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    <title>Rethinking Antitrust</title>
    <description>Rethinking Antitrust will examine the economics, institutions, law, legislation, and policy goals of antitrust enforcement. Bilal Sayyed, the host, is TechFreedom&apos;s Senior Competition Counsel and a former Director of the FTC&apos;s Office of Policy Planning. He will host discussions with lawyers, economists, academics, Congressional and Agency officials, and other professionals with interest and experience in antitrust law and policy.</description>
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    <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 20:22:17 +0000</pubDate>
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      <title>Rethinking Antitrust</title>
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    <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com</link>
    <itunes:type>episodic</itunes:type>
    <itunes:summary>Rethinking Antitrust will examine the economics, institutions, law, legislation, and policy goals of antitrust enforcement. Bilal Sayyed, the host, is TechFreedom&apos;s Senior Competition Counsel and a former Director of the FTC&apos;s Office of Policy Planning. He will host discussions with lawyers, economists, academics, Congressional and Agency officials, and other professionals with interest and experience in antitrust law and policy.</itunes:summary>
    <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
    <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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    <itunes:owner>
      <itunes:name>Jared Smith</itunes:name>
      <itunes:email>jsmith@techfreedom.org</itunes:email>
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    <itunes:category text="Technology"/>
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      <title>#39: FTC v. Meta: The Experiments That Undercut the FTC’s Monopolization Case</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bilal Sayyed sits down with Compass Lexecon economists Joseph Goodman and Evan McKay to discuss one of the most closely watched monopolization cases in recent years: the FTC’s allegation that Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were efforts to maintain its monopoly in the market for Personal Social Networking Services. At the center of the case—and the court’s decision—is a simple but always core question: What is the relevant market and who is in it?  Join Bilal, Evan and Joseph for a discussion of the economic evidence - drawn from both natural experiments and field experiments designed by John List and the team - that the judge credited as the most helpful evidence presented to answer those questions. </p>
<p>Links:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/joseph-h-goodman/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Joseph Goodman bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/evan-c-mckay/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Evan McKay bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BFI_WP_2026-01.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer">Consumer Demand and Market Competition with Time-Intensive Goods</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 20:22:17 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/39-ftc-v-meta-the-experiments-that-undercut-the-ftcs-monopolization-case-6tOYGBKY</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bilal Sayyed sits down with Compass Lexecon economists Joseph Goodman and Evan McKay to discuss one of the most closely watched monopolization cases in recent years: the FTC’s allegation that Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were efforts to maintain its monopoly in the market for Personal Social Networking Services. At the center of the case—and the court’s decision—is a simple but always core question: What is the relevant market and who is in it?  Join Bilal, Evan and Joseph for a discussion of the economic evidence - drawn from both natural experiments and field experiments designed by John List and the team - that the judge credited as the most helpful evidence presented to answer those questions. </p>
<p>Links:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/joseph-h-goodman/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Joseph Goodman bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/evan-c-mckay/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Evan McKay bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/BFI_WP_2026-01.pdf" rel="noopener noreferrer">Consumer Demand and Market Competition with Time-Intensive Goods</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="78446648" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/media/audio/transcoded/139f7bdd-49f7-427e-9e38-ca6f1e93f51d/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/audio/group/d255944e-5495-4584-8db2-02cd6edfd474/group-item/cf663dfa-44be-4ade-8a41-f8a4c038e133/128_default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#39: FTC v. Meta: The Experiments That Undercut the FTC’s Monopolization Case</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/7a71600e-a69e-4b12-b9d7-6e2e58ae48ac/3000x3000/rethinking_antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:21:30</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Bilal Sayyed sits down with Compass Lexecon economists Joseph Goodman and Evan McKay to discuss one of the most closely watched monopolization cases in recent years: the FTC’s allegation that Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were efforts to maintain its monopoly in the market for Personal Social Networking Services. At the center of the case—and the court’s decision—is a simple but always core question: What is the relevant market and who is in it?  Join Bilal, Evan and Joseph for a discussion of the economic evidence - drawn from both natural experiments and field experiments designed by John List and the team - that the judge credited as the most helpful evidence presented to answer those questions. 

Links

Joseph Goodman bio page (https://tinyurl.com/yva967ak)

Evan McKay bio page (https://tinyurl.com/36tm4her)

Consumer Demand and Market Competition with Time-Intensive Goods (https://tinyurl.com/3a76sf7n)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Bilal Sayyed sits down with Compass Lexecon economists Joseph Goodman and Evan McKay to discuss one of the most closely watched monopolization cases in recent years: the FTC’s allegation that Facebook’s acquisitions of Instagram and WhatsApp were efforts to maintain its monopoly in the market for Personal Social Networking Services. At the center of the case—and the court’s decision—is a simple but always core question: What is the relevant market and who is in it?  Join Bilal, Evan and Joseph for a discussion of the economic evidence - drawn from both natural experiments and field experiments designed by John List and the team - that the judge credited as the most helpful evidence presented to answer those questions. 

