G20 Summit</p><p>[4:30] Qin Gang’s New Approaches  </p><p>[5:50] Internal & External Pressures on China’s Behavior?</p><p>[9:59] China-Australia Relations</p><p>[15:32] Allyship & Challenges in Southeast Asia  </p><p>[18:27] US-China Relations</p><p>[23:48] Indicators of Changes to China's Foreign Policy</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jan 2023 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Ryan Hass)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-shifting-foreign-policy-MJa_TJ_n</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:42] Xi Jinping’s Public Diplomacy at the G20 Summit</p><p>[4:30] Qin Gang’s New Approaches  </p><p>[5:50] Internal & External Pressures on China’s Behavior?</p><p>[9:59] China-Australia Relations</p><p>[15:32] Allyship & Challenges in Southeast Asia  </p><p>[18:27] US-China Relations</p><p>[23:48] Indicators of Changes to China's Foreign Policy</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="25349770" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/a855a20b-8f9e-43a5-a8a4-b4b3a44bb2fb/audio/627f4916-ed9e-4ec8-bb51-a9203f5d3c54/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Shifting Foreign Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Ryan Hass</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:23</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>President Xi Jinping smiled when he met his US counterpart, Joe Biden, on the margins of last November’s G20 summit in Indonesia. Xi also struck a moderate tone in his remarks and in meetings with several other leaders, especially Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese. Are we seeing a shift in Chinese foreign policy? If so, is it tactical or more strategic? And what is driving it?

The National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, recently suggested that the Chinese have recognized that certain elements of their foreign policy, such as their wolf-warrior diplomacy, have been unsuccessful and, in many respects, have backfired. Other experts speculate that Xi needs to focus attention on addressing mounting domestic economic and pandemic challenges , and consequently needs a more favorable external environment including, in particular, reduced tensions with the United States.

To discuss the factors shaping current Chinese foreign policy and the direction China’s approach to the world is taking, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>President Xi Jinping smiled when he met his US counterpart, Joe Biden, on the margins of last November’s G20 summit in Indonesia. Xi also struck a moderate tone in his remarks and in meetings with several other leaders, especially Australia’s new prime minister, Anthony Albanese. Are we seeing a shift in Chinese foreign policy? If so, is it tactical or more strategic? And what is driving it?

The National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, recently suggested that the Chinese have recognized that certain elements of their foreign policy, such as their wolf-warrior diplomacy, have been unsuccessful and, in many respects, have backfired. Other experts speculate that Xi needs to focus attention on addressing mounting domestic economic and pandemic challenges , and consequently needs a more favorable external environment including, in particular, reduced tensions with the United States.

To discuss the factors shaping current Chinese foreign policy and the direction China’s approach to the world is taking, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies and the Chen-fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies at the Brookings Institution. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>foreign relations, g20, chinese, indo-pacific, foreign policy, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>43</itunes:episode>
    </item>
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      <guid isPermaLink="false">97c24859-2425-40c4-be95-9bf108055fd7</guid>
      <title>China and the Middle East</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[01:34] China’s Interests in the Middle East</p><p>[03:25] Chinese Engagement During the Past Decade</p><p>[05:54] Xi’s Trip to Saudi Arabia</p><p>[08:22] Security and the Sino-Middle Eastern Relationships</p><p>[11:05] Role of Multilateral Institutions</p><p>[14:09] Perceptions of Huawei</p><p>[18:12] Perceptions of Xinjiang</p><p>[22:39] The Sino-Iranian Relationship</p><p>[26:24] China’s Role in Conflicts</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 4 Jan 2023 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Jonathan Fulton, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-and-the-middle-east-2g_xbcwL</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[01:34] China’s Interests in the Middle East</p><p>[03:25] Chinese Engagement During the Past Decade</p><p>[05:54] Xi’s Trip to Saudi Arabia</p><p>[08:22] Security and the Sino-Middle Eastern Relationships</p><p>[11:05] Role of Multilateral Institutions</p><p>[14:09] Perceptions of Huawei</p><p>[18:12] Perceptions of Xinjiang</p><p>[22:39] The Sino-Iranian Relationship</p><p>[26:24] China’s Role in Conflicts</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="28505477" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/6609bc2c-8a3f-423b-bacc-ca812df0d1d6/audio/fce25db6-05a4-421f-9bff-d71377e07643/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China and the Middle East</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Jonathan Fulton, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:41</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In early December, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Saudi Arabia for a three-day trip, his first to the country since 2016. Xi met with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Kingdom, which promises to usher in a “new era” of China-Saudi relations. Xi also held a summit with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries and a China-Arab States Summit with leaders from 21 countries of the Arab League.

To discuss Xi’s visit and China’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Jonathan Fulton, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and the host of the China-MENA Podcast.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In early December, Chinese President Xi Jinping traveled to Saudi Arabia for a three-day trip, his first to the country since 2016. Xi met with King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Kingdom, which promises to usher in a “new era” of China-Saudi relations. Xi also held a summit with six Gulf Cooperation Council countries and a China-Arab States Summit with leaders from 21 countries of the Arab League.

To discuss Xi’s visit and China’s policy towards the Middle East and North Africa, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Jonathan Fulton, an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zayed University in Abu Dhabi, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and the host of the China-MENA Podcast.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>middle east, chinese foreign policy, north africa, xi jingping, saudi arabia, foreign policy, china, gulf countries</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>42</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
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      <title>China’s Energy Security</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:40] China’s Approach to Energy Security</p><p>[4:45] Dependence on Russia’s Energy</p><p>[14:08] Oil Partnerships with the Gulf</p><p>[16:41] Decarbonization & Energy Security Goals</p><p>[19:41] China’s Overseas Energy Investments </p><p>[22:23] US-China Energy & Climate Change Cooperation</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Erica Downs)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-energy-security-p4tJaMAG</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:40] China’s Approach to Energy Security</p><p>[4:45] Dependence on Russia’s Energy</p><p>[14:08] Oil Partnerships with the Gulf</p><p>[16:41] Decarbonization & Energy Security Goals</p><p>[19:41] China’s Overseas Energy Investments </p><p>[22:23] US-China Energy & Climate Change Cooperation</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="28065366" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/edcfe2e1-62b0-4a21-a4f5-cd7031a84fad/audio/778912d0-c538-42aa-97e0-1af9890ee887/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Energy Security</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Erica Downs</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:14</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Following the COP 27 climate change summit in Egypt and preceding the oncoming winter, energy security is a concern for many countries. China, which has become a major player in global energy markets, is no exception. Its willingness to buy Russian oil and sell excess liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe has significantly influenced energy flows in 2022. 

Unsurprisingly, energy security has been among Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s priorities. He has said that China “must hold the energy food bowl in its own hands”. The country is a significant consumer of renewables and fossil fuels, and its changing energy mix and overseas energy investments impacts the world’s ability to combat global warming. 

To discuss the evolution of China’s energy policy and its influence on global energy markets, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with 
Dr. Erica Downs, senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Dr. Downs previously worked as a senior research scientist in the China Studies program of the CNA Corporation, as a senior analyst in the Asia practice at Eurasia Group, as an energy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and as a lecturer at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Following the COP 27 climate change summit in Egypt and preceding the oncoming winter, energy security is a concern for many countries. China, which has become a major player in global energy markets, is no exception. Its willingness to buy Russian oil and sell excess liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe has significantly influenced energy flows in 2022. 

Unsurprisingly, energy security has been among Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s priorities. He has said that China “must hold the energy food bowl in its own hands”. The country is a significant consumer of renewables and fossil fuels, and its changing energy mix and overseas energy investments impacts the world’s ability to combat global warming. 

To discuss the evolution of China’s energy policy and its influence on global energy markets, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with 
Dr. Erica Downs, senior research scholar at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Dr. Downs previously worked as a senior research scientist in the China Studies program of the CNA Corporation, as a senior analyst in the Asia practice at Eurasia Group, as an energy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency, and as a lecturer at the Foreign Affairs College in Beijing.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>energy security, security, liquefied natural gas, oil, energy, energy markets, foreign policy, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>41</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">939555d3-140b-48ac-9cab-4942954bad9f</guid>
      <title>China’s Role in the United Nations</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[2:20] UN Significance & China’s Objectives</p><p>[8:25] China’s Veto Power</p><p>[11:17] UN Security Council Reform</p><p>[13:53] China’s Funding Contributions</p><p>[18:13] China’s Leadership in UN Agencies</p><p>[25:21] Influence on WHO & COVID-19</p><p>[28:47] China’s Future Role in the UN</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 1 Dec 2022 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Courtney Fung)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-role-in-the-united-nations-uMbKxVrp</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[2:20] UN Significance & China’s Objectives</p><p>[8:25] China’s Veto Power</p><p>[11:17] UN Security Council Reform</p><p>[13:53] China’s Funding Contributions</p><p>[18:13] China’s Leadership in UN Agencies</p><p>[25:21] Influence on WHO & COVID-19</p><p>[28:47] China’s Future Role in the UN</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="31425340" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/6aca353d-793c-49b9-b78b-dc74a1500cb3/audio/badf0ec5-2d23-4f1f-8ea8-e60c57fc3564/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Role in the United Nations</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Courtney Fung</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:44</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China has been a member of the United Nations and the UN Security Council since its founding. UN Resolution 2758, which expelled the Republic of China and gave its seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), marked a turning point in the PRC’s diplomatic representation and led to the normalization of relations with many countries, including the United States. Over time, China became an active participant in the UN and its influence increased dramatically. In 2020, China headed four of the 15 principal specialized agencies of the UN and had deputies in nine other agencies. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October, China’s leader Xi Jinping said that “China is firm in safeguarding the international system with the United Nations at its core,” reiterating the importance that China attaches to the UN in the international system. 
Beijing’s agenda in the United Nations provides important clues about its views of the global order and how it seeks to revise that order to defend and advance its interests. At times, China has voted alongside the United States and its allies, such as when sanctions were imposed on North Korea for conducting nuclear weapons tests. However, on other issues, such as human rights and the war in Ukraine, Beijing has adopted opposing positions.  
To discuss China’s policy toward the UN, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Courtney Fung, an associate professor in the Department of Security Studies &amp; Criminology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. Fung is also an associate fellow at both Chatham House and the Lowy Institute and her book, China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (2019), examines China’s engagement with the UN. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China has been a member of the United Nations and the UN Security Council since its founding. UN Resolution 2758, which expelled the Republic of China and gave its seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), marked a turning point in the PRC’s diplomatic representation and led to the normalization of relations with many countries, including the United States. Over time, China became an active participant in the UN and its influence increased dramatically. In 2020, China headed four of the 15 principal specialized agencies of the UN and had deputies in nine other agencies. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress in October, China’s leader Xi Jinping said that “China is firm in safeguarding the international system with the United Nations at its core,” reiterating the importance that China attaches to the UN in the international system. 
Beijing’s agenda in the United Nations provides important clues about its views of the global order and how it seeks to revise that order to defend and advance its interests. At times, China has voted alongside the United States and its allies, such as when sanctions were imposed on North Korea for conducting nuclear weapons tests. However, on other issues, such as human rights and the war in Ukraine, Beijing has adopted opposing positions.  
To discuss China’s policy toward the UN, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Courtney Fung, an associate professor in the Department of Security Studies &amp; Criminology at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia. Fung is also an associate fellow at both Chatham House and the Lowy Institute and her book, China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status (2019), examines China’s engagement with the UN. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>un, chinese policy, ukraine, global order, un security council, human rights, foreign policy, china, united nations</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>40</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">d2bad9b8-6492-49f7-92d8-a64b1d804e79</guid>
      <title>Olaf Scholz’s Trip to China</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[01:26] Criticism of Scholz’s Trip</p><p>[5:18] Scholz’s Trip Aspirations</p><p>[8:40] German and European Perceptions of the trip</p><p>[11:33] Xi Jinping’s Gains & Sino-German Relationship</p><p>[13:20] Germany’s China Strategy</p><p>[21:38] Germany’s Changing Taiwan Policy</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2022 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Noah Barkin)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/olaf-scholzs-trip-to-china-auMOQOur</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[01:26] Criticism of Scholz’s Trip</p><p>[5:18] Scholz’s Trip Aspirations</p><p>[8:40] German and European Perceptions of the trip</p><p>[11:33] Xi Jinping’s Gains & Sino-German Relationship</p><p>[13:20] Germany’s China Strategy</p><p>[21:38] Germany’s Changing Taiwan Policy</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="24577078" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/368fe636-801b-4464-9101-6e9a0fd4b6ff/audio/f7404ac2-ac24-4c9d-8a81-0f4778a4ca8c/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Olaf Scholz’s Trip to China</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Noah Barkin</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:25:36</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On November 4, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China, marking the first time that a G7 country’s leader met with President Xi Jinping since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic and since Xi secured a third term in power. It was also their first in-person meeting since Scholz took over the Chancellery from long-time leader Angela Merkel in 2021 and since the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi’s further consolidation of power. 
To assess the outcomes of Chancellor Scholz’s trip and Germany’s policy toward China, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Noah Barkin, a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and Managing Editor at the Rhodium Group’s China Practice. Barkin writes about European policy toward China in his monthly Watching China in Europe newsletter. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On November 4, Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz visited China, marking the first time that a G7 country’s leader met with President Xi Jinping since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic and since Xi secured a third term in power. It was also their first in-person meeting since Scholz took over the Chancellery from long-time leader Angela Merkel in 2021 and since the conclusion of the 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party and Xi’s further consolidation of power. 
To assess the outcomes of Chancellor Scholz’s trip and Germany’s policy toward China, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Noah Barkin, a visiting senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund and Managing Editor at the Rhodium Group’s China Practice. Barkin writes about European policy toward China in his monthly Watching China in Europe newsletter. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>olaf scholz, european foreign policy, taiwan, europe, chinese foreign policy, xi jingping, foreign policy, china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>39</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">7b471a21-b76d-4d0d-9a89-334919b17b0b</guid>
      <title>The 20th Party Congress &amp; China’s Foreign Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:41] Xi Jinping’s Political Report: Main Themes </p><p>[3:27] The International Environment and Implications</p><p>[7:59] Taiwan</p><p>[13:21] China’s Reform of the Global Governance System</p><p>[16:23] The PLA and China’s Military Modernization</p><p>[20:51] US-China Competition: Xi Jinping’s Approach Going Forward</p><p>[23:48] Personnel Arrangements</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 2 Nov 2022 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Bates Gill)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-20th-party-congress-chinas-foreign-policy-zeVGPPFp</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:41] Xi Jinping’s Political Report: Main Themes </p><p>[3:27] The International Environment and Implications</p><p>[7:59] Taiwan</p><p>[13:21] China’s Reform of the Global Governance System</p><p>[16:23] The PLA and China’s Military Modernization</p><p>[20:51] US-China Competition: Xi Jinping’s Approach Going Forward</p><p>[23:48] Personnel Arrangements</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="24986270" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/3c6d199c-347a-4271-a89c-dd9711f6f6d8/audio/79fefc9d-8362-4a68-95e7-4ca1920e6248/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>The 20th Party Congress &amp; China’s Foreign Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Bates Gill</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:01</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>From October 16 to 22, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 20th Party Congress. The Party Congress is held every five years to reshuffle the Party’s top leadership, followed by a political report delivered by the Party General Secretary. This report reviews the achievements of the past five years and sets priorities for the next five years. During the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping secured a third term as General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In spring 2023, the National People’s Congress will elect the next president of the People’s Republic of China and minister of foreign affairs. China watchers around the world have been closely tracking the personnel changes and analyzing the Party Congress political report. 

