Sushant: Hello, and welcome to India Speak, a podcast by the Centre for Policy Research. I am Sushant Singh Senior fellow at CPR. in this series we have been speaking to the leading experts and academics on the many facets of Sino-India relations, and important aspects of the China-India rivalry is often visible in the countries of South Asia. Today, we are looking at Nepal, and its relationship with China. As it stands after Chinese Foreign Minister, and State Councillor, Wang Yi paid a visit to Kathmandu. To do that our guest today, is the Nepalese Publisher, Editor, Commentator, and Writer Kanak Mani Dixit, is the founder of the magazine Himal Southasian, and Co-founder of Himal Media. He has degrees in law from Delhi University, and international relations, and journalism from Columbia University. He has been a journalist since 1971, and worked at the United Nations Secretariat between 1982, and 1990. Lately, he has been engaged in civil rights activism in relation to peace, democracy, and human rights in Nepal. He is an author of children’s books and has contributed to several South Asian anthologies. He is also the author of two works of political commentary, “Dekhe ko Mulk”, “The Country I see”, and “Peace Politics of Nepal”, Kanak welcome to India Speak.

Kanak: Thank You Sushant!

Sushant: Kanak the day Wang Yi landed in Kathmandu you wrote a long essay, by your own admission a bit too long in Nepal Times, highlighting the broken parts in the Nepal-China relationship, and asking him to have a better understanding of Nepal, the link to the essay in show notes,I hope Wang read that essay, and the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu, got it translated in Mandarin. Now that the visit is over, what do you make of Wang's trip? How did it go particularly from a Nepali’s perspective?

Kanak: I personally believe that Wang, Sushant was, in Kathmandu to sort of make amends for certain overreach by Chinese commentators who, we take to mean as taking the position of the Chinese State in relation with Nepal. Several things that have gone wrong lately, some of them having to do with the Nepali overreach. But the largest issue had to do with the particular grant from the United States for Nepal for 500 million dollars called the MCC (Millennial Challenge Compact) to make transmission lines, and highways. It was a pure grant of 500 million dollars, and at the time of covid when the international grants dried up, it was a bonanza for Nepal. But, the Chinese suddenly piped up, if that's the right word, to oppose it publicly before it was adopted by Nepal’s parliament, the agreement. So I feel that there was a patch up needed, and we can come to the MCC later. But I believe essentially Wang Yi’s visit was to reach out to Nepal which is the vital state for the Chinese, even though China borders many countries of Asia, and South Asia, but Nepal is vital because it’s in the Himalayan land with India on the other side, with which it has problem, and Tibetian population on this side. So, for these reasons I think the Chinese made an extra effort to come to Kathmandu. I believe the results have been mixed. In that there was a proforma meeting, and there was no bilateral communicae if I remember. But, from the read out from the Nepali side, there was not a mention of the BRI, “The Belt and Road Initiative '', which has been the Chinese foriegn policies flag, of the last five years atleast, and with presidency Xinjping wanting that. But, the Nepalies obviously chose not to highlight that, so I believe Wang Yi would have gone back thinking that he has made some amends for the highly charged commentary coming out of Beijing in the last few months, but beyond that I think we are not further ahead on mending Nepal- China ties to the extent in my view that we need the Chinese to better understand Nepal, and Nepalies, rather than think of Nepal as a supplicant state, which I believe they do.

Sushant: What do you mean when you say Chinese do not understand Nepal. What would it require from them to understand Nepal better? What is it that they get wrong about Nepal?

Kanak: They do not interact enough with Nepalese. We do not know who they talk to or how they make up their point of view. For all the mistakes for example India makes, you know India has a wide network of journalists, civil society, average Nepali citizens that they will as a matter of course meet. Whereas you do not know who the Chinese meet, and who they talk to, what kinds of opinions they make based on actual interactions. Instead it is a kind of imperious, if not imperial outlook, and not to blame the Chinese entirely, the Nepali response has been at some points near civility or obsequiousness, and there is reason for that we can get to, but the Chinese essentially need to understand Nepali society, Nepali people's desire for example for democracy, which will be hard for the Chinese to understand, but they would have to because what we know is, Chinese were very supportive of royalty in Nepal, the King in Nepal when Nepal was a constitutional Monarchy, before that a monarchy because, and that would seem incongruous to some because China is a communist country, and this is a monarchy. But, China’s primary focus vis-a-vis Nepal is political stability. They want to know who they are dealing with, and there is some kind of planning that they can do in Nepal. After Nepal became a republic, and the rambunctious, and the credulous democracy that it has become with many parties, many voices, lots of ranker, China feels that we need somebody stable in Nepal, but it is not done. Firstly, it should accept that Nepal will be like this. We will not go back to being a stable country whether a dictatorship or a democracy that China can play with. China will have to understand Nepal better, Kathmandu better to play a role in the punges. I don't think they have got the capacity at this point whether they have think tank studying Nepal, or whether they have individual scholars studying Nepal, and even there we don't know whether these think tanks and scholars really have a say in the central CPC corridors the Communist Party of China which essentially defines China’s foreign policy, and directs Chinese foreign ministry. We actually are flying blind when it comes to who looks out of China, into Nepal, and this might be true with the other countries as well.

Sushant: Kanak you spoke about the Washingtons Millennium Corporation Challenge, or the MCC project. For listeners who may not be aware of the issue, can you help summarize it for them? And also, bring in SriLanka, and other examples which were part of MCC.

Kanak: About a decade and a half I believe, when Americans were deciding how to have a different type of support outside of the US to support developing countries they decided on a criteria, having to do with governability, corruption, or lack of corruption, democratic values etc, and then they put out a call, Nepal also applied like other countries, and you had to make the grade. Make the grade in a nice way, that essentially you are a democracy, to begin with I don't believe the Americans do everything right, by long short they have their own burdens to carry including in Nepal. But, when it comes to the MCC in relation to what it was offered in Nepal it was a clean grant that was negotiated over 10 years, and finally it was ready for the signing, and a requirement was slipped in that it had to be passed by parliament, it need not have been but that came about and, ok that’s a long story. So things came ahead when Nepali politics had changed enough and players wanted to utilize MCC for the purpose, stand against MCC for their purpose. So the major parties, the UML, and the Nepali Congress were for it. The person who was decidedly against it was a coalition partner of the current government Mr Pushpa Kamal Dahal, known to the world as Prachanda, the Maoist chief.  He decided to play politics by raising the ante on MCC. Essentially letting his supporters and circles to present MCC as an imperialist project against Nepal's greater good. And, this is where things came to ahead and where China comes into the picture at the last moment, when MCC was about to be passed by the parliament,  China came out publicly against it.  The spokesperson in Beijing of the foreign ministry, came out called it, said adopting the particular resolution in the Nepali parliament would be opening up Pandora's box. They spoke of the American influence without naming America, in getting Nepal to pass this as a part of coercive diplomacy. The main problem that I have with what they did was they denied Nepal the agency of adopting it for its own good.  Rather they saw it as a play of the United States in Nepal and I believe that is where in a way China got found out because it seems to have actively worked for Nepal not to get a  500 million dollar grant.

Sushant: Kanak two questions on that, what kind of projects were exactly there in the MCC? I believe there were only power projects, infrastructure projects and road construction projects. Were they in any way detrimental to the Chinese interest?  And the second question is that even Wang Yi’s statement yesterday in Nepal, on Saturday in Nepal asking the outside powers not to interfere was almost in the same tone and tenor as the earlier statement of the Chinese foreign ministry, that you referred to.

Kanak: Yes, that Comes out that the read out from the Chinese side, the Nepalis side is trying to downplay it but Nepali side did not prefer to BRI, the Belt and Road Initiative, which China pushed on Nepal like the other world it is not entirely a bad thing, but indicative that Nepal preferred not to mention it at all, whereas the Chinese readout is essentially what you said.And, I believe that is very undiplomatic, and if Wang Yi’s visit to Nepal was to make amends, that one statement if he has said it, that you know, Nepal should have an independent stance and China stands for an independent Nepal with full flexibility vis-a-vis its international scope, it was a  pointed reference to the fact that Americans foisted “MCC''. MCC itself to go back to the earlier is in my view an innocent project. Provided in Nepal by the Nepalis and if somewhere it becomes coercive down the line, Nepalis are alert enough to reject it.  And there is a clause in there, three months or so after which you can get out of it.But, what  the project actually is, it's mostly a project for high tension lines and electricity transmission lines to make up for a shortfall in the grid within Nepal.  After many years of negotiations, the MCC came that included Nepali and American officials decided that as Nepal wanted the thing that was lacking was power evacuations from many hydropower stations that are being made in Nepal. And, so it is good for Nepal's economy, it's good for Nepals society and there is no doubt that this would be good for Nepal. The point is a smaller quotient of the project is for some highway maintenance project, highway maintenance essentially.

Sushant: Kanak you earlier spoke about Beijing is now making the same mistake in Nepal which New Delhi earlier made. And, that is something a lot of Indian commentators bloat about that we did learnt our lessons the hard way in Nepal, now China is going to learn the same lesson.  But what are those mistakes? Everybody says, what are those mistakes that China is now making, and is China  likely to cross correct or you don't see any signs of it at all? 

Kanak: Well, to begin with the Nepali society marches to a different drummer for various reasons.  One of it could be as it was non colonised so the world doesn't understand Nepal enough or doesn't invest in understanding Nepal enough. There is a kind of nationalism and a kind of resilience in the society that if you go beyond a point then the society rejects. They will  keep quiet for long enough and then come up and reject anything being  foisted on Nepali society.  And, there the Indians have certainly messed up in the past and, the fact that I wrote that Chinese are making the same mistake that Indians have made does not necessarily mean that New Delhi will not make mistakes in future.  Because, New Delhi was taught, if you don't mind my using the term kind of a lesson. During the blockade that India conducted in Nepal, in the second half of the 2015 as indication of the displeasure for the constitution that was adopted in September 2015.  And, that was just the most egregious kind of activism that the Indian state did. But, before that there was a lot of what you call micro management of Nepali state affairs by India. Much of that happening because the Nepalis allowed the Indians that space. The Indian diplomats, the Indians spooks, they allowed that space.  But, when something as horrific as the five and a half month long blockade was conducted, the Nepali public sort of came together to resist. It was an economic hardship that they bore much harsher than what the earthquake of 2015 April, the kind of impact that it had on Nepal.  So, that was,  the blockade in a way like the apogee of Indian interventionism. Now, 

Sushant: Kanak, if I may intervene, I was there with you in Nepal during the blockade and I remember even the elite of the Nepalese society, top Generals, top politicians actually using firebrick to cook and, I remember sitting on the roof of your house and, discussing this early in the morning. Nepal was going through a very very tough time due to the blockade and even some of the elite areas, some of the high end areas of Kathmandu were suffering. 

Kanak: The whole society was. By now there are enough Indian commentators who conceive in their writings that it was a blockade by India but for a while it was made as if it was the Madhesi agitation of the south. Citizens blockading their own citizens which was not really what was happening. But, what is interesting to know in the context of Nepal-China,  is that the Indian blockade of Nepal in 2015 was such a bad disastrous strategy on the side of India because we all know India regards its northern himalayan frontier as vulnerable, Nepal also as a vulnerable neighbour because it borders the Himalaya. So, everything to keep Nepal with you,  but on the other hand, the Himalayas is no longer a strategic or economic barrier. So sooner or later Nepal would open up to the north,  what the blockade did was to bring that date forward by about a decade at least. Meaning, when you did the blockade, Nepal suddenly realised, the Nepali public that we are not landlocked, but we are India locked. So, we must reach out to the North because it is not like we are absolutely without capacity of going elsewhere to get our  land borders, transit to other countries etc. So, there was what I call pivot. So, Kathmandu did a pivot towards Beijing and signed a slew  of agreements and protocols one for cross border trade with Beijing, one for connectivities, highways, transmissions,railways,  railroads, all of them plans till now, but nevertheless the northern Himalayan frontier of Nepal is breached for much closer interaction with China and that is not a pie in the sky anymore because, the Chinese railway has arrived in the Tibetan plateau in 2000 in Lhasa and in 2006 in Sigachi,and so you have and you can look forward to a day to all these and the third country transit. Seven ports and dry ports and,sea ports are now allowed access for Nepal to reach out to the world.All of this happened, it would have happened 10-15 years later, all of it at least in terms of agreements on paper were signed because of the Indian blockade. So this is how I see the problem, that India at least New Delhi perceives as a problem, was generated by itself. 

Sushant: Kanak if you have read the former Indian Ambassador to Nepal Ranjit Rai’s book, he mentions a very specific line when Prime Minister Modi asked him why does Nepalis hate us so much or dislike us so much. Kanak you seem to be almost suggesting that New Delhi or India made it too easy for Beijing and Nepal.  Is that what you are saying?

Kanak: Yes I am saying exactly that. New Delhi not realizing as I said earlier that Nepal marches to its own drummer. I would just like to make a point about if it is Mr Modi's understanding that the Nepalis hate India or dislike India, they don’t.  There is ,firstly there is an open border, secondly there is so much cultural interaction not just between the Terai communities and  Uttar Pradesh and, Bihar but the hill communities of Nepal and India that there might be a sense of suffocation at times when the Indian states comes down hard on the Nepal and that's why the corrective for India is to let Nepal go its way.  And, fortunately since the blockade I feel that India has kept more or less to that track.And I would want it to keep on that track and China to learn from India to let Nepal be Nepal. That is what China should be doing. You asked in an earlier question, “Do I think Chinese will learn”? Well, given that Wang Yi came for what I was thinking was a fence mending exercise but he would not like any kind of coercion on Nepal's foreign policy, because Nepal is independent. Well that is true, Nepal is independent.Nobody needs to make that pointed reference that could be referred to in any other country. 

Sushant: Kank what exactly are the drivers of these China-Nepal relationships, other than India? Or India’s behavior in 2015, or earlier can be defined.  How will you contrast them with the drivers of India Nepal ties? This seems to be very distant.  India Nepal ties seem to be driven more by culture, more by open borders, trade, almost an integration of Nepal with India, in the sense  of culture, economy, society etc. Whereas with China it seems to be more driven by BRI, tourism, keeping out rough (—-).  How are the two drivers different, if you can number them and explain them? 

Kanak: Nepal is integrating into India, or  India is integrating into Nepal, it's more or less we are talking on the same frame. That Nepali society knows and values its links, if you call it civilisational links to India.  But historically, economically Nepal was more linked to Tibet. When we speak in historical terms Kathmandu valley was actually doing trade with Tibet and it took on a lot of culture from the south the Gangetic plains.  But, its actual trade was more with Tibet than with Gangetic plains.  All of that changed with a YoungHusband Mission of 1902-03. In a way Tibet pivoted via Kalimpong into India, British India rather than through Nepal.  So when we talk now about Nepal- China links, I wrote this recent article to also remind Nepalis that you can not neglect Tibet. Grant it as a part of China even the Dalia lama would be looking at it more or less in the same frame. He would want it to be truly autonomous within China.  As far as Nepal is concerned, Nepal regarding Tibet in China, is also that Nepal’s historical linkages to the North have not been with Beijing, they have been with the border region that is Tibet. Why is it important to say this because, right now Tibet is almost like untalked, not talked about in Nepal. Whereas for the sake of Nepal's culture and Nepal’s economy it is important for the Tibetan border to be opened up for people to people contact. People of Tibet and people of Nepal should continue but for right now it is a rigid blockage. This rigid blockade also came up because New Delhi is not, sorry, Beijing is not confident enough about its optics control over Tibet. So, particularly after the 2008 Olympics, Beijing olympics.   Beijing has made the border between Nepal and India very harshly closed as a result the contact between Tibet speaking people of Nepal and China Tibet particularly the trade and including now the trade from mainland china into Nepal through the Nepali border point these have all dried up.  It is not fair and it is not good. I have mentioned this because Nepal-Tibet linkages while conceding and accepting Tibet as part of China, the discourse in Kathmandu does not speak enough about Tibet. That's what I referto now.  As far as drivers of China- Nepal relationship are concerned, till now it has mostly been about china's sense of vulnerability, about any kind of activities in Tibet being supported out of Nepal, and that's why China ritually asks nepal to repeat the line that we are for the one china policy, number one and the other one, we will never allow our territory to be used against China. So I have proposed again in that article that there should be a billboard put up at the national arrival lounge of the international airport in Kathmandu, saying Nepal accepts one china policy as its policy and will never allow its territory to be used against china,  which is true and Nepal would never do it. But why do we have to repeat it ad nauseam before every meeting, before even getting into substandard agendas in bilateral meetings, we are supposed to by rule repeat these lines.  And this is not how you treat a respected neighbor. 

Sushant: Two parts you did not speak off. One is tourism, another is BRI. Because none of the BRI projects have been signed so far, The BRI projects all have been announced and the Nepalese elite talks so much about it portraying them as something big, but as a fact during this visit nothing has been signed on BRI.

Kanak: Yes, Belt and Road Initiative, firstly let's keep in mind, there were lots of Chinese activities not only in Nepal but around the world,  the infrastructure, loans given etc. It’s just that everything is now being subsumed in the title BRI.  Right? So now we accept Xi Jinping's vision for China to promote infrastructure around the world. Now Himalaya needs any kind of work in Himalayan region for connectivity which requires massive infrastructure and massive funds for the infrastructure. So what the Chinese and Nepalese have done is they have signed an agreement in 2017 for the BRI project. In the beginning Nepalis went with a vision, wish list which was too big and the Chinese asked the Nepalese to vitle it down.So the only catch there is Nepal has been alerted enough of the debt traps. Including debt trap vis-a-vis China.They seem to be looking carefully but it is feasible for Nepal and I believe I haven't spoken to the officials yet but I believe that the nepalese side took the position it took in Wang Yi’s visit that we want grants.  Apparently Prime Minister Sher Bahadur, specifically said we want grants rather than loans, and BRI from what I understand is it should be concessional loans at 2 percent or less. And I believe the Chinese in the end are mercantilist and they have not been able to offer this. So now at the position where we are merely deciding to do the detailed project studies of these BRI projects. The biggest one you should know about is the railroad planned from the Rasuwagadhito Kathmandu, which is Chinese railways through the Himalayas breach coming into Kathmandu. I have a personal belief that the Chinese would never spend, or give concessional loans or grants for such massive infrastructure, mile and miles of tunneling through the Himalayas etc. would never do itif they were notin the Indian market. So, ultimately Chinese are looking ahead into the day, what they are trying to convince the Nepaliese is that mainly for you guys is actually meant to excess the plains market of the Gangetic plains.

Sushant: What about tourism? Nepal seems to be the favorite destination of Chinese tourists. 

Kanak: Well, Nepty have never picked up enough on the statement made by President Xi Jinping and when he came calling to Kathmandu, in October 2019 where he said certain problematic things,  but one of the things he said interestingly was, he said among all the countries for South Asia it is Nepal that the Chinese people want to visit the most. And, the Nepali tourism industry has not been able to make enough of that statement although in between we have had covid but what is interesting specially for an Indian audience to know is without anybody really watching or planning, China is much better connected by air to Nepal, than India is.There are six, at last count five or six airports, before Covid with daily if not twice daily flights from Vangxao, Kunming, Chengdu even Shanghai at the last instance in Lhasa flights into Kathmandu daily over the Himalayas coming, where as the Nepal India flights have essentially stayed where they were. Kolkata few flights a week to Bangalore, there used to be some flights to Bombay but after covid everything of course has dried up. So, it's mainly Delhi-Kathmandu.  Whereas the spread into China is much more,  what it is doing is taking much more Nepali students to China. Nepalese are now studying and understanding China better, studying Mandarin for sure and coming back with a lot of understanding of the Chinese people and the Chinese government, and tourists are also coming in. If you go to Pokhra in central Nepal, there is a lake and a grand view of the Annapurna, you will find that there are little lanes that are practically Chinatown. And Chinese sign boards without even English indicate who the clientele is, same with the touristing neighborhood in the Thumming in Kathmandu.  But I think what Chinese are really eyeing in terms of destinations for Chinese pilgrim tourists is Lumbini KapilVastu. Why?  Because there are five sites to the life of Siddharth Gautam The Buddha and only one site is in present day Nepal, all sites are in present day India, Vishnunagar, Bodhgaya , Sarnath, whereas Lumbini the birthplace of the buddha and Kapil Vastu regarded as the hometown of the or the home base of the lord Buddha are in Nepal and international airport has just been, is about to be completed which is known as Gautam Buddha International airport, next to Lumbini. so, you can expect hundreds of thousands of Chinese pilgrim tourist visiting Nepal also because as been an interesting evolution in terms of the Chinese state looking at what is the approved religion “within China” even growing middle class will need some spiritual solace they are looking at what could it be it wont be falun gong, it wouldnt be Islam it wont be anything, and Chinese do regard Buddhisn as an indiginious religion or a faith because it arrived there early enough before it spread to the rest of Asia so we expect in the days ahead, quite an expansion of Chinese visit in Nepal. 

Sushant: India and China are in the major border crisis for the past 22 months which shows little sign of resolution. Wang Yi’svisit to India just before Nepal has not moved the needle at all, on the relationship or on the border crisis. What are the various views whether dominant or not or dominant in Nepal about the crisis.

Kanak: Nepalese are only at this point they state as well as civil society are only passively reading up and looking at what is happening in Ladakh, in Galwan, and also before this what was happening on the other side in Bhutan at Dokhlam or at Arunachal. It is in Nepal's interest, strategic interest that India and China patch up.  Because one Chinese assertiveness along the Himalayas makes it problematic for Nepal as well.  Because anything that makes India nervous constricts Nepal's own way vis a vis China vis a vis India as well. The Himalayan region there is a kind of paranoia in India that has not gone away since 1962 and the debacle. So Indian policy look as the Himalaya as vulnerable space and Nepal the way they look at nepal is also because nepal is part of Himalaya and what Chinese have gone and done with there assertiveness, which is i think continuity of what they are doing from the South china sea to Ladakh is upturn the cart so to speak.  And what I see looking out from Kathmandu is an Indian inability to countenance or do anything about Chinese activity. So if anything even though it is not talked about India has fallen in esteem if I may say I am choosing my words very carefully, it seems flummoxed, in my writings by the chinese assertiveness I won't call it billigience but some may call it that but India is tongue tied to do anything about it. So that certainly will have been given without commentators really talking about it in Kathmandu.  It certainly would give a sense that India is weaker today than it was in the past vis a vis China. 

Sushant: Kanak moving on to the regular to all countries of South Asia, I know you have traveled Pakistan , Sri lanka, Bangladesh very very regularly besides India ofcourse.  How Nepal of today is different from today's Bangladesh or today's Sri Lanka.  And I am choosing these two countries carefully because of the similarities in size, form of a government etc etc when it comes to its foreign policies.