Links

Joseph Goodman bio page (https://tinyurl.com/yva967ak)

Evan McKay bio page (https://tinyurl.com/36tm4her)

Consumer Demand and Market Competition with Time-Intensive Goods (https://tinyurl.com/3a76sf7n)</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>39</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#38: Antitrust Issues in the Fight for Warner Bros.?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Note: This conversation was recorded before Netflix officially withdrew from its attempt to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery’s studio and streaming assets.</p>
<p>On a new episode of Rethinking Antitrust, Bilal is joined by John M. Yun, Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, and Jay Ezrielev, former economic advisor to Joseph Simons, to discuss whether there are insurmountable antitrust issues in Netflix’s and Paramount’s competing bids for Warner Brothers.   </p>
<p>Links:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/directory/profiles/yun_john_m" rel="noopener noreferrer">John Yun bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20260107/118797/HHRG-119-JU05-Wstate-YunJ-20260107.pdf?" rel="noopener noreferrer">John Yun Written Testimony</a> before the House Judiciary Committee</p>
<p><a href="https://www.elevecon.com/jay-ezrielev/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Jay Ezrielev bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20260107/118797/HHRG-119-JU05-Wstate-EzrielevJ-20260107.pdf?" rel="noopener noreferrer">Jay Ezrielev Written Testimony </a>before the House Judiciary Committee </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 11 Mar 2026 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/38-antitrust-issues-in-the-fight-for-warner-bros-tqUsOqZf</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Note: This conversation was recorded before Netflix officially withdrew from its attempt to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery’s studio and streaming assets.</p>
<p>On a new episode of Rethinking Antitrust, Bilal is joined by John M. Yun, Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, and Jay Ezrielev, former economic advisor to Joseph Simons, to discuss whether there are insurmountable antitrust issues in Netflix’s and Paramount’s competing bids for Warner Brothers.   </p>
<p>Links:</p>
<p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/directory/profiles/yun_john_m" rel="noopener noreferrer">John Yun bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20260107/118797/HHRG-119-JU05-Wstate-YunJ-20260107.pdf?" rel="noopener noreferrer">John Yun Written Testimony</a> before the House Judiciary Committee</p>
<p><a href="https://www.elevecon.com/jay-ezrielev/" rel="noopener noreferrer">Jay Ezrielev bio page</a></p>
<p><a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20260107/118797/HHRG-119-JU05-Wstate-EzrielevJ-20260107.pdf?" rel="noopener noreferrer">Jay Ezrielev Written Testimony </a>before the House Judiciary Committee </p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="69843540" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/media/audio/transcoded/139f7bdd-49f7-427e-9e38-ca6f1e93f51d/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/audio/group/4d565fb1-2ce4-46dc-b623-dde0d9974482/group-item/5593d383-0e9e-4351-bdb8-d98c48a12970/128_default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#38: Antitrust Issues in the Fight for Warner Bros.?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/86387cae-c0ce-4de7-82ba-ab7890127cac/3000x3000/rethinking_antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:12:32</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Note: This conversation was recorded before Netflix officially withdrew from its attempt to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery’s studio and streaming assets.

On a new episode of Rethinking Antitrust, Bilal is joined by John M. Yun, Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, and Jay Ezrielev, former economic advisor to Joseph Simons, to discuss whether there are insurmountable antitrust issues in Netflix’s and Paramount’s competing bids for Warner Brothers.   </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Note: This conversation was recorded before Netflix officially withdrew from its attempt to acquire Warner Bros. Discovery’s studio and streaming assets.

On a new episode of Rethinking Antitrust, Bilal is joined by John M. Yun, Professor of Law at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, and Jay Ezrielev, former economic advisor to Joseph Simons, to discuss whether there are insurmountable antitrust issues in Netflix’s and Paramount’s competing bids for Warner Brothers.   </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>38</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">4f985868-df9a-4cf3-b0fd-9eff6e5d6ae3</guid>
      <title>#37: Canada is About to Get Leveled By Bigger and Stronger Players</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The United States needs a strong Canada.  But Canada is clearly falling behind the major economies of the world and is now under significant pressure from the United States.  What can be done about Canada’s economic malaise? Is it a competition issue? Or something else – protectionism, intra-country trade barriers, failure to diversify markets, a corporate governance and government regulatory environment that prioritizes limiting risk and maintaining stability?    </p><p><a href="https://www.torys.com/en/people/assaf-dany-h">Dany Assaf</a>, a globally recognized competition and foreign investment lawyer at Torys, and <a href="https://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/the-rotman-experience/our-community/people/hejazi-walid/">Walid Hejazi</a>, a professor of international business, economic analysis and policy, at University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management, join me on the podcast to discuss their new book (with <a href="https://www.edgewoodhealthnetwork.com/team-members/joe-manget/">Joe Manget</a>) <a href="https://www.everybodysbusinesscanada.ca/"><i>Everybody’s Business: How to Ensure Canadian Prosperity Through the Twenty-First Century. </i></a>Have they diagnosed the causes of Canada’s stagnation, and have they identified the solution? We discuss.</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 14:47:43 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/37-canada-is-about-to-get-leveled-by-bigger-and-stronger-players-FmOe2Pug</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States needs a strong Canada.  But Canada is clearly falling behind the major economies of the world and is now under significant pressure from the United States.  What can be done about Canada’s economic malaise? Is it a competition issue? Or something else – protectionism, intra-country trade barriers, failure to diversify markets, a corporate governance and government regulatory environment that prioritizes limiting risk and maintaining stability?    </p><p><a href="https://www.torys.com/en/people/assaf-dany-h">Dany Assaf</a>, a globally recognized competition and foreign investment lawyer at Torys, and <a href="https://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/the-rotman-experience/our-community/people/hejazi-walid/">Walid Hejazi</a>, a professor of international business, economic analysis and policy, at University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management, join me on the podcast to discuss their new book (with <a href="https://www.edgewoodhealthnetwork.com/team-members/joe-manget/">Joe Manget</a>) <a href="https://www.everybodysbusinesscanada.ca/"><i>Everybody’s Business: How to Ensure Canadian Prosperity Through the Twenty-First Century. </i></a>Have they diagnosed the causes of Canada’s stagnation, and have they identified the solution? We discuss.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#37: Canada is About to Get Leveled By Bigger and Stronger Players</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/c893609c-608b-4bd7-ae0a-f467957dea9c/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:09:56</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The United States needs a strong Canada.  But Canada is clearly falling behind the major economies of the world and is now under significant pressure from the United States.  What can be done about Canada’s economic malaise? Is it a competition issue? Or something else – protectionism, intra-country trade barriers, failure to diversify markets, a corporate governance and government regulatory environment that prioritizes limiting risk and maintaining stability?    