To analyze some of the crucial elements of that report and discuss the impact of the Party Congress on China’s foreign policy strategy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bates Gill. Gill is the executive director of the newly established Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Gill has authored or edited nine books on China and Asia, including Daring to Struggle: China’s Global Ambitions under Xi Jinping, which was published in June 2022. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>From October 16 to 22, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 20th Party Congress. The Party Congress is held every five years to reshuffle the Party’s top leadership, followed by a political report delivered by the Party General Secretary. This report reviews the achievements of the past five years and sets priorities for the next five years. During the 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping secured a third term as General Secretary of the CCP and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. In spring 2023, the National People’s Congress will elect the next president of the People’s Republic of China and minister of foreign affairs. China watchers around the world have been closely tracking the personnel changes and analyzing the Party Congress political report. 

To analyze some of the crucial elements of that report and discuss the impact of the Party Congress on China’s foreign policy strategy, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bates Gill. Gill is the executive director of the newly established Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Gill has authored or edited nine books on China and Asia, including Daring to Struggle: China’s Global Ambitions under Xi Jinping, which was published in June 2022. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>china foreign policy, chinese party congress, chinese elections, xi jinping, national people’s congress, political report, foreign policy, china, ccp</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>38</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">ae72603d-cd52-4eb7-9e94-9c070dce9646</guid>
      <title>China’s Influence on Global Media</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[2:01] China’s Objectives in the Global Media Environment</p><p>[5:22] Evolution of CCP’s Tactics, and Investments</p><p>[8:22] Levels and Effectiveness of Chinese Media Influence</p><p>[18:03] Approaches in Less/Non-Free Countries</p><p>[20:02] Government, Civil Society, & Journalists’ Resilience</p><p>[26:29] Erosion of Governance </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Oct 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Sarah Cook)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-influence-on-global-media-duMzlWIA</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[2:01] China’s Objectives in the Global Media Environment</p><p>[5:22] Evolution of CCP’s Tactics, and Investments</p><p>[8:22] Levels and Effectiveness of Chinese Media Influence</p><p>[18:03] Approaches in Less/Non-Free Countries</p><p>[20:02] Government, Civil Society, & Journalists’ Resilience</p><p>[26:29] Erosion of Governance </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="29153323" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/72c29fb8-7208-476a-b01c-f473604a46f6/audio/6261c5bb-9104-4707-8d2c-ed061d23357c/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Influence on Global Media</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Sarah Cook</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:22</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Over the last two decades, China has invested in the international media system to shape different populations’ public opinion on China and to suppress anti-China media narratives. Its investments include funding media organizations and communications infrastructure in targeted countries, engaging with foreign publics on social media, launching dis- and misinformation campaigns, training journalists, and other strategies. In the process, independent, objective journalism has been eroded, thus challenging the resiliency of governments, civil society, and the media. 
 
To discuss China’s investments in and impact on international media, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Sarah Cook, research director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House. Cook is one of the lead authors on Freedom House’s recently published report, Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022. She also directs the China Media Bulletin, an English and Chinese monthly digest on China-related media freedom developments. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Over the last two decades, China has invested in the international media system to shape different populations’ public opinion on China and to suppress anti-China media narratives. Its investments include funding media organizations and communications infrastructure in targeted countries, engaging with foreign publics on social media, launching dis- and misinformation campaigns, training journalists, and other strategies. In the process, independent, objective journalism has been eroded, thus challenging the resiliency of governments, civil society, and the media. 
 
To discuss China’s investments in and impact on international media, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Sarah Cook, research director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House. Cook is one of the lead authors on Freedom House’s recently published report, Beijing’s Global Media Influence 2022. She also directs the China Media Bulletin, an English and Chinese monthly digest on China-related media freedom developments. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>global media, media, misinformation, disinformation, chinese media influence, media influence, news organizations, china, journalist, anti-china media, ccp, china journalism</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>37</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">a13c6f3f-077b-4aff-946d-6b0fb1c28939</guid>
      <title>China, the SCO, and Central Asia</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[2:21] Shanghai Five and the SCO </p><p>[6:22] Takeaways from Xi Jinping’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan</p><p>[10:16] Russia-China Dynamic in Central Asia</p><p>[15:07] Public Attitudes Toward China</p><p>[17:34] Xinjiang and Government Responses</p><p>[19:08] China’s Approach to Central Asia’s Energy Resources</p><p>[21:33] Turkey and Expanding SCO Membership</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 4 Oct 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Vina Nadjibulla)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-the-sco-and-central-asia-7h5AiVyR</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[2:21] Shanghai Five and the SCO </p><p>[6:22] Takeaways from Xi Jinping’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan</p><p>[10:16] Russia-China Dynamic in Central Asia</p><p>[15:07] Public Attitudes Toward China</p><p>[17:34] Xinjiang and Government Responses</p><p>[19:08] China’s Approach to Central Asia’s Energy Resources</p><p>[21:33] Turkey and Expanding SCO Membership</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="26625078" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/3c5a4a22-7541-476e-9fea-b8e54932d9d0/audio/45dca71c-f027-46b7-8bd3-60908e2322ec/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China, the SCO, and Central Asia</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Vina Nadjibulla</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:44</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit took place on September 15–16 in Uzbekistan&apos;s Samarkand. The leaders of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, as well as the leaders of observer countries Iran, Belarus, and Mongolia attended. In addition, the leaders of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan joined the summit as special guests. This was the first in-person SCO summit since June 2019 and was also Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first trip outside of China since early 2020. As the SCO marks 21 years since its founding, the question remains: has it achieved Beijing’s goals and advanced Chinese interests?  

To discuss the SCO as well as China’s interests and role in Central Asia, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Vina Nadjibulla, an adjunct professor at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia. Her current research focuses on China’s diplomacy in multilateral and regional organizations. Nadjibulla previously worked at the United Nations headquarters in New York and in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in West and Central Africa. Born in the Soviet Union, raised in Afghanistan, and educated in the United States, Nadjibulla has also worked and lived in China and Central Asia.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit took place on September 15–16 in Uzbekistan&apos;s Samarkand. The leaders of China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, as well as the leaders of observer countries Iran, Belarus, and Mongolia attended. In addition, the leaders of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Turkmenistan joined the summit as special guests. This was the first in-person SCO summit since June 2019 and was also Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first trip outside of China since early 2020. As the SCO marks 21 years since its founding, the question remains: has it achieved Beijing’s goals and advanced Chinese interests?  

To discuss the SCO as well as China’s interests and role in Central Asia, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Vina Nadjibulla, an adjunct professor at the School of Public Policy and Global Affairs at the University of British Columbia. Her current research focuses on China’s diplomacy in multilateral and regional organizations. Nadjibulla previously worked at the United Nations headquarters in New York and in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in West and Central Africa. Born in the Soviet Union, raised in Afghanistan, and educated in the United States, Nadjibulla has also worked and lived in China and Central Asia.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>energy, turkey, central asia, xi, xi jinping, shanghai, kazakhstan, energy resources, china, shanghai cooperation organization, xinjiang, uzbekistan, sco, russia-china</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>36</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">5e5aba3a-63d0-41f8-b9ac-dc76973db59a</guid>
      <title>China’s Dominance in Global Supply Chains</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:28] China's Dominance in Global Supply Chains</p><p>[3:50] Role of China's Industrial Policy</p><p>[9:08] Implications of Variables Affecting Supply Chains</p><p>[13:37] US Policy Response and the CHIPS Act</p><p>[20:36] Made in China 2025</p><p>[24:54] Economic Coercion, Vulnerabilities, and an Effective Response</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Sep 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, David J. Bulman)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-dominance-in-global-supply-chains-LG_peYPY</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:28] China's Dominance in Global Supply Chains</p><p>[3:50] Role of China's Industrial Policy</p><p>[9:08] Implications of Variables Affecting Supply Chains</p><p>[13:37] US Policy Response and the CHIPS Act</p><p>[20:36] Made in China 2025</p><p>[24:54] Economic Coercion, Vulnerabilities, and an Effective Response</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="29049247" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/7965a751-4a88-44a4-b34c-3c0ccfe18f50/audio/6828f0fe-5eb1-40db-b434-927bad6fa521/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Dominance in Global Supply Chains</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, David J. Bulman</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In 1978, China was a nearly autarkic country. But in the 30 years that followed, the country transitioned to become the world’s largest manufacturer and goods exporter. Today, China is a major actor in global value chains, accounting for nearly 20 percent of global manufacturing trade and an even greater share of many intermediate global value chain inputs that are essential for production. So how did China become so deeply integrated into global supply chains? What has been the role of industrial policies in China’s achievement of supply chain dominance?

To answer these questions and to discuss China’s dominance in global supply chains, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. David J. Bulman, the Jill McGovern and Steven Muller Assistant Professor of China Studies and International Affairs and the US Director of the Pacific Community Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His research examines economic and political development in China and the implications for US-China relations.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In 1978, China was a nearly autarkic country. But in the 30 years that followed, the country transitioned to become the world’s largest manufacturer and goods exporter. Today, China is a major actor in global value chains, accounting for nearly 20 percent of global manufacturing trade and an even greater share of many intermediate global value chain inputs that are essential for production. So how did China become so deeply integrated into global supply chains? What has been the role of industrial policies in China’s achievement of supply chain dominance?

To answer these questions and to discuss China’s dominance in global supply chains, host Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. David J. Bulman, the Jill McGovern and Steven Muller Assistant Professor of China Studies and International Affairs and the US Director of the Pacific Community Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. His research examines economic and political development in China and the implications for US-China relations.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>china industrial, global supply chain, chips act, economic vulnerabilities, economic coercion, supply chain variables, china 2025, us policy, china, industrial policy</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>35</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">183fc446-758e-4d41-be5d-635d23870fc2</guid>
      <title>The People’s Liberation Army: China’s Capabilities and Intentions in 2022</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:38] Beijing's Goals and Signals</p><p>[5:43] People’s Liberation Army and Advanced Planning</p><p>[7:20] A New Normal?</p><p>[11:44] Learning from the Recent Drills</p><p>[13:58] China’s Interpretation of US Response</p><p>[16:40] Mobilization, Confidence, and Capabilities</p><p>[26:43] US Congress’ Taiwan Policy Act and China’s Reactions</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Sep 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, John Culver)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-peoples-liberation-army-chinas-capabilities-and-intentions-in-2022-msCb7ZsP</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:38] Beijing's Goals and Signals</p><p>[5:43] People’s Liberation Army and Advanced Planning</p><p>[7:20] A New Normal?</p><p>[11:44] Learning from the Recent Drills</p><p>[13:58] China’s Interpretation of US Response</p><p>[16:40] Mobilization, Confidence, and Capabilities</p><p>[26:43] US Congress’ Taiwan Policy Act and China’s Reactions</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="28835252" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/ae31ed2c-301d-4f7e-b740-ff70cb7c0ebd/audio/91042800-3e91-4775-a88d-cb190d564470/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>The People’s Liberation Army: China’s Capabilities and Intentions in 2022</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, John Culver</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:02</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In early August, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, visited Taiwan. Her visit was met with harsh condemnation by Beijing, followed by a Chinese ban on thousands of Taiwanese food imports, from fruits and vegetables to cookies and baby food. In addition, China suspended or canceled various dialogues with the United States. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), conducted a series of provocative exercises around Taiwan. These actions were reminiscent of when China fired missiles into the waters around the island in 1995–1996 after Taiwan’s then-President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States. Of course, the PLA’s capabilities have evolved significantly over the past 25 years, and the current round of military drills reflected some of this progress.

In this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver to discuss the military exercises and China’s intentions and capabilities. Culver is currently a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously he was a National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a Central Intelligence Agency analyst. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In early August, Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, visited Taiwan. Her visit was met with harsh condemnation by Beijing, followed by a Chinese ban on thousands of Taiwanese food imports, from fruits and vegetables to cookies and baby food. In addition, China suspended or canceled various dialogues with the United States. The Chinese military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), conducted a series of provocative exercises around Taiwan. These actions were reminiscent of when China fired missiles into the waters around the island in 1995–1996 after Taiwan’s then-President Lee Teng-hui visited the United States. Of course, the PLA’s capabilities have evolved significantly over the past 25 years, and the current round of military drills reflected some of this progress.