Kanak: Nepal is perceived by the international community including south asian communities as  a kind of a basket case. And it's always in political turmoil , it is always changing Prime Ministers. It has kind of managed a conflict but there still seems to be resolute as a society but I find it important to tell the world and to tell south asia that at this point now Nepal is the most free country of south asia , it is a place where media is most free, there is least self censorship and fundamental freedoms and human rights are the most at play.  Now that is saying a lot because in my personal view india is taking a back step in even though India was an exemplar for the rest of south asia in terms of democratic values and we all want india to remain where it is as an exemplar also in terms of inter community relation, in terms of fundamental freedom democracy whatever you call it but there seems to be a sleepage in india. Regarding the other countries they are more or less at the various points of slippage. Sri Lanka with the Rajapaksa brothers having a nepotistic control over the society, Bangladesh doing economically very well, and everybody would want to emulate Bangladesh including big India, not to even talk about Nepal. But, Bangladesh has got a brittle regime governance system because it is very autocratic at this stage, and there is no opposition to peak off in Bangladesh. So in that sense, Nepal for all the little but bad press that it gets around the world, Nepal actually is the place to be right now. How Nepal could do better if only we have more political stability in democracy, not political stability in autocracy, that South Asia is doing. Nepal can be the exemplar, as a country that is a messy democracy but remains open. We need this in Nepal because when one, Nepal can only wipe tied everything from autocratic monarchy to two  messy democracies and now we once again are trying messy democracy. Nepal succeeded in  adopting a constitution, when one constituent assembly didn't work, elected constituent assembly not a nominated one, another constituent assembly. There are problems in the constitution document, there are contradictions, there are some issues there but essentially it is that constitution that we can carry, and work on it over years so in that sense there is also a foundational reason that Nepal will be stable, where we have instability is in the political ambitions of individual players. Particularly a player such as Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachnada, who drags down the values of Nepali politics so low that Nepal becomes unstable. So, if we can get over this period, I believe that Nepal needs and will remain a well defined democracy by itself. But, to be there for the rest of South Asia.

Sushant: Kanak that's a very hopeful Nepalies view Kanak. But, final question Kanak. Where does South Asia go wrong? You know going by what he spoke of Bangladesh, what is happening in Pakistan, SriLanka, ofcourse India you mentioned. Where did we in South Asia go wrong ? And, I am just not limiting SAARC, which now seems to be on the verge of extinction.

Kanak: South Asia went wrong because, all of us in each of our country allowed not nationalism or cultural nationalism to rule but ultra nationalism. That ruling elite of each country learnt to use ultra populism to promote ultra nationalism, and there are examples where the ultra nationalism also laced with religion. Pakistan taught us how to do it, certainly India seems to be following in that direction. So ultra nationalism, religion based tried arouse the populous all of this are giving us a lethal bru that separates us. The people who would want to look for social justice in the sub-continent though using the South Asia formula. Which would essentially mean bring down the rigidity of the borders, allow economy of scale to work, allow trade to happen across. South Asia trades least amongst itself. Whereas when you look at the historical evolution of South Asia we are essentially one large you could use the world civilization. It is now cut up and there is a great asymmetry because they are largest and that too in the center, that gets to define as much as the world understands of south asia. So what happened with South Asia I believe is that a good idea that we must try to bring down these barriers, but it was formulated wrong. For example, SAARC is an essential organization of eight foreign ministries, and anything that has to be promoted has to have the agreement of all eight, there is no life there, so it becomes a rigid organization. That doesn't not mean that the visionaries, who lead us of south asia, understand that you need a SAARC like south Asian formula because it will make people richer, it will provide more social justice, there will be more local or regional government. These are the kinds of the visions, that south asia vision should have been, South Asian ontology or conceptualization. But unfortunately, South Asia to you, and me as it is presented me its a SAARC south asia which means i am a Nepali and you are an Indian, and we meet in a SAARC conclave, as a Nepali, as an Indian. Whereas, what you should be doing is south asia being unique in relation with many other parts of the world that your identity requires you to be on the one hand at the local level. You are from some shehar or some mauhaulla, you have this language and you have that faith at the interpersonal level there is that hidentity. Then you have the state. I am Indian, you are Bangladeshi, you are Srilankan, but South Asia will never be complete unless you have an additional identity that links us to our past, and that's the term South Asia, which is a geographic term but what it means is what earlier people might say is the broader Hindustan. Now this doesn't mean we are looking for Akhand Bharat, because it is something beyond that idea of the Akhand Bharat ideology. I feel that we have not done enough homework to make South Asia real. And, so people just think when they think South Asia they think of SAARC. When they think of SAARC they think of an ineffectual organization. We don't really, we haven't even begun to imagine what we have lost when we do not consider South Asia as a space for all of us. Some day with some crisis we may begin to think about that.

Sushant: Let's hope Kanak that your vision comes true with or without a crisis. As always it was a pleasure talking to you Kanak. And, I look forward to seeing you again whether in Kathmandu or in Delhi. To all our listeners, Thank you for listening. For more information on our work follow us on twitter @CPR_India and log on to our website at www.cprindia.org.

Sushant: Hello, and welcome to India Speak, the podcast by Center for Policy Research. I am Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research. This Podcast series features leading experts, and academics on China, and the many facets of Sino-India relations. Some of them like Rana Mitter, and Arnab Ghosh have looked at the historical side of things. While others, like Taylor Fravel, have focused on the strategic facets. You can listen to all the previous episodes in this series for those conversations. But, today we will be discussing China and Sino-India ties from a very different perspective, a social-cultural, and political perspective of someone who knows China rather intimately both personally, and professionally. To do that our guest today is Cindy Yu, the Broadcast Editor in China Report for the spectator in the UK. She is the host of the highly acclaimed, and extremely popular Chinese Whispers Podcast. She was born and brought up in  Nanjing in China, where she did her early schooling, before growing up in the UK. She has a Master’s in Chinese studies from Oxford University. Cindy, welcome to India Speak.

Cindy: Thank you so much for having me.

Sushant: Cindy let me begin with something that you have spoken of, written about, a lack of information, nuance, and understanding of China in the west, and let me assure you that India is no better off in that aspect. We read western scholars and reports on China, and other than in the military and the strategic aspects, have no real work of our own onChinese society, and politics in the modern era. For such an audience, what is the best way in which you could explain modern China or contemporary China? Uniqueness, the differences from developed countries like the US, UK, or France or even from other developing countries like India.

Cindy: Sushant I think to start with you know it’s fascinating as we talk a little bit about before we start recording which is that you know the USA, and India have got so much information on China through the west. So I have never thought about it, like you may think that two countries sharing a border would have more direct communication with each other, a more direct Asian understanding of each other, but I have never thought about the west as a filter between the two. So that’s really fascinating to think about. And, I think inevitably you will have western stereotypes, and western assumptions in that given that, given how the information is being translated. I think the best way to understand China in the way that the Chinese would want you to understand is probably, to think about us not so different from other countries. So, you know whether you are an Indian, or whether you are Brits, or whether you are American, you know that your country is an incredibly complicated place. You know that in your country there are people on the left side, people on the right side. There are people who are more internationalist, people who are more nationalist. You understand all these of these things and you also understand, that there are people who are not interested in politics at all, they just want to get on with their lives, they just want to have their families, they want to make sure that everyone around them is clear, they want to have their career, they want to have their education, and China is not really different from that. And, what I see is one of the misconceptions in western reporting about China, is that people forget that people in China have these individual lives that will matter to them. So then, you would get questions like, why would anyone be going to the Chinese Communist Party, well you know if you are a bright university student that might be the best option for you in your career. So it’s not a political, ideological choice, but it is in the environment that you are in best career choice, and to understand, that kind of you know all the different things that matter to you in any individual’s life, also happens in China. So, not necessarily a political issue, it's just people being people and then living the best way they can. So I would say that people need to understand that China is not so different, and Chinese people have their own lives. But, I would also say that there is one key difference which is China’s recent history which definitely weighs very very heavily on the Chinese mentality as I am sure Rana Mitter talked about as well and Sushant you know from the Indian perspective, I am sure is very similar well the last couple of hundred years of history you can never get away from that. And, that would weigh in every single contemporary political decision, or even in the non-political just how individuals see the rest of the world, as well. Because, you can’t forget that, and I think, I am speaking to you from London, and people in the UK have a different recent history and much more on the victim side I would say, and that would be different, you know that would have different psyche, different assumptions as well. So, I think in that respect I think India, and China are probably quite similar in trying to come to grasp,  to come to grips with their recent history, and what that means to modern politics, and that’s something that the Americans, and Britsdon't quite understand as nearly as much.

Sushant: But, Cindy let me put it slightly differently. When you go from London, or from Europe back to China, even for a short visit, or to meet your relatives, what is that one significant difference that strikes you as you land there, wherever in Beijing, or wherever what is that you say oh man! This is it now.

Cindy: I think I am always struck by when I spend too long in the west. You know I grew up in China and London. When I spend too long in London I go back to China, and I think, Oh My God! People here don't think that they are bad people. People here don't think that China is bad. So, it's really interesting because in the western world it is so easy to think about China in all of the negative ways. But, in China, you know if you are thinking about things I actually found there is a lot more cynicism about the Chinese in global politics. People would say to you, yeah well the Americans are doing that because of the realpolitik way. Whereas in London we don't tend to think about things like that. Because Americans are the allies and we never would cynically analyze their motives. And, then people in China don't think that they are the big padsin this. One moment that just struck me when I watched this Sci Fi-film called, “wandering earth” and it is adapted from a book by a man who wrote, “The three-body problem” which above my head rated as one of his best books to read. It's about a woman in the future where Earth had to be moved around, and the Chinese in the film, oh boy! You know the Earth gets saved basically which is obviously every country would do that in the film industry. Interestingly there was no political thing about it, there was nothing political or Communist about it. There was nothing particularly anti-western about it, but in the end in the very final scene when other nations needed to help it was Russians, who came on board first, and then it was the french. You would think Americans came to help, but no actually. So it is really interesting to see that there are such ways that you could see that from both sides. But the Chinese people in China don’t see them as the enemy, which it sounds obvious but, when you are there, they depoliticize a lot of things that we politicize in London.

Sushant: Cindy, how much of an interest is in China for India, and I mean going beyond the current border crisis, or what happened in the summer of 2020 when soldiers both from India and China died on the borders of Ladakh, etc. Before it when you went to school etc did India matter at all? Or what did your family think of India? What is it like?

Cindy: So while growing up we didn't talk much about India at all. We didn’t learn much about India, we didn't think much about India,I think India fits in a particularly, it doesn't fit neatly in China’s patriotic education by which I mean, it's propaganda campaign, and your listeners would know after the Tiaman square protests the government we were training up a whole generation of young people who are not patriotic, they don't love their country by which they mean they don't love this party and they don't love this government. So, in the 90s which is when I grew up, there was a renewed sense of looking at the curriculum. Looking at how we can make people more patriotic, and that’s what I went through. But the way to do that was very much through recent history through the century of humiliation that the Chinese government talks about why it was basically carved up, and there were all sorts of you know different incursions by various imperial powers. India was not one of them. So India never fit neatly into that narrative because we couldn’t really accuse India of being a bully for your recent history in the same way as we can accuse the British, or the Americans or the French. At the same time that was never that solidarity with India the same way as the solidarity with like other post colonial countries because, India was such a good ally of UK, felt like when Mao was talking about his being the leader of the third world, he wanted India to be on their side of it. But, it always had friendly relations with the west, and didn't quite fit in that narrative. So I think that is why we didn’t learn much about it while growing up, apart from basic history lessons. Because, maybe really moving to the UK, obviously the UK has such a large Indian population. Whenever, I came into contact with someone here, with some Pakistani they would say, “oh! You are Chinese, we are old friends” and then they would start making conversation and that’s when I realized coming in contact with the Pakistani, and Indians that there was a slightly different relationship there, but it wasn't something that would over acttoo much. In preparation for this podcast I had luck with Chinese social media, and what people were saying about India and a lot of it was very predictable things I think you can think of. Videos of what it is like to be on Indian streets, all sorts of services you can know about, food stalls lots of, tourists like what it is like to travel in India, stuff like that mainly. But I think in some way more positive, than exciting, you know this is a certain type of people who would say India, dirty, and backward, unsafe for women and influence keeps going up and say it's not like that it's not that bad, which was a nice thing to see provided internet is a big place.

Sushant: Cindy just to add to the point that you made about Mao not looking at India despite being a post-colonial country, or the fact was India was always accused, Nehru was actually accused of inherited colonial British India, and so they said no no India became independent but it is not really postcolonial it has a narrative colonial tendency. And, I think also the fact that during the colonial era the Indian soldiers Indian soldiers fought, Indian policemen were deployed in Shanghai, or in Hongkong etc, that created acertain problem and followed by the 1962 border crisis.

Cindy: Yes of course, and then obviously Indian involvement not necessarily willingly in the opium wars, but as the source of the opium, right? I don't think there is a desire to see India as a victim in China, in the same way as China sees itself as a victim, but India just doesn’t, refuses to be put into that box.

Sushant: That’s true. Cindy I don't know if you are aware of it but there are more than 23,000 Indian Medical students studying in China, they have not been allowed to travel back so far. Only South Korean and Pakistani students have been allowed to return, also it may surprise you but Hindi films are extremely popular in China, that is the second biggest market for them after India, for Hindi films. And, Hindi film industry as you know is the biggest film industry in the world, in terms of the number of films that it produces. One of the Indian actors Amir Khan has had several hits there, he has traveled there, featured there in various things, you know seems to be rather popular talking to Indians who travel to China. Despite being geographical neighbors, and drawing from the answer which you just gave about the previous question, why have the people of two countries not  hit it off? Why do you think is it so?

Cindy: Yeah I mean, I can only give my best theory is interesting, like I had looked again for the preparation of this podcast, the top outbound destinations for Chinese tourists from China, the top 35 doesn't include India. So people are more like to go to the Czench Republic, trying to more likely to go to Czench Republic as tourism or to go to Egypt, than to go to India, and I think that is fascinating. I think you know it’s very hard to say I did an episode recently of my podcast on China- Russia relations and what was interesting to hear that was actually Chinese and Russian haven't really had that cordial exchange either so I do wonder partly while there is no reason, yes. So I do wonder partly just because of the political thing where under you know colonialism, or Imperialism, China obviously had more molding features with the west, with the European powers, with America, Japan as well, than the Communist China having the   links with anyone, right? So it wasn't really India would not think it is just nobody at all. Before opening China is looking upward, it's looking at influential countries like America, despite the politics China has very close quarter links to because that’s what you are aspire to. And, I am no expert in the Indian economy but I know that India was going through a very similar state at the same time which means that China  wasn't aspiring to India because China was trying to do what India was already doing. But , China to looking to America to see how it could be doing that’s all. So, I think that could be one reason possibly, and then another reason is that, I do think that a lot of China is , the Chinese population society are focused on the eastern edges of the country or the center of the country, not so much in the West which is where the border with India is shared. So given the Han dominated society that China is anyway, 92 percent of Chinese people are Han ethnic who live in the central and eastern border regions of China. People other countries would interest them would be, South East Asia, like Thailand, or like Japan or like South Korea. So that kind of geographical border probably, I think buffers things a lot. I think that's similar for Russia, a vast northern region which is not very densely populated. You can understand why people don't link nso much. I think in Bollywood, though, it is interesting that Chinese filmmakers would love their films to be internationally as popular as Bollywood but, they haven't quite cracked it yet. But you know, they would love for it to be like that, so I think it is interesting, even though Chinese films are some of the most highest grossed internationally now but if you have to break down the data, that's only because  chinese speaking market is so large, majority of Chinese speaking viewers still has not had  international average, so Bollywood is a good role model in that sense.

Sushant: You know you spoke about the border areas surrounding India and actually, the two provinces which share a border with India are Tibet and India. You know, I wanted to ask you about legal issues as well as about Tibet, and the Hong Kong issue. The official Indian state perspective on these Indian issues are very different. You know they are worried about Kashmir, they are worried about the treatment of muslims, and other minorities in India. The Indian government doesn't raise any of these issues, unlike the west. There is a whole sovereignty argument that comes into play. The Indian government doesn’t want to talk about any of these issues with China, or publicly or  internationally. Even though the Dalai Lama is based out of India, you know he lives in India he operates out of here. I have two questions on this, you know how Indians should look at these issues? Whether it is the legal issue whether it is Tibet or whether it is Hongkong , and what do the Chinese outside of Tibet make out of the Dalai Lama?

Cindy: On your first question, Sushant I  really can't tell Indians what they think, but from my perspective from my own understanding, and please tell me if I am wrong, that Modi is still quite popular right now I think lots of Indians find him, and his strong approach to ethnic minorities in the country, they welcome it. So, I think in that sense it is a very similar situation to what's happening in China. Whether the majority ethnicity is saying, well you either integrate with us, welcome our way of life, or if you don't we are going to make your lives difficult. And, obviously, I am not accusing Indian or Indian government anyway near the scale of atrocities happening in Xinjiang at the moment, but where it’s coming from is probably from a very similar place where you put Han Chinese, either they don't know anything about us because of the  control of media, or they do know something about it but they don't care enough about it, because they don’t know anything aboutUyghurs themselves or they have never come across any Uyghurs because, that’s very much, China is a huge country so again the geographical point if you are at the eastern or central you don't really go into the west where there is a vast place, we just tend to live. So that breeds this prejudice and lack of understanding and ignorance about each other which, I know that India is in a different situation and obviously, Muslims and Hindus live more side by side than that, but, I think there is a similar kind of desire from the majority ethnicity just to say, we want our country to be this culture. In China, it is not the same religious because, Han Chinese dont have one religion, they do have have many religions at all, though lot of them are Buddhists, you know even though there is this kind of  racial sectarianism that has come about, I actually don't think, I wonder  what you think Sushant, whether or not that’s why the Modi government is quiet on what’s happening in Xinjiang, that you know its kind og similar alienation of the Muslim community.

Sushant: I think Muslims are definitely a factor. The fact that Uyghurs are Muslims, predominantly Muslims, and Mr. Modi’s rolling ideology is Hindu majoritarian, that definitely plays a part. 

Cindy: Yeah, and obviously Modi has not gone nearly as far as the Chinese. 

Sushant: But, how should one look at Tibet, Dalai Lama, and Hongkong? Is there another side to the story to what Tibet tries to project it to be?

Cindy: Sure, I mean the Chinese version of things, would be, you know in the west you often think of Tibet as been overtaken by the Communists in the 1950s but, the Chinese would say actually Tibet was part of China before the 1950’s that’s what the Chinese would say. And, they will look back at the Qing Dynasty which was the last Imperial Dynasty in China before the evolution of imperialism in China. They had taken over Tibet and Xinjiang in very much the way that you know a lot of these pre modern medieval territorial spats happen. You know, they just took over these things and if you think about how Genghis Khan and then the Manchurians, the Qing dynasty themselves were not Han Chinese they had forced their way down into China proper from the steps in the north. So, you know these boundaries are fluid, they are influx regardless at the end of the Qing dynasty, Tibet and Xinjiang were part of China. And, even then there, this is a very very interesting this tension, even though the people who overthrew the Qing dynasty were Han nationalists and they thought Qing dynasty were Manchurians who invaded they, wanted to keep the Qing territory because, if you want to govern the country you want to stall which are the good places which I think is territories, which I think I am right in saying that these region have lot of natural resources. So, even though they wanted to say we are Han Chinese and this is the Han China, they wanted all of these and minority Non-Han territory. So, that's why Chinese today think about the Qing dynasty as China and to say Xinjiang and Tibet were asked. And then you obviously have these decades of several wars of warlordism in China between the end of Qing dynasty and founding of Communist China, and that is when Tibet had a chance to breathe, had a chance to create a state. But, when the Communists come they obviously want to reclaim that kind of territory. I personally find territorial disputes, and I don't know what you think about this. I personally find that it is quite hard to justify on either end. I don't think Nations have a prior claim on any piece of land. It really is  just real politik and you can say that historically this part was mine or historically that part was mine. But, historically, parts could be many people and I really do think what is going to determine what is going on right now is really just the sadder part of the gun really. And I am not saying that’s the right way to do it but I do think territories have this kind of created malleable memory we should, we do have a claim to this we do have a claim to  that, which is often I feel is not that justifiable on either end and so I think that’s what probably what the Chinese would say about Tibet, and obviously, what’s happened to Tibet since you can have more conversations about that, more moral discussions about that which is you know what do you do with the minority in your country? Do you allow them to integrate or do you say that they are autonomous regions, who can govern themselves, which actually make them even less Chinese which is what the government right now thinks. And it’s interesting that the former leader in the Xinjiang region, he had to cut his teeth into that before. So clearly the central government in Beijing sees the two regions have similar problems and it was  because he had done quite well in that, that he was promoted to Xinjiang as the new problem. But I would say Xinjiang, and Tibet are slightly different problems as for the Dalai Lama. I think China doesn't, I think China will always protest any country that has the Dalai Lama because it has to in order to say that Tibet as its own. And, to the believer, it is always a matter of China is never going to let go of that. And, I think a lot of Chinese people can see it from that perspective, it is not so much like a human rights issue but more of a territory issue. I am not, I think there are two issues here basically, how you treat Tibet, and whether or not you think about whether or not Tibet is a part of China. And you might have Chinese literacy say we must treat ancient China differently but, mostly people are going to say it is still part of China.

Sushant: How about Hong Kong, you know there is a view about Hongkong that China is annexing now Hong Kong. All the human rights have been finished, there are no democratic values. Is there another side to the story as well in Hongkong?

Cindy: Well, I mean the Hongkong story is, would you be fascinated about what Indian memory of the empire is? But China’s memory of the empire is not positive at all and Hongkong is the sore point of all of that. It is the beginning of the Qing dynasty’s fall in the unequal treaties. It is a reminder that at its weakest China couldn't protect its territory. Not just territory, that was newly fought for under an ethnic minority government. But also territories that have been China’s you know dominated by Han Chinese people so ethnically that is much more conservative China proper than Tibet and Xinjiang are considered. And that's why the return of Hongkong, and I say the return in English is called the handover in 1997, and in Chineses it's calledthe return because that's how the Chinese here see it. They see it as, it's not just handing over from one monarch to another, it's a return. So that's under one party, one country system , you know it worked quite well for 15-20 years. What changed it I think is two things, I think Xi Jinping himself, wanting a personal legacy of being the general secretary who ends all of China’s untied-issues, unsolved issues from the empire and Hongkong is part of that.  But what was the most immediate hassle was the protests in Hongkong in 2019. Protests have been happening in Hongkong for since 21 century over a few years, but in 2019 for the first time ever it got really very violent. And for that Beijing thought what we are currently doing now we are not getting Hongkong back anytime sooner, the west which is seeing China's rise in Hongkong way to get out China, to promote that kind of democracy but inside China, and we have to cut that completely control that and so the National Security Bill I think was actually brought forward faster by the protest, I do not say it would have never come it place I don't think any country chooses that what's lost past 27 years anyways, but, HongKong was, I think I would be older when 2047 came about and so that’s the 50 year grace period with the basic law. And, so I think China was never going to let Hong Kong be one be one country two systems for that long, but what happened in 2019, that date was brought forward. You know is it justifiable, it doesn't seem because you know a lot of people in China, do have different political opinion, obviously, it’s a country of 1.4 billion people, but, on Hongkong anecdotally lot of people do agree with what's happened there, do agree with the government’s approach there. They think that Hongkong has not been patriotic enough, and we can have a discussion about this idea of loving your country equals loving your government which the Chinese Communist Party has so successfully merged. Today the average man on the street of China is not necessarily going to think too much about separating the two. So, if they see Hongkong being opposed to the political system then, they must think of them as a-patriotic. Which is deeply ironic because, that's the kind of one-party rule that they are subjected to in mainland China themselves and they don't, yeah I find the cognitive dissonance very fascinating and striking, and they think that education is the way to do it. They need to have better, more controlled patriotic education campaigns in the same way that I described in the mainland 90s and so that's what you see the government doing now. I also think there are a lot of people who owe all political issues down to economics, they think it's a house price problem in Hongkong, you know there house prices are really really very high a lot of it because of the mainland investors which means that young people are discountoured and you know they follow this dicountoument into political issues, and so if they saw the economic crises in Hongkong they will also quell that kind of political unrest. Whatever it is, I think the Chinese think this is not scientific because opinion polls are hard to come by in China. But, anecdotally when Chinese people are spoken to they are quite supportive of what’s happened, of what the government has done in Hong Kong.