Dany Assaf, a globally recognized competition and foreign investment lawyer at Torys, and Walid Hejazi, a professor of international business, economic analysis and policy, at University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management, join me on the podcast to discuss their new book (with Joe Manget) Everybody’s Business: How to Ensure Canadian Prosperity Through the Twenty-First Century. Have they diagnosed the causes of Canada’s stagnation, and have they identified the solution? We discuss.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The United States needs a strong Canada.  But Canada is clearly falling behind the major economies of the world and is now under significant pressure from the United States.  What can be done about Canada’s economic malaise? Is it a competition issue? Or something else – protectionism, intra-country trade barriers, failure to diversify markets, a corporate governance and government regulatory environment that prioritizes limiting risk and maintaining stability?    

Dany Assaf, a globally recognized competition and foreign investment lawyer at Torys, and Walid Hejazi, a professor of international business, economic analysis and policy, at University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management, join me on the podcast to discuss their new book (with Joe Manget) Everybody’s Business: How to Ensure Canadian Prosperity Through the Twenty-First Century. Have they diagnosed the causes of Canada’s stagnation, and have they identified the solution? We discuss.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>37</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#36: Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/kathleen-w-bradish/">Kathleen Bradish</a>, Vice President and Director, Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss her new paper, <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AAI-Google-Remedies-White-Paper_Final.pdf"><i>Unrealistic Causation Standards Put Effective Monopolization Remedies At Risk</i></a>. Kathleen’s paper argues that Supreme Court case law prioritizes effectiveness and judicial flexibility over application of rigid causation standards in designing relief for violations of Sherman Act Section 2. Judge Mehta’s remedy opinion in the Google Search case, accepting this discretionary authority and recognizing the need for effective relief, may offer support for broader remedies in other monopolization cases brought by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, according to Kathleen. </p><p>Links:</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust # 33: <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/33-examining-the-ruling-in-the-dojs-ad-tech-antitrust-case">Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Case</a> (Bilal Sayyed, Derek Moore, and Giovanna Massarotto) (June 24, 2025).</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 18,<a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/18-judge-douglas-ginsburg-on-antitrust-law-and-the-tech-industry"> Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry</a> (Bilal Sayyed and Douglas Ginsburg) (Jan. 24, 2025). </p><p>Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 15, <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/15-the-microsoft-framework-shaping-antitrust-enforcement-today">The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today </a>(Bilal Sayyed, Andy Gavil, and Harry First) (Dec. 4, 2024). </p><p>Transcript, Rethinking Antitrust # 36:  <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Oct-6-2025-Annotated-Edited-Transcript-Rethinking-Antitrust-36-Kathleen-Bradish.pdf">Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases?</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 6 Oct 2025 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/36-unrealistic-causation-standards-for-remedies-in-monopolization-cases-dyvSuvCl</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/kathleen-w-bradish/">Kathleen Bradish</a>, Vice President and Director, Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss her new paper, <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/AAI-Google-Remedies-White-Paper_Final.pdf"><i>Unrealistic Causation Standards Put Effective Monopolization Remedies At Risk</i></a>. Kathleen’s paper argues that Supreme Court case law prioritizes effectiveness and judicial flexibility over application of rigid causation standards in designing relief for violations of Sherman Act Section 2. Judge Mehta’s remedy opinion in the Google Search case, accepting this discretionary authority and recognizing the need for effective relief, may offer support for broader remedies in other monopolization cases brought by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, according to Kathleen. </p><p>Links:</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust # 33: <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/33-examining-the-ruling-in-the-dojs-ad-tech-antitrust-case">Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Case</a> (Bilal Sayyed, Derek Moore, and Giovanna Massarotto) (June 24, 2025).</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 18,<a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/18-judge-douglas-ginsburg-on-antitrust-law-and-the-tech-industry"> Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry</a> (Bilal Sayyed and Douglas Ginsburg) (Jan. 24, 2025). </p><p>Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 15, <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/15-the-microsoft-framework-shaping-antitrust-enforcement-today">The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today </a>(Bilal Sayyed, Andy Gavil, and Harry First) (Dec. 4, 2024). </p><p>Transcript, Rethinking Antitrust # 36:  <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Oct-6-2025-Annotated-Edited-Transcript-Rethinking-Antitrust-36-Kathleen-Bradish.pdf">Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases?</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="57783153" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/a70bcba7-f22e-4fac-bb45-2a7ccd4993f3/audio/cf0d262f-bd76-49f1-a07f-7c8d7f19d0de/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#36: Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/9d39b8d5-5b37-4c9d-9ef0-c6c45db21ef4/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:59:58</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Kathleen Bradish, Vice President and Director, Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss her new paper, Unrealistic Causation Standards Put Effective Monopolization Remedies At Risk. Kathleen’s paper argues that Supreme Court case law prioritizes effectiveness and judicial flexibility over application of rigid causation standards in designing relief for violations of Sherman Act Section 2. Judge Mehta’s remedy opinion in the Google Search case, accepting this discretionary authority and recognizing the need for effective relief, may offer support for broader remedies in other monopolization cases brought by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, according to Kathleen. 