In this episode, host Bonnie Glaser is joined by John Culver to discuss the military exercises and China’s intentions and capabilities. Culver is currently a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub. Previously he was a National Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a Central Intelligence Agency analyst. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>us-china, us congress, pelosi taiwan, chinese military, taiwan, military, china, people’s liberation army, public policy, beijing, pla</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>34</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China’s Global Security Initiative</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>[1:51] Beijing’s Objectives</p><p>[5:43] China’s Vision for the International Order</p><p>[8:49] GSI’s Relation to US-China Competition</p><p>[10:45] "Meat and Bones" over Time</p><p>[14:47] “Indivisible Security”</p><p>[16:37] India and Others' Perspectives on GSI</p><p>[21:27] Sino-Russian Alignment: Implications for China’s Global Security Governance Ambitions?</p><p> </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 25 Aug 2022 18:13:24 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Manoj Kewalramani)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-global-security-initiative-upcwv3H5</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[1:51] Beijing’s Objectives</p><p>[5:43] China’s Vision for the International Order</p><p>[8:49] GSI’s Relation to US-China Competition</p><p>[10:45] "Meat and Bones" over Time</p><p>[14:47] “Indivisible Security”</p><p>[16:37] India and Others' Perspectives on GSI</p><p>[21:27] Sino-Russian Alignment: Implications for China’s Global Security Governance Ambitions?</p><p> </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Global Security Initiative</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Manoj Kewalramani</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:49</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On April 21, China’s President Xi Jinping proposed a new Global Security Initiative (GSI) during a keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference. Like Xi’s other big ideas, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, GSI is heavy on principles and light on concrete details.  

Described as “another global public good that contributes Chinese solutions and wisdom to addressing the world’s security challenges” by China’s state media, the GSI rests on six pillars. Some of them, like respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, are long-standing features of Chinese foreign policy. However, the GSI also has new components, including upholding “indivisible security.”

To unpack the Global Security Initiative and its components, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Research Programme and a China Studies fellow at the Takshashila Institution in India. He is also a non-resident senior associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Kewalramani publishes “Tracking People’s Daily,” a newsletter that offers a breakdown of the weekday editions of the People’s Daily. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On April 21, China’s President Xi Jinping proposed a new Global Security Initiative (GSI) during a keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference. Like Xi’s other big ideas, such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Development Initiative, GSI is heavy on principles and light on concrete details.  

Described as “another global public good that contributes Chinese solutions and wisdom to addressing the world’s security challenges” by China’s state media, the GSI rests on six pillars. Some of them, like respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, are long-standing features of Chinese foreign policy. However, the GSI also has new components, including upholding “indivisible security.”

To unpack the Global Security Initiative and its components, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Research Programme and a China Studies fellow at the Takshashila Institution in India. He is also a non-resident senior associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Kewalramani publishes “Tracking People’s Daily,” a newsletter that offers a breakdown of the weekday editions of the People’s Daily. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>india, global security initiative, asia annual conference, xi, china, indivisible security, sino-russian alignment, gsi, security challenges, security, international order, boao forum, beijing, us-china competition</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>33</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China’s Relations with the Philippines under Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr.</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Episode Highlights:</strong></p><p>[1:30] Duterte’s China Policy</p><p>[4:36] Change under the New Marcos Government?</p><p>[6:53] Philippines’ Relations with the United States</p><p>[8:45] Public Opinion in the Philippines toward China</p><p>[14:10] Joint China-Philippines Energy Exploration Talks</p><p>[17:15] Railway Projects Loan Agreements with China</p><p>[19:14] Future Developments</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 9 Aug 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Charmaine Willoughby)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-relations-with-the-philippines-under-ferdinand-bongbong-marcos-jr-ns3sb6ub</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Episode Highlights:</strong></p><p>[1:30] Duterte’s China Policy</p><p>[4:36] Change under the New Marcos Government?</p><p>[6:53] Philippines’ Relations with the United States</p><p>[8:45] Public Opinion in the Philippines toward China</p><p>[14:10] Joint China-Philippines Energy Exploration Talks</p><p>[17:15] Railway Projects Loan Agreements with China</p><p>[19:14] Future Developments</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Relations with the Philippines under Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr.</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Charmaine Willoughby</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:22:54</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Rodrigo Duterte, the former president of the Philippines, tried to improve ties with China during his presidency in the hope of securing economic benefits for the country. However, those efforts did not see fruition. During his 2022 presidential campaign, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. did not openly criticize Duterte’s China policy. In fact, he argued that the policy of engagement was correct, saying “we don’t want to go to war with China” over the South China Sea. Moreover, the Marcos family has maintained warm ties with Beijing throughout the decades. 
 
But changes are afoot. The newly elected President Marcos is adopting a tougher stance on the South China Sea disputes and calling for a renegotiation of loan agreements with China for railway projects worth almost $5 billion. 

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Charmaine Willoughby, Associate Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University in Manila. They discuss the past, present, and future developments in the China-Philippines relationship and examine how the relationship may change under the new Marcos government.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Rodrigo Duterte, the former president of the Philippines, tried to improve ties with China during his presidency in the hope of securing economic benefits for the country. However, those efforts did not see fruition. During his 2022 presidential campaign, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. did not openly criticize Duterte’s China policy. In fact, he argued that the policy of engagement was correct, saying “we don’t want to go to war with China” over the South China Sea. Moreover, the Marcos family has maintained warm ties with Beijing throughout the decades. 
 
But changes are afoot. The newly elected President Marcos is adopting a tougher stance on the South China Sea disputes and calling for a renegotiation of loan agreements with China for railway projects worth almost $5 billion. 

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Dr. Charmaine Willoughby, Associate Professor of International Studies at De La Salle University in Manila. They discuss the past, present, and future developments in the China-Philippines relationship and examine how the relationship may change under the new Marcos government.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>bongbong marcos, energy, railway, united states, china global, loans china, energy exploration, china, china-philippines, philippines, ferdinand marcos, us-philippines, duterte</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>32</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program</title>
      <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Jul 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Bradley Parks, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/banking-on-beijing-the-aims-and-impacts-of-chinas-overseas-development-program-7XaZDart</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Bradley Parks, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:23</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Though China’s overseas development program has a long history, it greatly expanded after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Since then, debates have emerged among policymakers, scholars, and journalists about the objectives and impacts of China’s lending and grant-giving activities. Various charges levied against Beijing include that its development programs seek to prop up corrupt and authoritarian regimes and saddle countries with unsustainable debts. Some observers also claim that Chinese projects are not substantially contributing to economic development in recipient countries. Uncovering the facts is challenging because China’s overseas financing is shrouded in secrecy. Gathering data is possible, but enormously time-consuming. 
 
In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, where he leads a team of 35 program evaluators, policy analysts, and media and communication professionals who work with governments and international organizations to improve the ways in which overseas investments are targeted, monitored, and evaluated. Parks collaborated with a large team of experts to evaluate China’s development programs through rigorous evidence and presented the research results in a book titled, “Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program.

[2:02]: Methodology and Data Set

[7:05]: Differences between China&apos;s and OECD Countries&apos; International Development Finance

[11:39]: Changes in Chinese Overseas Lending

[15:11]: Impact on Recipient Countries&apos; Economic Growth

[21:33]: Objectives

[29:11]: Reevaluating and Looking Ahead</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Though China’s overseas development program has a long history, it greatly expanded after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Since then, debates have emerged among policymakers, scholars, and journalists about the objectives and impacts of China’s lending and grant-giving activities. Various charges levied against Beijing include that its development programs seek to prop up corrupt and authoritarian regimes and saddle countries with unsustainable debts. Some observers also claim that Chinese projects are not substantially contributing to economic development in recipient countries. Uncovering the facts is challenging because China’s overseas financing is shrouded in secrecy. Gathering data is possible, but enormously time-consuming. 
 
In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Bradley Parks, executive director of AidData, where he leads a team of 35 program evaluators, policy analysts, and media and communication professionals who work with governments and international organizations to improve the ways in which overseas investments are targeted, monitored, and evaluated. Parks collaborated with a large team of experts to evaluate China’s development programs through rigorous evidence and presented the research results in a book titled, “Banking on Beijing: The Aims and Impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program.

[2:02]: Methodology and Data Set

[7:05]: Differences between China&apos;s and OECD Countries&apos; International Development Finance

[11:39]: Changes in Chinese Overseas Lending

[15:11]: Impact on Recipient Countries&apos; Economic Growth

[21:33]: Objectives

[29:11]: Reevaluating and Looking Ahead</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>31</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
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      <title>China&apos;s Global Development Initiative</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.</p><p>In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.</p><p>[1:26] Beijing’s Objectives</p><p>[5:54] GDI's Relation to the BRI</p><p>[7:34] China's Resources into GDI</p><p>[10:31] UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</p><p>[14:06] Group of Friends of the GDI and Interested Countries</p><p>[20:04] Origin of the GDI</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Yu Jie, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-global-development-initiative-tADzc3kf</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.</p><p>In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.</p><p>[1:26] Beijing’s Objectives</p><p>[5:54] GDI's Relation to the BRI</p><p>[7:34] China's Resources into GDI</p><p>[10:31] UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development</p><p>[14:06] Group of Friends of the GDI and Interested Countries</p><p>[20:04] Origin of the GDI</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Global Development Initiative</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Yu Jie, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:25:22</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations&apos; 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations&apos; 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>pandemic, us, united nations, united states, xi, un, jin ping, global development initiative, china, general debate, prc, european union, gdi, foreign policy, beijing, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>30</itunes:episode>
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      <title>Lithuania: How Beijing Deals with Small States via Economic Pressure</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office.

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Jun 2022 05:37:50 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/lithuania-how-beijing-deals-with-small-states-via-economic-pressure-3HyDO8Lg</link>
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      <itunes:title>Lithuania: How Beijing Deals with Small States via Economic Pressure</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:43</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office.

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office.

In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>economic, europe, united states, nato, policy, military, china, lithuania, departure, ambassador, usa, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>29</itunes:episode>
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      <title>US Strategy toward China under the Biden Administration</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.</p><p> </p><p>In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.</p><p> </p><p>[1:45] Objectives of the US-China Strategy under the Biden Administration</p><p>[5:58] Differences between the Biden and the Trump Approach toward China</p><p>[9:55] Beijing’s Response to Blinken’s May 26 Address and China’s Perception of the US</p><p>[13:18] Potential Opportunities for Cooperation between the US and China</p><p>[17:24] Critiques of the Biden Administration’s US-China Strategy</p><p>[26:21] China’s Strategy toward the United States</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Jun 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/us-strategy-toward-china-under-the-biden-administration-Ev_W6SOg</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.</p><p> </p><p>In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.</p><p> </p><p>[1:45] Objectives of the US-China Strategy under the Biden Administration</p><p>[5:58] Differences between the Biden and the Trump Approach toward China</p><p>[9:55] Beijing’s Response to Blinken’s May 26 Address and China’s Perception of the US</p><p>[13:18] Potential Opportunities for Cooperation between the US and China</p><p>[17:24] Critiques of the Biden Administration’s US-China Strategy</p><p>[26:21] China’s Strategy toward the United States</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>US Strategy toward China under the Biden Administration</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Evan Medeiros</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:12</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.

In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future.

In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>align, and mongolia, invest, taiwan, china, tony blinken, foreign service, and compete, national security council</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>China’s Relations with the Two Koreas</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.</p><p>To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.</p><p><strong>Marker Notes</strong></p><p>China's Relations with South Korea 1:51.442</p><p>China's Response to Missile Tests 10:08.780</p><p>China's Relationship with North Korea 14:02.939</p><p>Looking Ahead 26:16.467</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-relations-with-the-two-koreas-kqX93OFb</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.</p><p>To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.</p><p><strong>Marker Notes</strong></p><p>China's Relations with South Korea 1:51.442</p><p>China's Response to Missile Tests 10:08.780</p><p>China's Relationship with North Korea 14:02.939</p><p>Looking Ahead 26:16.467</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Relations with the Two Koreas</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:41</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.

To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol formally began his five-year term on May 10, 2022. His predecessor, former president Moon Jae-in, attempted to strike a balance between ties with China and the United States during his term, but whether he was able to successfully advance South Korean interests is unclear. Concurrently, public attitude in South Korea toward China has continued to harden, as Yoon pledged to prioritize the country’s alliance with the United States. China’s relationship with North Korea also seemed to become more distant due in part to the pandemic, but despite this, Beijing has not criticized North Korea’s missile tests—it has only generally urged all parties to exercise restraint.

To discuss China’s policy toward and relations with both North and South Korea, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Seong-hyon Lee, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies and a fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for US-China Relations.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>moon jae-in, united states, yoon suk-yeol, china, south korea, north korea</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>China-Solomon Islands Deal and PRC Interests in the Pacific Islands</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications.</p><p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.</p><p><strong>Marker Notes</strong></p><p>[1:44] China's Interests and Activities in the Pacific Islands</p><p>[9:00] Recent Deal between China and the Solomon Islands</p><p>[13:56] China-Pacific Relations</p><p>[21:30] Attention from the United States</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 May 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Anne-Marie Brady, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-solomon-islands-deal-and-prc-interests-in-the-pacific-islands-B8or_063</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications.</p><p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.</p><p><strong>Marker Notes</strong></p><p>[1:44] China's Interests and Activities in the Pacific Islands</p><p>[9:00] Recent Deal between China and the Solomon Islands</p><p>[13:56] China-Pacific Relations</p><p>[21:30] Attention from the United States</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>China-Solomon Islands Deal and PRC Interests in the Pacific Islands</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Anne-Marie Brady, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:31:44</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications. 
 
In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On April 19, the PRC signed an agreement with the Solomon Islands that has prompted concerns in the United States, New Zealand, and Australia about growing Chinese influence that some worry could lead to a Chinese military presence in the Solomons. The Pacific Islands countries are scattered over a broad expanse of ocean and are widely seen as strategically significant. Yet, the region only receives episodic attention from the United States and other leading countries. Beijing has stepped up its engagement in the region, and there is a pressing need to understand the nature of that engagement and its implications. 
 
In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Professor Anne-Marie Brady, professor at the University of Canterbury in New Zealand on China’s interests, activities, and role in the Pacific Islands as well as the recent deal between China and the Solomon Islands. Among other issues, Professor Brady is a specialist in Chinese politics and China-Pacific relations, and her groundbreaking work on Chinese interference in New Zealand and other countries is globally renowned.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>australia, un, china-pacific, military, china, solomon islands, oceana, usa, foreign policy, new zealand, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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      <title>Implications of Ukraine War, US-China Competition, and Southeast Asia’s Role</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future.</p><p> </p><p>Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore. </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 3 May 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaiser, Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/implications-of-ukraine-war-us-china-competition-and-southeast-asias-role-ltjCuwEi</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future.</p><p> </p><p>Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>Implications of Ukraine War, US-China Competition, and Southeast Asia’s Role</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaiser, Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future.

Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore&apos;s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser hosts Singapore’s Ambassador Bilahari Kausikan to discuss several international trends and their strategic significances. They discuss the implications of the war in Ukraine for the global order, particularly the Indo-Pacific, the consequences of growing strategic alignment between China and Russia, the possible endgame of the US-China strategic competition, and Southeast Asia’s future.

Ambassador Kausikan is a former Ambassador-at-Large in Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Prior to this role, he served as the Second Permanent Secretary and then Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. He has held a variety of appointments during his career, including as Singapore&apos;s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York and as Ambassador to the Russian Federation. Currently, Ambassador Kausikan serves as Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an institute affiliated with the National University of Singapore. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>ukraine, europe, singapore, chairman of the middle east institute, china, ministry of foreign affairs</itunes:keywords>
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      <title>EU-China Relations: The Summit and What Comes Next</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion.</p><p> </p><p>On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy.</p><p> </p><p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 19 Apr 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Janka Oertel, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/eu-china-relations-the-summit-and-what-comes-next-GKmHdlCI</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion.</p><p> </p><p>On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy.</p><p> </p><p>In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>EU-China Relations: The Summit and What Comes Next</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Janka Oertel, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:00</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion. 

On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy.

In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Europe’s relations with China have been on a downward trajectory the past few years. The list for this decline is long: Europe’s concerns about human rights violations in Xinjiang, Chinese sanctions on EU parliamentarians, European uneasiness about PRC plans to dominate key strategic technologies, Chinese rebuff to international law in the South China Sea and its military pressure on Taiwan. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and the resulting civilian causalities further strained relations between China and the EU as Beijing abstained in the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly and blamed the conflict on the five waves of NATO expansion. 

On April 1, the 23rd EU-China summit took place via video conference. President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, accompanied by High Representative Josep Borrell, met with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in the morning and Chinese President Xi Jinping in the afternoon. Borell later described the meeting as a dialogue of the deaf—the Chinese side had little interest in talking about the war in Ukraine, preferring to discuss shared EU and Chinese interests. In an effort to drive a wedge between the US and the EU, Xi also called on the EU to form its own perception of China and adopt an independent China policy.

In this episode, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Janka Oertel, Director of the Asia Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations to further discuss the April 1 EU-China summit and analyze the overall EU-China relationship.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>ukraine, united states, un, taiwan, human rights, un security council, china, south china sea, security, xinjiang, un general assembly, usa, foreign policy, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>24</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China-India Ties: Wang Yi’s Visit Highlights Strains</title>
      <description><![CDATA[On March 25, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and met with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, marking the first high-level visit by a Chinese official to India since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which both Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed. Since the 2020 incident, both militaries have ramped up troops, weapons deployments, and infrastructure in the disputed region. Arranged at the initiative of Beijing, Wang Yi’s visit took place against the background of the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which both China and India have adopted stances on Russia’s invasion that are at odds with those of the United States, Europe, and some countries in Asia.  
To discuss Wang Yi’s meetings in India and the trajectory of the bilateral China-India relationship, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and director of The India Project at Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War.”
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 5 Apr 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Tanvi Madan)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-india-ties-wang-yis-visit-highlights-strains-t65ggooE</link>
      <enclosure length="30839007" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/ba683086-0e99-4270-a3aa-2449a5aef3b1/audio/f83537da-f65d-4b85-89fc-538fc40a3893/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China-India Ties: Wang Yi’s Visit Highlights Strains</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Tanvi Madan</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:05</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On March 25, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and met with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, marking the first high-level visit by a Chinese official to India since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which both Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed. Since the 2020 incident, both militaries have ramped up troops, weapons deployments, and infrastructure in the disputed region. Arranged at the initiative of Beijing, Wang Yi’s visit took place against the background of the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which both China and India have adopted stances on Russia’s invasion that are at odds with those of the United States, Europe, and some countries in Asia.  
To discuss Wang Yi’s meetings in India and the trajectory of the bilateral China-India relationship, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and director of The India Project at Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War.”
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On March 25, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India and met with India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, marking the first high-level visit by a Chinese official to India since the 2020 Galwan Valley incident in which both Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed. Since the 2020 incident, both militaries have ramped up troops, weapons deployments, and infrastructure in the disputed region. Arranged at the initiative of Beijing, Wang Yi’s visit took place against the background of the ongoing war in Ukraine, in which both China and India have adopted stances on Russia’s invasion that are at odds with those of the United States, Europe, and some countries in Asia.  
To discuss Wang Yi’s meetings in India and the trajectory of the bilateral China-India relationship, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Tanvi Madan, senior fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and director of The India Project at Brookings Institution. She is author of the book “Fateful Triangle: How China Shaped US-India Relations during the Cold War.”
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>india, united states, galwan valley, geopolitics, brookings, subrahmanyam jaishankar, china, tension, foreign policy, wang yi</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>23</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <title>China’s Ukraine Balancing Act</title>
      <description><![CDATA[On the orders of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the Russians invaded Ukraine just after the close of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and a few weeks after Putin and Xi Jinping inked a sweeping joint statement that challenged the United States as a global power, opposed NATO enlargement, and condemned liberal democracy as a model for the world. 
 
To investigate China’s stance on the conflict and to better understand the interests that Beijing is trying to protect and advance in the Ukraine crisis, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. Dr Feigenbaum previously held several roles in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2022 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, Bonnie Glaiser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-ukraine-balancing-act-4KtkHog5</link>
      <enclosure length="32234001" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/5aeb42a5-f8c5-4774-98b6-86057d0af3e9/audio/831c30de-f25c-483e-8204-710d720fb87f/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Ukraine Balancing Act</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, Bonnie Glaiser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:32</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On the orders of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the Russians invaded Ukraine just after the close of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and a few weeks after Putin and Xi Jinping inked a sweeping joint statement that challenged the United States as a global power, opposed NATO enlargement, and condemned liberal democracy as a model for the world. 
 
To investigate China’s stance on the conflict and to better understand the interests that Beijing is trying to protect and advance in the Ukraine crisis, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. Dr Feigenbaum previously held several roles in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On the orders of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, the Russians invaded Ukraine just after the close of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing and a few weeks after Putin and Xi Jinping inked a sweeping joint statement that challenged the United States as a global power, opposed NATO enlargement, and condemned liberal democracy as a model for the world. 
 
To investigate China’s stance on the conflict and to better understand the interests that Beijing is trying to protect and advance in the Ukraine crisis, Bonnie Glaser will speak with Dr. Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he oversees research in Washington, Beijing, and New Delhi. Dr Feigenbaum previously held several roles in the State Department in the George W. Bush administration.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>ukraine, united states, xi jinping, putin, china, russia, war</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>22</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">00e29f74-5176-4580-92f0-20a0c9eecbb3</guid>
      <title>China in the Arctic: Ambitions and Strategy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Link to the Arctic development white paper: <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-01/26/c_1122320088.htm">中国的北极政策-新华网 (xinhuanet.com)</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Mar 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-in-the-arctic-ambitions-and-strategy-C9O_Wyoo</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Link to the Arctic development white paper: <a href="http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-01/26/c_1122320088.htm">中国的北极政策-新华网 (xinhuanet.com)</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="25085572" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/55e7b35c-97d6-422d-8451-721241a8db76/audio/691457af-c7dd-4e5b-8f05-19a7eacbd244/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China in the Arctic: Ambitions and Strategy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:26:05</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In 2014, Xi Jinping declared his intention to make China into a polar great power. Four years later, Beijing outlined its vision for Arctic development in a white paper on the Arctic, which declared China’s role as a near-Arctic state. As part of its global Belt and Road Initiative, China is stepping up its activity in the Arctic—setting up research stations, investing in mining and energy, and working with Russia to create a new sea route through the Arctic Ocean. Amid rising tensions between China and the West, the trajectory of China’s Arctic agenda will likely become ever more salient to the future of trade, sustainable development, and international security. 
 
To discuss China’s role, ambitions, and strategy in the Arctic, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan, a leading polar geopolitics expert. Dr. Buchanan is Lecturer of Strategic Studies with Deakin University and the inaugural Co-Director of the Modern War Institute’s Polar Security Research Initiative. Her forthcoming book is titled, “Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin.”
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In 2014, Xi Jinping declared his intention to make China into a polar great power. Four years later, Beijing outlined its vision for Arctic development in a white paper on the Arctic, which declared China’s role as a near-Arctic state. As part of its global Belt and Road Initiative, China is stepping up its activity in the Arctic—setting up research stations, investing in mining and energy, and working with Russia to create a new sea route through the Arctic Ocean. Amid rising tensions between China and the West, the trajectory of China’s Arctic agenda will likely become ever more salient to the future of trade, sustainable development, and international security. 
 
To discuss China’s role, ambitions, and strategy in the Arctic, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Elizabeth Buchanan, a leading polar geopolitics expert. Dr. Buchanan is Lecturer of Strategic Studies with Deakin University and the inaugural Co-Director of the Modern War Institute’s Polar Security Research Initiative. Her forthcoming book is titled, “Red Arctic: Russian Strategy Under Putin.”
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>trade, ukraine, arctic, world, strategy, power, shipping, military, china, russia, usa</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>21</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <title>A Discussion with Emily Feng, NPR&apos;s Beijing Correspondent</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Foreign press correspondents reporting in China experience a host of challenges—and not just because of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s rigorous “zero COVID” policy. As the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China’s recently released annual report on media freedom <a href="https://fccchina.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2021-FCCC-final.pdf?x39796">details</a>, foreign journalists in China are encountering increasingly stringent visa restrictions, harassment, surveillance, and risk of expulsion or even arrest.  </p><p>Emily Feng joins Bonnie Glaser on China Global to discuss the challenges facing reporters in China today, as well as trends in Chinese society and Xi Jinping’s first ten years in power. Emily is <i>NPR’s</i> Beijing Correspondent after having previously worked for the <i>Financial Times</i>. She covers everything from semiconductors to girl bands and Chinese coal mines and has earned many awards, including a Human Rights Press Award and a Gracie Award for her coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic. </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Feb 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Emily Feng, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/a-discussion-with-emily-feng-nprs-beijing-correspondent-9HK__YAH</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Foreign press correspondents reporting in China experience a host of challenges—and not just because of the Covid-19 pandemic and China’s rigorous “zero COVID” policy. As the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of China’s recently released annual report on media freedom <a href="https://fccchina.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2021-FCCC-final.pdf?x39796">details</a>, foreign journalists in China are encountering increasingly stringent visa restrictions, harassment, surveillance, and risk of expulsion or even arrest.  </p><p>Emily Feng joins Bonnie Glaser on China Global to discuss the challenges facing reporters in China today, as well as trends in Chinese society and Xi Jinping’s first ten years in power. Emily is <i>NPR’s</i> Beijing Correspondent after having previously worked for the <i>Financial Times</i>. She covers everything from semiconductors to girl bands and Chinese coal mines and has earned many awards, including a Human Rights Press Award and a Gracie Award for her coverage of the Covid-19 pandemic. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>A Discussion with Emily Feng, NPR&apos;s Beijing Correspondent</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Emily Feng, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:52</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary></itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle></itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>entry, foreign, npr, united states, journalism, party congress, xi jinping, access, china, coverage, correspondent, restriction, usa</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>20</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">cf70d65e-c4e7-4257-8060-7a0069ee7e01</guid>
      <title>China&apos;s Vision for the International System</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The post-World War II international system was created primarily by liberal democracies committed to the rule of law, free markets, and universal human rights. They launched multilateral institutions to advance their shared values and norms. China has long said that it views the international system as unjust and unfair, but for a long time, it had little ability to change it. 

Today, China not only has the means, but its leader Xi Jinping—who is likely to get a third five-year term in power this fall at the 20th National Party Congress—may also have a vision for a radically altered international system. A new book called The World According to China makes the case for this proposition. 

Bonnie Glaser speaks with the book’s author, Dr. Elizabeth Economy, on China’s approach to the international system. Dr. Economy is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is currently on leave and is serving as senior advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce. Views expressed are her own. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Feb 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Elizabeth Economy)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-vision-for-the-international-system-rdQ7ZTy_</link>
      <enclosure length="31347337" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/11999bde-d4b3-4ac5-8d4d-e767ad5382b3/audio/ebb45d2d-92ec-4420-b622-13ec8b691d67/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Vision for the International System</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Elizabeth Economy</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:37</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The post-World War II international system was created primarily by liberal democracies committed to the rule of law, free markets, and universal human rights. They launched multilateral institutions to advance their shared values and norms. China has long said that it views the international system as unjust and unfair, but for a long time, it had little ability to change it. 

Today, China not only has the means, but its leader Xi Jinping—who is likely to get a third five-year term in power this fall at the 20th National Party Congress—may also have a vision for a radically altered international system. A new book called The World According to China makes the case for this proposition. 

Bonnie Glaser speaks with the book’s author, Dr. Elizabeth Economy, on China’s approach to the international system. Dr. Economy is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is currently on leave and is serving as senior advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce. Views expressed are her own.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The post-World War II international system was created primarily by liberal democracies committed to the rule of law, free markets, and universal human rights. They launched multilateral institutions to advance their shared values and norms. China has long said that it views the international system as unjust and unfair, but for a long time, it had little ability to change it. 

Today, China not only has the means, but its leader Xi Jinping—who is likely to get a third five-year term in power this fall at the 20th National Party Congress—may also have a vision for a radically altered international system. A new book called The World According to China makes the case for this proposition. 

Bonnie Glaser speaks with the book’s author, Dr. Elizabeth Economy, on China’s approach to the international system. Dr. Economy is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. She is currently on leave and is serving as senior advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce. Views expressed are her own.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>united states, xi jinping, international, system, china, multilateral</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>19</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">4ed82b8f-219e-4778-aad5-94a3104bbe5a</guid>
      <title>China in 2022: Domestic and Foreign Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The Beijing Olympics will be held next month, and China faces both the challenge of Covid-19 spreading to several Chinese cities and growing criticism of its policy in Xinjiang, which has led some countries—including the United States—to declare diplomatic boycotts.   