Sushant: That's an interesting humanization of President Xi’s personality. This is something I also wanted to ask you about, we hear a lot about President Xi’s personality driving Chinese policies, particularly foreign policies. Also, two more issues I wanted to ask you about, how should people in India our listeners look at these two issues as well, one is President Xi’s personality, another is Han nationalism, you know which is spoken about a lot, and the third thing which interests a lot of Indian but they really don't understand is this great firewall of China that keeps it technologically secluded, but still technologically very advanced. You know what are the assumptions and how do you break through these issues when you look at these assumptions, when you look at these three issues.

Cindy: Well on the great firewall isn't it the case where the Indian Government has banned a lot of Chinese apps? 

Sushant: Not really, it was more optics to show people that we have acted against China for what it has done on our territory in Ladakh, but not really more than that.

Cindy: That’s interesting, people can still download it later.

Sushant: People can download it, not really people can download, the majority of apps were still available so, some of the I think the most prominent app that went away I think is Tiktok.

Cindy: Yeah, yeah

Sushant: So in India, you can't use Tik tok and in India, you have various Indian versions of Tiktok that have come in.

Cindy: Well guess it's similar to that, the great firewall which is that if you ban an app you have a domestic version coming up right?  And, just because you have banned something doesn't mean the Chinese have to put a ban on the access of service provider people, so you have copycats all the time. I think China has a particular advantage on this because the market is just so big 2.4 billion people, I think half of whom have smartphones, it means you always stay when it needs in international market for you tech to be good, you can grab hold the data domestically, and you can have all market you can possibly service inside the great firewall, so I think you have got the equivalent apps and alternative better.Tiktok in China is better than the Tiktok in the west, Toing which is the original Chinese app. You can buy things online, like e-commerce apps as well as streaming services, they all become great eco-system and that work. Yeah, I remember when I went to China, I actually think China's smartphone revolution is fascinating because it came about so much faster than in the west. In London, today people are getting used to QR codes now, because of covid, and you scan something you order on the table. That was happening in China 8 years ago, no that’s not a mark of progress, that’s sort of a gimmick at the end of the day, I remember going back 6 years ago I think in 2016 with my boyfriend and we were at a restaurant and I look Chinese, and I was like why we are not getting served and eventually i gathered courage to ask someone and they just said that you scan this thing on the table and you just order on your phone. And I was like, what and I have never heard of anything like that before, I was really embarrassed because they looked at me like I was an alien which I was because I hadn't been to China hadn't done that before, so in that sense Chinese live a very digital life.

Sushant:  If I can go back to the digital part of it, so when you travel to China, when you want to access your twitter account or gmail account or your facebook or Insta. How difficult is it even with a VPN I am sure a lot of people talk about oh! You can use VPN and access all these platforms, all these websites. How difficult is it for someone like you or someone going from abroad?

Cindy: So because of covid, I haven't been back for almost three years. But, the last time I was back, you know before covid in 2019, it was rather easy. You could download the VPN or one for which you pay for and it can basically just get everything. I personally was very cautious because as a journalist I was traveling also through Hongkong in August 2019. So, yeah, I just deleted twitter my friend anyway, I was being a bit cautious, but yeah you can’t just access these things but, what I have heard since then is VPN have become much harder to have. Foreigners are really thinking of leaving China right now. Foreign friends or foreign colleagues, who are in China and the environment is not good right now, they feel like they are not welcome right now, that they are not part of that because VPNs are harder to come by. And, the other thing is that as an outsider going in, I know what I am getting, I know what a VPN is, I know in terms of the outside world, in terms of the digital world. If you are a Chinese person, you would already have an interest in getting a VPN and seeing what's on Twitter, what's on Facebook, you have to be really kind of technologically apt, or really kind of interested in the west or the outside world. In order to do that, because, for all of the information, all of the popular quotient, all of the, anything that you really want to access you can't get it on the Chinese internet, so there has to be a desire to do that. But of course there are a few people who do and I have  interviewed a few of them. In Chinese it's called “fantag”, which is leaping the wall, and it is the euphemism for getting out of the firewall, and a lot of young people do, do that, but. older people, less educated people, people who are not interested, you know they didn't do it. And the normal personality front I think can be over act because he is a very elusive character. We really don't know much about his personality at all. Is he patient, is he short tempered, is he humorous , is he selfish, we literary don't know nothing about this President at all, and what we do know is what we can gather from bits here and there, so for example Desmond Shum is a businessman he writes in early ’90s and he has written a memoir, at least we could read about that about his time doing business in China and he is Honkong Chinese and he, his wife were very close to Wenjaba, who was the then premier. She has since disappeared, taken by the Chinese state because of certain corruption things and he thinks she has not apologized and that is why she hasn't retaliated.He has written a memoir about all of these and he has a front-row seat to all of these of his wife going to have dinner with Xi Jinping and Paul Yuan who washis wife. Before he even won on to the standing committee I think he was and what was interesting is that he noted that there was no gossip about them, they were very dignified, they didn't say much, they didn’t reveal much about themselves, they were perfectly pleasant but there was nothing memorable that his wife could remember about the conversation that was made leverage of that conversation. Luckily, they are very cautious people, this lack of understanding of his personality is cultivated. He doesn't want people to know about him because it’s a protection mechanism. And I think that's why it can be overreacting because there is no positive proof like it’s  because Xi Jinping weighs a person for example so he wants to do that. All we can say is that his political opinions are very nationalist. He grew up in the court revolution where he suffered a lot. His dad was a very senior Communist cadre and his grown-up is now as the princeling. He is the second-generation, Communist. And, I think that comes across basically in what he does. He really really cares about the party personnel, he cares about China being led by the party. But I think when we say that how if China had different leaders things would have been different, we forget how much the party itself matters to him, and we forget how much the party itself will have an impact on all of these things and I think we also underestimate, how nationalistic China as a country and as a government in is turning in general. So it's not just this one man from the top-down saying, we have to do this and that, it is also a lot of people supporting him in doing that. So we need to understand that in order to understand the country. If China was a democracy, what kind of democracy would it be, because what is the public opinion of the people? It would have been more awful to the ethnic minorities than at the moment because that is what the majority might vote for. So I think it is interesting to know how much Xi Jinping's creation of the institution of the systems around him rather than just, rather than one man top-down giving, setting down upon everyone else. And your other question about Hans nationalism, I kind of touched down as well which, it's a slightly different problem because the Han are 92% of China so, Han nationalism often doesn't have the opportunity to show itself because it don't have a contrasting view because you can live in China all your life and never meet a non-Han person. Han nationalism doesn't come out necessarily in kind of discrimination or anything like that let me rephrase that because when I have talked to uyghurs & huy muslims, and other ethnicity traveling around China they said that they felt discriminated against. Whether or not I get any ethnic minority might be feeling, in places, countries where you might be denied service at the hotel, or that kind of thing. And I will fully take my privilege that I am a Han Chinese. I don't know what it is to live in China as an ethnic minority. But having said that I know a lot of Han nationalism, It doesn't end in people to people problem or anything like that whereas it is promoting a Chineseness which is dominated by what Han think of Chineseness, obviously always fussy around the edges but it is going to be hands full which is going to make things which is Han dynasty clothing you know from a thousand years ago, you know because of a way of saying recalling of china that wasn't invaded by the Mongolians and the Manchurians that’s Han nationalism. And that aesthetic sense of it, it's not dangerous I would say, it's not a  malicious way of doing things. But I think Han nationalism is obviously much more malicious when it comes to Xinjiang. Because, what is the problem with people living that if you say that ethnic minorities are Chinese, you know if you can say that you can have a Muslim minority then you should be allowing them to have Halal food, to wear head scarfs or to but I think a lot of people who interpret Han nationalism in a malicious way don't think of us Chinese at all. But they have got Chinese nationalism and that's the problem right? Coz they would say that the Chinese identity is dominated by the Hans. I am so sorry I am not sure that's a very good answer to your question at all.

Sushant: But Cindy, that’s very true. The biggest problem is that it is mistaken for countries' nationalism. You know Han nationalism is seen as Chinese nationalism, Hindu nationalism can be seen as Indian nationalism, white nationalism can be seen as American nationalism. You can easily mistake it to be the national thing because it is so dominant and so visible everywhere. Whereas minorities are all marginalized. That is the big danger there. But moving on Cindy, I was curious to know what are the best cultural markers of modern China? I am talking about the TV shows or the OTT shows from music, podcasts, trends that you would like to highlight and recommend to our listeners? But, primarily Indians.

Cindy: I think that I would recommend ‘ The three-body problem”, as a trilogy of SciFi books” is really very excellent series, written by Liu Cixin, and I think that book just really kind of it just does embody a lot of people's political relationship which is  that it is relatively suppressive because it is talking about the court revolution, and it is talking about you know one of the promises is that one of the main character hates humanity because of her experiences in the court revolution. That is pretty suppressive to say obviously the Chinese Communist Party has recognized its mistake but even so to be colorful about it and to be able to level the point I think it is interesting. At the same time because it is Sci Fi-it goes into the future and it doesn’t see China as a different piece  to other nations and just sees China taking the leading role, but not linguistically at all. And it is just depoliticising in a very nice way. Honestly, I quite enjoy scifi and I think it is one of the best sci-fi books I have ever read, that's including the western books that I have read. I would really recommend that because China is not just politics. Unfortunately, I don't watch Chinese TV shows these days, I am not very good. And I would say that there are a lot of dross around, there is a lotsoap and stuff around one thing that was recently quite popular is “I am not yet 30” which is about these three women leaving in Shanghai touching 30 and their different lives, one is a mother, one is a career woman one is newly married possibly thinking about being a mother and it is a very cosmopolitan lookout which is like to be a modern woman in China today which is nice we don't get to  see often outside. That I would recommend a film as well which is more historically, if I may “Fell off my concubine” and I think to get out that painful history that China has been under, obviously Chinese communist Party would like to say the painful history ended in 1949, when they took over but it really didn’t and “Fell of the concubine” tell us the story of 20th century China, it's not about concubines at all, it’s about these two main characters, two men who grow up as Beijing oppressing is and they going into this dancing tube in 1910’s in China and its about their lives throughout the 20th century and told through the lives of just two ordinary people, you see all of the political uproar that happens in the background which really goes to show that the pain of humiliation definitely didnot end in 1949. But, I think to understand modern China and to understand why 21st century China is so different to, why a lot of people in 21st century China, think their lives are quite good you have to see what the previous comparison and that’s why the film was really really good as well and I also think because there is homosexual undertone in that film, which I think is interesting because it shows liberalism in Chinese filmmakers of certain generation which I think is interesting as well it is a whole other question whether or not makers can make the films today

Sushant: Actually before other than Chinese whispers any other podcast that you listen to or you would recommend our listeners to listen to understand , get a better understanding of contemporary China?

Cindy: So I think my favorite Chinese podcast is probably the Cynical Podcast that cut quarters of China over America and he does a very similar thing which is just talk about. He doesn't shy away from politics, he doesn't shy away from the important issues about western China’s power struggle, also at the same time talk about the other things that make China so interesting. Recent episode that I listened to of his was about Authoritarian resilience, why is it that authoritarian states are much more resilient than anyone gives credit for from the outside, and his guests have surveyed people in China, about their public opinions, about their opinions of the state which I think is fascinating to hear because anecdotally I know that to be true, which is a lot of Chinese all supportive of the government. But as an academic he was able to bring up research in support of that. So I think that's a very good podcast and there are all sorts of amazing podcasts about Chinese history, about Chinese role in Africa, and all these sorts of things which are definitely worth looking into.

Sushant: Thank you so much Cindy. It was wonderful Talking to you, it was really enlightening and interesting. Really enjoyed talking to you this was wonderful

Cindy: Thank you so much!

Sushant: Thank you to our listeners for listening to this podcast for more information on our work, follow us on Twitter @CPR_India or log on to our website www. cprindia.org

Sushant: Hello and welcome to India speak, a podcast by the Center for Policy Research. I am Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow at Center for Policy Research. This podcast features leading global experts and academics on the many facets of Sino-India relations. Some of them like Professor Taylor Fravel have looked at the strategic sides of things, while others have focused on the military facets. But today, we will be discussing the historical and political aspects. Looking at China, and its relationship with India through that unique lens. And, to do that our guest today, is one of the top academics studying Modern China. Rana Mitter is the Professor of History and Politics of Modern China, at the University of Oxford. He works on the emergence of nationalism of modern China both in the early 20th century and in the present era. He has published books on the political and cultural history of 20th century China and is currently working on the connections between war and nationalism in China from the 1930’s to the present. He is the author of several well-acclaimed books, his latest one being “China’s Good War: How World War ll is Shaping a New Nationalism”. His new book “Chinese Characters: A BBC History of China in 20 Lives”, is expected soon. Rana, welcome to India Speak.

Rana: Sushant, it's a great pleasure to be here. And, thanks so much for the opportunity to talk to you.

Sushant: Rana, let me begin with something which you believe in and have stated explicitly, that to help us understand the new China we must look at its past. Can you tell our listeners as to what the past really tells us about the new China, especially when we look at it from an Indian perspective, from a perspective  here in New Delhi.

Rana: Absolutely, well I have to say this, in service of that idea, looking at the past is essential for understanding the present. I wouldn't just say my own authority, which may not be very great. I would say with the fact that when you look at the list of China's top leaders when they travel around the world, Xi Jinping, whoever it might be, quite often they will sight some aspect of Chinese history as a means of justifying or explaining some aspect of China’s contemporary policy. So, you can agree or disagree with that policy. I am sure many of us have quite varied views on these things, but in terms of understanding where the Chinese side is coming from, a study of the ancient and modern history of China is a really useful thing to have in the tool kit. So, let's just give a quick example to try and back up the argument that understanding the past does matter. One of the things that, I think is notable, and I think it’s a controversial thing to say is that China does seem to be very very defensive in the way that it talks about its own interest on the borders in the wider world. And, if you look at the way in which the Chinese themselves talk about why they feel this way, they are very self-aware about it. It's not a surprise or a secret to them. The long history of invasion and occupation during the Mohammadian era is central to that. My own particular research is concentrated when China’s experience during the Second World War, and while on this occasion going past full details and aspects of that, I can say that the experience of being invaded and occupied by Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, even though you own its three course of  centuries ago, or more than that really, still shapes the way that many many Chinese policymakers, and thinkers think about the vulnerabilities of their own societies, objectively, ofcourse, China’s second-biggest economy in the world, second-biggest military in the world, it’s not really vulnerable in the sense that most of us understand that term, but it’s past history shapes a mindset that makes people think, maybe we will be invaded again one day, maybe someone might attack us, and that why we have to do certain things rest of the world doesn't always understand, that would be the Beijing point of view anyway.

Sushant: Rana, are you saying that this has created some insecurities in the Chinese decision-makers mind, policymakers mind? Or, the more cynical view would be, this is just a narrative that they have projected to project a certain face to the world. As they did not want to attack anyone, every time they do a military action it is only a counter-attack that has been done. Which of the two would be more true, or is it the combination of both.

Rana: I think it’s not possible to separate the two things as being either, or because they both play an element. I think first of all you are quite right that there are certain rhetorical phrases and troops that China uses over and over again as a means of avoiding conversation rather than necessarily taking it head on. So the idea that China has never invaded any other country, might come as a surprise to the South Koreans as in 1950, or the Vietnamese in 1979 who have some different views on that question. But, you know, we know the other countries, like the United States invaded Iraq, and there are other examples too. The point is not what the Chinese did was good or bad, the point is China in some way is quite comparable with other places, and China’s argument wants to be actually, that China is different. And, as you say  well you know China in many ways is quite the same is less romantic but, perhaps more realistic. But, the other part of your question Sushant, is how genuine is this? Is, also a very tricky question to ask. And, even when one asks that, just because something has genuinely been held as a view doesn't necessarily mean that we are necessarily comfortable with it. Lots of people who hold extremist political views around the world are very genuine in what they think, again they are being cynical, but I don’t necessarily think that I want to spend too much time in the company of their world views. So, I think there is a genuine sense in China based on their own let’s say a century and a half, most recently or history. China is vulnerable to the outside world for a variety of reasons. Number one, as many many borders I think India knows something about this. I think 14 international land borders is what China has at last glance. As well as of course the huge maritime exposure and also, of course more things about it, such as a feeling, logical or not, that certain important supply rigs to China including the Straits of Malacca, Classic Maritime example, are things that China could be cut off at the pinch of point. So, in terms of is there is a strategic design to build up a nationalistic mindset that fuels this idea, which has been deliberately pushed by propaganda, sure, is that also the set of geopolitical reality, that also means that China is different from the U.S which have two massive oceans on either side to keep it separated, that’s also true.

Sushant: Rana, coming back to something which you covered in your last book. You know the reimagination of the Second World War in China over a certain period of time. Now, I wanted to ask you, has this reimagination of the Second World War seen India figure in those conversations anyway? And, even beyond that, where does India figure in the Chinese historical narrative of the 20th century? Or, is it what many Indians fear, that China does not care for India at all?

Rana: So, several parts to that question, let me take them one by one. Each has, I think, really quite interesting answers. In terms of the Second World War experience, you may be surprised, maybe not the answer is yes, actually in recent years China has become much more interested. But, through a slightly sideways narrative. Let me explain, it may, or may not be well known, but actually, India was rather significant at the various aspects of China’s World War ll experience. India had its own liberation struggle, you know in ’30s and ’40s, but, in terms of direct attack during World War ll, it was relatively more shielded, although I should say that my father who grew up in Kolkata in the ’30s and 40’s still has some kind of memory of the other kind of air raids and so forth that did happen on the sporadic basis over the city, so India was not spared. But, compared to China which is repeatedly fire-bombed by the Japenese on a sort of yearly basis where the invasion created destruction of huge amounts of properties, and the destruction of millions of lives the two are aren’t comparable. However, there was very important, useful British India, in terms of the trained ground in terms of the crack troops. They were Chinese troops they were kept as the ex-force, that were trained by a variety of officers, British, Indian, and the Chinese too, to be sent in for the second Burma campaign in 1944. Now, mostly because of the bad relations between China and India that you know we will talk about in just a few minutes, but, because of that, that history wasn’t very well remembered, frankly either in India, or in China, but, certainly in China, during most of the Cold War, most Cold War period. Recently, this is one of the topics of my book, “China’s Good War”, I am delighted to say actually is available in the special Indian edition, I hope people give that time inclination  they should feel free to check it out, is a revival of interest in the communist's old opponents the nationalists, Kuomintang, the Chiang Kia Shek, who  were actually running China during World War ll. And, those Chinese nationalists were a very important part of the thrust factor capturing of Burma from the Japanese in 1944, and of course many of the troops the ex-force troops came in from British India through the Jungles of Burma to fight in that war. Now, the Chinese contribution along with the Indian contribution is nearly well remembered in the western memory of the Burma campaign, as it should be. But, nonetheless, in China, there has been a revival of interest, and I am thinking of my own visit few years ago to the sort of Burma-China border area, some of the really fiercely fought battle of that era, which were fought by the Chinese expedition forces but in tandem with the British Indian expeditionary forces have now got the museums, they have books, there are T.V shows, on social media etc. to due recall that period. I wouldn’t say it's the permanent memory of that period, but it's now very much part of the historical conversations in the way that simply wasn't true, in the sense that 25 years of ideas go. So, things have changed. More broadly speaking, is a sort of sense in which the experience, or conflict, invasion, or wartime has been part of the shaping of the Chinese perception of India. It's one part of the long story. I don't think it's true that China simply doesn’t care about India, it is quite fair to say that until quite recently, India tended to be regarded less slightly, you know, sort of second-tier way. Relations with India are important to us, but in the end, when the trading relationship is that big, the military relations are mostly this kind of clashes on the border that never seem to erupt very much, until 2020. And, of course, as many will be aware, while in India the legacy of the 1962 border war is still very keenly felt and mourned. It really until very recently has been much talked about in China though. A country which went through the cultural revolution which millions of people suffered, the great famine with millions and tens of people dying, in that context a small border war with India with a few hundred thousand deaths, is not really something that fits into their historical narrative. So, India until recently has been important but I think probably it’s fair to say secondary, not kind of the bottom of the pile but, not quite in the top tier of relationships, compared to Russia, America, or even possibly Europe.

Sushant: Rana, is it because of the big geographical features of the Himalayas which actually separated the two countries. Despite being neighbors, or if you look at the two-dimensional map, they look like neighbors. But, once you look at the three-dimensional map, the Himalayas form a formidable barrier between the two countries. And, also because the intermediation with China was being done through a colonial power through Britain. Whether in Hongkong, or whether the Indian cops which were deployed in Shanghai. Is that the reason why there was no interaction with India, or no interest in India, even after the Chinese Communist Party took over?

Rana: Well, actually in terms of elites there was perhaps more interest than that in India than the Himalayas of course the massive physical barrier. But, in some ways, they provided a point of connection of course. Famous during World War ll, pilots flew the famous Burma hump across the Himalayas across from British India into China to provide supplies. But, in terms of the way in which Chinese leaders and Indian leaders thought about each other in the Mid-20th century, actually made the relationship even more complex, unless you take a figure like Nehru. Nehru of course had many pan-Asian connections during the years that he was fighting for India’s liberation. And, amongst the worst Chiang Kai Shek. The Chinese nationalist leader who came to be slightly unstable, nonetheless had real power in the late 1920’s, and remained in-charge on the mainland through that war against Japan, until finally being kicked off the mainland by Mao Zedong. Now, Nehru’s relationship with Chiang Kai Shek was very much those of two Asian liberation leaders, who talked to each other on that basis. Chiang Kai Shek, was of course in charge of China, which was a country that was largely but not completely sovereign, whereas India of course, was the full colony. But, nevertheless, they both had the imperial western power and Japanese of course, in the case of China on their soil, and that gave them certain points of commonality. However, there is a particular incident or two that somewhere strikes the gap between the two sides. In February 1942, very early on in the allied war, you know after Pearl Harbour, Chiang Kai Shek, against the wishes of Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister flew to Kolkata, and basically met both Gandhi and Nehru at that time. His aim, actually Churchill should have criticized because, his aim was Churchill should have supported which was try and persuade Congress into wholeheartedly joining the British war effort, and, Nehru and Gandhi made it very clear that this year Quit India was going to happen, later on, they weren't  going to be doing that. So, actually, Chiang Kai Shek in his diary read off, he felt quite connected with Nehru, not so much with Gandhi. Other figures like the Congress party he also had I think had a decent relationship with. But, in the end, there was a difference in views as well. The fact that they felt a certain sort of friendship because of their shared anti-Imperial ideas, didn’t necessarily mean that they would share the same policy. Now, when Mao won power in China after 1949, Nehru was very keen to keep the relationship going, regretted the loss of connection with Chaing Kai Shek but admired Mao and wanted to have that relationship with him. And, for a while Mao, and communist rulers were keen to find other connections that would enable this newly emerging China in the communist block, no relations with the U.S, making its way to make new friendships, and it’s a wonderful book called, “Making it Count” by Arnab Ghosh, he is some Professor of Chinese History at Harvard.