Links:

Rethinking Antitrust # 33: Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Case (https://tinyurl.com/4ky2u4xc).

Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 18, Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry (https://tinyurl.com/2hxna2bx)

Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 15, The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today (https://tinyurl.com/bdk2c5k2) 

Transcript, Rethinking Antitrust # 36:  Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases? (https://tinyurl.com/jxrey5cr)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Kathleen Bradish, Vice President and Director, Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss her new paper, Unrealistic Causation Standards Put Effective Monopolization Remedies At Risk. Kathleen’s paper argues that Supreme Court case law prioritizes effectiveness and judicial flexibility over application of rigid causation standards in designing relief for violations of Sherman Act Section 2. Judge Mehta’s remedy opinion in the Google Search case, accepting this discretionary authority and recognizing the need for effective relief, may offer support for broader remedies in other monopolization cases brought by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, according to Kathleen. 

Links:

Rethinking Antitrust # 33: Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Case (https://tinyurl.com/4ky2u4xc).

Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 18, Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry (https://tinyurl.com/2hxna2bx)

Rethinking Antitrust Podcast # 15, The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today (https://tinyurl.com/bdk2c5k2) 

Transcript, Rethinking Antitrust # 36:  Unrealistic Causation Standards for Remedies in Monopolization Cases? (https://tinyurl.com/jxrey5cr)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#35: Bread and Butter Antitrust: Where do the States Fit In?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gwendolyncooley/">Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley</a>, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the state of Wisconsin, AI merger tech entrepreneur, antitrust podcaster, and practicing lawyer, joins the podcast to discuss why the State AGs must play a leading role in refocusing antitrust enforcement (and where it should go).  We also discuss <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/taimetllc/posts/?feedView=all">Taimet</a>, a Targeted Artificial Intelligence Merger Evaluation Tool, which I was very excited to learn about. </p><p><a href="https://www.naag.org/attorney-general-journal/a-farewell-from-gwendolyn-cooley-july-article-of-the-month/">A Farewell From Gwendolyn Cooley</a> (Sept. 2024)</p><p>Written Testimony of Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024-12-17_pm_-_testimony_-_cooley.pdf">Continuing a Bipartisan Path Forward on Antitrust Enforcement and Reform</a> (Dec. 17, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://fedsoc.org/events/fireside-chat-with-gwendolyn-j-cooley">Fireside Chat with Gwendolyn Cooley</a> (Oct. 2024)</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/pl/podcast/antitrust-101/id1779359857">Antitrust 101 Podcast</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 11 Sep 2025 15:10:58 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/bread-and-butter-antitrust-where-do-the-states-fit-in-rqhBcMac</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/gwendolyncooley/">Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley</a>, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the state of Wisconsin, AI merger tech entrepreneur, antitrust podcaster, and practicing lawyer, joins the podcast to discuss why the State AGs must play a leading role in refocusing antitrust enforcement (and where it should go).  We also discuss <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/taimetllc/posts/?feedView=all">Taimet</a>, a Targeted Artificial Intelligence Merger Evaluation Tool, which I was very excited to learn about. </p><p><a href="https://www.naag.org/attorney-general-journal/a-farewell-from-gwendolyn-cooley-july-article-of-the-month/">A Farewell From Gwendolyn Cooley</a> (Sept. 2024)</p><p>Written Testimony of Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, <a href="https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2024-12-17_pm_-_testimony_-_cooley.pdf">Continuing a Bipartisan Path Forward on Antitrust Enforcement and Reform</a> (Dec. 17, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://fedsoc.org/events/fireside-chat-with-gwendolyn-j-cooley">Fireside Chat with Gwendolyn Cooley</a> (Oct. 2024)</p><p><a href="https://podcasts.apple.com/pl/podcast/antitrust-101/id1779359857">Antitrust 101 Podcast</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#35: Bread and Butter Antitrust: Where do the States Fit In?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/182d90ed-5479-45da-a04c-4f1c14059643/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:21:02</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the state of Wisconsin, AI merger tech entrepreneur, antitrust podcaster, and practicing lawyer, joins the podcast to discuss why the State AGs must play a leading role in refocusing antitrust enforcement (and where it should go).  We also discuss Taimet, a Targeted Artificial Intelligence Merger Evaluation Tool, which I was very excited to learn about. 

Links

Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley Bio Page (https://tinyurl.com/2epuw73m)

A Farewell From Gwendolyn Cooley (https://tinyurl.com/3e2p2knn)

Written Testimony of Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, Continuing a Bipartisan Path Forward on Antitrust Enforcement and Reform (https://tinyurl.com/2s9sethz)

Fireside Chat with Gwendolyn Cooley (https://tinyurl.com/4u7jwm49)

Antitrust 101 Podcast (https://tinyurl.com/4nfuahha)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust for the state of Wisconsin, AI merger tech entrepreneur, antitrust podcaster, and practicing lawyer, joins the podcast to discuss why the State AGs must play a leading role in refocusing antitrust enforcement (and where it should go).  We also discuss Taimet, a Targeted Artificial Intelligence Merger Evaluation Tool, which I was very excited to learn about. 