Taking place in March, the National People’s Congress will have important implications for China’s economic policy, among other issues. Personnel rotations around the country are already beginning to take place and will continue throughout the year, as the Chinese Communist Party prepares for the all-important National Party Congress slated for the fall. Apart from bestowing a third five-year term in power to Xi Jinping, what else should we expect from the upcoming Party Congress? 

Jude Blanchette speaks with Bonnie Glaser on the key developments of 2022. He holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His first book is China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 Jan 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Jude Blanchette, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-in-2022-domestic-and-foreign-policy-8LXJJPf5</link>
      <enclosure length="28210042" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/fafc92f0-ba9f-49a9-bb78-3a0cefbe2aa9/audio/50ebfc21-f7bc-4dc3-b31f-fd6142477e22/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China in 2022: Domestic and Foreign Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jude Blanchette, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:21</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Beijing Olympics will be held next month, and China faces both the challenge of Covid-19 spreading to several Chinese cities and growing criticism of its policy in Xinjiang, which has led some countries—including the United States—to declare diplomatic boycotts.   

Taking place in March, the National People’s Congress will have important implications for China’s economic policy, among other issues. Personnel rotations around the country are already beginning to take place and will continue throughout the year, as the Chinese Communist Party prepares for the all-important National Party Congress slated for the fall. Apart from bestowing a third five-year term in power to Xi Jinping, what else should we expect from the upcoming Party Congress? 

Jude Blanchette speaks with Bonnie Glaser on the key developments of 2022. He holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His first book is China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Beijing Olympics will be held next month, and China faces both the challenge of Covid-19 spreading to several Chinese cities and growing criticism of its policy in Xinjiang, which has led some countries—including the United States—to declare diplomatic boycotts.   

Taking place in March, the National People’s Congress will have important implications for China’s economic policy, among other issues. Personnel rotations around the country are already beginning to take place and will continue throughout the year, as the Chinese Communist Party prepares for the all-important National Party Congress slated for the fall. Apart from bestowing a third five-year term in power to Xi Jinping, what else should we expect from the upcoming Party Congress? 

Jude Blanchette speaks with Bonnie Glaser on the key developments of 2022. He holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His first book is China’s New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>olympics, global, united states, domestic, covid-19, china, year ahead, ecomony, foreign policy, 5 year, beijing</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>18</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">b0dabe54-9950-47c8-a0bc-2ba237f070f3</guid>
      <title>China in Latin America and the Caribbean</title>
      <description><![CDATA[China’s engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the past decade. The Chinese government describes its cooperation with the region as focused on numerous areas: trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Nineteen governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative.

Competition between China and Taiwan in the region remains fierce, with eight countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei and the remaining 25 recognizing Beijing. Nicaragua was the latest to switch recognition to the PRC on December 9, 2021.

US concerns about Chinese activities and objectives in the region are on the rise. In the final year of the Trump administration, the United States issued a strategic framework for the Western hemisphere, which included among its priorities countering economic aggression and malign political influence from external actors such as China. The 2021 Posture Statement of the US Southern Command warns that China is “seeking to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere.” 

Dr. Evan Ellis joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss Chinese intentions, influence, and impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously served in the State Department on the Policy Planning Staff.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Jan 2022 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Evan Ellis, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-cOVBb_h0</link>
      <enclosure length="32664902" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/51800ea5-0478-4453-bea4-ef647c2587d8/audio/d4554f2d-a86d-45bf-9048-6fcde89c0a04/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China in Latin America and the Caribbean</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Evan Ellis, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:59</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>China’s engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the past decade. The Chinese government describes its cooperation with the region as focused on numerous areas: trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Nineteen governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative.

Competition between China and Taiwan in the region remains fierce, with eight countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei and the remaining 25 recognizing Beijing. Nicaragua was the latest to switch recognition to the PRC on December 9, 2021.

US concerns about Chinese activities and objectives in the region are on the rise. In the final year of the Trump administration, the United States issued a strategic framework for the Western hemisphere, which included among its priorities countering economic aggression and malign political influence from external actors such as China. The 2021 Posture Statement of the US Southern Command warns that China is “seeking to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere.” 

Dr. Evan Ellis joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss Chinese intentions, influence, and impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously served in the State Department on the Policy Planning Staff.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>China’s engagement with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown significantly in the past decade. The Chinese government describes its cooperation with the region as focused on numerous areas: trade and investment, agriculture, energy, infrastructure, manufacturing, and technological innovation. Nineteen governments across Latin America and the Caribbean have joined Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative.

Competition between China and Taiwan in the region remains fierce, with eight countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei and the remaining 25 recognizing Beijing. Nicaragua was the latest to switch recognition to the PRC on December 9, 2021.

US concerns about Chinese activities and objectives in the region are on the rise. In the final year of the Trump administration, the United States issued a strategic framework for the Western hemisphere, which included among its priorities countering economic aggression and malign political influence from external actors such as China. The 2021 Posture Statement of the US Southern Command warns that China is “seeking to establish global logistics and basing infrastructure in our hemisphere.” 

Dr. Evan Ellis joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss Chinese intentions, influence, and impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a research professor of Latin American Studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute and previously served in the State Department on the Policy Planning Staff.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>economic, europe, united states, geopolitics, economics, military, china, latin america, usa, central america, carribean</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>17</itunes:episode>
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      <title>The 2022 Winter Olympics, Calls for Boycotts, and the Role of Sports in China</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Next February, the 2022 Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Beijing, the venue of the 2008
Summer Olympics. Preparation for the Games is well underway and China has said that it looks
forward to welcoming the athletes; but due to the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has banned foreign
spectators, as did Japan when it hosted the 2020 Summer Olympics.

As the 2022 Olympics near, several countries, including the United States, Australia, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Lithuania, have announced a diplomatic boycott of the
competition, and others may do so as well. So far, all countries will allow their athletes to compete.
The diplomatic boycotts are a response to concerns about China’s human rights practices, especially
in Xinjiang, where at least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subject to
involuntary detention in what China labels “reeducation camps.” Countries have very limited
leverage over Chinese domestic human rights practices, and some argue that the Olympics provides
a rare opportunity to voice the international community’s concerns in a way that could shine a
spotlight on China’s human rights violations. In an August 2021 survey, just under half of Americans
stated that they believe China’s human rights record should prevent it from hosting the 2022 Winter
Olympics, while 33 percent were uncertain.

Please note that this podcast was recorded just prior to the Biden administration’s announcement
that it would not send officials to the Olympic Games.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Susan Brownell about the upcoming Olympics and, more broadly, about the
role of sports in China and what the Olympics means to the Chinese people and to the Chinese
Communist Party. Dr. Susan Brownell is a professor of anthropology at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis. She was a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University and competed on the
Chinese track and field team at the Chinese National College Games in 1986. She is also the author
of Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Dec 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Susan Brownell, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-2022-winter-olympics-calls-for-boycotts-and-the-role-of-sports-in-china-_HuGg46s</link>
      <enclosure length="20836430" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/09bfc75b-666f-4a8b-9d2a-aff0cadca04e/audio/ed9b8e9d-46bf-4e48-87e0-ad6675a7df8a/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>The 2022 Winter Olympics, Calls for Boycotts, and the Role of Sports in China</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Susan Brownell, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:21:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Next February, the 2022 Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Beijing, the venue of the 2008
Summer Olympics. Preparation for the Games is well underway and China has said that it looks
forward to welcoming the athletes; but due to the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has banned foreign
spectators, as did Japan when it hosted the 2020 Summer Olympics.

As the 2022 Olympics near, several countries, including the United States, Australia, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Lithuania, have announced a diplomatic boycott of the
competition, and others may do so as well. So far, all countries will allow their athletes to compete.
The diplomatic boycotts are a response to concerns about China’s human rights practices, especially
in Xinjiang, where at least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subject to
involuntary detention in what China labels “reeducation camps.” Countries have very limited
leverage over Chinese domestic human rights practices, and some argue that the Olympics provides
a rare opportunity to voice the international community’s concerns in a way that could shine a
spotlight on China’s human rights violations. In an August 2021 survey, just under half of Americans
stated that they believe China’s human rights record should prevent it from hosting the 2022 Winter
Olympics, while 33 percent were uncertain.

Please note that this podcast was recorded just prior to the Biden administration’s announcement
that it would not send officials to the Olympic Games.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Susan Brownell about the upcoming Olympics and, more broadly, about the
role of sports in China and what the Olympics means to the Chinese people and to the Chinese
Communist Party. Dr. Susan Brownell is a professor of anthropology at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis. She was a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University and competed on the
Chinese track and field team at the Chinese National College Games in 1986. She is also the author
of Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Next February, the 2022 Winter Olympics are scheduled to be held in Beijing, the venue of the 2008
Summer Olympics. Preparation for the Games is well underway and China has said that it looks
forward to welcoming the athletes; but due to the coronavirus pandemic, Beijing has banned foreign
spectators, as did Japan when it hosted the 2020 Summer Olympics.

As the 2022 Olympics near, several countries, including the United States, Australia, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Lithuania, have announced a diplomatic boycott of the
competition, and others may do so as well. So far, all countries will allow their athletes to compete.
The diplomatic boycotts are a response to concerns about China’s human rights practices, especially
in Xinjiang, where at least one million Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities have been subject to
involuntary detention in what China labels “reeducation camps.” Countries have very limited
leverage over Chinese domestic human rights practices, and some argue that the Olympics provides
a rare opportunity to voice the international community’s concerns in a way that could shine a
spotlight on China’s human rights violations. In an August 2021 survey, just under half of Americans
stated that they believe China’s human rights record should prevent it from hosting the 2022 Winter
Olympics, while 33 percent were uncertain.

Please note that this podcast was recorded just prior to the Biden administration’s announcement
that it would not send officials to the Olympic Games.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Susan Brownell about the upcoming Olympics and, more broadly, about the
role of sports in China and what the Olympics means to the Chinese people and to the Chinese
Communist Party. Dr. Susan Brownell is a professor of anthropology at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis. She was a Fulbright Senior Researcher at Beijing Sport University and competed on the
Chinese track and field team at the Chinese National College Games in 1986. She is also the author
of Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s Republic.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>uyghurs, olympics, australia, united states, human rights, diplomatic, china, xinjiang, usa, beijing, boycott, sports</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>16</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">0f5a2a3a-a761-443a-8b28-9e2ec1f57adf</guid>
      <title>The U.S.-China Leaders Meeting on November 16: A Perspective from China</title>
      <description><![CDATA[The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. 

Against this background, the two countries’ leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden’s inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours.

To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China’s think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China’s top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 7 Dec 2021 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Da Wei)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-us-china-leaders-meeting-on-november-16-a-perspective-from-china-lzZ_uvuV</link>
      <enclosure length="32866715" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/494e841e-e81f-47ed-9a0a-50420c36f415/audio/5308477d-c9af-4e01-8125-6d5c75e1e533/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>The U.S.-China Leaders Meeting on November 16: A Perspective from China</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Da Wei</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:12</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. 

Against this background, the two countries’ leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden’s inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours.

To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China’s think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China’s top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The U.S.-China relationship is in unchartered waters. The bilateral frameworks and mechanisms that existed in the past are now widely seen as inadequate to address the current complex and contentious relationship. The Biden administration put forth a three-pronged approach to the bilateral relationship: being competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must be. The Chinese side emphasizes principles to guide the relationship, including mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation. 

Against this background, the two countries’ leaders, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, held their first virtual meeting on November 16. They had previously held two phone calls since Biden’s inauguration. This meeting was intended to enable a comprehensive strategic discussion about how to manage the differences between the United States and China and how to proceed with cooperation where the interests of the two countries align. Presidents Biden and Xi talked for 3.5 hours.

To discuss this meeting and its implications for the U.S.-China relationship, Dr. Da Wei joins Bonnie Glaser. Da Wei is a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University and a senior research fellow at Tsinghua’s Center for International Security and Strategy. He has worked in China’s think tank and university communities for more than two decades and is among China’s top experts on the United States and U.S.-China relations.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>biden, united states, xi, xi jinping, strategy, joe, policy, framework, china, jinping, competition, joe biden</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>15</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">104205ac-9020-4339-9155-b28ef52e85d0</guid>
      <title>China’s Nuclear Strategy, Capabilities, and Build-up</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Nearly six decades ago, China became the world’s fifth nuclear weapons state, joining the United States, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union. China’s nuclear warheads stockpile was estimated last year to be in the low 200s. By comparison, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads was at 3,750 as of September 2020.

But recent developments suggest that Beijing is now engaged in a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and maybe modifying its nuclear strategy as well. In the past few months, there have been reports of the construction of new missile silo fields and tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that could potentially evade U.S. missile defense systems. The Pentagon now predicts that China could quadruple its stockpile of nuclear warheads by 2030. What is motivating China’s nuclear force expansion? And what should the United States do to respond to China’s nuclear build-up? 
Dr. Fiona Cunningham joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss China’s evolving nuclear forces, its strategy, and how the United States might engage with China to mitigate the risk of conflict. Dr. Cunningham is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and has published research on China’s nuclear strategy, U.S.-China strategic stability, and escalation dynamics in the nuclear domain.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 23 Nov 2021 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Fiona Cunningham, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-nuclear-strategy-capabilities-and-build-up-_w2Iy1_u</link>
      <enclosure length="31845920" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/5daa6a59-e15d-4346-986d-b50c25104e78/audio/3c23bbd1-1655-4cf2-8c8d-29c5ef1592b8/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Nuclear Strategy, Capabilities, and Build-up</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Fiona Cunningham, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Nearly six decades ago, China became the world’s fifth nuclear weapons state, joining the United States, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union. China’s nuclear warheads stockpile was estimated last year to be in the low 200s. By comparison, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads was at 3,750 as of September 2020.