Sushant: He was called at the first episode of the podcast with him, with Arnab.

Rana: Fantastic! So, you know his book is basically in terms of science and statistics between India and China during those early Nehru- Mao years, and then of course 1962, and the confrontation over the border essentially shatters that relationship. But, the early imperial shows that the Himalayas are, of course, an important barrier, but they were not an insurmountable one if the meeting of minds, and ideas were closer than they were.

Sushant: You spoke of the 1962 war, and clearly on the Indian side it weighs very heavily when it looks like China. But, how does China look at the 1962 border conflict, particularly I ask this for a very specific reason, because of the new PLA approved history of the 1962 border conflict, you know the Titled “100 Questions on the China-India border Self-Defense Counter-Attack” that came out last month, you know excerpts of the book were published in the popular Chinese website Guanxi, if I am pronouncing it correctly. So, How does China look at the border conflict now?

Rana: Guanxi is a website I know quite well, is run by Eric li, who has been a prominent spokesperson of Chinese ideas in the world, and some wireless ways have appeared actually for translations on that website too. People have agreed and disagreed on various aspects, always part of the good debate. But, I think that Guanxi is certainly the kind of website that likes to put forward, how can you put it? Quite a robust view of China’s place in the world. So look, I think if I have to say this for most of the past 60 years, 1962 to 2022, the India-China war has not been a major subject of discussion or interest compared to some of the other wars, the Korean war or the second

Sushant: Vietnam…

Rana: Vietnam, well Vietnam or the China-Vietnam war 1979, has been of great interest but most of the discussion has been suppressed. Because, of course, China didn't win that war, and very best to say it was a draw between two bad sides, and therefore the discussion on this has been some way quite restricted. Korean war China regards as essentially having won enough to be discussed quite proudly.  But, then the Indian war, when China surfaced having won, wasn't really in service ofa wide political aim at the station. Therefore, they remain more the subject of discussion than academia but not very popularly. I think that almost certainly the link between the growing tension and the confrontations in the present day on the India-China border, Gallon and so forth. And the desire to pull out the historical justification that is behind this particular book the, “100 Questions” that’s been put forth. I have read the summaries, but I haven't had the chance to read the book itself. So, one has to see in detail what it says but certainly, it will suggest that something which for a long time China had been willing to put on the backburner could be continuing Chinese phrase friction with India on the border. Seems to have turned off the full flame, at least something a little hotter in terms of that relationship. And, this is actually in a sense part of the slightly surprising loop of Chinese diplomacy, or the definition has been doing the last 2 or 3 years. Previously China was really quite careful to make sure anyhow they won the potential confrontation on its borders at one time. So, the time when North Korea was playing up you would find its relations with Japan quite calm but, they really wanted to push back against the Japanese and they would be quite nice to India. But in the last few years, actually China’s diplomacy has pushed more of the buttons at the same time, and see what happens. So, the fact that there is this more confrontational language with India at the same time their relationship with America still very floor, and of course, continuing of pressure in the Pacific region, particularly on the South China Sea has suggested there is a sort of shift in China’s robust diplomatic language by confrontational diplomatic language, in which there is one part that can't be seen simply on it own, that has to be seen as a part of the wider matrix.

Sushant: But Rana is it, this change, taking on all the adversaries at the same time or many areas of interest at the same time is it due to present Xi’s personality? President Xi’s personality? What is it that is driving this or is it nationalism, ethnonationalism that is playing out which many people blame for what's going on with India on the border for the last 21months in Ladakh? Because India and China seemed to have moved from the path of competition to confrontation to almost conflict now. So what parts are playing a major role? Nationalism, ethnonationalism, Xi’s personality, the U.S role, PLA’s own importance, you know the territorial desires of the Chinese Communist Party? What is it that’s playing an important part here?

Rana: Mainly for any major political shift or movement you can’t separate personalities from the structural shift, and that’s very important here. Yes, Xi Jinping is very important. I think it is very clear, there is no doubt that compared to his predecessor Hu Jintao, he has a much more active idea of how China will engage with the world. But, you also have to also consider how he got to that position, and that's partly because from late 2000, the date more precisely from my view, is a really important turning point 2008 global financial crises. Because, that was the moment when China's elites as well as the wider population, began to think maybe this Washington defined economic and political system doesn’t  work so well. We don't have to spend our time thinking how we are going to fit into it, we have our own thing to do, and maybe that will work better. Now that was 4 years before Xi Jinping came to power, although he had been designated as the next leader. But, the leaders of that time Hu Jintao, and even Prime Minister want both of them to step down in 2012, with beginning to use this language with the wider world, “look China is going to find its own path, we don't necessarily have to fit into rest of you taking to the west” have to say. So, the question of  why China has gone down that path? I think has something to do with Xi’s Personality, he is very comfortable in his skin, that's a phrase I have heard from more than one of the western leaders, he is not the guy who feels nervous or in any way lacks confidence about the path he is taking, a confrontational path with the western world, at least in terms of rhetoric. But, beyond that, there are structural factors which we read have shifted things, the second-biggest economy in the world. It may or may not, but it may become the biggest at some point given the confidence boost. It’s also of course, impending to the world economy in the way that even now when the countries including India are trying to find the ways to decouple from the aspects of China’s global presence, it's really really hard, and that gives them loads and loads of confidence. Now, that would be true even if someone other than Xi Jinping, or the President. But, the fact that he is President and general secretary, and his personality is very keen on making sure that China pushes its advantages, economic, military, cultural with a strong, and unapologetic view about China’s right to have a place in the world, operates at the same time as these wider economic currents that suggest for instance in the areas like technology, many other actors find it difficult to find an alternative ways to go compared to taking on to Chinese technology, and know-how. India, of course, for various reasons decided to post on Galwan trying to go in that direction, and of course they are indigenous in their own, tech producers part of that process. But, India’s experience shows actually it's not easy to substitute Chinese technology with hardware and software and know-how, if you want to do it, it can be done, in some cases the countries feel they have to do it, shows China has the reason structurally for the confidence that it feels in terms of its leadership in terms that it would be able to go out in the world and say we want this and we don't want that, and that’s the way it's going to be.

Sushant: Rana, are there any specific factors, pertaining to India which may not pertain to the west when it comes to this conflict, confrontation whatever you may be called classified as we are seeing now, there are almost 50,000 troops from each side in Ladakh, additionally deployed in a really horrible climate. I just haven't figured it out for 21 months. What's going on?

Rana: In the most obvious difference is, one of the things that actually you just mentioned Sushant, which is the fact that this is India and China war with the neighbors potentially doesn't come to a conflict. You know the physicality of the troops on both sides is something that oversees the United States in the confrontation in the broader sense with China. But, even now and even in the age of the hypersonic missiles, things that the Chinese are aiming to bring out is geographical separation that doesn't make the composition significantly different. Even with Japan, which is perhaps the Asian power that has most to lose from the rise of China, the separation physically of two sides is important in that sense. They are all maritime disputes but they are slightly different in nature significantly from the question of land borders. I think, also there is something that is probably distinctive at the moment to the Indian situation. In the sense it’s the version the Chinese problem is this, how are these two large, populous and globally significant countries, positioning their own positions in Asia to the outside world? Look at the caricature for a moment, but for a long time, India’s foreign policy was almost not to have a foreign policy except the specific questions like Pakistan. But, in terms of having to deal with the neighbors, having to deal with China, it was a kind of strategy management, because Indian politics was lively and all-consuming and exciting. Almost all Indian politicians get to power by promising things domestically. They always talk about India shining, and you know global India, or whatever, it’s not something people spend that much time either thinking or frankly voting about. The question that now comes at this point is, trying to what happened in Beijing as well is that shifting. Do you, if you study the quad arrangement, you know as you ever will India, Japan, Australia and the United States coming together in quadrilateral military shared exercises in relative command. This increasing navalization of the Indian Ocean space, and you know the question of affiliations of Middle East countries and Island countries, prove that actually, India is changing in deciding to how to proactive the foreign policy or is the growing sense that actually this can become part of a new era which China gets to define, a previously relatively ungoverned space in Chinese terms. That is something I think is different from the other make, other Asianic terms India and other actors, the Atlantic for the moment remains American like Russian presence or  Chinese presence are suspect now it's still about the United States and its allies. The Pacific is already divided. We know  that American allies are trying to find ways you know like their military and security stories, and trade stories in the region come together, and India is a smaller part of that. But the Indian Ocean space is still much much more grabs if there is a way. And, the question of what India is going to do about that is much more interesting, Beijing as. As the question of how Beijing feels about it should be news of interest in New Delhi.

Sushant: You are right Rana because of one of the Chinese and less famous lines “Indian ocean, not India’s Ocean”, that always sounds very omniscient in Delhi or India wherever you are? How does India counter China, power? What can India really do? At one point in time, you located Shanghai cooperation could be an answer it could be the model of the Asian you said. You know Indians seem to be keen on the code you just referred to and then we have the recent putenshi bonhomie and this long statement that has come out after the meetings between two leaders, that’s bound to make India uncomfortable. Why should he be forced to choose a side in someone calling it the cold war. What are India’s options in this case?

Sushant: It depends on what the end goals of India's Strategy is supposed to be. I am assuming, unlike many other countries, India is not seeking to expand its territory or its not seeking to create some sort of newly reordered will. My guess is most elites regardless of which political party they come from would rather like a relatively quiet world, or quite Asia in which India gets on with Indian things and the  rest of the world can leave it alone. I mean India never, even in the days of Nehru, wanted to be more than rhetorical actor, military actor in the wider world. So the question of pushing back against China depends on what context, in terms of trying to make India as economically self-sufficient as possible, some of the answers might be uncomfortable. India has a very long tradition of trying to keep its state barriers as restricted as possible, compared to other societies. You know, Indian background and grew up coming to Kolkata in the 1980’s & 1990’s still have fond memories right from load shedding to substitutes cans of Coca-Cola because Campa cola wasn't permitted. I know these are the things that are difficult to do, I know that things have changed over the last 30-40 years but, nevertheless, most people working in international trade will say that dealing on trade with China is hard and tough. Dealing with India is pretty much impossible. You know India has not signed any major trade agreements in the recent decades. and, at the moment it's unlikely to do so. The problem is that, the kind of like-minded countries you believe in the international trade system, you broadly still stick to the democratic structure even if India becomes much more populous recently, it still remains a structural democracy. These are things that are difficult to pick, and to choose from to some extent I don't think there is an argument anymore that India should throw open its doors to every single western character that comes along once it opens up the market. But, at the same time it is difficult to maintain an argument that China as one of the world's major supply chain operating andtrading powers, can in some way be pushed back against spiral in the international trading assistance if you are not fully willing to be part of that system, which includes the course of reform and change within the system not simply accepting as the days. Right now, that conversation that is still quite active, there are  plenty of other examples, but i think my part/ overall answer to you is Sushant, in how many areas does India feel willing to get uncomfortable about some of the things it might have to do to create new source of alliances and partnerships that would enable it to reshape the Asia’s space.

Sushant: Rana, that is a very great point about trade, because India pulled out of the RECP after almost a decade of negotiation and even otherwise it has turned more and more automatic in its nature in the name of self-reliance, and that's something a lot of policies have been reversed FDA’s have been canceled and etc. As London knows better than us, even signing a deal with India is almost impossible even after you guys are pulled out of the EU, that’s absolutely true. Something  which you hinted at Rana, but I wanted to explore that. Now, India’s strength is the liberal democracy, which values plural and peaceful engagement, democratic values etc. They have gone down dramatically in the last few years, since Mr. Modi became the Prime Minister. As India really does not have the economic and military gear to take on China. How is this loss of what would classify as the soft power, and values now playing out for India?

Rana: It’s really very important in the particularly, in part of the narrative about China is going to be, there are democracies that essentially have a different way of ordering society that can stand up to China’s economic, so far highly successful authoritarian model, and also I myself think the ability to maintain freedom is very important part of the democratic state, I would say that’s very very important. I have written frequently people continue to write with more things coming up, making case that one of the greatest obstacles in terms of more broadly speaking being able to push back against the China’s argument that its technocracy or meritocracy, as they would call it , just works better than democracy, when it comes from anything to covid prevention, to economic actualization of opportunities is to show that actually democracies, believe in their own values and the ability to even know the results, as we speak there is big regional election going on in Uttar Pradesh and the ability that was seen over the decades for India’s voters to, throw out governments and change the people who rule them does remain an important part of the reason why I think even after at this point India has not had a revolution, it has not had kind of overturning of the system, crossing over China many points in the last 70-75 years. But, the rest of us, you know the United States cannot keep electing the politician they don't accept, the ability or the electoral results. The United  Kingdom, you know the country I am sitting in now, needs to make sure that it values the institution or the wider liberal media. I sometimes say and I will say here again that, it sometimes appears that the two political parties in the world that want to shut down the BBC, one of them  is the Chinese Communist Party, the other one is the British Conservative Party. Now that is slightly unfair to the good Conservatives who are proud of the fact that the BBC is well respected. But, if you are working in British media it actually feels like you are fighting against your own government, rather than being part of what it should be, which is a strong liberal front, which embrasses different viewpoints, and willingness to ask tough questions to authority. Because, that’s the one thing that the Chinese system absolutely doesn’t have. To its credit for the most part that even if there is something left of India, even the press has obviously become more constrained over the recent years, as well pushing back in the other direction, and having governments that get annoyed by the criticism on a day to day basis. But, I understand what makes the system great. We need to get back in that direction.

Sushant: Tell us in India about it. I was a journalist for six years, we can probably talk about it much more. But, the point which you referred to about China and the Chinese model, you know in India almost the China’s economies success and  it's rise as the global power, shiny infrastructure when you go to Beijing or Shanghai, or wherever there is high rate of growth it has created almost a sense of China and we in India, and I am not talking about the day’s alarm and what Chinese are doing on the border, but there is almost a sense of China that you see of more and more in India. The secret of its success, you know in a much-simplified manner, is seen as its character is a very centralized, authoritarian state, directly and totally controlling everything. The Chinese Communists Party controls everything very very closely. Is that a fair understanding of contemporary China and the reasons for its success?

Rana: So, I got good news for those, who got China envy of that sword. I would say that just about you is almost exactly the wrong way to think about why China has been so successful economically. One of the things that makes China’s model so unique is that it represses political freedom very strongly in all sorts of areas like you know, no multi-party democracy being an obvious example. They actually provide huge amounts of economic freedom and one of the things that the government simply doesn't know is controlled from top, even if it wants to, is the ability of people to undertake massively great economic experiments across the country. So, you know Guangdong Province down on the south coast from the days shopping onward became a sort of the test zone for trying out everything from marketization to the ability to actually bring in foriegninvestments you sort of want to grow the economy. Very different experiments were tried in South west China from the Ching, were much more state-driven ideas of directing investment, and also much more strongly a first system that actually might work better. China is a huge conglomeration of economic experiments, some of them have been successful some of which haven't. But it's the system's unwillingness after  the disaster cultural revolution that everything was centralized. The unwillingness of the system even now everything fits into one economic roof that I think is important. What that system is andI would say that very openly, I think that there  is no reason to suggest China couldn’t do that politically as well. The ability to open its politics far more than its done in recent years is not in any way a counter argument to economic success. There have been times, when China has been much more willing to talk openly in the early 1980’s and late 1990, 2000’s when actually times you know one party or the authoritarian state, but, the social media was much free, there was much discussion on conceptual ideas like democracy and constitution, being the last that’s been  in the last 7 to 8 years shutdown in for the power for most beneficial degree. But, even within the one-party system, there was space for the  more political liberalness then there had been before the system didn't fall apart. It actually did perfectly well at that time and it dint in anyway impede the economic experiments in which actually anti centralization  really important part of what made it succeed

Sushant: And Rana, before we finish, can you finally can you suggest three books about modern China that you would recommend to those interested in understanding the country better

Rana: So many choices I am sure I don’t mention any by myself, that would be quite the right thing to do. But, in terms of “Sweeping the Very Readable History of the 20th-century” first book that ever on the Chinese history and the author died just a few weeks ago in fact, “ The Greater American Story” by Jonathan his book “ The Date of Heavenly Peace'' about the chinese and their revolution goes back from the late 19th century to the late 20th century and its a superb panoramic view, beautifully written, very moving. In terms to understand China today you know there is a plethora of wonderful books, by wonderful expert but just because we are speaking in February 2022, I will make sure, one of the recently published by the fantastic Elizabeth Economy, fellow of Stanford, council for foreign relations and the book is just called “World Record to China”, and it's a really good, one-stop shop in terms of trying to understand some of the geopolitical concerns of China. And then, the fun thing that I add-in that mixture is the, you need to understand something about the mind or the intellect of China, and i think one of thebest ways, if the people haven't read it, is to read the best selling Chinese science fiction novel that’s also gone global and, that’s the three body problem by Liu Cixin, easily available in English translation, one of the few but I am sure growing in number is science fiction novels that really had  a big take off around the world, and that is a very different viewpoint of what China’s about compared to a book of political , economy or may be even history.

Sushant: Thank you so much, Rana. This was really enlightening and very interesting.

Rana: Well thank you so much Sushant. It's been a real pleasure to talk to you and thank you for some great questions, and I hope things can change via podcast. 

Sushant: Thank you so much to our listeners. Thanks for listening. For more information on our work, follow us on twitter @cpr_india and log on to our website at www.cprindia.org

Sushant: Hello and welcome to India speak, a podcast by the center for policy research. I am Sushant Singh, senior fellow at the Center for policy research in India. This podcast features leading global experts and academics on the many facets of Sino-India relations. Some of them like Dennis Blasko have looked at the military sides of things while others like Arnab Ghosh have focused on the historical facets. But, today we will be discussing the strategic aspects. Looking at China and its troubled relationship with India through a strategic lens, and to do that my guest today is a top scholar of international relations with the focus on International security China and East Asia. Professor Taylor Fravel is the Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Security Studies Program, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Taylor has been a member of the Board of Directors of the National Committee on US-China relations and serves as the Principal Investigator for the Maritime Awareness Project. His books include Strong Borders Secure Nation, Corporation and Conflicts in China’s Territorial Disputes, and Active Defence China’s Military Strategies Since 1949, which came in 2019. Taylor, Welcome to India Speak.

Taylor: Thanks much for having me! It’s good to be here.

Sushant: Taylor, both your books, the first one about China’s territorial disputes with its neighbors and the second one about China’s Military Strategy have huge relevance for India today. Starting with your latest book first, in what manner exactly does the military strategy, the 1993 strategic guideline, and the subsequent alterations of 2004, and 2014 winning informatize local wars, apply to India of today.

Taylor: Sure, thanks Sushant, that's a great question. So, I think one has to break down the components of the strategic guidelines in order to be able to provide an answer to this question but one of the most important component to focus on this idea of work of local wars in other words China’s current strategy is designed to prevail in limited conflicts on itsperiphery is contested, so of course, it includes the border of India, but it also includes Taiwan as well as the disputes in East China Seas and the South China Seas. This idea of inframactization or informatization also refers to how these wars will be fought, application of high technology, connecting sensors, sheeters, and commanders, focusing on a joint operation. Now, with all these strategies, China has focused on what is known as the strategic direction and Chinese strategic guidelines have sort of identified the primary or a main strategic direction and the secondary or the other strategic directions. And, the point here for India is, that India is not a primary strategic direction or in other words the main as far as the conflict scenario that China’s strategy has cleared to address, and that, of course, is a Taiwan and questions related to whether or not China might be forced to pursue unification, and given the nature of that relationship this come to also include whether or not China might have to fight the United States in the context of Taiwan. So, in this sense India is always a secondary strategic concern for China and its military strategy and not a primary concern, it's biggest and relevant in that way. Now, what is changing recently in the last five years or so is that China has shown a willingness, however, to sort of work with distinction with the primary and secondary instituted direction such that to tolerate friction from multiple directions at the same time. So we have today, with the increasing frequency of  Chinese air force strikes in Taiwan's air defense identification zones, you have an almost permanent presence of Chinese coast guard vessels near the disputed Senkaku islands. Of course the massive build-up in the South China sea and finally, of course, the tensions insinuating along the border of India, you know a decade that came to ahead in 2020 and now in the conditions that we find ourselves in where there is significant forces, more or less deployed along the border, and so, Taiwan is still the primary contingency or the main strategic direction. Chinese leadership is willing to tolerate friction and to take war forward leading positions in the past in multiple strategic directions and that of course would include India.

Sushant: Taylor, does the fact that the ground forces really would not be involved when it comes to South China Sea, or Coco island or Taiwan, which is the primary challenge which you said, but ground forces would be at the forefront of the challenge against India. Does that matter?

Taylor: I think it matters. I think because when China does the PLA army. The PLA a clear mission which is the primary service, moreover although one invasion a sub-degree of ground and air operations in the Himalayas and the other mountainous regions so it's not going to be truly joined, involving the navy and in that sense, I think it does matter a lot want to go so far to say that tensions have increased primarily because the ground forces need something to deal. But training for this continues, certainly keeps them quite busy and focused. Moreover, another thing that I tell you is that I should have said earlier is the ground forces would be involved in sort of the most significant campaign against to get Taiwan or would be invading but short of that in other course of campaign, certainly the maritimein the East and south tennessee, the ground forces would be possible. Also as you know that China has a layered border, so depending on the entire stretch of the frontline is also an important mission for the ground forces even though they are the only area where it's heartily contested is probably India.

Sushant: Taylor, when you see the current PLA deployment on the India border, does it fit in with the concept of the active defense which you wrote about in your book. What would be the PLA’s likely design of the war as per your appreciation of the situation based on what you see on the borders?