Links

Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley Bio Page (https://tinyurl.com/2epuw73m)

A Farewell From Gwendolyn Cooley (https://tinyurl.com/3e2p2knn)

Written Testimony of Gwendolyn J. Lindsay Cooley, Continuing a Bipartisan Path Forward on Antitrust Enforcement and Reform (https://tinyurl.com/2s9sethz)

Fireside Chat with Gwendolyn Cooley (https://tinyurl.com/4u7jwm49)

Antitrust 101 Podcast (https://tinyurl.com/4nfuahha)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#34: A First Look at the ACCC’s New Merger Assessment Guidelines</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/">Australian Competition and Consumer Commission</a> released updated <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/merger-control-regime-assessment-guidelines.pdf">Merger Assessment Guidelines</a> in June. <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/team/chris-whelan/">Chris Whelan</a> and <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/team/chris-hart/">Chris Hart</a> of <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/">RBB Economics</a> join the podcast to discuss the strengths and limitations of the revised guidelines, whether (and how) they differ from the draft set out for public comment, and issues that will need clarification and development over the next few years by the ACCC.  </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.datocms-assets.com/79198/1745570317-rbb-economics-comments-on-accc-draft-merger-assessment-guidelines.pdf">Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines, Comments by RBB Economics </a>(April 17, 2025)</p><p><a href="https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-10/c2024-554547-rbb-economics.pdf">Proposed Changes to the SLC Test: Economic Considerations</a> (August 16, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Comments-on-ACCC-Draft-Merger-Assessment-Guidelines.pdf">Comments of TechFreedom on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines (ACCC) </a>(April 24, 2025)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Jul 2025 15:50:04 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/34-a-first-look-at-the-acccs-new-merger-assessment-guidelines-dOHFN3tk</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/">Australian Competition and Consumer Commission</a> released updated <a href="https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/merger-control-regime-assessment-guidelines.pdf">Merger Assessment Guidelines</a> in June. <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/team/chris-whelan/">Chris Whelan</a> and <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/team/chris-hart/">Chris Hart</a> of <a href="https://www.rbbecon.com/">RBB Economics</a> join the podcast to discuss the strengths and limitations of the revised guidelines, whether (and how) they differ from the draft set out for public comment, and issues that will need clarification and development over the next few years by the ACCC.  </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.datocms-assets.com/79198/1745570317-rbb-economics-comments-on-accc-draft-merger-assessment-guidelines.pdf">Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines, Comments by RBB Economics </a>(April 17, 2025)</p><p><a href="https://treasury.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-10/c2024-554547-rbb-economics.pdf">Proposed Changes to the SLC Test: Economic Considerations</a> (August 16, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Comments-on-ACCC-Draft-Merger-Assessment-Guidelines.pdf">Comments of TechFreedom on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines (ACCC) </a>(April 24, 2025)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#34: A First Look at the ACCC’s New Merger Assessment Guidelines</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/36f9892b-87ac-4c4b-9e8a-63c5f994b42d/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:06:30</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission released updated Merger Assessment Guidelines in June. Chris Whelan and Chris Hart of RBB Economics join the podcast to discuss the strengths and limitations of the revised guidelines, whether (and how) they differ from the draft set out for public comment, and issues that will need clarification and development over the next few years by the ACCC.

Links: 

Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines, Comments by RBB Economics (https://tinyurl.com/2ymbpmd4)

Proposed Changes to the SLC Test: Economic Considerations (https://tinyurl.com/3wrtcda4)

Comments of TechFreedom on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines (ACCC) (https://tinyurl.com/3a5d2xsn)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission released updated Merger Assessment Guidelines in June. Chris Whelan and Chris Hart of RBB Economics join the podcast to discuss the strengths and limitations of the revised guidelines, whether (and how) they differ from the draft set out for public comment, and issues that will need clarification and development over the next few years by the ACCC.

Links: 

Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines, Comments by RBB Economics (https://tinyurl.com/2ymbpmd4)

Proposed Changes to the SLC Test: Economic Considerations (https://tinyurl.com/3wrtcda4)