But recent developments suggest that Beijing is now engaged in a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and maybe modifying its nuclear strategy as well. In the past few months, there have been reports of the construction of new missile silo fields and tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that could potentially evade U.S. missile defense systems. The Pentagon now predicts that China could quadruple its stockpile of nuclear warheads by 2030. What is motivating China’s nuclear force expansion? And what should the United States do to respond to China’s nuclear build-up? 
Dr. Fiona Cunningham joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss China’s evolving nuclear forces, its strategy, and how the United States might engage with China to mitigate the risk of conflict. Dr. Cunningham is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and has published research on China’s nuclear strategy, U.S.-China strategic stability, and escalation dynamics in the nuclear domain.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Nearly six decades ago, China became the world’s fifth nuclear weapons state, joining the United States, France, the U.K., and the Soviet Union. China’s nuclear warheads stockpile was estimated last year to be in the low 200s. By comparison, the U.S. stockpile of nuclear warheads was at 3,750 as of September 2020.

But recent developments suggest that Beijing is now engaged in a significant expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and maybe modifying its nuclear strategy as well. In the past few months, there have been reports of the construction of new missile silo fields and tests of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile that could potentially evade U.S. missile defense systems. The Pentagon now predicts that China could quadruple its stockpile of nuclear warheads by 2030. What is motivating China’s nuclear force expansion? And what should the United States do to respond to China’s nuclear build-up? 
Dr. Fiona Cunningham joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss China’s evolving nuclear forces, its strategy, and how the United States might engage with China to mitigate the risk of conflict. Dr. Cunningham is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and has published research on China’s nuclear strategy, U.S.-China strategic stability, and escalation dynamics in the nuclear domain.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>australia, united states, nuclear strategy, strategy, deterrence, taiwan, china, defense, national, usa, nuclear</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>14</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">95b6bb57-d1a3-4e84-a310-21f5a5ce939e</guid>
      <title>China’s Prospects for Joining CPTPP</title>
      <description><![CDATA[After the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, the trade agreement’s future was uncertain. Fortunately, Japan grabbed the baton and took it across the finish line in a slightly revised form and renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The agreement was signed in 2018 by the remaining 11 countries in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas, accounting for 13 percent of world GDP. The CPTPP’s high degree of market access—alongside other digital, labor, and environmental provisions—has earned it the reputation as “one of the broadest and most state-of-the-art trade agreements ever signed.”

On September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the CPTPP after nearly a year of hinting at its interest in membership. Observers still have many questions about its eligibility to meet the CPTPP’s high standards and there is an ongoing debate about whether and under what terms it should be included. Many also wonder when—or even if—the United States will consider rejoining the agreement.

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Wendy Cutler about China’s bid to join the CPTPP. Wendy Cutler is vice president and managing director of the Washington D.C. office at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Wendy previously worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for nearly three decades, most recently serving as the acting deputy U.S. trade representative.   
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 9 Nov 2021 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Wendy Cutler, CPTPP, China, United States, Trade, TPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-prospects-for-joining-cptpp-5lwFVrQm</link>
      <enclosure length="27697001" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/71958826-76a9-4bb0-b54a-7589c8251740/audio/3203c01a-d0ed-4623-ac3b-11fec6e5e23f/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Prospects for Joining CPTPP</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Wendy Cutler, CPTPP, China, United States, Trade, TPP, Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:50</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>After the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, the trade agreement’s future was uncertain. Fortunately, Japan grabbed the baton and took it across the finish line in a slightly revised form and renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The agreement was signed in 2018 by the remaining 11 countries in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas, accounting for 13 percent of world GDP. The CPTPP’s high degree of market access—alongside other digital, labor, and environmental provisions—has earned it the reputation as “one of the broadest and most state-of-the-art trade agreements ever signed.”

On September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the CPTPP after nearly a year of hinting at its interest in membership. Observers still have many questions about its eligibility to meet the CPTPP’s high standards and there is an ongoing debate about whether and under what terms it should be included. Many also wonder when—or even if—the United States will consider rejoining the agreement.

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Wendy Cutler about China’s bid to join the CPTPP. Wendy Cutler is vice president and managing director of the Washington D.C. office at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Wendy previously worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for nearly three decades, most recently serving as the acting deputy U.S. trade representative.  </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>After the Trump administration pulled out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, the trade agreement’s future was uncertain. Fortunately, Japan grabbed the baton and took it across the finish line in a slightly revised form and renamed the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The agreement was signed in 2018 by the remaining 11 countries in the Indo-Pacific and the Americas, accounting for 13 percent of world GDP. The CPTPP’s high degree of market access—alongside other digital, labor, and environmental provisions—has earned it the reputation as “one of the broadest and most state-of-the-art trade agreements ever signed.”

On September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the CPTPP after nearly a year of hinting at its interest in membership. Observers still have many questions about its eligibility to meet the CPTPP’s high standards and there is an ongoing debate about whether and under what terms it should be included. Many also wonder when—or even if—the United States will consider rejoining the agreement.

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Wendy Cutler about China’s bid to join the CPTPP. Wendy Cutler is vice president and managing director of the Washington D.C. office at the Asia Society Policy Institute. Wendy previously worked at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for nearly three decades, most recently serving as the acting deputy U.S. trade representative.  </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>13</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">b78cdd4f-d86a-4123-a711-db1ad5b1d34e</guid>
      <title>COP26 and China’s Global Climate Agenda</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In 1990, China’s greenhouse gas emissions were less than a quarter of developing country emissions. In 2019, almost 3 decades later, China’s annual emissions exceeded those of all developed countries combined. In per capita terms, however, China’s carbon emissions are considerably less than the US and other developed countries. China is under growing global pressure to take steps to reduce its emissions. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping pledged “to peak [China’s] carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” At this year’s UNGA meeting, Xi said China would “not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.” On October 31st the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, will be held in Glasgow, Scotland. Will Xi Jinping make additional pledges? How should we evaluate China’s commitments so far, and why does Beijing seek to be a global leader on climate change?

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joanna Lewis about China’s prospects at COP26 and the country’s broader climate agenda. Dr. Joanna Lewis is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Oct 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Dr. Joanna Lewis, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/cop26-and-chinas-global-climate-agenda-Jo3z6Bah</link>
      <enclosure length="27747503" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/cdb8dc40-f983-474a-bf4e-d56355bb0415/audio/b9401f69-a376-40a9-9caa-a71f057f1eb8/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>COP26 and China’s Global Climate Agenda</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Dr. Joanna Lewis, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:52</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In 1990, China’s greenhouse gas emissions were less than a quarter of developing country emissions. In 2019, almost 3 decades later, China’s annual emissions exceeded those of all developed countries combined. In per capita terms, however, China’s carbon emissions are considerably less than the US and other developed countries. China is under growing global pressure to take steps to reduce its emissions. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping pledged “to peak [China’s] carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” At this year’s UNGA meeting, Xi said China would “not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.” On October 31st the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, will be held in Glasgow, Scotland. Will Xi Jinping make additional pledges? How should we evaluate China’s commitments so far, and why does Beijing seek to be a global leader on climate change?

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joanna Lewis about China’s prospects at COP26 and the country’s broader climate agenda. Dr. Joanna Lewis is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In 1990, China’s greenhouse gas emissions were less than a quarter of developing country emissions. In 2019, almost 3 decades later, China’s annual emissions exceeded those of all developed countries combined. In per capita terms, however, China’s carbon emissions are considerably less than the US and other developed countries. China is under growing global pressure to take steps to reduce its emissions. Last year at the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping pledged “to peak [China’s] carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.” At this year’s UNGA meeting, Xi said China would “not build new coal-fired power projects abroad.” On October 31st the 26th UN Climate Change Conference of the Parties, or COP26, will be held in Glasgow, Scotland. Will Xi Jinping make additional pledges? How should we evaluate China’s commitments so far, and why does Beijing seek to be a global leader on climate change?

Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Joanna Lewis about China’s prospects at COP26 and the country’s broader climate agenda. Dr. Joanna Lewis is an Associate Professor and Director of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs Program at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>carbon, cop 26, cop26, united nations, europe, environment, united states, un, change, china, net zero, climate change, neutrality, climate, emissions, u.n., glasgow, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>12</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">d87fa02d-afdd-4f91-a3d8-084e3c5dc69b</guid>
      <title>Think Globally, Act Locally: China’s Local Diplomacy Strategy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In a decades-long effort to expand its international “circle of friends,” the PRC has persisted in supplementing its national-level diplomacy with local exchanges. Over the past four decades, the PRC has forged more than 2000 sister-city relationships worldwide, including over 200 in the United States and over 350 in the EU. China forms these ties across the world through the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a United Front organization that specializes in developing relationships with local business, political, and media figures abroad. But sister cities are only one of many avenues for Beijing to engage with local actors in order to realize its global aspirations. 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Mareike Ohlberg about China’s strategy of local diplomacy and its importance in an environment of increasingly tense national-level relations. Dr. Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow with GMF’s Asia Program. Her research interests include China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Mareike is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World.
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 12 Oct 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Mareike Ohlberg)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/think-globally-act-locally-chinas-local-diplomacy-strategy-NSOOwkYK</link>
      <enclosure length="31240619" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/3b2418a9-cdb5-4ac4-abb5-3f28ce8c6a26/audio/0cf509bb-4ff8-494e-b093-b6c77cc2a291/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Think Globally, Act Locally: China’s Local Diplomacy Strategy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Mareike Ohlberg</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:32:31</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In a decades-long effort to expand its international “circle of friends,” the PRC has persisted in supplementing its national-level diplomacy with local exchanges. Over the past four decades, the PRC has forged more than 2000 sister-city relationships worldwide, including over 200 in the United States and over 350 in the EU. China forms these ties across the world through the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a United Front organization that specializes in developing relationships with local business, political, and media figures abroad. But sister cities are only one of many avenues for Beijing to engage with local actors in order to realize its global aspirations. 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Mareike Ohlberg about China’s strategy of local diplomacy and its importance in an environment of increasingly tense national-level relations. Dr. Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow with GMF’s Asia Program. Her research interests include China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Mareike is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World.
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In a decades-long effort to expand its international “circle of friends,” the PRC has persisted in supplementing its national-level diplomacy with local exchanges. Over the past four decades, the PRC has forged more than 2000 sister-city relationships worldwide, including over 200 in the United States and over 350 in the EU. China forms these ties across the world through the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, a United Front organization that specializes in developing relationships with local business, political, and media figures abroad. But sister cities are only one of many avenues for Beijing to engage with local actors in order to realize its global aspirations. 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Mareike Ohlberg about China’s strategy of local diplomacy and its importance in an environment of increasingly tense national-level relations. Dr. Mareike Ohlberg is a senior fellow with GMF’s Asia Program. Her research interests include China’s media and digital policies as well as the Chinese Communist Party’s influence campaigns in Europe. Mareike is co-author of the book Hidden Hand: Exposing How the Chinese Communist Party is Reshaping the World.
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>europe, chinese people’s association for friendship with foreign countries, united states, united front, china, sister, sister cities, communist, prc, european union, local diplomacy, cities, usa, america, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>11</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">6b2ea448-899a-4e93-ba23-5440683705b6</guid>
      <title>China’s Economic Statecraft in the Developing World with Dr. Matt Ferchen</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Eight years since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy has gone global, making significant inroads into the developing world. Of the 140 bilateral BRI MoU’s signed between the People’s Republic of China and its partners, 85 of them have been with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. In some ways, the BRI formalizes the PRC’s pre-existing trade and investment practices in these regions. However, the initiative also reflects a more ambitious phase in Beijing's economic strategy in the developing world. And to date, the United States and its allies are still in search of an effective multilateral response. Can alternative economic initiatives like the Blue Dot Initiative and the G7’s recently introduced Build Back Better World (B3W) compete with the BRI in developing nations?

Bonnie Glaser talks with Matt Ferchen about China’s economic strategy in the developing world. Dr. Matt Ferchen is the Head of Global China Research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. His research interests include Chinese economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative in developing nations, and U.S.-China relations. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 28 Sep 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Matt Ferchen, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-economic-statecraft-in-the-developing-world-with-dr-matt-ferchen-3GdsAugq</link>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Economic Statecraft in the Developing World with Dr. Matt Ferchen</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Matt Ferchen, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Eight years since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy has gone global, making significant inroads into the developing world. Of the 140 bilateral BRI MoU’s signed between the People’s Republic of China and its partners, 85 of them have been with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. In some ways, the BRI formalizes the PRC’s pre-existing trade and investment practices in these regions. However, the initiative also reflects a more ambitious phase in Beijing&apos;s economic strategy in the developing world. And to date, the United States and its allies are still in search of an effective multilateral response. Can alternative economic initiatives like the Blue Dot Initiative and the G7’s recently introduced Build Back Better World (B3W) compete with the BRI in developing nations?

Bonnie Glaser talks with Matt Ferchen about China’s economic strategy in the developing world. Dr. Matt Ferchen is the Head of Global China Research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. His research interests include Chinese economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative in developing nations, and U.S.-China relations.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Eight years since the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy has gone global, making significant inroads into the developing world. Of the 140 bilateral BRI MoU’s signed between the People’s Republic of China and its partners, 85 of them have been with countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. In some ways, the BRI formalizes the PRC’s pre-existing trade and investment practices in these regions. However, the initiative also reflects a more ambitious phase in Beijing&apos;s economic strategy in the developing world. And to date, the United States and its allies are still in search of an effective multilateral response. Can alternative economic initiatives like the Blue Dot Initiative and the G7’s recently introduced Build Back Better World (B3W) compete with the BRI in developing nations?