Taylor: I think the concept of active defense has come around since the 1930's. It basically had different meanings at different points and times. That is why I note that for your listeners. In the 1930's it was literally an operational concept for how to sort of deal with stronger forces raid by the nationalists in the soviet base areas in jiangxi and fujian provinces and so forth and then after 1949 it actually became sort of vague military strategy in the sense, China postering its forces to counter attack after being invaded. Of course the definition of active defense going back to the 30’s is also the defense or being defensive at the strategic level or offensive about sort of campaign operational and tactical Now today as far as strategic principle that China will retaliate once its interests is violated, so it doesn't necessarily need to include being attacked or forceful with certainly being attacked in other way. So in that sense, it’s a war overtime so that is how it applies to the world today. I think it is less about Chinese forces being first being attacked by Indian forces but I think they have a strong incentive to do that but of course, that would be one application. Secondly, to be postured in a way to retaliate if China believed that India took political or diplomatic actions that harm its interest in the area of sovereignty is contested. What does this mean in terms of the deployment? Well it's hard to say as clearly China has moved from more recessed posture on the border or in the border areas actually its actually not they are not literally on the border, they are still set back to some degree but its moved from a much more recessed posture to a less recessed or forward posture. What this says to me is that China is making it much easier to retaliate the next time it believes that its interests have been violated or attacked or what China may read this as adventurism or opportunism by the Indian Armed forces.

Sushant: So, Taylor, just to reiterate what you said is that China could decide on its own that its interest has been violated and it decides to undertake counter-attacks so to speak. And its definition of counterattack is not actually a physical attack being retaliated. It's more, interest or sovereignty or whatever issues it decides that are being violated. Am I right?

Taylor: Yes, with the cap that is not any issue , it's one that they believe possesses direct harm to their core interest and that requires a military response to defend it. I don't think the PLA can see or Chinese leaders can see an act of defense necessarily as a blind check simply to do whatever it is that they want, always gonna justify their actions as defensive and that's the major act of defense that I should have mentioned earlier. Namely, seasonal high ground in any kind of conflict situation, and of course China is only acting in response to the offensive actions of another state whether those are military actions or other kinds of actions that are harming what China believes to be its core interest.

Sushant: Taylor, but the red lines in this case, and I am not using the red as a pun but the Chinese red lines in this case vis a vis India. What would those redlines be? Excluding the physical escalation from India or physical provocation which is highly unlikely from the Indian side. What could those red lines be?

Taylor: I think we may have seen some of these redlines earlier, going back to Article 370, initially we talked a lot about but in other words a perception on the part of Chinese leaders that India is adopting significantly new and from their point more hostile or regressive postures on the borders. I think the Chinese leaders like to avoid red lines so or at least making them clear but that kind of action or something like that in the future I think would be something in which there might be a military response, wanted you know of course active defense  need not be a kinetic response could be a threat of force or display of force as well as the negotiation of the combat or operations. I think it would be something along those lines, where China believed that India was terrifying them until the alerting its opposition, from China's standpoint, did not go unchecked which could have weakened China's position in the disputed long run and that the response it wanted to. But, I should also point out that China in the past has been quite able and willing to live with unresolved contested issues. To include the border with India, Taiwan, and others so this is not the case that or without the case that active defense would be triggered and a very low threshold actions take by the other side again from China’s standpoint but something that would be viewed as the significant and negative shift in China’s position in the dispute.

Sushant: Reeling back a bit Taylor, 21 months down the line, what is it about the current Sino-India border crises that has really taken you by surprise, and if I may ask why?

Taylor: I will still reserve the curious part to me is what happened I guess May-April through the end of May 2020. When there was a significant movement of forces in Moscow areas at the same time in particular areas wherethe line of actual control is itself is contested, with absolutely no public statements by  any PLA spokesperson or governments spokesperson. So you have this really significant shift on the border without any corresponding kind of political or diplomatic campaign. To include mobilizing the Chinese public against India in some way. So it, not the combination of the significant movement in multiple areas that was a precedent as well as the reticence at the sort of the public levels at least one does not know it was well I don't know what was being said between the governments but clearly China was not seeking to draw attention to this so that to me is still somewhat puzzling. And of course, that first set the stage for the clash of Taiwan leading upto to everything else Taiwan make the situation much more tense following India’s great Procol operation quite serious standoff right throughout the fall of 2020 to february of 2021 on the areas of the North and South of Pangong Lake.

Sushant: But you know these things have changed in the recent months. There has been a very high pitched domestic coverage in China of the so-called Galwan heroes, the PLA soldiers part of the clash on 15 June 2020 in Galwan which you just referred to. They raised the flag in Galwan valley on New year’s day this year. They broadcast the video and put it out on youtube. The so-called heroes are being taken to schools, special medals have been given to those PLA soldiers who died in Galwan. They have been put in the communist party, in documents they have been hailed as heroes, the torchbearer in winter Olympics was a so-called galwan hero. There is a new six-part documentary which CCTV has broadcast on China’s Western Theater Command, focused on what kind of deployment is going on in Ladakh and so on. The list goes on, what exactly is going on here domestically in China?

Taylor: Wooh! That’s a brilliant form of a question. The first thing I would say is it is important to know that China did not begin to draw attention to any of the heroes until after the February de-escalation which is actually the opposite of the Indian approach right? The Indian approach is to draw attention immediately to those who perished in the Gallon valley and rightly so I don't, that's not a criticism in any way but I think what more important is that China waited and waited quite a long time, and it appeared not to want to tie its hand in terms of bringing about at least a tactical de-escalation that meant to prevent at that kind of conflict that I think was certainly unintended by China and almost certainly by India as well. But at the same time like Xi Jinping has elevated the wall of nationalism in the defense of sovereignty as part of his Chinese dreams. Chinese soldiers did die in the clash after China's standpoint they died defending Chinese territory and because of the fact that China has not actually been engaged in many military conflicts over the last few decades. There are very few here that PLA has that can underscore the Chinese public that they all placed in, defending Chinese interest. So I think, all the attention are given afterwards is the part of the prerogative that the China dream of defensive sovereignty which one sees pretty frequently but now faces and names can be attached to some individuals who play a very direct role in doing so, and of course, China like many societies does seek to honor people if police, heroes who stood up to defend China’s interest or denied doing so. So, I think that’s one element that has the first two elements right? There is this very important pause which could have been driven in the end. I think you have great attention been drawn to these individuals, one serving as the torchbearers as you know and thirdly I would say I reflect the power of the Chinese propaganda after that. Because, once this is deal in the acceptable topic of conversation you have sort of all of the kinds of things that you just mentioned and it's very clearly and it probably intended to bolster the view of the armed forces in China which has not necessarily be seen a much lately given the peaceful environment that China has enjoyed and I think it also finds a lesson I would say i don't think much of it is actually directed at India. It all seems very clear that for the most part has been directed to its internal audience that occasionally, especially all the time, may draw attention to something like this when it comes out of English Indian media. But for totality they are doing, I think is very much internally focused propaganda, a style campaign, a focused on real heroes from China standpoint and less about targeting India even if one is sitting in India the whole unit has been quite clearly not targeted at India

Sushant: Taylor can the Communist Party, Chinese communist party really dial down the nationalism once they are anti so to speak? Do they really have the power to calibrate this up and down? Because, in most countries, you can dial up nationalism but you cannot dial it down very quickly. Can the Communist Party dial it down if tomorrow there is, if the situation de-escalates and both sides need to step back can they quickly dial it down?

Taylor: I think they can quickly dial it down than other societies, especially more democratic ones because after all you control the news media, the party's propaganda department. Certainly the past has seen efforts to do such things with Japan or in other circumstances so I think this propaganda campaign was viewed as presenting an obstacle in some way could turn down the reign. All that being said though, it won't go back to the way in which Xi Jinping has elevated sovereignty when defensive sovereignty is the part of the Chinese dream. This is the party standpoint a legitimate issue to cover and discuss and so, that also reflects the power of the party in shaping the discourse but that kind of discourse might be certainly hard to change or to tone down because now it's so clearly attached to China’s leader. That said I think the party and leadership did wanted to pursue at least the tactical pauses they can certainly issue the propaganda directives that would say do not cover you know the China-India border or only use tax permission ones agency to cover the China-India border and very quickly you can see sort of how the marginalization of coverage of these stories, certainly within China.

Sushant: Taylor, just coming back to the border crisis per se, you know the arrangements, agreements, SOPs between India and China or the border areas held good for nearly three decades. Why did they break down now in the summer of 2020? Or was it always coming, did we not see it, did we not see what happened with Doklam, did we misread the resolution of the Doklam crisis of 2017. What is it really that  happened here?

Taylor: So mind you, these United Nations agreements could no longer contain the level of activity of either side you know along the line of actual control in disputed areas, which is to say those were the agreements of the time when the Line of Actual Control in many places was difficult for either side to access plus you had very few opportunities for forces to come into contact with each other, especially on the same day. So, you might have a weekly patrol or monthly patrol on one side, you would leave a tin can for the other side to find something you might be familiar with but no actual contact. And, there has been a very significant increase in the border infrastructure, especially on the Chinese side but also on the Indian side, which means you have increased the rates of patrols, I don’t know the rates of patrols on both sides, I assume Chinese patrol quite regularly but at least, Indian media reports that come across indicate a shift of patrolling certain areas from a weekly basis to patrolling on the daily basis and so. In essence, you have such a high level of contacts that you know and forces in such closer proximity that these forces that agreement is no longer relevant to the circumstances that now exist on the floor. Certainly, not at all relevant now that incidents of Gallon valley have happened and you are quite a significant forward presence of the Chinese side and what appears to be on the Indian side as well. So, It seems to me that new agreements are needed, right that these agreements, held for a period of time, but new agreements would be needed to sort of address new challenges to stability on the border created by this much-agreed presence and ease of operating. And, you look at it in different ways: new agreements could be crafted but I think simply, old agreements outlived their usefulness because the situation on the border changed the way, the past agreement simply could not contain.

Sushant: Taylor, actually you are absolutely right on that one. When I speak to Indian retired or serving Indian military officers they tell me that somewhere around the second half of the first decade of the century, that is between around 2007,8,9,10. The quantum of Indian forces on LAC increased, as well as the infrastructure on the LAC, and the frequency of the patrols consequently increased and this is one of the complaints from the PLA commander that historically you have never come to these areas or have come very very infrequently, why are you coming so frequently what’s your design and why are you asserting your claims and that's as you know fair clashes have taken place from border patrol have come into contact with each other and that clearly as you rightly brought out has put strains on the existing agreements, existing protocols and they clearly now have broken down. Taylor, do you also think that the 2017 Doklam crisis where the Indians went and stopped China and Bhutan. Did it also in a material way also affect the Chinese thinking about it?

Taylor: I think it has a significant impact on the Chinese assessment of Indian intentions. And, Indians sort of resolve not just their claims along the border but also Bhutan’s claims, because as you may recall India moved forces across, what both China and India agree as international frontier they just don't agree which countries a lot on the opposite side of the that international frontier that China has claimed as part of the Chinese territory and certainly where the clash took place its been under effective Chinese control and heavy build-up for quite some time. At least one can find images of roads via Google earth that connected China back to 1990s when those images first became available and so I think the Indian action really the Chinese, and if you recall the level of rhetoric in red alert in the summer 2017 was actually harsher than the level of rhetoric in the summer of 2020. Despite the fact that you had the first debonair clash in decades, actually, quite a serious situation, summer of 2020 but summer of 2019 that Chinese concluded that India had violated a pretty important principle from their standpoint and this I think was then projected across the other disputes between China and India. And, so you see of course an increase, in India reporting of Chinese interrogation across the LAC, especially after in the western sector of Ladakh where it gets easier for certain controls to come in contact with each other. So I think China probably elevated its posture in response, and then of course we see the action reaction cycles. The trigger of Doklam, Chinese should have re-building was not connected with the Indian perception or Chinese perception of India but simply to decade long effort to basically be able to have decent roads that go right upto the actual Line of Control I don't think China was by building road was seeking cut the chicken’s neck, actually, it's very difficult for China to move forces there and India has I don't know how many division on the other side it is a very heavily defended area. So I don't believe that was China’s intention to simply engage in this manifestation of this road building in that area but to trigger Indian sensitivity. But of course, it's a mystery which I do not understand is that China has notified the Indian commander multiple times in May that they will be undertaking this activity and so it seems to me, I don't understand what happened to that information, or why knowing that information there were no other efforts to address the situation I think that was the historical turning point. It wasn't meant by China as a fate accomplice because it's recorded I think it ended didn’t acknowledge on the Indian side that these notifications were made now maybe the scale at what China brought in was simply inconsistent with the notifications that the Chinese made or could be another explanation but it's a bit of a mystery that I do not yet fully understand.

Sushant: But whatever, may have happened as you say the outcome or the impact that was much bigger than what seemed at that point, or that point of time. Taylor, what exactly now we see this crisis going on, the rhetoric etc? What exactly are China’s intentions, and are they really driven by Xi's own personality? Are they linked to Chinese domestic politics in some other way to the party Congress that's coming up? Is it about Taiwan the fact that they are not able to get back Taiwan, is it about some other  external drivers Vis a Vis India chord Indo-pacific, the United State? What really are the drivers of this crisis in China now?

Taylor: If you mean now as in February 2022, China has taken a position that it does not, it appears to maintain the new status quo on the border and to prevent the escalation of the situation or conflict, and not to pursue a reset with India may be possible to maintain some semblance of workable diplomatic ties, perhaps impart to set the table for driving wedge through the quad later on but I think China has adopted a position and even it did quite quickly after Galwan that it wanted to try to put the Genie back into the bottle as it works. It will be fun to assess Chinese diplomacy in June and July 2020. Now, who wants to talk about China's intentions leading up to May-June 2020. I think after June it simply says their perception of the situation on the border and perhaps exacerbated by the pandemic in China and heightened sensitivity to sort of external threats at that time, what China accuses as the Indian provocations occurred mostly in 2019 and early part of 2020. Also, to answer this question, we need to distinguish what were the intentions that motivated China to sort of make those moves in May or late April end of May 2020 versus verses motivating China now. But this is the year of Party Congress , China seeks a stability whenever there is a party Congress, this party congress is perhaps the most important Congress held since the start of reformative opening like we all most certainly consolidate as Xi’s third term as the general secretariat of the party, his third term continuing his chairmanship of the central military commission, becoming president of the following sprint for another term and maybe or maybe not depending on what happens signaling some succession plan based upon some kind of the ages of the individuals who make it to the powerful standing committee whether or not they will still be eligible to serve in the era of 2027 party Congress. Also, there is a massive turnover in the central committee which is the body that is elected or selected to make it to the political standing. Also, there is massive turnover in the central committee, which is the body which is elected or selected or predesignated at the party congress which is an opportunity for Xi to consolidate his position in that leading body perhaps for several more Party congresses to come so I think China’s attention is very much focused in words on Xi ping, the attention of China’s leadership is very much focused on this party congress. Which makes me think if they can they will prefer to maintain a stable equilibrium and their external ties to generate that, the external environment allows them to do so and not upset or create issues that can upset the arrangements that have been put in place for the party congress is coming for.

Sushant: Taylor, so how will this problem now between India and China be resolved. Are you hopeful about it to be resolved or are we walking closer to the conflict between two nuclear major powers in  Asia?

Taylor: I don't think it will be resolved in the sense, there being an agreement to demarket the border, I do think one can see stability for the time to come, and that is of course shorter resolution but than the alternatives. I don't think China has a strong incentive to take offensive actions against India. The same time I can see the signal very clearly that they are not going to compromise, especially in Ladakh where I don't know, you would know better, that India has always bullied them to gain more concessions from China sort of forward deployment and entrenchment of forces that I am guessing you discussed with them. Dennis Blasco indicates that the current situation along the border with India is the one that China will support in the final settlement. So, that has the potential to stabilize in the agree or have a fact to an agreement accept and not challenge that would include China not challenging India in certain areas and Indian army not challenging china in certain areas, specially in the areas where the perception of the line of actual control defers, of course, there are unresolved issues, include those you have written about yourself, mainly around devsung but I think at least at the strategic level, China probably sees little benefits now of antagonizing India so long as it can maintain and deepen the consolidated control over those areas in the western sector has no intention of giving up in any case of final negotiation or settlement. As I said China has lived with the unresolved issues for a long time or has a part depending on the issue from China’s standpoint depending on is it a stable one or unstable one which importantly is a function their perception like Indian policies instead of haters along the Line of Actual Control but I don't see China necessarily as seeking to further antagonize India now, both in the short term due to question-related to the chord to the party congress in the longer term of quad and so forth so I think, it's not an inherently stable situation when you have for more deployed forces there is more work to be done in a particular. I think the two sides should consider renegotiating the 93 and 94 agreements into account and with the new situation along the border it could include they are diplomatically created by creating, no - go zones perception of LAC, conflict because that is always the spark that it seems to me and so if that is all the spark that to remove opportunities for fires to start that would be hugely, sort of , beneficial in terms of peace and stability would not help resolve the dispute and if I think if both sides knew they would be giving up something because you won't be able to go to their extent of Line of Actual Control but the benefit will be a more stable situation along the border.

Sushant: On that hopeful and optimistic note Taylor that both sides would agree to a newer status quo, which is more stable, more peaceful, less tense. Thank you so much, Taylor, this was so illuminating and wonderful talking to you.

Taylor: It was so great to talk to you. Thank you so much for having me.

Sushant: Thank you listeners for listening, for more information on our work, follow us on Twitter at CPR_India, and log on to our website www.cprindia.org

Sushant: Hello, and welcome to India Speak, a podcast by the Center for Policy Research. 

I am Sushant Singh, senior fellow at CPR. 

This is the second episode of our series featuring leading experts and academics, on the many facets of Sino-India relations. Some of them will be looking at the historical side of things, while others will focus on the strategic facets. Today, we will be discussing the military aspects, looking at the China’s People Liberation Army, and what it means for India and to do that our guest today is Dennis Blasko, an independent analyst, and former senior Military fellow at the National Defense University in Washington DC, a retired Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army with 23 years of service as a Military Intelligence Officer, and foreign area officer specializing in China. He has served at the Defense Intelligence Agency and office of Special Operations. From 1992 to 1996 he was an Army Attache in Beijing and Hong Kong. Dennis has written numerous articles, and book chapters on the Chinese Military, including his book “The Chinese Army Today, Tradition and Transformation for the 21st century”, which remains an essential reading even after more than 15 years. 

Dennis, welcome to India Speak.

Dennis: Thank you very much for the invitation.

Sushant: Let me begin with your book Dennis where you explained who forms the PLA, what it is, what it is not, where exactly is the People's Liberation Army, how will it fight, what its doctrine is, what equipment it uses, how it trains, and how it interacts with the larger society. Essentially your book argues that the PLA is an Army of the revolution, it owes its loyalty to the party, and political guidance plays an important part in the professional character of the Chinese Military. What is the best way to explain the uniqueness of the PLA and the differences that it has vis-a- a-vis militaries from other democratic states, like the United States, United Kingdom, France, and even India for that matter?

Dennis: Well, Thank you. The PLA is definitely a political Army. However, I would say for the past 30-40 years it’s been less and less of a revolutionary Army, and becoming much more professional as it has modernised since its last war, last major conflict in 1979. But the main point is that it remains an arm of the Chinese Communist Party, and they have huge infrastructure and personnel to maintain that party control over the Army. However, over the past four decades of modernisation, it has become much more professional and modernised in terms of its equipment and doctrine.

Sushant: So, would it be fair to say that PLA is an untested army? Having fought the last war against Vietnam in 1979, four decades ago. I ask this because many people consider this as the weakness of the PLA, especially after the recent theaterisation under the tenure of President Xi, about 7-8 years ago, pointing out that this military has not been tested at all.

Dennis:Right. It hasn’t been tested in actual combat, since the 1979 war, but it is important to understand the situation in Ladakh, in Aksai Chin, that for most of the 80s, there was a low-level border conflict simmering on the Sino-Vietnamese border. During that time, they rotated its troops in and out for many years from all over the country to get some experience getting shot at. What is happening today at Aksai Chin, South China Sea, East China Sea is similar to that, but without as much gunfire and actual conflict. The whole point of these deployments and activities is to pursue national objectives, given to the PLA from the Chinese Communist Party and the government. While it hasn't been a part of a major conflict, it is trying its best to remain relevant through various deployments and training. It continues to constantly improve training over the last couple decades with the type training it undertakes. It’s not tested in actual conflict, but some of the things that we often think may be a problem such as the relationship of the commander to the political commissars or instructors might have been worked out as the situation seems to be in place for decades. I think they look at the political relationship between the Army to the party and between commanders and the political system, as a strength.

Sushant:With this theaterisation model and this restructuring that has taken place, can training or various exercises replicate something that you may face in real combat? Because theaterisation is a very different kind of structure of the PLA. 

Dennis: Yeah actually, this is what we can see today in Aksai Chin. Their actual deployments look a lot different when they are training, down on the border & near the Line of Actual Control; they are deployed much differently than what we see them doing on television and in photographs. They look like they are taking this seriously – digging in, spacing themselves out and they are deployed in much wider areas than they would be normally. I think they have learnt some lessons on what happens if someone starts shooting at you. It is quite different, even the training they do, even the force on force, the red versus blue with the laser identifiers, the pop-up smoke when people get hit, we do the same thing at our national training center. It looks very similar but a lot of what I see with respect to their training away from the border training looks quite different from what I see them deployed on the ground in the very difficult terrain in the Himalayas.

Sushant: Before I get to Aksai Chin I wanted to go back to something which you said about the strength and weaknesses of the PLA, you spoke about the training, the deployment, the logistics. How would you compare the modern PLA of the 21st century or of 2022 with the US military or with the Indian armed forces? I hear a lot from my former colleagues in the Indian Military about the quality of Chinese infrastructure, the pace of structure construction, the pace at which they construct roads, tracks, bridges, habitat is something to be seen. The induction of modern equipment into the PLA, their mobilisation time, the pace of their mobilisation, their logistic support. While they are not quite sure about the quality of the PLA soldiers who are roughing it out in the winters, they are also not sure about their relationship with the political commissars or the military commanders. How will you characterise these strengths and weaknesses of the PLA as they exist today?

Dennis: One of the things that I try to emphasise is not to mirror image. I know, I hope I know, I may not know the United States military as well as I did when I retired a long time ago. But, it's a mistake to look at what the PLA is doing and say “well, if we do something like that therefore it must be just as good as us” and can operate on the battlefield in the same way that we would or would even want to operate in the same way as we would. The PLA is actually constructed much differently than the United States military. Even though reforms have come up with some aspects that are sort of like the United States, the more I look at the PLA and the entire Chinese Armed Forces, the more differences I see. Perhaps one of the biggest differences obviously is the funding. The PLA budget, no matter how you calculate it, is a fraction, maybe a third of the United States defense budget now. Yet the PLA, the people's armed police and the militia are many many times larger than the United States military. One of the things that they are constantly talking about is trying to conserve money and spend their money wisely. This leads to another element that is consistent even today when its reform started years ago, in that PLA modernisation is subordinate to but coordinated with economic development. One of the things they learned from the Soviet Union during the late ’80s and ’90s when the Soviets spent themselves to death & they didn't have an economy that could support their population. The Chinese have learnt from that, the defense spending in China does not interfere with the civilian economy. They also look to the civilian economy to support PLA modernisation and we can see that happening everywhere. So, despite everything that is going on they are trying to do it on a shoestring budget.