Comments of TechFreedom on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines (ACCC) (https://tinyurl.com/3a5d2xsn)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#33: Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Antitrust Case</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>A district court has found that Google willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets for open-web display advertising. Is the district court’s decision likely to withstand appellate scrutiny? What remedies might the DOJ seek? What factors will constrain the court’s remedy decision?  On the latest episode, we replay our webinar with Washington Legal Foundation examining the ruling’s impact on Google and on the FTC/DOJ big-tech litigation docket.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/about/">Bilal Sayyed</a>, TechFreedom (Moderator)</p><p><a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/">Giovanna Massarotto</a>, University of Pennsylvania</p><p><a href="https://www.rulegarza.com/attorneys/derek-w-moore/">Derek W. Moore</a>, Rule Garza Howley LLP</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 24 Jun 2025 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/33-examining-the-ruling-in-the-dojs-ad-tech-antitrust-case-cfQHSN7v</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A district court has found that Google willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets for open-web display advertising. Is the district court’s decision likely to withstand appellate scrutiny? What remedies might the DOJ seek? What factors will constrain the court’s remedy decision?  On the latest episode, we replay our webinar with Washington Legal Foundation examining the ruling’s impact on Google and on the FTC/DOJ big-tech litigation docket.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/about/">Bilal Sayyed</a>, TechFreedom (Moderator)</p><p><a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/">Giovanna Massarotto</a>, University of Pennsylvania</p><p><a href="https://www.rulegarza.com/attorneys/derek-w-moore/">Derek W. Moore</a>, Rule Garza Howley LLP</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#33: Examining the Ruling in the DOJ’s Ad Tech Antitrust Case</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:summary>A district court has found that Google willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets for open-web display advertising. Is the district court’s decision likely to withstand appellate scrutiny? What remedies might the DOJ seek? What factors will constrain the court’s remedy decision?  On the latest episode, we replay our webinar with Washington Legal Foundation examining the ruling’s impact on Google and on the FTC/DOJ big-tech litigation docket.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>A district court has found that Google willfully engaged in a series of anticompetitive acts to acquire and maintain monopoly power in the publisher ad server and ad exchange markets for open-web display advertising. Is the district court’s decision likely to withstand appellate scrutiny? What remedies might the DOJ seek? What factors will constrain the court’s remedy decision?  On the latest episode, we replay our webinar with Washington Legal Foundation examining the ruling’s impact on Google and on the FTC/DOJ big-tech litigation docket.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#32: A Dose of Competition: Improving Health Care by Removing Regulatory Barriers to Entry</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Katie Ambrogi joins the podcast to discuss some of the many regulations that limit entry into health care markets.  Katie is a former FTC attorney, with over a decade of experience at the FTC, most recently in the Office of Policy Planning, where she focused on antitrust health care enforcement and antitrust health care policy. </p><p>Links:</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/COPA_Policy_Paper.pdf" target="_blank">Policy Perspectives on Certificates of Public Advantage</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2022)</p><p>Competition Matters, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/competition-matters/2021/04/physician-group-healthcare-facility-merger-study" target="_blank">Physician Group and Healthcare Facility Merger Study</a> (Mike Vita, Deputy Director Research and Management, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission) (April 2021)</p><p>United States Department of Health & Human Services, United States Department of the Treasury, Department of Labor, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Reforming_Americas_Healthcare_System_Through_Choice_and_Competition.pdf" target="_blank">Reforming America’s Healthcare System Through Choice and Competition</a> (2018)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/options-enhance-occupational-license-portability/license_portability_policy_paper_0.pdf" target="_blank">Options to Enhance Occupational Licensing Portability</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2018)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/policy-perspectives-competition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses/140307aprnpolicypaper.pdf" target="_blank">Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2014)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf" target="_blank">Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition</a> (2004)</p><p>Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/everything-old-new-again-health-care-and-competition-21st-century/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf" target="_blank">Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century</a> (Nov. 2002).</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust # 27: <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/27-are-health-care-markets-competitive" target="_blank">Are Health Care Markets Competitive?</a> (A conversation with Marty Gaynor)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 17 Jun 2025 15:42:47 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/32-a-dose-of-competition-improving-health-care-by-removing-regulatory-barriers-to-entry-GQVgHsW1</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Katie Ambrogi joins the podcast to discuss some of the many regulations that limit entry into health care markets.  