Bonnie Glaser talks with Matt Ferchen about China’s economic strategy in the developing world. Dr. Matt Ferchen is the Head of Global China Research at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. His research interests include Chinese economic statecraft, the Belt and Road Initiative in developing nations, and U.S.-China relations.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>us, belt and road, europe, united states, xi, xi jinping, developing world, caribbean, and the pacific, china, sub-saharan africa, jinping, south and southeast asia, prc, bri, latin america, china’s economic strategy, usa, america, africa, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>10</itunes:episode>
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      <title>The Significance of Evolving Sino-Russian Relations with Alexander Gabuev</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Ties between Moscow and Beijing continue their upward trajectory, with their bilateral cooperation expanding across a broad range of areas. In the wake of the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia and China are coordinating their policies. This past June, NATO expressed concern about Chinese-Russian military cooperation and their joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. While the United States and virtually all its allies are criticizing numerous Chinese policies, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping in a phone call a few weeks ago that he supports China’s legitimate actions to safeguard its interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, and said he opposes any external interference in China’s domestic affairs.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Alexander Gabuev about Sino-Russian relations and the reactions of and the implications for the United States and Europe. Alexander Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia’s policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China’s relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Sep 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Alexander Gabuev)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/the-significance-of-evolving-sino-russian-relations-with-alexander-gabuev-hcPuCpi3</link>
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      <itunes:title>The Significance of Evolving Sino-Russian Relations with Alexander Gabuev</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Alexander Gabuev</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:34:51</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Ties between Moscow and Beijing continue their upward trajectory, with their bilateral cooperation expanding across a broad range of areas. In the wake of the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia and China are coordinating their policies. This past June, NATO expressed concern about Chinese-Russian military cooperation and their joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. While the United States and virtually all its allies are criticizing numerous Chinese policies, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping in a phone call a few weeks ago that he supports China’s legitimate actions to safeguard its interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, and said he opposes any external interference in China’s domestic affairs.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Alexander Gabuev about Sino-Russian relations and the reactions of and the implications for the United States and Europe. Alexander Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia’s policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China’s relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Ties between Moscow and Beijing continue their upward trajectory, with their bilateral cooperation expanding across a broad range of areas. In the wake of the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia and China are coordinating their policies. This past June, NATO expressed concern about Chinese-Russian military cooperation and their joint exercises in the Euro-Atlantic area. While the United States and virtually all its allies are criticizing numerous Chinese policies, Russian President Vladimir Putin told Xi Jinping in a phone call a few weeks ago that he supports China’s legitimate actions to safeguard its interests on issues related to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and the South China Sea, and said he opposes any external interference in China’s domestic affairs.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Alexander Gabuev about Sino-Russian relations and the reactions of and the implications for the United States and Europe. Alexander Gabuev is a senior fellow and the chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. His research is focused on Russia’s policy toward East and Southeast Asia, political and ideological trends in China, and China’s relations with its neighbors—especially those in Central Asia.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>us, international relations, europe, united states, afghanistan, china, relations, russia, security, sino-russian, foreign policy, eu</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>9</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">bf80de5e-5ed5-4e97-9d7f-2e91ab3ace46</guid>
      <title>China’s Concept of National Security under Xi Jinping with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens</title>
      <description><![CDATA[In 2014, Xi Jinping established the China National Security Commission (CNSC) and was appointed its head by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo. A year later, Xi stated that China “should attach equal importance to internal and external security.” Under his direction, the CCP has created a unified national security system based on Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security. That concept has evolved to include at least 16 forms of security, including military, territorial, technological, ecological, societal, polar, cyber, space, cultural, political, economic, bio, deep sea, resource, nuclear, and overseas interests. It is no exaggeration to say that national security tops Xi Jinping’s agenda.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens about China’s concept of national security under Xi Jinping and the linkages between domestic security trends and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Greitens is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research interests include East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 31 Aug 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-concept-of-national-security-under-xi-jinping-with-dr-sheena-chestnut-greitens-fHP4lZX2</link>
      <enclosure length="34528077" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/aedabf20-e32d-4073-b427-b7b8d212cb31/audio/f441e0bb-76cf-4177-b2a6-06f6c46188ba/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Concept of National Security under Xi Jinping with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:35:56</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In 2014, Xi Jinping established the China National Security Commission (CNSC) and was appointed its head by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo. A year later, Xi stated that China “should attach equal importance to internal and external security.” Under his direction, the CCP has created a unified national security system based on Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security. That concept has evolved to include at least 16 forms of security, including military, territorial, technological, ecological, societal, polar, cyber, space, cultural, political, economic, bio, deep sea, resource, nuclear, and overseas interests. It is no exaggeration to say that national security tops Xi Jinping’s agenda.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens about China’s concept of national security under Xi Jinping and the linkages between domestic security trends and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Greitens is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research interests include East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In 2014, Xi Jinping established the China National Security Commission (CNSC) and was appointed its head by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo. A year later, Xi stated that China “should attach equal importance to internal and external security.” Under his direction, the CCP has created a unified national security system based on Xi’s concept of comprehensive national security. That concept has evolved to include at least 16 forms of security, including military, territorial, technological, ecological, societal, polar, cyber, space, cultural, political, economic, bio, deep sea, resource, nuclear, and overseas interests. It is no exaggeration to say that national security tops Xi Jinping’s agenda.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens about China’s concept of national security under Xi Jinping and the linkages between domestic security trends and Chinese foreign policy. Dr. Greitens is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas, Austin. Her research interests include East Asia, American national security, and authoritarian politics and foreign policy.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>8</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">4cc823ec-cfab-49d9-9a66-d3f8c8b09220</guid>
      <title>Lithuania&apos;s ties with China Sour, and Warm with Taiwan</title>
      <description><![CDATA[On August 10th, the People’s Republic of China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius recall its representative to Beijing. The reason? Lithuania’s decision to allow Taipei to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name "Taiwanese Representative Office." Sino-Lithuanian relations started deteriorating in 2019. That year, Vilnius identified Chinese espionage as a threat to its national security. Since then, Lithuania has opposed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawn from the China-led 17+1 grouping, and criticized PRC policies in Xinjiang. In the meantime, Vilnius’ ties with Taiwan are warming. The new coalition government in Vilnius announced in November 2020 that it would follow a values-based foreign policy. Leaders pledged to “oppose any violation of human rights and democratic freedoms…from Belarus to Taiwan.”  In addition to Taiwan’s plans to open a diplomatic mission in Vilnius, Lithuania will open its own trade office in Taipei this fall.

 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas about the drivers of Lithuania’s recent policy shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the potential for future Lithuania-Taiwan cooperation. Dr. Andrijauskas is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the political systems and international relations of Asia. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Aug 2021 08:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/lithuanias-ties-with-china-sour-and-warm-with-taiwan-6txcHcFa</link>
      <enclosure length="32163896" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/59b89e79-7049-4eea-b774-2c696517b623/audio/da1add80-d248-4cc7-97c8-3b14b10528ff/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Lithuania&apos;s ties with China Sour, and Warm with Taiwan</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:33:29</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>On August 10th, the People’s Republic of China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius recall its representative to Beijing. The reason? Lithuania’s decision to allow Taipei to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name &quot;Taiwanese Representative Office.&quot; Sino-Lithuanian relations started deteriorating in 2019. That year, Vilnius identified Chinese espionage as a threat to its national security. Since then, Lithuania has opposed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawn from the China-led 17+1 grouping, and criticized PRC policies in Xinjiang. In the meantime, Vilnius’ ties with Taiwan are warming. The new coalition government in Vilnius announced in November 2020 that it would follow a values-based foreign policy. Leaders pledged to “oppose any violation of human rights and democratic freedoms…from Belarus to Taiwan.”  In addition to Taiwan’s plans to open a diplomatic mission in Vilnius, Lithuania will open its own trade office in Taipei this fall.

 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas about the drivers of Lithuania’s recent policy shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the potential for future Lithuania-Taiwan cooperation. Dr. Andrijauskas is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the political systems and international relations of Asia.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>On August 10th, the People’s Republic of China recalled its ambassador to Lithuania and demanded Vilnius recall its representative to Beijing. The reason? Lithuania’s decision to allow Taipei to open a representative office in Vilnius under the name &quot;Taiwanese Representative Office.&quot; Sino-Lithuanian relations started deteriorating in 2019. That year, Vilnius identified Chinese espionage as a threat to its national security. Since then, Lithuania has opposed the Hong Kong National Security Law at the UN Human Rights Council, withdrawn from the China-led 17+1 grouping, and criticized PRC policies in Xinjiang. In the meantime, Vilnius’ ties with Taiwan are warming. The new coalition government in Vilnius announced in November 2020 that it would follow a values-based foreign policy. Leaders pledged to “oppose any violation of human rights and democratic freedoms…from Belarus to Taiwan.”  In addition to Taiwan’s plans to open a diplomatic mission in Vilnius, Lithuania will open its own trade office in Taipei this fall.

 

Bonnie Glaser talks with Dr. Konstantinas Andrijauskas about the drivers of Lithuania’s recent policy shifts, Chinese interests in the region, and the potential for future Lithuania-Taiwan cooperation. Dr. Andrijauskas is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Vilnius University’s Institute of International Relations and Political Science. His research focuses on China’s domestic and foreign policies and the political systems and international relations of Asia.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>taiwan, china, lithuania</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>7</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">c9d543f4-10dd-41ff-befd-77be190a17f4</guid>
      <title>China’s Interests and Role in Afghanistan Amid U.S. Withdrawal with Andrew Small</title>
      <description><![CDATA[After two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO are withdrawing their forces, with potential implications for regional security and thus for Chinese interests. Some observers have suggested the U.S. withdrawal will create opportunities for China to fill the void, but in fact, Beijing is worried about the potential negative security and economic impact of the U.S. pull-out. China has several major investments in Afghanistan, including in the Aynak Copper Mine and in the Amu Darya Basin Oil Fields. The Taliban has said it would welcome Chinese investments and reconstruction, but the Taliban’s rapidly growing influence has alarmed the Chinese government. An explosion that killed nine Chinese workers in Pakistan in mid-July, which Beijing has said was a terrorist attack, has further heightened Chinese fears of regional instability.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Andrew Small about China’s interests, strategy, and future role in Afghanistan on this episode of China Global. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Asia Program and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China's foreign and economic policy. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 3 Aug 2021 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Andrew Small)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/episode-6-lIp5IZsk</link>
      <enclosure length="29705981" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/9a0d04da-82a7-4626-9b18-704cc776daaa/audio/63277a32-2e20-4260-9b1f-1681ebca67c4/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>China’s Interests and Role in Afghanistan Amid U.S. Withdrawal with Andrew Small</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Andrew Small</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:56</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>After two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO are withdrawing their forces, with potential implications for regional security and thus for Chinese interests. Some observers have suggested the U.S. withdrawal will create opportunities for China to fill the void, but in fact, Beijing is worried about the potential negative security and economic impact of the U.S. pull-out. China has several major investments in Afghanistan, including in the Aynak Copper Mine and in the Amu Darya Basin Oil Fields. The Taliban has said it would welcome Chinese investments and reconstruction, but the Taliban’s rapidly growing influence has alarmed the Chinese government. An explosion that killed nine Chinese workers in Pakistan in mid-July, which Beijing has said was a terrorist attack, has further heightened Chinese fears of regional instability.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Andrew Small about China’s interests, strategy, and future role in Afghanistan on this episode of China Global. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Asia Program and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China&apos;s foreign and economic policy.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>After two decades of military involvement in Afghanistan, the United States and NATO are withdrawing their forces, with potential implications for regional security and thus for Chinese interests. Some observers have suggested the U.S. withdrawal will create opportunities for China to fill the void, but in fact, Beijing is worried about the potential negative security and economic impact of the U.S. pull-out. China has several major investments in Afghanistan, including in the Aynak Copper Mine and in the Amu Darya Basin Oil Fields. The Taliban has said it would welcome Chinese investments and reconstruction, but the Taliban’s rapidly growing influence has alarmed the Chinese government. An explosion that killed nine Chinese workers in Pakistan in mid-July, which Beijing has said was a terrorist attack, has further heightened Chinese fears of regional instability.

Bonnie Glaser talks with Andrew Small about China’s interests, strategy, and future role in Afghanistan on this episode of China Global. Andrew is a senior transatlantic fellow with GMF’s Asia Program and author of The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations, Europe-China relations, Chinese policy in South Asia, and broader developments in China&apos;s foreign and economic policy.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>international relations, afghanistan, china, foreign policy</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>6</itunes:episode>
    </item>
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      <title>Chinese Investment in Global Ports and PRC Strategy with Dr. Isaac Kardon</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Chinese companies are investing in ports that are strategically located along sea lanes of communication, connecting China to resources and markets that are vital for China’s economy. These ports, called “strategic strongpoints” by Chinese military writers, can be found all over the world—in Europe, the Americas, and countries situated adjacent to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. A growing number of observers believe that these commercial ventures will eventually become dual-use facilities or even military bases that will enable the Chinese navy to project power further from its shores.
 
In this episode of China Global, Bonnie speaks with Dr. Isaac Kardon to discuss China’s growing role in port construction and operation and its potential strategic implications. Dr. Kardon is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. He specializes in China’s maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and Chinese firms’ overseas port projects. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 20 Jul 2021 09:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (The German Marshall Fund)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinese-investment-in-global-ports-and-prc-strategy-with-dr-isaac-kardon-a7Y0HHR0</link>
      <enclosure length="41473526" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/bbd58102-fa61-4510-ae8e-179b64eeb955/episodes/542e4c13-f194-49fe-a4fe-15f3a82275bd/audio/8b7d057e-e0b4-4912-bac2-c515cc8470c3/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=dC8zmowZ"/>
      <itunes:title>Chinese Investment in Global Ports and PRC Strategy with Dr. Isaac Kardon</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>The German Marshall Fund</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:43:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Chinese companies are investing in ports that are strategically located along sea lanes of communication, connecting China to resources and markets that are vital for China’s economy. These ports, called “strategic strongpoints” by Chinese military writers, can be found all over the world—in Europe, the Americas, and countries situated adjacent to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. A growing number of observers believe that these commercial ventures will eventually become dual-use facilities or even military bases that will enable the Chinese navy to project power further from its shores.
 
In this episode of China Global, Bonnie speaks with Dr. Isaac Kardon to discuss China’s growing role in port construction and operation and its potential strategic implications. Dr. Kardon is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. He specializes in China’s maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and Chinese firms’ overseas port projects.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Chinese companies are investing in ports that are strategically located along sea lanes of communication, connecting China to resources and markets that are vital for China’s economy. These ports, called “strategic strongpoints” by Chinese military writers, can be found all over the world—in Europe, the Americas, and countries situated adjacent to the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. A growing number of observers believe that these commercial ventures will eventually become dual-use facilities or even military bases that will enable the Chinese navy to project power further from its shores.
 