Sushant: Dennis, if you are comparing it with the US Military and that's why you're talking about a shoestring budget but when compared to a country like India which is economically much weaker the PLA man to man spends far greater than what India spends. So, in that sense India would be in bigger trouble.

Dennis: Yes and as I said, I haven't studied Indian Military so I am not this familiar with it, but from your perspective, it is much different.

Sushant: Yes, because from our perspective the Chinese economy is five times Indian economy, their defense budget is four to five times our defence budget, they are spending man to man more than we are spending, they are producing many more military platforms within that country while we are not producing that much equipment within our country, we are the biggest importer of military platforms globally. The advantage that the United States Military has over PLA, perhaps the PLA has over the Indian Military to some extent.

Dennis: Yes perhaps that’s a good reason why we should all be happy that the Himalayas are between the two countries. Because it is such difficult terrain. But, I am not quite sure what the Indian reserves are like. If you have got a system of the reserve units.

Sushant: We do have a system for reserve Units but we don't need to use reserves, reserves are not called into service. I don’t remember in the last many decades reserves being called into service at any point of time. 

Dennis: Right. For example, here in the United States, especially over the last two wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, we used our reserves almost interchangeably with our active-duty forces. The PLA reserves are much less advanced and really would not contribute in the same way as the United States reserves. The PLA reserves may be a little more advanced in development than the Indian but they are quite different from the United States.

Sushant: Dennis, getting back to what everybody is talking about, the Sino-India border crises in Aksai Chin or Ladakh in the high Himalayas. Based on your extensive reading of the Chinese Military media and studying publicly available satellite imagery. Do you now have some understanding of what happened on the disputed border starting in the summer of 2020 and more importantly, why did it happen? Firstly, what happened & why did it happen?

Dennis: The why is much more difficult but first it’s important to start with, the PLA army is broken down for this purposes into two major elements, one is the border defense forces which are deployed along China’s border and Coastal Defense forces and I estimate there are at least a hundred thousand, maybe up to two hundred thousand border defense troops whose main job is to monitor the border, do some initial reporting, fighting delay any invasion that comes on, but the bulk of the PLA army is in the mobile operational forces- the divisions, and the brigades, the group armies that are stationed further back from the border. In the Aksai chin, I see two permanently deployed border defense regiments through that area. One regiment in the Hotanprefecture in the military sub-district and another regiment in the Nagari or Ali military sub-district prefecture, Tibet. And, an interesting anomaly is that the Nagari sector of Tibet is actually under the command of the Nanjiang Southern Xinjiangmilitary district, and there is a big dip into Tibet, it's a big bite chunk that’s cut out that is under command of the Xinjiangmilitary district and Nanjiang military district. I believe that what initially happened is that the border defense forces, especially up in theGalwan valley, were involved in the June 15th conflict. It was specifically one regiment and I think one battalion that was patrolling in theGalwan valley. Honestly, I credit both sides for the discipline that they showed because both sides were carrying weapons. They got into a major scuffle, but no shots were fired, which I think says something about the discipline on both sides. At the time, there was talk that there was change over between the units, between the battalions with that regiment. But, for some reason, I don't believe, based on no evidence, but I don't believe that there was an order from Beijing or Xinjiang or Nanjiangto go out and kill people. I believe it was units, a lot of people in very close proximity that started pushing and shoving each other that got out of hand, but eventually both sides were disciplined enough to pull back and withdraw. At the same time or just before that happened, there had been exercises in the area but not in the Galwan valley, because that's a terrible place to do military exercises, but to the north up in the Dapsong plains and beyond and perhaps to the south east in Nagari, there were out of area units coming in and doing exercises. At the same time, there were some of these out of area units, and I believe they were the initial forces that came from Xinjian, Nanjiang, the Sixth (what is now combined armed division) started moving forces into the sector south of Galwan. Eventually, they went into Galwan, but they started going into Kongka (the hotspring region), then the north of Pangong Lake. I am not sure when they went south of Pangong lake but they eventually showed up at the south of the Pangong lake. Anyway, they started moving in these divisional elements from Xinjiang and over the next six months poured in what I would consider probably an entire division. Some 10,000 people spread through these four/ five sectors from Galwan to hot spring to Pangong Lake to Spanggur Lake & set up these encampments. The most important thing is and one of the things that is very useful for identification is that the encampments are generally far apart, the sectors often are 35 miles apart. So that you can’t move troops back and forth between the sectors but they have come in with artillery, and artillery can often support each other from the sectors and it is by seeing the artillery that I can make an estimate of what size units are there. But after looking at the available Google Earth images from October to January and early February of last year, I estimated that a full division had been deployed there, but it was deployed to stay, not to go south or East or West. It was deployed to hold territory and as they say create facts on the ground. The important thing is that they were dug in by engineers and probably reinforced by engineers to do the digging. Perhaps, some civilian engineers came in to dig out these camps, that were all in defensive positions spread out for miles and miles in the Galwan valley. There is a regiment, I estimate that is 23 miles from the Line of Actual Control and in Pangong Lake, they have two regiments, combined arms regiment supported by firepower or artillery regiment. It's spread for almost 15 miles along the Pangong lake. So, those are defensive positions meant to hold territory.

Sushant: You know Dennis couple of questions you said this is a defensive formation, you spoke about the border defense forces, so what is the significance of the border defense forces? Are they as well trained as the regular operational troops? Are they poorly trained, poorly equipped, less equipped, are they paramilitary, gendarmerie, what are they? And the second question is, were there any offensive formations there which could have gone and taken some territory on the Indian side, if the need arose.

Dennis: The border defense forces are generally much lighter than the mobile operational units. They are mostly infantry, they may have some heavy machine guns, they might have some mortars. Few regiments have older armed personnel carriers. In some places, coastal defense will have artillery but generally, they are spread out in company-size positions miles and miles apart. Their mission is to patrol the border and man outposts and observe things. So they would be observing what the Indian side is doing and they might be reacting to that, and as you know you, have over the past decades established protocols for how to patrol, where to patrol, how to identify yourselves, how to carry your weapons and things like that. But these people, the border defense units, I would estimate probably throughout that entire region the two prefectures probably are two regiments amounting to some four thousand forty-five hundred troops. That would include the patrol bulks on thePangong lake. So you have got about forty-five hundred of those troops to spread out over the border of two hundred and fifty miles, a very long border, and then superimposed upon that are these outside units from Nanjiang (the division). So, what has happened is in many places, the out of area units came in, reinforced and built camps around existing border defense units. Now, could any of those forces cross the LAC, attempt an offensive to take land well into what is established Indian territory – yes certainly, they could have tried, but as you know, this is a terrible terrain for mechanised movements. It will be very difficult to make those kinds of movements. If there were any sort of opposition with modern artillery or anti-tank weapons or air support – any sort of thrust into the other side's territory would be very vulnerable.

Sushant: Dennis, based on your study of the Chinese military media, could you ascertain the reasons for the PLA doing what it did? Have you been able to see any analysis of that, any reasoning is given out anywhere?

Dennis: I have not seen exactly why they have done that, and that would be a much higher-level party decision. You are familiar with the concept of the chicken and egg, which came first. The Indian side says the Chinese have been building their infrastructure along the border. The Chinese side says the Indians have been building their infrastructure along the border. So, who did it first? Both sides are improving their infrastructure and we are seeing now with this bridge that's been built across the Pangong lake.

Sushant: Based on your assessment so what are the number of PLA troops including the border guarding forces, and the combined operational division. What is the approximate number of troops you would assess based on the encampments etc that the PLA has deployed in Aksai chin?

Dennis:I look back to maybe 20 miles, 25 miles from the LAC back into Chinese territory and I see five sectors that I have mentioned before. I don't see the very the northern sectors of Depsang and I don't see the very southern sector of Demchok, but the five sectors that I see which is about 200 miles and then 20 -25 miles back when you include border defense, the division which I would estimate to be about ten thousand personnel, and then there are certainly non-divisional forces, engineers coming in. I have seen further back in Rutog, what I think is a long-range multiple rocket launcher battalion. I think there is artillery and there are probably some special operation forces. There are definitely some communications forces. There are a lot of transportation and support forces both from the region and then from the army and from the joint logistic support force. So, I would say there are probably about twenty thousand in total when you include the border defense, the division combined arms division, and the supporting forces.

Sushant: But, Denis based on the military formations, areas, districts which are involved in the PLA side of the crisis. Do we have any knowledge of the commanders and their personalities who are involved. And has the recent restructuring made a difference to the way these things operate now and also how these commanders now operate?

Dennis: At the operational level, you know the regimental commanders, the division commanders, we may know the names but, I don't know if we may know much about them. The Major General who is in charge of the Nanjiang military districts is the one who meets with your... 

Sushant: Core commander...

Dennis: Yes. I would imagine you know him very well and I don't follow personalities that close. But, I believe that if I remember correctly he has been there for some sometime. Therefore, he has got a lot of experience in Xinjiang. There has been a lot of talk about the western theater, change of commands, having four commanders in a couple of years, and all that kind of stuff. The first change of command, a new guy came in without much experience in the region and he replaced somebody who had been in the region for a long time, and I think medical problems led to him leaving which brought in a third person who also didn’t stay but a couple of months, and now finally, a fourth commander who has come in, who also has extensive experience. One of the problems with PLA changes of commands is that you never really know if the medical reasons are the real reasons for their departure, and there could be other reasons too. Right now, I believe that they do have in the chain of command people with extensive experience operating in Xinjiang because it is an anomaly, it’s much different. Xinjiang forces did not undergo some kind of reforms that the vast majority of the rest of the PLA undertook. In Xinjiang, there are no group armies. The rest of the PLA is pretty much group armies, except for the Tibet Military district. So, there has been change and modernisation in Xinjiang but they still have both the border defense chain of command and the chain of command for the divisions and other supporting units, as they did before reform. I believe they have done that because of the unique situation, the huge expanses of land, and the harsh terrain throughout that area.

Sushant: Dennis, just stepping back a bit, what is the political direction to the PLA now, particularly on Taiwan and on the South China Sea. I ask this because there is definitely a connection between what the PLA does on Taiwan or what the political direction in Taiwan is to what PLA does vis-a-vis India, because you know, if nothing happens to Taiwan then doing something to India allows the communist party to showcase itself as doing something for PLA. So, do we know something about the political direction the PLA has now on Taiwan and on the South China Sea?

Dennis: I would say what we have seen in Aksai Chin is the army equivalent of what we have seen in the South China Sea, and opposite Taiwan. In the South China Sea, we primarily see a naval operation, a single service naval operation with the building of structures on the reefs and all that. Then against Taiwan, we see a more joint operation, both naval and airforce, heavy air force presence with all the flights mostly south of the island. But, both of these or all three of these different sectors or fronts as you might want to call them are being undertaken at the direction of the central military commission and the Chinese communist party. The PLA, in that regard is obeying the orders of the party, in their mind with Taiwan, it is to prevent further steps towards independence by Taiwan – in other words deterrence of Taiwan’s independence. In the South China Sea, in many ways, it's similar to what's going on in Aksai chin. It’s establishing realities on the surface and establishing military patrols in that region to reinforce their claims to the disputed areas. I don't see any of them building up an offensive deployment that would be necessary for a real war. For example, if you were to look at what's going on opposite Ukraine, you see concentrations of forces that are much different than what you see the PLA doing.

Sushant: Dennis, one final question and then let me put you on the spot. Are there any signs of China and India going to war? Based on whatever you see, whatever you hear, whatever you analyse, or are we going to see something on the India border,as you just said earlier, what we saw of China from the Vietnam border, but with lesser kinetics may be less artillery shelling and fewer casualties than what we saw in 1979 and 1987 on the Vietnam border. My final question to you is, do you see a war or not?

Dennis: No, I don't see a decision to go to war. The problem is the more all sides increase the tension, hype their soldiers up, and then send them out to do small unit patrols, I see the potential for escalation – something like what happened in June of 2020, where perhaps a platoon or a complete battalion size element clashes with the other side. There may not be immediate command and control withhigher headquarters, and things could spiral out of control and that's what worries me in all of these places – that a miscalculation, a mistake or misidentification could cause something much bigger. But if that does not happen, what I do see is the PLA digging in to stay in these encampments, in the sectors that I have described – they look like they are to stay for quite some time. Now, it's not infrastructure, it’s not as expensive doing all of that as it is building facilities. So the good thing that I see between the Indian and Chinese sides is that at least they are having meetings. They may not amount to much, but at least you are talking. Talking is better than not talking. And, it is possible, the Generals who meet aren’t going to make these decisions but if they are told by Delhi or Beijing to come to some sort of agreement, there could be a political way out of this. In all of these, both sides are going to have to make some concessions in some ways. I do see the Chinese, if there is no political resolution through negotiations, they are prepared to stay for a long time and rotate units in. To the best of my knowledge, I have only seen units coming from Xinjiangbut if they stay there for years on end, they may bring units from other places if it goes on that long. This to me is a very important test, not so much tactically about how they can fight, but about how they can actually live in such austere conditions, and support them with such  large deployments of forces for such extended periods of time. This is a very difficult logistics operation to keep that many people in the field, healthy and prepared to fight if necessary.

Sushant: Dennis, that's something we look forward to about how the PLA behaves. I am happy to end on a very hopeful note, that things would probably look up and there would be a political solution to this crisis between two of Asia's biggest countries, two of Asia’s biggest powers. 

Thank you so much Dennis for coming onto the podcast. Thank you once again.

Thank You for Listening. For more information on our work, follow us on Twitter and log on to our website at https://cprindia.org/

Sushant Singh00:09

Hello and welcome to India Speak: the podcast by the Centre for Policy Research. I'm Sushant Singh, Senior Fellow at CPR. This is the first episode of our series featuring leading experts and academics on the many facets of Sino India relations. Some of them will be looking at the military side of things, while others will focus on the political facets. But today, we will be discussing the historical aspects, looking at China and its relationship with India through a historical lens. To do that, our guest today is a historian of modern China with research and teaching interest in social and economic history, history of science and statecraft, transnational history, and China- India history. Professor Arunabh Ghosh is the Associate Professor of Modern Chinese History at Harvard University. His first book, Making it Count: Statistics and Statecraft in the early People's Republic of China came out in 2020. It investigates how the early People's Republic of China state built a statistical capacity to know the nation through numbers. He has conducted research for the book in Beijing, Guangzhou, New Delhi and Kolkata Arunabh, welcome to India Speak.

Arunabh Ghosh01:26

Thank you Sushant for having me. And it's a real honor to be the first in this new series that CPR is organising. So thank you so much.

Sushant Singh01:33

Thank you. I'd like to begin with your book first, because you mentioned a collaboration between India and China on the statistical front that is hard to imagine today. It involves PC Mahalanobis of the ISI. Can you tell our listeners as to what this collaboration was about? And how do you discover that interesting nugget? And were there other collaborations also at around the same time that we don't know?

Arunabh Ghosh01:56

Great, thank you. Yeah, this is, this is always an intriguing sort of thing, because it was very surprising for me too actually because as you just mentioned, in your very generous introduction, the book that I've written is primarily about statistics in 1950s China. I didn't really expect to encounter such a strong India connection and an India connection that would help me understand crucial aspects of statistics and statistical work in 1950s China. So maybe first, I'll give you a sense of how I chanced upon this, and it really was quite a serendipitous kind of discovery. I think it was, while I was browsing issues of the People's Daily, that I encountered a photograph that showed Mahalanobis with the Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, and a bunch of other people. And then the small caption read, "Zhou Enlai host Mahalanobis for dinner". This completely blew me away, this was July of 1957, I had no expectation of something like this being possible. So then I started digging, and eventually discovered that this was actually part of a much more sustained series of exchanges that involve statistics. But why statistics? So what's interesting here is that on the Indian side, which I think a lot of our listeners will be familiar with, the Indian Statistical Institute and PC Mahalanobis, as its director, are central to this early phase of Indian history in terms of planning, in terms of placing statistics at the heart of planning. What Mahalanobis was famous for, not just in India, but globally, was the adoption and expansion of large scale randomised sample survey, this was a relatively new technology at that time. On the Chinese side, what's interesting is that after 1949, the Chinese had explicitly rejected any kind of statistical activity that relied on probabilistic methods, including large scale random sampling. So what happened was, over the first, say, five to eight years of the People's Republic of China from 1949, to about 1956-57, they relied on other means. And by this, I mean, primarily on exhaustive enumeration on attempts to essentially count everything to the final instance of its existence- the census method, if you will. And this as you can imagine, led to tremendous problems, especially in the agricultural sector. So, it was this chance meeting in 1956, when Zhou Enlai actually visits India, and he comes to the Indian Statistical Institute, and is kind of blown away by the work that he sees being done, and then invites Mahalanobis to come to China. This is a short episode where there is a real desire on the part of the Chinese statisticians to learn more about large scale random sampling, because they feel this might allow them to overcome the kinds of problems that they are encountering, because of this overt reliance on essentially the census method of counting everything exhaustively. So that's sort of in a nutshell, what happened and I traced this exchange from about, it's really intensive about 1956 to 59. With a lot of people going back and forth, and things like that. But, for the other part of your question, this is not the only instance of these kinds of exchanges. I think they were happening in other domains. I have recently published an article about who I think is the first Chinese scientist to get a PhD from an Indian University, from Lucknow University. He was a student of Birbal Sahni. But I'm collaborating with a range of other scholars, in particular by mining archival materials that were thus far not easily available, including actually, the recently declassified Nehru papers at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library. And our hope is really to, to rediscover the actual breadth of exchanges that were going on in the 50s, beyond the sort of narrative of Indi Chini bhai bhai and sort of the cultural, diplomatic kind of exchanges, but much more substantive exchanges that are going on. So I think there is actually a lot more to discover. And what I found are essentially crumbs that should lead us to explore more.

Sushant Singh05:41

So were these exchanges Arunabh, were they facilitated by the state, were they driven by the state, both the Chinese state and the Indian state over these exchanges, like the Science one, you refer to that was happening primarily through Cambridge and Europe? Because Birbal Sahini was such a major prominent scientist in Asia at that point in time, and the Chinese wanted to collaborate with them. So were they driven by individuals or what they're driven by state, or were they driven by some other mechanics or processes?

Arunabh Ghosh06:09

Right, I think you find instances of both. There is certainly a very strong state element in many of these exchanges. Some of these, because of the sort of larger geopolitics of the moment, sort of the emergence of a certain kind of third world politics, or, you know, global south solidarity. I'm using these terms slightly, ahistorically, Global South wasn't used in the 1950s, but you know, this postcolonial moment, if you will. So there is a lot of state interest and an attempt to bring people from both China and India as part of, you know, bringing people from different parts of the post colonial world together. But, I think you have a lot of instances where there are other mechanisms at play. So the one that I just mentioned, and that you also brought up about the scientists, the Paleobotanist - that is about scientific networks, pre existing scientific networks, that then carry on into post 1945, 49, 47, into the 1950s. But you also have interesting transnational political movements that are emerging that have to do with emerging Cold War politics, but also have to do with an attempt at an institutional level to engage. So the ways in which people are thinking of establishing transnational institutions, like the UN, but for Asia, for instance. And here, there is some state support, but not necessarily it's driven by the state. So this might be individual's conceiving some kind of Asian Association, say, for the advancement of a particular area of knowledge. Then maybe someone like Nehru will get on board or Zhou Enlai will get on board and so on. But the impetus is coming from elsewhere. So I think part of the goal has to be to recognise the multiplicities of possibilities. With a small footnote or asterisk to this, of course, this is more true on the Chinese side than on the Indian side where, given the strong nature of the state in China, by this time already, at some point, it was necessary to get state approval, and that could be a harder process.That may have led to greater state involvement as part of getting that approval. On the Indian side, I think you see even more diversity.

Sushant Singh06:15

Any examples of these associations which you refer to which were pan-Asian associations?

Arunabh Ghosh07:33

So there were these very interesting discussions right after the establishment of the UN, to set up, under UNESCO and other organisations, sort of scientific networks in Asia. So people like Joseph Needham, and I'm blanking on a few of the other names who are involved, were in conversation with people on the Indian side, for instance, with people like Homi Bhabha at TIFR, DD Kosambi, and also with mathematicians at Tsinghua University and also later on after 1949 in Taiwan, about say, establish the Institute of Mathematical Research. Again, the idea was not just mathematics in terms of pure mathematics, but also in terms of how it applies to physics and research in the physical sciences, and so on. So things like that, which were sprouts if you will, did not lead anywhere. Mahalanobis himself wanted to set up a statistics association for Asia and the Pacific, I think I forgot the exact acronym. So there are two that come to mind immediately.

Sushant Singh09:14

Arunabh, when does this kind of collaboration and cooperation end? Is it the 1962 war? Is it 1959 when the border tensions started increasing? Or is it well before that, something else happened before that?

Arunabh Ghosh09:28

No, those are two hugely important moments. 1959 March, when the Dalai Lama escaped, I think is a huge moment, at least from a state to state perspective in terms of a cooling of enthusiasm. 1962, of course, then becomes like a major wedge. But it's important to also recognise the internal dynamics of these things. The 1950s is a very interesting period in Chinese history, with a lot of interesting upheavals that impact the intellectual world, the world of academia in very specific ways. So, intellectuals are targeted, for instance, in 1957 in the anti-writers movement. So those things also have an impact on the possibilities for these kinds of exchanges. So one has to be mindful of the international sort of bilateral kinds of relations, but also then the domestic developments that might impact this sort of engagement.

Sushant Singh10:17

Arunabh, there is something else you have written a lot about in the public domain - the inadequate scholarship on China and India? Can you give our listeners an overview of the kind of scholarship on China in modern times, you know, leading to the contemporary era? And also, what are the reasons for this inadequacy in studying China and India? Why have we not done better?