Katie is a former FTC attorney, with over a decade of experience at the FTC, most recently in the Office of Policy Planning, where she focused on antitrust health care enforcement and antitrust health care policy. </p><p>Links:</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/COPA_Policy_Paper.pdf" target="_blank">Policy Perspectives on Certificates of Public Advantage</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2022)</p><p>Competition Matters, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/competition-matters/2021/04/physician-group-healthcare-facility-merger-study" target="_blank">Physician Group and Healthcare Facility Merger Study</a> (Mike Vita, Deputy Director Research and Management, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission) (April 2021)</p><p>United States Department of Health & Human Services, United States Department of the Treasury, Department of Labor, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Reforming_Americas_Healthcare_System_Through_Choice_and_Competition.pdf" target="_blank">Reforming America’s Healthcare System Through Choice and Competition</a> (2018)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/options-enhance-occupational-license-portability/license_portability_policy_paper_0.pdf" target="_blank">Options to Enhance Occupational Licensing Portability</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2018)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/policy-perspectives-competition-regulation-advanced-practice-nurses/140307aprnpolicypaper.pdf" target="_blank">Competition and the Regulation of Advanced Practice Nurses</a> (FTC Staff Paper, 2014)</p><p>Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf" target="_blank">Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition</a> (2004)</p><p>Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/everything-old-new-again-health-care-and-competition-21st-century/murishealthcarespeech0211.pdf" target="_blank">Everything Old is New Again: Health Care and Competition in the 21st Century</a> (Nov. 2002).</p><p>Rethinking Antitrust # 27: <a href="https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/27-are-health-care-markets-competitive" target="_blank">Are Health Care Markets Competitive?</a> (A conversation with Marty Gaynor)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#32: A Dose of Competition: Improving Health Care by Removing Regulatory Barriers to Entry</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>01:11:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Katie Ambrogi joins the podcast to discuss some of the many regulations that limit entry into health care markets.  Katie is a former FTC attorney, with over a decade of experience at the FTC, most recently in the Office of Policy Planning, where she focused on antitrust health care enforcement and antitrust health care policy. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Katie Ambrogi joins the podcast to discuss some of the many regulations that limit entry into health care markets.  Katie is a former FTC attorney, with over a decade of experience at the FTC, most recently in the Office of Policy Planning, where she focused on antitrust health care enforcement and antitrust health care policy. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#31: Innovation and Competition Policy</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://econ.berkeley.edu/profile/richard-j-gilbert" target="_blank">Rich Gilbert</a>, author of <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/4844/Innovation-MattersCompetition-Policy-for-the-High" target="_blank">Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy</a> the Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economics, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,  one of the drafters of the 1<a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf" target="_blank">995 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property</a>, and a leading scholar on innovation, intellectual property and competition policy, joins to podcast to discuss Innovation and Competition policy, and the <a href="https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CPI-Gilbert.pdf" target="_blank">underrated remedy of compulsory licensing</a>. </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Jun 2025 16:06:25 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/31-innovation-and-competition-policy-0wlJii4e</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://econ.berkeley.edu/profile/richard-j-gilbert" target="_blank">Rich Gilbert</a>, author of <a href="https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/4844/Innovation-MattersCompetition-Policy-for-the-High" target="_blank">Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy</a> the Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economics, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,  one of the drafters of the 1<a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf" target="_blank">995 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property</a>, and a leading scholar on innovation, intellectual property and competition policy, joins to podcast to discuss Innovation and Competition policy, and the <a href="https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/CPI-Gilbert.pdf" target="_blank">underrated remedy of compulsory licensing</a>. </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#31: Innovation and Competition Policy</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/54ffb1ef-9a48-4608-b951-b5ee4d932145/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:07:28</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Rich Gilbert, author of Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy the Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economics, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,  one of the drafters of the 1995 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, and a leading scholar on innovation, intellectual property and competition policy, joins to podcast to discuss Innovation and Competition policy, and the underrated remedy of compulsory licensing. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Rich Gilbert, author of Innovation Matters: Competition Policy for the High-Technology Economy the Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General For Economics, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice,  one of the drafters of the 1995 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, and a leading scholar on innovation, intellectual property and competition policy, joins to podcast to discuss Innovation and Competition policy, and the underrated remedy of compulsory licensing. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>31</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#30: Block Chain, Algorithms, and Digital Platforms: Using Computer Science to Improve Antitrust</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Bilal speaks with Giovanna Massarotto, Academic Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law, regarding how computer science technologies can help improve and strengthen antitrust enforcement.  