In this episode of China Global, Bonnie speaks with Dr. Isaac Kardon to discuss China’s growing role in port construction and operation and its potential strategic implications. Dr. Kardon is an assistant professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. He specializes in China’s maritime disputes, Indo-Pacific maritime security and commerce, and Chinese firms’ overseas port projects.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>5</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China&apos;s Outer Space Ambitions with Dr. Namrata Goswami</title>
      <description><![CDATA[A few months ago, China became the second country to successfully land on Mars. Since then, its Zhurong rover has sent back captivating panoramic images of the red planet. Meanwhile, China is building its own space station, which will rival the International Space Station (which Beijing was barred from in 2011) once completed next year. Last month, three Chinese astronauts arrived at the Tiangong station for a three-month stint; and just this weekend, the astronauts performed the country’s first tandem spacewalk. 

China’s ambitions don’t just reach beyond its borders – they reach far beyond this planet. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami to explore Beijing’s activities and ambitions in outer space, its cooperation in this domain with Russia and Europe, and the absence of collaboration with the U.S. Dr. Goswami is an author, strategic analyst, and consultant who focuses on great power competition and security in space. She is currently working on two book projects on space power and China’s grand strategy. 
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 6 Jul 2021 16:01:02 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser, Namrata Goswami)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-outer-space-ambitions-with-dr-namrata-goswami-jTCVuRVx</link>
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      <itunes:title>China&apos;s Outer Space Ambitions with Dr. Namrata Goswami</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser, Namrata Goswami</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:29:30</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>A few months ago, China became the second country to successfully land on Mars. Since then, its Zhurong rover has sent back captivating panoramic images of the red planet. Meanwhile, China is building its own space station, which will rival the International Space Station (which Beijing was barred from in 2011) once completed next year. Last month, three Chinese astronauts arrived at the Tiangong station for a three-month stint; and just this weekend, the astronauts performed the country’s first tandem spacewalk. 

China’s ambitions don’t just reach beyond its borders – they reach far beyond this planet. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami to explore Beijing’s activities and ambitions in outer space, its cooperation in this domain with Russia and Europe, and the absence of collaboration with the U.S. Dr. Goswami is an author, strategic analyst, and consultant who focuses on great power competition and security in space. She is currently working on two book projects on space power and China’s grand strategy. 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>A few months ago, China became the second country to successfully land on Mars. Since then, its Zhurong rover has sent back captivating panoramic images of the red planet. Meanwhile, China is building its own space station, which will rival the International Space Station (which Beijing was barred from in 2011) once completed next year. Last month, three Chinese astronauts arrived at the Tiangong station for a three-month stint; and just this weekend, the astronauts performed the country’s first tandem spacewalk. 

China’s ambitions don’t just reach beyond its borders – they reach far beyond this planet. In this episode of China Global, Bonnie sits down with Dr. Namrata Goswami to explore Beijing’s activities and ambitions in outer space, its cooperation in this domain with Russia and Europe, and the absence of collaboration with the U.S. Dr. Goswami is an author, strategic analyst, and consultant who focuses on great power competition and security in space. She is currently working on two book projects on space power and China’s grand strategy. 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>namrata goswami, zhurong rover, tiangong station, mars, china, great power politics, beijing</itunes:keywords>
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      <itunes:episode>4</itunes:episode>
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      <title>The Past, Present, and Future of China-Iran Relations with Dr. William Figueroa</title>
      <description><![CDATA[Earlier this year, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement outlining plans for economic, political, and security cooperation. On paper, the agreement appears ambitious. Some experts warn that it signals closer ties between Beijing and Tehran at the expense of the United States and its partners. But others caution that this should not be read as a major shift in China’s overall approach to Iran or the Middle East--noting that obtaining technology from Israel and oil from Saudi Arabia is too important for Beijing.  
 
As the two countries mark fifty years of relations, Bonnie is joined by Dr. William Figueroa to dive deeper into the history of Sino-Iranian ties, what each side wants out of their bilateral relationship, and what this quarter-century agreement really means for the balance of power in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Dr. Figueroa is an expert on the China in the Middle East, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania where he wrote his dissertation on the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 1900s to the foundation of the Islamic Republic.
 
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Jun 2021 19:31:18 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (William Figueroa, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-iran-relations-with-william-figueroa-HrR2uH1t</link>
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      <itunes:title>The Past, Present, and Future of China-Iran Relations with Dr. William Figueroa</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>William Figueroa, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:11</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Earlier this year, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement outlining plans for economic, political, and security cooperation. On paper, the agreement appears ambitious. Some experts warn that it signals closer ties between Beijing and Tehran at the expense of the United States and its partners. But others caution that this should not be read as a major shift in China’s overall approach to Iran or the Middle East--noting that obtaining technology from Israel and oil from Saudi Arabia is too important for Beijing.  
 
As the two countries mark fifty years of relations, Bonnie is joined by Dr. William Figueroa to dive deeper into the history of Sino-Iranian ties, what each side wants out of their bilateral relationship, and what this quarter-century agreement really means for the balance of power in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Dr. Figueroa is an expert on the China in the Middle East, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania where he wrote his dissertation on the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 1900s to the foundation of the Islamic Republic.
 
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Earlier this year, China and Iran signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement outlining plans for economic, political, and security cooperation. On paper, the agreement appears ambitious. Some experts warn that it signals closer ties between Beijing and Tehran at the expense of the United States and its partners. But others caution that this should not be read as a major shift in China’s overall approach to Iran or the Middle East--noting that obtaining technology from Israel and oil from Saudi Arabia is too important for Beijing.  
 
As the two countries mark fifty years of relations, Bonnie is joined by Dr. William Figueroa to dive deeper into the history of Sino-Iranian ties, what each side wants out of their bilateral relationship, and what this quarter-century agreement really means for the balance of power in the Middle East and the rest of the world. Dr. Figueroa is an expert on the China in the Middle East, and holds a Ph.D. in history from the University of Pennsylvania where he wrote his dissertation on the history of Sino-Iranian relations from the early 1900s to the foundation of the Islamic Republic.
 
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>china-iran relations, iran, china, william figueroa, tehran, sino-iranian relations, beijing, bonnie glaser</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>3</itunes:episode>
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      <title>China’s Vaccine Diplomacy with Ivana Karásková</title>
      <description><![CDATA[As the pandemic spread last year, the provision of life-saving supplies – PPE, ventilators, medicines, and eventually, vaccines -- quickly became intensely political. Pandemic response became not only a matter of life and death, but also of global reputation and influence. For China and Russia in particular, the distribution of supplies became a new front for flexing soft power. As early as April 2020, Xi Jinping made his plans known to treat China’s vaccines as global goods.  And observers speculate that Beijing is using good will to mask a bigger geopolitical play: to press its interests on controversial issues like Taiwan and Huawei in exchange for desperately needed relief.
 
What are China’s tactics and goals, and how have they evolved over the course of the pandemic? Will vaccine efficacy affect China’s ability to maneuver? Has Beijing had much luck in providing vaccines in exchange for political favors?  Today on China Global, Bonnie Glaser digs deep into Beijing’s approach to vaccine diplomacy with Ivana Karásková, founder of MapInfluenCE and the organization China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe
 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 8 Jun 2021 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Ivana Karásková, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-with-ivana-karaskova-IYZj1rYJ</link>
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      <itunes:title>China’s Vaccine Diplomacy with Ivana Karásková</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Ivana Karásková, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:27:18</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>As the pandemic spread last year, the provision of life-saving supplies – PPE, ventilators, medicines, and eventually, vaccines -- quickly became intensely political. Pandemic response became not only a matter of life and death, but also of global reputation and influence. For China and Russia in particular, the distribution of supplies became a new front for flexing soft power. As early as April 2020, Xi Jinping made his plans known to treat China’s vaccines as global goods.  And observers speculate that Beijing is using good will to mask a bigger geopolitical play: to press its interests on controversial issues like Taiwan and Huawei in exchange for desperately needed relief.
 
What are China’s tactics and goals, and how have they evolved over the course of the pandemic? Will vaccine efficacy affect China’s ability to maneuver? Has Beijing had much luck in providing vaccines in exchange for political favors?  Today on China Global, Bonnie Glaser digs deep into Beijing’s approach to vaccine diplomacy with Ivana Karásková, founder of MapInfluenCE and the organization China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe
</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>As the pandemic spread last year, the provision of life-saving supplies – PPE, ventilators, medicines, and eventually, vaccines -- quickly became intensely political. Pandemic response became not only a matter of life and death, but also of global reputation and influence. For China and Russia in particular, the distribution of supplies became a new front for flexing soft power. As early as April 2020, Xi Jinping made his plans known to treat China’s vaccines as global goods.  And observers speculate that Beijing is using good will to mask a bigger geopolitical play: to press its interests on controversial issues like Taiwan and Huawei in exchange for desperately needed relief.
 
What are China’s tactics and goals, and how have they evolved over the course of the pandemic? Will vaccine efficacy affect China’s ability to maneuver? Has Beijing had much luck in providing vaccines in exchange for political favors?  Today on China Global, Bonnie Glaser digs deep into Beijing’s approach to vaccine diplomacy with Ivana Karásková, founder of MapInfluenCE and the organization China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe
</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:keywords>xi jinping, china, soft power, covid, diplomacy, beijing, vaccines</itunes:keywords>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>2</itunes:episode>
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      <title>How China Sees Europe with Professor Lanxin Xiang</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<ul><li><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-china-harder-line/31267233.html">Europe Signals Harder Line on Beijing with Frozen EU-China Trade Deal</a> (RFE/RL; May 21, 2021)</li><li><a href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2115">EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Milestones and Documents</a> + <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/china_en">China - International Partnerships</a> (European Commission) </li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/china-europe-xi-jinping.html">China, Seeking a Friend in Europe Finds Rising Anger and Frustration</a> (The New York Times, September 17, 2020)</li><li><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/special_report/eu-china-cooperation-on-climate-green-engines-of-global-economic-recovery/">EU-China Cooperation on Climate Change</a> (Euractiv, November 2020) </li><li><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-restricts-exports-to-hong-kong-over-china-security-law/a-54359734">EU Restricts Exports to Hong Kong over China Security Law</a> (Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2020)</li></ul>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 25 May 2021 07:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Lanxin Xiang, Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/how-china-sees-europe-with-professor-lanxin-xiang-duv1ilBQ</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<ul><li><a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-china-harder-line/31267233.html">Europe Signals Harder Line on Beijing with Frozen EU-China Trade Deal</a> (RFE/RL; May 21, 2021)</li><li><a href="https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=2115">EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Milestones and Documents</a> + <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/where-we-work/china_en">China - International Partnerships</a> (European Commission) </li><li><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/17/world/asia/china-europe-xi-jinping.html">China, Seeking a Friend in Europe Finds Rising Anger and Frustration</a> (The New York Times, September 17, 2020)</li><li><a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-china/special_report/eu-china-cooperation-on-climate-green-engines-of-global-economic-recovery/">EU-China Cooperation on Climate Change</a> (Euractiv, November 2020) </li><li><a href="https://www.dw.com/en/eu-restricts-exports-to-hong-kong-over-china-security-law/a-54359734">EU Restricts Exports to Hong Kong over China Security Law</a> (Deutsche Welle, July 28, 2020)</li></ul>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>How China Sees Europe with Professor Lanxin Xiang</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Lanxin Xiang, Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:30:55</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>As each other’s biggest trading partners, China and the European Union have typically viewed one another as collaborators on global challenges. But in recent months, China’s relationship with Europe has become more contentious than ever before. Just a few months after agreeing on a new Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), the EU and Beijing traded sanctions and pointed statements. And just last week, the European Parliament voted to freeze ratification of the deal altogether, pressing China to lift its sanctions first. Meanwhile, friction is growing over Chinese policies in Hong Kong and in the South China Sea.
 
There are reams of analysis on Europe’s evolving views of China, but much less on China’s own perspectives on Europe. In the inaugural episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Professor Lanxin Xiang to discuss Europe through China’s eyes, and where the relationship could be headed.  Xiang is the Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, and he directs the Center of One Belt and One Road Studies at the China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>As each other’s biggest trading partners, China and the European Union have typically viewed one another as collaborators on global challenges. But in recent months, China’s relationship with Europe has become more contentious than ever before. Just a few months after agreeing on a new Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), the EU and Beijing traded sanctions and pointed statements. And just last week, the European Parliament voted to freeze ratification of the deal altogether, pressing China to lift its sanctions first. Meanwhile, friction is growing over Chinese policies in Hong Kong and in the South China Sea.
 
There are reams of analysis on Europe’s evolving views of China, but much less on China’s own perspectives on Europe. In the inaugural episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser is joined by Professor Lanxin Xiang to discuss Europe through China’s eyes, and where the relationship could be headed.  Xiang is the Professor of International History and Politics at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, and he directs the Center of One Belt and One Road Studies at the China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>Introducing &quot;China Global&quot; from the German Marshall Fund</title>
      <description><![CDATA[
China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world. 
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 24 May 2021 20:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>GMFUSpodcast@gmail.com (Bonnie Glaser)</author>
      <link>https://china-global.simplecast.com/episodes/china-global-teaser-rf49Xm_A</link>
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      <itunes:title>Introducing &quot;China Global&quot; from the German Marshall Fund</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Bonnie Glaser</itunes:author>
      <itunes:duration>00:01:26</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>
China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>
China’s rise has captivated and vexed the international community. From defense, technology, and the environment, to trade, academia, and human rights, much of what Beijing does now reverberates across the map. China Global is a new podcast from the German Marshall Fund that decodes Beijing’s global ambitions as they unfold. Every other week, host Bonnie Glaser will be joined by a different international expert for an illuminating discussion on a different aspect of China’s foreign policy, the worldview that drives its actions, the tactics it’s using to achieve its goals—and what that means for the rest of the world.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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      <itunes:episode>0</itunes:episode>
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