Arunabh Ghosh10:36

Right, this is a great question. It's a very big question. Before I get into the China studies, in India case, I should actually preface any response by saying there is a larger malaise in the Indian academia in terms of how we study and understand the rest of the world. So the China case is a very important case within a larger malaise, where I think we lack expertise on pretty much anything, including our neighbours, including the immediate neighbours in the South Asian context, where we haven't devoted adequate resources over the past several decades. But in the Chinese case, what's interesting is that you see a period of intense actual interest in the first half of the 20th century, a really important moment is the establishment of China Bhavan at Shanti Niketan, Tagore's University, that becomes the first research centre dedicated to studying China, primarily at that time studying ancient Chinese history – so, looking at the expansion of Buddhism in China and  looking at questions of linguistic and cultural exchange, things like that. But what's important about that moment from a research perspective, is that you have the establishment of the first dedicated China Studies library in India. And I think for any good research to take place, the necessary, but insufficient, of course, but necessary condition is a good research library. So that kernel was established in the 1930s. And during this time, I think the other thing to remember about sort of Indian engagement with China is that there is actually a tremendous amount of interest at the popular level where people are travelling back and forth, and there are stories of people travelling to China writing travelogues, often not in English, but in different vernacular languages that you can find. And some of these have begun to be translated now. So there are several in Bengali that have not been translated. But there are there are others,  there's essentially a memoir called Chīn Me Terah Mās (13 months in China), which was essentially a memoir of a British Indian Army soldier who spent time in China serving, if I remember correctly, during the Boxer Rebellion, and then he writes about it. So there was that kind of, I think, at a popular level, a certain kind of engagement. In terms of scholarship, I think you would expect that after 1947, after 1949, there would be a real investment. And there certainly was an attempt to bring about serious exchanges at a bilateral level. But you don't really see the kind of investment that you would expect. Given that, you know, this is India's largest neighbour. And similarly for China, this is China's largest neighbour, you see the establishment at China Bhavan and a few other places, an attempt to establish language programs. In the 1950s, they attempted to begin bilateral exchanges of students and things like that. But 1962 then becomes a huge, as I think many people recognise, sort of a huge stumbling block. But the irony in my opinion is that instead of leading, therefore, to a greater sort of investment in studying and understanding China, even if it is from a narrow perspective, why did we get what happened in 1962 so wrong? Why did the leadership, why didn't the intelligentsia, the sort of political elite that was informing the leadership, why did they get things so wrong? Instead of seeing greater engagement, greater desire to try and understand China, you saw sort of a retreat. So 1962 becomes this moment, I think, where you see not investment, but disinvestment in China studies, and that has in some ways lingered into the present, I feel, where China studies remains a fairly niche kind of subject, discipline or domain of knowledge to pursue. But that's at the meta or macro level. There are other things at the institutional and micro level that I think are also very important to recognise. So one of the things of course, I had mentioned library, the other thing that's absolutely essential in studying China, of course, is his mastery of the Chinese language. While mastery might be an extreme case, but at least a sufficient degree of competence, to engage with scholars in China, to engage with people in China, to read materials in Chinese, and so on. And what has developed in India and I think here, it's the expansion of a model that we find in JNU, but then that seems to have spread to other institutions in India as sort of best practices, is a real separation of the School of Languages where you have excellent teachers of Chinese and students who actually learn Chinese to a high degree of competence. And then places like SSS (School of Social Sciences) and the SIS (School of International Studies) that are then working on China substantively. You see a real divide here, so the people who do language don't engage in subject domain expertise, and vice versa. And this I think, over the long run has led to a sort of it has really debilitated this kind of area studies in India. So you have a range of China scholars now who were produced by JNU, and a handful of other institutions that cannot engage at the level that you would expect with material in Chinese, with scholars in China. And therefore I think it sort of hamstrings our ability to then understand the complexity of a country as large and as diverse as China is,

Sushant Singh15:46

Arunabh, I understand that the shadow of 1962 looms large, but after 1962, there is 1988 when Rajiv Gandhi goes and meets Deng Xiaoping, then there is 2004 and this current century that we are in, by now things should have changed, things should have improved. Why didn't anything change in the last 30-40 years?

Arunabh Ghosh16:06

Yeah, I fully agree things should have changed dramatically. And why they haven't is a bit of a mystery, but also not entirely in the sense that I think a lot of this area studies impetus. Unfortunately, we have enough historical instances of this and the best example is the evolution of area studies in the US often emerges from the recognition of the state, that these are strategic areas that we need expertise in, and then the funnelling in of resources. But what's interesting in the US case, and I think this would have had a salutary sort of effect if it had been pursued in India, is that yes, you create sort of a very narrow, strategically focused kind of expertise, but in supporting area studies broadly, you also provide grounds for a much wider engagement. So in the US, you see not only this sort of foreign policy and sort of contemporary China focused academic community, but a much wider community that has expertise in China now. Something like that could have happened in India, if there was concerted state support starting after 1988, as you said, or even more recently. Now, that did not happen. I think this is a failure of leadership in many ways. Again, as I mentioned earlier, it speaks to a broader failure of higher education in India. I think the Chinese case is an example, China studies is an example of this. Another footnote to this, of course, is that there are interesting developments more recently now, with private universities trying to sort of establish some kind of presence in China studies. It's very early, it's not clear how successful they will be. But I think it represents a recognition at least from, if not the state itself, then from society, more broadly speaking, that we need to know more as a society. So you know, there are private institutions that have set up centres for China studies that are trying to set up MA programs, and things like that, but it's very early days still, in that process.

Sushant Singh17:55

Arunabh, you brought up western area studies model. Most Indian scholars use Western research and Western scholars to understand and study modern China and obviously, these in the field of national security and diplomacy as well. To your mind, what are the dangers of doing this for Indian scholars and for Indian policymakers? This intermediation of knowledge through a Western prism? What are the dangers of this?

Arunabh Ghosh18:18

Yeah, I think this is hugely important. And it speaks very much to things we were just discussing in terms of, you know, an ability to work with primary materials ourselves, inability to form our own conclusions based on our reading, as opposed to reading essentially someone else's interpretation of events or documentary evidence. At a general level, I think that the danger is that essentially, in being second hand consumers of knowledge, and then formulating our own sort of interpretations, we are giving up, in some ways, a certain kind of agency in terms of formulating the questions and frameworks themselves. Which is not to say that all of the existing work that emerges primarily in the Anglophone, but say the West, broadly speaking, on China is useless – most of it's actually very interesting and very useful. But it is in some ways, granting over our ability to ask our own questions. And I think asking those questions with, you know, particular contexts that are South Asia specific or India specific in mind. These don't have to do with bilateral relations only, these have to do with a whole range of things that are going on in India right now, whether it's urban policy, whether it's health policy, I mean, Omicron and COVID is a great example. Right? How do we think about policy in India, vis a vis other places, including China? So I think if we formulate the questions, then the frameworks, the way in which we look for evidence, all of that follows. So I think in some ways, there's a kind of path dependence that emerges from where you start. And so that is, I think, at a very broad methodological level the danger here. More specifically, I think if you take a look at specific instances, then of course it is that you are essentially relying upon other strategic goals with which a particular policy piece may have been written, and then you have to try and interpret that and make it applicable to say, the Indian case, as might be what happens a lot and that again, is in some ways a needless exercise. You're not treating it as a data point, but as essentially, largely informing your perspective altogether.

Sushant Singh20:30

Would it be fair to say that even though India and China have been neighbours, they have been and remain distant in that sense. They've never been neighbours? They've been physical neighbours, but they've not been neighbours in other senses. Is that true?

Arunabh Ghosh20:41

Yeah. So this is I think, yes, the short answer is yes. But there is a footnote or a complicated answer that would be no. The yes is in terms of contemporary nation states, I think the ways in which the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China see each other.  The Himalayas are not just a physical barrier, you know, they are a barrier in other ways. But if you think in a slightly longer historical sense, then people from both subcontinents, if you think of East Asia, China and India, as subcontinental sort of spaces, have been meeting and intermingling in other parts of the world. So Southeast Asia is a great example of this. The Caribbean is another great example of this. And of course, now much more recently, actually, the US is a good example of this, because you have roughly, I think, 5 million people of Indian descent in the US and roughly 5 million people of Chinese descent in the US. So there is actual engagement in other spheres, but from a contemporary nation state perspective, in China and in India. Yes, you're totally right, that there has been I think there is a real impasse in terms of bilateral engagement and understanding. So that's why you fixate on the specific moments like Amir Khan's amazing popularity in China, it becomes this thing to wonder at because it's so unusual, it's so exceptional.

Sushant Singh21:54

And you sometimes wonder that China is India's biggest trading partner, and by a long distance, and you still don't have that kind of neighbourly relations? 

Arunabh Ghosh22:00

Absolutely, that's the other reality. And I mean, I think it's gone over $100 billion in mutual trade now, right, in spite of all the political rhetoric of not buying Chinese products, and so on. So there are ways in which the Chinese and Indian economy are actually much more deeply interlinked than people realise. But again, in terms of popular perceptions, there is a real divide.

Sushant Singh22:28

Arunabh, as a historian, what is the biggest myth about China in India that you constantly face and maybe even get irritated about? And similarly, when you are in China, what is the biggest misconception or misunderstanding about India that gets your goat?

Arunabh Ghosh22:42

I don't know if I have a good answer about this, because this, again, perhaps speaks to some of the problems you are alluding to. I think in India, the thing that I find the most galling at times is the sheer ignorance about China. There really isn't much of a sense, besides sort of a very sort of contemporary notion. And of course, more recently, that it's this amazing success story, and so on. It's not a myth, but it's the constant sort of raising China up onto a particular kind of pedestal by a certain set of Indian elite, I should say. If you go beyond that, there isn't even that much. There is no sense, no real acknowledgement of what it is. The other thing I should actually add in terms of it's an irritating myth, of course, is this complaint about the quality of Chinese products that you do hear a lot, which I think is also somewhat misplaced. But it itself would be interesting to research in terms of, you know, about how much of this is, you know, it's by design in terms of the ways in which commodities are flowing in terms of the ways in which markets are understood, and where higher quality versus low quality products are being sent. And, of course, the role of intermediaries, the people who are actually importing stuff, which might be on the Indian side. Anyway, that's an aside. So as I said, the bigger thing for me, though, is not so much a myth, but just ignorance, the sort of the very broad strokes generalisations that exist about China, that can be a bit of an irritation. 

On the Chinese side, it's not so much ignorance, as opposed to there is sort of a romanticisation. It's interesting, in more recent terms, mostly in the past two decades, as the Chinese economy has taken off, and there's a certain kind of confidence amongst the Chinese middle class about their own place in the world and their own sort of economic growth – that, you know, India is now it's, in some ways, an interesting kind of Orientalisation, India is the land of mystical wisdom and the power of religion and morality and things like that. This is not a dominant strain, but you do hear it's certainly distinct amongst a certain set of, again, middle class elite Chinese. And this I find very interesting in terms of it's not longer even seen in comparative terms, but it's seen as this again, you can, as I said, you can orientalise it and you can almost romanticise it. So this is the place you would need to visit if you are, you know, you're in the throes of a crisis of materialism, then India is the place that you could go. So this certainly happens amongst elite, very rich Chinese that you know, partly this is driven by sort of the tourism surrounding Buddhism. So you visit the various holy sites in South Asia, in India, in particular, that are linked to Buddhism and of course, this is not just Chinese tourists, but also Japanese tourists, tourists from Southeast Asia. But there's this kind of search for a certain kind of moral, or religious equanimity. So that's something that I find kind of both interesting and a little irritating. But it's that perception is devolved to just that.

Sushant Singh25:53

And yoga is well, we have done a bit by putting yoga in the mix as well.

Arunabh Ghosh25:57

Yes, thank you. Yoga, I feel, is a global phenomenon. It's not restricted to the Chinese themselves.

Sushant Singh26:06

You know, China's economic success and rise as a global power has really created a sense of China envy in India, the one you alluded to in your answer. The secret of Chinese success is seen in its character as a centralised authoritarian state, unlike India's very raucous democracy. Is that a fair understanding of contemporary China in India? And if not, why not?

Arunabh Ghosh26:28

I think it's a fair understanding of what the understanding in India is or a fair reflection of what the understanding in India is. But, I think it's sort of again, this is the understanding at again, at the level of sort of the elite intelligentia in India, right? I think that's not the popular perception. And so, I guess this would be my answer to your question, if I was only looking at the elite response would be this kind of envy at, or the hankering for a strong, centralised authoritarian state. So there isn't much wiggle room to say that, yes, it's relatively authoritarian compared to other parts of the world. It's relatively centralised, compared to other parts of the world. But I think in some ways, framing it in this way, begs the question, because one sort of looks at it today without acknowledging both the recent history- the history of the past 70 years since 1949, but also the longer history of the nature of the state and state society relations in China. The same thing is being done on the Indian side, right. So you're not acknowledging the longer history in India of states, a centralised state, the rule, the nature of state- society relations, and so on. But I think one important test, or a question one should ask, when we frame it this way is this, look at how successful China is. And it's because of its strong, centralised authoritarian state, you have to then acknowledge by that same token, that all the failures before the success should also be attributed to precisely the same thing – the fact that it is a strong centralised authoritarian state. And these failures are not trivial, these failures are failures that led to arguably the largest famine, in absolute terms in human history. This is the great famine of the late 1950s. It led to tremendous turmoil in the decades that followed, essentially sort of tearing society apart from the inside. So I think we have to recognise that certain things come with a strong centralised authoritarian state. It can be very effective in certain areas, but the failures can also be cataclysmic. So that's one thing to remember. Then the other is to what extent, this is where the longer your historical point becomes important, to what extent can a particular contemporary reality that has a larger sort of historical set of antecedents, how can you sort of apply that to a place like the Indian subcontinent, which is tremendously different. A simple way to think about this is the way in which we understand the centrality of the state, or the presence of a large centralised state, through the longer history of the subcontinent. In the Indian subcontinent, a large centralised state is the exception, not the rule. Whereas if you were to generalise that's the opposite case, in the Chinese case, it is a rule and the exceptions are when there is disarray and being broken apart. So, there is a very different sense altogether about how individuals think about the state. And I think until this is acknowledged and taken up seriously, this kind of very superficial envy and like, oh, all we need is a strong state that can ride roughshod over, you know, whether it's people's rights or other kinds of environmental regulations and so on, I think, will have a certain kind of appeal, but is extremely dangerous. 

Sushant Singh29:52

I also think that it comes out of a certain ignorance of China because there is a certain amount of federalism in the Communist Party model as well. The provinces and the districts decide what they wish to do in terms of so many policies that they have at their other levels and the competition among these provinces and districts. And even if you look at  some of the public health, public education things, you know, that have also come about because of that.

Arunabh Ghosh30:20

Absolutely, this is hugely important and this, again, speaks to thinking of China as a sort of given unit and not recognising actually, that it's demographically, while still, but maybe not for very long larger than India, but geographically significantly larger with a tremendous amount of variation. And then, the way in which the provinces run. There's a very good example from just very recently, which is what happened in the city of Xi An. And the massive lockdown that took place in Xi An because of the cases of COVID that were discovered. And if you look at the internal chatter, and the way in which people are understanding this within China, Xi An has historically been seen as a relatively poorly run city, compared to say, Shanghai or Beijing or some of the other cities. And so there were people who were not surprised that you saw mismanagement and all those cases about people being turned away from hospitals and so on, because the lockdown is being imposed. But then that led to other kinds of hardship. These are people who are not, you know, who are seeking help, not because of COVID, but for other medical, medical reasons. So there was this kind of internal recognition of diversity, variation, different ways in which different provinces have responded. I mean, one of the things you see, for instance, is the tremendous inequality right now within China, where the coastal provinces are significantly richer than the inland provinces. So again, that needs to be explained and understood, it can't be explained, understood with this sort of unitary, centralised authoritarian state model. So yeah, that's very important.

Sushant Singh31:50

Arunabh, this border crisis that India and China face, which is the most contemporary issue when Indians think of China today. History plays a role in it, the colonial part, the Imperial past, how important is the role of history in the kind of crisis that we see between India and China now?

Arunabh Ghosh32:07

So I think history is important at two levels. One, is just as you just alluded, I think, recognising that a lot of these problems have their origins in the Imperial and colonial legacies that both the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China are dealing with, but more than just dealing with, recognising that, in some ways, enthusiastically both states, accepted these Imperial legacies – in particular, the territorial imaginaries and the realities of British India, of the Qing empire. So I think recognising this is the first step. And there is, I think, in both countries, again amongst the elite and the intelligentsia. They are very quick to blame Imperial and colonial legacies when it comes to the other country, but are very slow to recognise the fact that similar logics are operating for them too. So at a meta historical level, I think that's hugely important. But I think at a more micro level in terms of the 20th century itself, I think historical scholarship is extremely important in understanding what exactly happened. And how to complicate the easy and grand narratives that exist. So right now, for instance, in India, it's very popular to blame everything on Nehru. Earlier it used to be Krishna Menon, and now it's Nehru. But I think this does a disservice to actually understanding what were essentially a series of very complex moments, and trying to understand why decisions were made the way they were, and so on. So I think the first step would also be to step away from the blame game. This is of course for popular consumption, this is what you want to do. It's easy to play things off and have people to blame. But from a historical scholarship perspective, I think this needs to happen on both sides. And here, the big challenge is access to archival materials, getting a sense of the deliberations as they happen in those specific moments. There's been good work on the Indian side recently, as you of course, I'm sure are also aware. Nirupama Menon Rao has just published a book and there's a whole host of other books that have tried to explore the border crisis and its evolution. We have seen some work on the Chinese side also, but the archives on the Chinese side remain closed. So it's been difficult for scholars outside of the PRC to explore these questions from the PRC’s side, in many ways.

Sushant Singh34:37

Arunabh before I let you go, can you suggest three books about modern China that you would recommend to those interested in understanding the country better?

Arunabh Ghosh34:44

This is there's been so many good books published in the past 2-3 years that this is an extremely difficult task. So if I can mention a few without restricting myself to three, then I can touch upon a few different areas that might be of interest to readers. So one that emerges out of the conversation we've had about the nature of the state and the nature of the Chinese state in particular, I think a really interesting book would be Great State: China and the World, Timothy Brook (2019), which tries to look at the way in which we should understand the nature of the Chinese state through a longer perspective, not just 20th century. So Brooke is primarily a historian of the Ming, but then writes expansively. So that would be a great book to get a slightly longer perspective on the history of the Chinese state itself. There's a good book on the history of the party that was just published by Tony Saich, my colleague at the Kennedy School here called From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party (2021). That gives you more of a sense of how the party, which is, it's a pretty dramatic story, because it's a party that was on the fringes in the early 1920s. And by 1949, came to dominate the largest country in the world. And now, the largest economy in the world is soon to be or if by PPP terms already there. So that's another book that gives you party history.There's a great book by the Chinese historian Yang Kuisong called     Eight Outcasts: Social and Political Marginalization in China Under Mao (2019). It was recently translated into English and this provides a very different perspective on post 1949 Chinese history, it's from the bottom up. As the title suggests, it's the story of eight people who had to undergo because of, you know, their individual identities made them outliers, or a certain kind of minority, you know, it could be because of their sexuality, it could be because of other kinds of things, and how they endured the first two, three decades of the PRC. I'm reading right now, after a long time. Finally, I've been meaning to write a memoir. And this might be of interest again, to an Indian audience. It's a memoir by probably China's most famous      Indologist, a man by the name of Ji Xianlin, who wrote a memoir called The Cowshed: Memories of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (2016)and it's his experience of the Cultural Revolution. He was a very prominent professor. He was at Peking University, the most prominent university in China, and endured     all kinds of hardship during the cultural revolution and he wrote about it. So that's another fascinating take. Finally, one last book I can mention, which I think is, again, speaks to sort of, the economic takeoff of China, starting in the 1980s,but     provides a sort of much more nuanced perspective on the kinds of decisions that were taken, is a book by the economic economist and economic historian Isabella Weber called, How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate (2021). And this is sort of about price controls and the ways in which price controls were imposed in the early 1980s, as China is     liberalising, so a very interesting economic history that is, in some ways, quite important today also in trying to understand the dramatic growth of the Chinese economy. So obviously mentioned more than more than more than three. I have many more dimensions, but maybe I'll stop there.

Sushant Singh37:51

Arunabh thank you so much for your time and for this wonderful conversation. It was it was really nice. Thank you so much.

Arunabh Ghosh37:58

Great. Thank you for having me.

Sushant Singh38:03

Thank You for Listening. For more information on our work, follow us on Twitter and log on to our website at https://cprindia.org/

In this episode of India Speak: The CPR Podcast, Yamini Aiyar (President and Chief Executive, CPR) speaks with two of India's foremost voices on agriculture- Harish Damodaran (Senior Fellow, CPR) and Mekhala Krishnamurthy (Senior Fellow and Director, State Capacity Initiative, CPR). Damodaran and Krishnamurthy dissect the important questions around the issue and what this repeal means for the Indian economy, society and for the farmer. They explain what the protests brought to the table, what pushed policymakers to repeal the laws and what direction the policy discourse ought to now take. They also shed light on the need for a new vocabulary for thinking of agricultural reforms to ensure the country can realise the full potential of Indian agriculture. 

Mukhopadhaya discusses the geopolitical ramifications of this development, the impending impact on women's rights, and the state of India-US relations. He also highlights how India should best approach this crisis and what the future course of action should be, given past reluctance to talk with the Taliban.

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic.

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas
• Impact on Jobs, Incomes, Inequality and Poverty featuring Amit Basole
• Responding to the Spread of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Abhijit Chowdhury
• Realities of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Anurag Behar
• Unpacking India's COVID-19 Vaccination Strategy featuring Partha Mukhopadhyay
• Dissecting India's Problem of Economic Inequality featuring Maitreesh Ghatak

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic.

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas
• Impact on Jobs, Incomes, Inequality and Poverty featuring Amit Basole
• Responding to the Spread of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Abhijit Chowdhury
• Realities of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Anurag Behar
• Unpacking India's COVID-19 Vaccination Strategy featuring Partha Mukhopadhyay

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter 

@CPR_India  or visit  www.cprindia.org .

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic.

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas
• Impact on Jobs, Incomes, Inequality and Poverty featuring Amit Basole
• Responding to the Spread of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Abhijit Chowdhury
• Realities of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Anurag Behar

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic.

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas
• Impact on Jobs, Incomes, Inequality and Poverty featuring Amit Basole
• Responding to the Spread of COVID-19 in Rural India featuring Abhijit Chowdhury

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

Chowdhury discusses what the on-ground realities look like in rural India. He sheds light on how the health system in these areas can be prepared to respond to this unfolding crisis. Finally, he discusses what it will take to achieve universal vaccination for all adults in these areas, advocating for a community-based approach to both treatment and vaccination. 

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic. 

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas
• Impact on Jobs, Incomes, Inequality and Poverty featuring Amit Basole

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

To discuss key findings of the report and more, Yamini Aiyar (President and Chief Executive, CPR) speaks to Amit Basole (Associate Professor of Economics and Head, CSE, Azim Premji University) in this episode of India Speak. Basole sheds light on the trends in employment patterns and the dynamics of informality in India’s labour market prior to the pandemic, to make sense of the slow structural transformation in the economy. He discusses the implications of the differentiated gender dynamics, the move to informality and the loss of income for India’s economy. He further highlights what the policy response should be to the immediate crisis and the lessons that can be learned from it. 

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic. 

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari
• Impact of the Second Wave on Unemployment and Labour Force Participation featuring Mahesh Vyas

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter  @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org

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Vyas sheds light on the trends in unemployment and labour participation rates during the peak of the national lockdown, the phase of economic recovery and the second wave. He discusses the impact of increased informality and decreased female labour force participation and the lessons learned from the first wave of COVID-19. Further, he underscores the impact of the second wave on consumer sentiment and what the government must do to revive the economy. Finally, he discusses the need to monitor the economy regularly and ways to strengthen India’s statistical systems. 

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic. 

Listen to other episodes in this series:

• Impact of the Second Wave on the Economy featuring Pranjul Bhandari

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter 

@CPR_India  or visit  www.cprindia.org

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What has been the impact of the second wave on India’s economy and how does it differ from the first wave? In this episode of India Speak, Yamini Aiyar (President and Chief Executive, CPR) speaks to Pranjul Bhandari (Managing Director and Chief India Economist, HSBC). Bhandari sheds light on the state of India’s economy before the second wave hit, the implications of the second wave particularly for the informal sector and why it needs a special focus and what a policy response to the economic crisis from the Centre and states should look like.

About the Series

The second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic poses serious challenges that need immediate attention. The collapse of an already strained health system, vaccine supply shortage, an unprecedented economic crisis and sharpening inequality, are factors that raise crucial concerns. How must India confront this crisis? The Centre for Policy Research (CPR) brings leading experts to discuss what the country’s response should look like in a new podcast series, India and the Pandemic. 

For more information on the Centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter  @CPR_India or visit  www.cprindia.org

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While air pollution levels are unsafe across the country, all-year round, they spike to dangerously high levels during the winter months in North India. This year, as the country confronts the COVID-19 pandemic, the challenge of air pollution is even more pressing, given increasing evidence of levels and transmission of the infection being exasperated by pollution. How can India solve this public health emergency?

In the 50th episode of ThoughtSpace, Yamini Aiyar, President & Chief Executive of CPR, speaks with Shibani Ghosh and Santosh Harish, Fellows at CPR’s Iniitative on Climate, Energy and the Environment. Ghosh and Harish have closely studied and engaged with this crisis in various capacities. They shed light on crop burning and other sources of pollution, the challenges of governance and state capacity, the new Commission set up to manage air quality, and the need to build a larger public discourse around the environment that views this problem as a social justice issue. The recommend a shift from reactive, political quick fixes to more systematic, long-term, institutional solutions.

You can follow the Centre’s work on air pollution on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

The Government of India passed three farm reform bills- The Farmers’ Produce Trade And Commerce (Promotion And Facilitation) Bill, The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement on Price Assurance and Farm Services Bill, and The Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill, in the Monsoon Session of the Parliament. The passage of these bills has led to widespread protests by farmers across the country. It has also raised critical concerns over the direction in which agricultural reforms should go, the nature of these three bills and the process through which they were passed in Parliament.

In this episode, Yamini Aiyar, President & Chief Executive of CPR, speaks with Dr Mekhala Krishnamurthy, Senior Fellow and Director, State Capacity Initiative at CPR and Associate Professor, Ashoka University, and Ajay Vir Jakhar, Chairperson, Bharat Krishak Samaj. Krishnamurthy and Jakhar are India’s most prolific commentators on agriculture and have deeply studied agricultural reforms. They shed light on what the current reforms mean for the Indian farmer and the future of agriculture in the country.

In an earlier episode of ThoughtSpace, Dr Mekhala Krishnamurthy discussed how the government could strengthen the mandi system to truly double farmers’ incomes. Listen here: https://bit.ly/3383lF2. For more information on the centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

As we debate the future of the Indian economy, the issue of regulation has emerged consistently as a crucial fault line. How does India design regulatory systems in ways that are effective, constrains capital where needed, but at the same time builds markets, enables the unleashing of animal spirits, and protects labour and citizens? These are critical roles the state is meant to play, but given India’s complex regulatory system, it has been argued that the only way ahead for India is to rid ourselves of the regulatory cholesterol to unleash animal spirits and build the Indian economy. In such a scenario, what ought to be the role of the state in building regulatory institutions and mediating the relationship between capital and labour?

Dr Krishnan sheds light on the difference between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ regulatory cholesterol, shares examples of positive financial regulation by the state, and calls for participatory processes in the design of regulation.

For more information on the centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can read more on TeamLease’s work on India’s compliance regime and regulatory cholesterol here: https://bit.ly/31M9xAu and here: https://bit.ly/2PMY1zj.

The COVID-19 pandemic has led to the closure of schools for over five months, and they are unlikely to reopen any time soon. This not only affects students and parents in the here and now, but is likely to have an impact on students learning levels, psychological development, and social engagement for years to come. To prepare for the post-COVID world, we need to discuss what happens when schools reopen. How should India deal with the challenge of school closures? What does the education system need to do to prepare for the reopening? And how can it ensure that the long gap in schooling is effectively filled to improve children’s’ learning levels and move on in their learning trajectories?

Banerji recommends leveraging the pandemic as an opportunity to truly integrate the community and parents in students’ learning, rethinking the curriculum to focus on basics and start where the child is in their learning trajectory.

For more information on the centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

As India begins to unlock, after three months of the world’s strictest lockdown, cases of COVID-19 are increasing in many parts of the country. This has put into question the effectiveness of the lockdown and our ability to flatten the curve. This presents us with important challenges for our public systems, especially the healthcare system, as it now rushes to cope with increased mobility and economic activity, and at the same time, deal with the surge in COVID-19 patients. How should India’s public health system respond as we unlock, and cases increase? What impact has the virus had on other public systems, like education? And what are the big questions we need to think about in the policy sphere as we learn to live with the virus?

Das talks about the challenges India’s public health system is likely to face going forward and how to build India’s public infrastructure in a world beyond COVID-19. He calls for building trust, flexibility, and agility in the public healthcare system in order to manage surges. In addition, he stresses on the losses that students are likely to face as a result of schools closing, and a need to rethink how students are taught once schools reopen.

For more information on the centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. This episode draws on findings of the paper, ‘Two Indias: The structure of primary health care markets in rural Indian villages with implications for policy’ authored by Jishnu Das, along with Benjamin Daniels, Monisha Ashok, Eun-Young Shim and Karthik Muralidharan. The paper provides a first-of-its-kind nationwide picture of rural healthcare and can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/3h2XPre .

In the last few weeks, the government of India has made significant announcements on reforming agriculture, particularly the regulatory framework for managing agriculture markets in India. These changes have been described as pathbreaking, long-term changes that will significantly alter the terms of trade in favour of the farmer. What are these reforms, what do they mean in practice, and what impact are they likely to have on the everyday lives of our farmers and markets?

Krishnamurthy sheds light on the history of agriculture market reforms in India, the intricacies of the mandi system (wholesale vegetable markets), and where the current reforms fall short on benefitting farmers. She recommends that while they are a step in the right direction, the government must look at expanding and strengthening the mandi system in order to truly double farmers’ incomes.

For more information on the centre’s work, follow CPR on Twitter @CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org.

In the last few weeks, a crisis has been brewing on our borders between India and China over the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Late last week, in an unprecedented move, top Generals from both countries met to seek a resolution to the crisis. The discussions have opened up the prospects of a second phase of dialogues. Against the backdrop of these dialogues, we explore the dynamics of India-China relations, the nature of this particular border dispute and the immediate and long-term implications this may have on India-China ties.

Saran, who is an expert on China, sheds light on the history of border disputes with China despite the LAC, the growing asymmetry of power between the two countries and calls for constraining Chinese aggression by cultivating strong ties with countries like the US. He also highlights that it is important to continue engaging on issues that may be mutually beneficial while at the same time confronting China where Indian interests are being threatened.

In a bid to revive the economy in the middle of the coronavirus pandemic, several state governments issued ordinances with respect to labour reforms that have further skewed the dynamics of labour-capital relations in India. These reforms have come under significant scrutiny and some steps have been taken to address the more draconian ones, but these debates have put a spotlight on some of the big questions that need to be addressed around the framing of labour-capital relations.

Dr Sundar takes us on a journey of the evolution of labour laws in India, discusses flaws inherent in them and how they fail to protect the most vulnerable of workers, and what the current reforms could mean for the future of labour-capital relations in the country.

This is the eleventh episode in a series by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org/covid-19. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

The coronavirus pandemic is a global crisis of an unprecedented nature that is reshaping the global order. Countries are grappling to control the spread of the disease by announcing lockdowns and closing borders. Economies have come to a grinding halt, and many countries, including India, have seen a rise in the narrative around self-reliance and self-sufficiency. With travel within and across countries barred, citizens are turning to technology communicate across borders. Simultaneously, states are using technology to mount surveillance on citizens to track and control the spread of the virus. What do these trends signal for a post-COVID global order? Are we likely to see a shift in the balance of power between the US and China? And where does India stand in the picture?

Ambassador Saran discusses the wide-ranging implications of the pandemic on the world, the need for decentralisation in India, and ends on a hopeful note that this period of change will give emerging powers like India more weight in the diplomatic space.

This is the tenth episode in a series by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org/covid-19. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

On March 25th, when the Government of India announced the first lockdown, it brought to light a problem that has remained invisible in the minds of our policymakers and public consciousness – the problem of insuring dignity and rights to the vast majority of India’s workers, most of whom are in the casual and informal sector. Within days of the lockdown, a group of researchers and activists came together to form SWAN to collect data on the experiences and challenges stranded workers were facing.

Adhikari, Mundoli, and Sinha shed light on the ground realities of migrant workers’ plight, where government initiatives and relief measures have failed, and what shape future policies measures need to take.

This is the ninth episode in a series by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter or visit www.cprindia.org/covid-19. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations. You can read the SWAN Report here: https://bit.ly/2T1r307.

Historically, pandemics have been watershed moments in altering citizen-state relations. In the context of COVID-19, data and technology are the underlying vehicles fuelling and powering these changes. States like South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Israel have done a stellar job of handling the unfolding coronavirus pandemic by testing, contact tracing, isolating, and quarantining. But underlying this approach is the highly effective deployment of surveillance data as a means by which these states have effectively controlled the pandemic. In India, we have seen debates emerge around the privacy implications of the Aarogya Setu app. What are the legal and privacy implications of these changes? Once the world exits from the immediacy of the coronavirus pandemic, will this new data and technology regime will fundamentally reshape the social contract?

Padmanabhan and Deo tell us about the different ways in which data and technology have been used, from controlling the spread of the disease to supporting governments, policymakers, and the public health system. They shed light on legal frameworks required to think through the long-term implications of these technological developments, as well as the likely changes in citizen-market relations.

This is the eighth episode in a series by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

In part 1 of the seventh episode of the CPR ThoughtSpace series on coronavirus, our guests, talked to us about how access to medication and new diagnoses of TB patients have come to a near halt because of the coronavirus lockdown. They highlighted that India has the highest TB burden in the world with over 1,000 deaths every day, even without COVID-19. In part 2, we continue the conversation with them to look at what the government needs to do immediately during the lockdown and once it is lifted to help patients who are already on treatment and ensure that new patients continue to get diagnosed and treated.

This is part 2 of episode seven in a series of episodes by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

On a regular day, tuberculosis (TB) claims over 1,000 lives in India. This is without the coronavirus pandemic. While the government and health care system’s energies have been focussed on controlling the spread of COVID-19, access to healthcare facilities for other infectious diseases, especially TB, has reduced significantly. How has the lockdown impacted TB patients and how are they coping? As we continue our fight against COVID-19, what must the government do to ensure that we do not slide back on the all progress we have made with TB care over the decades?

In part 1, Pai, Venkatesan, and Rastogi lay out the context of TB in India and share first-hand accounts of the disruption in diagnosis and care as a result of the lockdown. They point to the fact that new diagnoses have come to a complete halt and patients on treatment regimens are facing extreme difficulty in accessing their medication. This could have devastating consequences for India’s fight against TB.

This is part 1 of episode seven in a series of episodes by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

As the economy comes to a grinding halt and businesses close for the duration of the lockdown, the big question we look at in this episode is the impact of the lockdown on unemployment, labour force participation, and the overall income levels of both individuals and business. The economy had not yet recovered from the previous shocks of demonetisation and GST; the lockdown has accentuated concerns around labour force participation and income levels, which have dropped staggeringly. As India thinks about post-lockdown strategies, what must the government do to ensure that households across the country have enough to meet basic requirements?

Dr Vyas sheds light on India’s labour force participation and income levels by sharing findings from CMIE’s regular household surveys and what they have revealed since the lockdown was imposed.

He points out that unemployment rate shot up from 7-8% to 23-24%, labour force participation rate dropped from 43% to 35.5%, and over 45% households report a reduction in income as compared to a year ago. Vyas recommends better communication from local governments to build confidence among workers and direct income transfers to beneficiaries equivalent to at least two months of salary, despite chances of wastage.

This is the sixth in a series of episodes by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://scroll.in/topic/56263/coronavirus-conversations.

While India goes into lockdown 2.0 and determines the best strategies to stop the spread of COVID-19, countries across the world have adopted myriad approaches to tackle the outbreak. In this episode, we step away from India to look at what is happening across the world, especially in the United States of America. We also delve deeper into understanding epidemiological models – what is required to build sound models and to what extent can they accurately predict the spread of disease. While the episode does not focus on India, we do probe lessons India can learn from what is happening in other parts of the world.

In the fifth episode on the Centre for Policy Research’s series on the coronavirus pandemic, co-hosts Yamini Aiyar, President & Chief Executive of CPR, and Dr Jishnu Das, Senior Fellow at CPR and Professor at Georgetown University dive into the medical, testing, and epidemiological aspects of COVID-19. They speak with Dr Christiana Iyasere and Dr Saumya Das, doctors at the Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston, and Dr Nim Pathy, an epidemiologist at Imperial College, London.

Iyasere, Das and Pathy talk to us about why the disease manifests differently in different people, speculation over aerosol versus droplet transmission, different testing mechanisms, variation in epidemiological model and whether or not comparisons between countries is justified.

This is the fifth in a series of episodes by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://bit.ly/3afpv8D.

The agriculture economy in India came to halt with the 21-day national lockdown. Supply chains have broken down, labour is in short supply and there has been a surge in food prices, leading to a drop in food availability. This comes at a time when farmers were gearing up to harvest the rabi crop and have raised issues about the difficulty anticipated in harvesting and brining the crop to market. What role does agriculture play as we think about the economic consequences of COVID-19, and what can India do to ensure that challenges we’ve experienced in the past 21 days do not extend further?

Sharma and Krishnamurthy talk about why food supply chains have broken down, what the lockdown means for the farmer, and what the Indian government should be doing to ensure both farmers and consumers are protected.

They recommend a revival of government procurement and the mandi within the next few week so farmers can continue trading, while ensuring that all aspects of the supply chain remodel themselves to the new normal of social distancing.

This is the fourth in a series of episodes by the Centre for Policy Research on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. You can follow the Centre’s work on Covid-19 on Twitter: https://twitter.com/CPR_India or visit www.cprindia.org. You can listen to all the episodes in the Coronavirus Conversation series here: https://bit.ly/2JXygcM.

The coronavirus pandemic and subsequent 21-day national lockdown have brought the Indian economy to a standstill. This comes at a time when India’s economy and public finances were already under considerable strain. It is with this backdrop that India must think about how it can deal with the current crisis and rebuild its economy once the immediacy of the public health crisis dissipates. How should the government generate finances and design a fiscal package to stimulate the economy? What must the government do to protect all Indians, especially the poor and vulnerable, and ensure they have income and food security?

Roy calls for a rethinking of the social contract; increased accountability from the government to ensure that money is spent for the purposes it has been allocated for; and adequate financing to states so that they can take measures to tackle the crisis.

This is the third in a series of episodes on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. The first episode looked at how prepared India’s health systems are to deal with the pandemic and the second looked at the crisis of migrant workers. You can find a link to the episode in our show notes (https://soundcloud.com/cpr_india/episode33 and https://soundcloud.com/cpr_india/episode34). Stay tuned for updates on future episodes. For more information on our work on COVID-19, follow us on Twitter @CPR_India or visit our website at www.cprindia.org.

The lockdown imposed by the Indian government last week has brought the country to a standstill. Simultaneously, it has created panic in the lives of India’s migrant workers and labourers. Videos and images of migrants walking home hundreds of kilometres have etched themselves in our minds. Over 20 migrant workers, including children, have lost their lives since the lockdown due to hunger, exhaustion, or in road accidents on highways. Who are these migrant workers and what is compelling them to make this arduous journey home on foot, in the absence of buses and trains? What are their vulnerabilities and were these taken into consideration when the state announced the lockdown? And are we now doing enough to alleviate their concerns, meet requirements, and ensure that they do not bear the disproportionate brunt of this lockdown?

In the second episode on the Centre for Policy Research’s series on the coronavirus pandemic, Yamini Aiyar, President & Chief Executive of CPR, speaks with Partha Mukhopadhyay, Senior Fellow at CPR, and Mukta Naik, Fellow at CPR, on the migrant worker crisis unfolding across the country. Mukhopadhyay and Naik talk about what makes the migrant worker invisible to India’s policymakers, how the state has failed to address their needs repeatedly, and how that has led to an inherent mistrust of the state among migrant workers. They recommend winning back this trust with open and honest communication, abstaining from coercive means of enforcing the lockdown, and ensuring safe passage home for migrants who want to go home.

This is the second in a series of episodes on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. The first episode looked at how prepared India’s health systems are to deal with the pandemic. Listen to the first episode here: https://bit.ly/2UARif5
You can read Mukhopadhyay and Naik’s opinion piece on the migrant crisis here: https://bit.ly/2R6E6wp

The passage of the CAA was met by a fierce reaction in the northeastern part of the country, particularly in Assam. Assam has also witnessed the National Register of Citizens or the NRC process. What were the reasons behind this process and how did it unfold? Why are the people of Assam protesting against the CAA and are these protests different from that in the rest of India? Are the CAA and NRC linked in any way?

MORE RESEARCH ON THE CAA BY CPR SCHOLARS:

1. Unpacking the Citizenship Amendment Act (https://cprindia.org/news/8348).
2. How Democratic Processes Damage Citizenship Rights: The Implications of CAA-NRC (https://cprindia.org/news/8339).
3. Podcast: Citizenship Amendment Act- Protests, Democracy & Politics: Lessons from Latin America (https://cprindia.org/news/8394).

As the world grapples with the coronavirus pandemic, the Indian government responded to the threat by imposing an unprecedented 21-day lockdown. The lockdown’s stated objective is to buy time to slow the spread of the disease and ‘flatten the curve’, a phrase that everyone is all too familiar with now. But what does flatten the curve mean for India? Is a complete lockdown the ideal way to go about it? And how can our already strained health systems prepare for a widespread outbreak, if we do experience one in the coming weeks?

Dr Jishnu Das’s work focuses on the delivery of basic services, and his in-depth research on India’s health systems makes him the ideal person to talk us through the challenges our health systems face as the Covid-19 outbreak unfolds over the next few months.

He recommends the adoption of a well thought out testing strategy along with widespread availability of testing, collaboration to get better data, and preparation of our health systems make it agile and draw on the entire gamut of health infrastructure in India – including informal providers, private doctors, and government doctors.

This is the first in a series of episodes we will be doing on the unfolding coronavirus pandemic in India. Stay tuned for updates. You can read more on Jishnu Das’s work here (https://www.cprindia.org/people/jishnu-das).

The passage of the CAA led to agitations across the country. Since December 15, thousands of students, activists and ordinary people are out on the streets every day in every city. Latin American countries including Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and most recently Colombia have experienced turmoil too. What are the parallels we can draw between the two regions? What do these protests say about the state of democracy across the world? And what are some of the lessons we can learn about peoples' movements?

Sharing key findings, Naik and Randolph shed light on the similarities and differences between the two countries and how their research can feed into policy.

This episode is in collaboration with the Oxford University Press, a department of University of Oxford that furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. To know more about the book visit oup.co.in.

Through the amendment of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution, the bill seeks to allow states to make ‘special provision for the advancement of any economically weaker sections of citizens’.

The book challenges the contemporary and common view that party politics in India is bereft of ideology and develops a new approach to defining the contours of what constitutes an ideology in multi-ethnic states.

Saran sheds light on how India should best approach this crisis and what the future course of action should be, given this has ramifications across South Asia.

Despite laws that prohibit the act of manual scavenging, the practice is rampant in India. The conversation highlights the lack of proper sanitation infrastructure, poor implementation of laws, and elaborates on the reasons behind the high number of deaths associated with sanitation work.

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In the twenty fourth episode of CPR ThoughtSpace, Richa Bansal talks to Devashish Deshpande, Senior Research Associate at the Accountability Initiative (AI) at CPR about AI's new study on the declaration of Udaipur as ODF (Open Defecation Free).

The study found significant gaps in the processes involved in achieving ODF, and resultantly found less than 100% toilet coverage and even lower usage, bringing into question the veracity of the ODF status.

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The book analyses Prime Minister Modi's foreign and military policies in the context of India's evolving socio-political and economic milieu, global power politics featuring other strongmen-alpha male leaders (Trump, Putin, Xi, Erdogan, Shinzo Abe), and of Modi's persona and style of governance, and offers a critical perspective that helps explain why India has not progressed much towards becoming a consequential power.

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The book presents a gripping account of America's political and strategic, economic and cultural presence in South Asia since 1776. By illuminating the patterns of the past, this sweeping history also throws light on the challenges of the future.

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In this episode of CPR’s podcast, Richa Bansal talks to Taraporevala and Bhardwaj as they draw on their research to contextualise and unpack the Mission and what being 'smart' means for different cities.

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In this episode of the podcast Dr Namita Wahi, a Fellow at CPR who heads the Initiative, unpacks the findings of the study, delving particularly into the massive imbalance between the state and land-losers, and highlights possible ways forward.

The full report can be accessed here: http://cprindia.org/system/tdf/policy-briefs/Land%20Acquisition%20Report.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=5891

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Navroz Dubash, a Senior Fellow at CPR, unpacks the implications of this order further, explaining how it will impact India's strategic interests, as well as the role India can play going forward.

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In this episode of the podcast, Kurian deconstructs the importance of the Brahmaputra for both countries; sheds light on the reasons for the tensions, and suggest ways forward for effective water management.

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In this episode of the podcast CPR researchers Neelanjan Sircar, Bhanu Joshi, and Ashish Ranjan, who spent months conducting intensive field research, draw on their experience and analyse available data to deconstruct BJP's victory, as well as what it means for UP's future, and for the general elections of 2019.

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Drawing on a multi-method study, from the late nineteenth century to the present of the stark variations in educational and health outcomes within a large, federal, multi-ethnic developing country like India, Dr Prerna Singh’s book ‘How Solidarity Works for Welfare: Subnationalism and Social Development in India' develops an argument for the power of collective identity, or subnationalism, as a driver of social welfare.

In this podcast Singh explains the central argument of her book, comparing the different states of India in detail, and also comments on how the idea of subnationalism is playing out in the current political scenario.

Prerna Singh is Mahatma Gandhi Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies and Fellow at the Watson Institute, Brown University. Her book is a winner of the Woodrow Wilson Prize awarded by the American Political Science Association for the best book published in politics and international relations in 2015, and Barrington Moore prize awarded by the American Sociological Association for the best book published in comparative historical sociology in 2015.

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Senior Researchers Mukta Naik and Ashwin Parulkar and Research Associates Eesha Kunduri and Manish unpack their findings on informal workers' strategies of coping with ‘notebandi’ in this podcast.

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Music: The Jazz Piano - Bensound.com

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In the second episode of CPR’s podcast, ThoughtSpace, Richa Bansal talks to Senior Fellow and Director of Accountability Initiative Yamini Aiyar on what is the root cause of this and unpacks ‘Bureaucracy from the Bureaucrat’s Perspective’, drawing on AI’s research with frontline bureaucracy.

All of AI's research outputs on frontline bureaucracy can be accessed at their blog: http://accountabilityindia.in/ub-21-october

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