Bilal and Giovanna also discuss how antitrust settlements can improve innovation.</p><p><strong>Links</strong></p><p><a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/bio/" target="_blank">Giovanna Massarotto bio page</a></p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/2025/3/25/5191297.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECYaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCCj%2BFWcjVnBJlu1OFwem0x5vGtpvyEqL4xe7gd19m5HwIgOeqCQdpIZqKVxLihxAG%2BrFkx4iarTpzWc1stvnlDp6kqxgUI7%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDA9osjCHBJPxogoxnyqaBYT15%2FSOmD6hCXMs71Jg9gBw9k45iEjIxlZ0maCR5O%2BhzRDuNiEIyAmhI2%2BIL8iVzVRLvwWBWJzXT3HbRSXCs4%2FSYOrMXTYJ8fn2Szz4XCOnKNfadq3lLUNuHLQ3VfgdakiA4dfK1YLoIfBCHO8uT6dRC9Sh9MHQwjmL%2FYBgDCw4SJ%2FwQfX7OZxvpG8zQPuVa%2Bq43LBBsvAfHmDdpK8aj62aJD%2By%2FIKj9m%2BmZJdhVtndaopzZbbseyWio%2F0V%2BUn9WVq4OBAzK058Xmmgy3Up%2FwfEbnCMOgvq9frWdPa9JhEuYP3sY5Y%2BRpNk%2FDtK%2BdCSF%2F5%2BtHA2wZaImYvMqErVOdOzlX2bOgSyN64uMFTpAJLpsKQDIOACpF6beUQxHaTj3Gs%2FEHaCnTRV2MpErUdFzLvwfSByptDc7oxiCJdepPWyhZq0JztSTVTuwEpBylP3PEyzphRBYm8uQHFITVwyoYHqsiL39wSapqumi%2Br3kGp3wTnXIThWQHl0ANi9N1h%2F8pIbvQUTnhTeJy%2BJaFIBWr1YrFe%2FDSkbyI8voYy0SCUH9A5YDbo%2BwKcIT3%2BIH0fHNGT4LqSzg%2FSQfzgH5PcQjGyvnSTBX2FrCTx8AeJEYXA7JmVBKyg3EYyxjUXKb4w7AmPmFodtboWApo2AZP5XBQQAI00sZ%2BD2o8tWz73y97NlpaiBF7h8AG9sRQ9RJdCZmz2uiJFQnuYoxnWcy%2Bczv9%2BuFqr6dFIVXQOOy918dA4ivvCTZwrk1wsCSSGwrd6%2B4hqmObd6MgOe%2BOMlLG9axmHsJCU8IvTK7uIrsSNVpuvA%2F8UFznuCkO25H1xijxFlMd2crGSDRAA%2BfUfbq2zC5T%2BkdnCp69h9%2Fe9WxytWcuubBDMAuzu5iXCsSTCn0%2FbBBjqxAQXVMo7lQkd5QQP2x7ftXEzqVm7KRUjr5Sa5sgdKTzi7d1qvccvfbja24fabJj1U3wlSOiywGLBOa%2B%2FQQmTyEJDV0wmEueresPo8iM7DZq1l14IUqHhRFdlaf8r3x1S246hycliweg5%2B%2F3HVdqeK4TlhlGp4GWze%2BF8RlqVPDo8a0mMthx2bH%2Fj2n%2BvU5pJFEKXuvy4Vpjsp5yt6ZO0YpxxDq5Fiv3VDWkVnyWJbpttYFw%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250602T144125Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWE3Z5AVWI2%2F20250602%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=ebee8f9527a92099a0aedb153848efe9c8c691ce9d2fe8ba90e92e0cee1eee99&abstractId=5191297" target="_blank">Detecting Algorithmic Collusion</a> (2025)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/2025/3/28/5021134.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECYaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCqkDFFM%2Fv6mkvGK0EWBs5jtcEd20rqLUodt4k%2Bab40igIhAPzU6hjL7d87LVBdGGn5bi4vlh8svLtaU6JDtqeMUo5JKsUFCO7%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3IgxGxnRV9yYCH4f6dU0qmQVldyb9M5PR5P4cNpoImDNxMQm%2FYmN1bXqOz4dfxo7vbbyv8XgFlMgyvkMaqL4gJtzXJfVtaGhFMyXRe5N3GqCTkz%2BIgEkkAenA2LoLafWQg29IpuXGjDyeEzfqDZ8EBZgo7bVHJLMkIofQ31TFP%2FcVe0Yz22V%2F65y5WpmPeshuVwhpHNK0rvfBGL9SGqBtsY3wQmdeV2u4l0QVPeuEDYLJqLUdUqOloTiD7EMF3kwT3oxcoqDcpqgSuyerN7fvDZ70vlGXa%2BCMjRxd%2F2bksKwAZt5pbQ97mM2djb%2FJXjdeGR7FroPXBshL3Z2yk1SrnbUDtYE4fX7QECWW%2Bsz3XZvUQpIru0fTSuaRj2UDlWoat7Aihg913Mt9aeBjg7pLqHUn6mHnX65PwK4yu6LDqc86%2BNCcdv6DcSsF3%2FgdebXgOH%2F2Ch8c3d2Bz4%2FqMPOmHjG76WnvxewbOR%2B1Tm15bVR3JbrvRkhhwNwZbrmUOvmycgUTHuZ0SEfS%2BKtnN6rqrg8jLeIQeNdSmfyRP4fyf%2FluZ4Pmv9GQ4e3%2F0A%2BkuANm0qQb%2BZlde%2FmHe4m3fzeHyzIBunb4hVfNyt%2FuyNsDMLUQ8tFATE%2F674qhaT4y4tARVTwt7p%2B68F1%2BXkH7ICqdU7KZ3a30QJ6GGRqq9AQ%2BZsYNPObrhlmZWp2n2GNfrn%2FeOfzVJQTXcI%2BYaYOmwOnL4ZzszxRFd%2BIewMTdyOECu7cbzW8L0WkqnVIWR1EVO%2FEHbdxAf%2B2F%2BSPR215l3LAIrAVf559lvSOZXK1Hjm3Jcb%2FdorxRA2Pr4qq9syS9cJadZgHvICitEAieQLI%2BoEVg4jwTmQFPcoGdoXCVecTlJCl4Y%2FVC6E5mPY0m5cTR2jo71Ap4gRmGl%2F2vKzDiyvbBBjqwAdpHSvxmX20V7MtnAhXe1iLOWl9%2FyMPkan1bMP2DsTSjGCEDw%2FVeY6tFYjelOxEM%2FEEFuGJxDX%2BKXog4MT%2ByjMWuii3z7Z7zYF3nBv0NuQuSBsEiv01fttJAin5kYNlLjOAaPYpZK21ofT%2B0UskKh1hR5HbxmFg7Y2%2Fxeobz%2BUiR6x7vLEbRaw3oHmTVEETbv2ViiUH2DDXfmBzo3hUMXttggvq5cu2jvQHHkOK4g1RO&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250602T144241Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWE4VGVUWQX%2F20250602%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=7590b24a7e9b8667512eedbf5e0f6a3b05c9e6bbcd07af320ad39c0f2c8fc4fb&abstractId=5021134" target="_blank">Regulating Tech Titans</a> (2025)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/04/10/driving-innovation-with-antitrust/" target="_blank">Driving Innovation with Antitrust</a> (2024)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto & Christopher Yoo, <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=jli" target="_blank">Antitrust at a Crossroads:  The Challenge of Digital Platforms</a> (2024)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto,  <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jbl/vol25/iss3/2/" target="_blank">Can Blockchain Technologies Resolve the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Problem</a> (2023)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/book/" target="_blank">Antitrust Settlements: How a Simple Agreement Can Drive the Economy</a> (2019)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 3 Jun 2025 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/30-block-chain-algorithms-and-digital-platforms-using-computer-science-to-improve-antitrust-lzn_62uj</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this episode, Bilal speaks with Giovanna Massarotto, Academic Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation & Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law, regarding how computer science technologies can help improve and strengthen antitrust enforcement.  Bilal and Giovanna also discuss how antitrust settlements can improve innovation.</p><p><strong>Links</strong></p><p><a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/bio/" target="_blank">Giovanna Massarotto bio page</a></p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/2025/3/25/5191297.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECYaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQCCj%2BFWcjVnBJlu1OFwem0x5vGtpvyEqL4xe7gd19m5HwIgOeqCQdpIZqKVxLihxAG%2BrFkx4iarTpzWc1stvnlDp6kqxgUI7%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDA9osjCHBJPxogoxnyqaBYT15%2FSOmD6hCXMs71Jg9gBw9k45iEjIxlZ0maCR5O%2BhzRDuNiEIyAmhI2%2BIL8iVzVRLvwWBWJzXT3HbRSXCs4%2FSYOrMXTYJ8fn2Szz4XCOnKNfadq3lLUNuHLQ3VfgdakiA4dfK1YLoIfBCHO8uT6dRC9Sh9MHQwjmL%2FYBgDCw4SJ%2FwQfX7OZxvpG8zQPuVa%2Bq43LBBsvAfHmDdpK8aj62aJD%2By%2FIKj9m%2BmZJdhVtndaopzZbbseyWio%2F0V%2BUn9WVq4OBAzK058Xmmgy3Up%2FwfEbnCMOgvq9frWdPa9JhEuYP3sY5Y%2BRpNk%2FDtK%2BdCSF%2F5%2BtHA2wZaImYvMqErVOdOzlX2bOgSyN64uMFTpAJLpsKQDIOACpF6beUQxHaTj3Gs%2FEHaCnTRV2MpErUdFzLvwfSByptDc7oxiCJdepPWyhZq0JztSTVTuwEpBylP3PEyzphRBYm8uQHFITVwyoYHqsiL39wSapqumi%2Br3kGp3wTnXIThWQHl0ANi9N1h%2F8pIbvQUTnhTeJy%2BJaFIBWr1YrFe%2FDSkbyI8voYy0SCUH9A5YDbo%2BwKcIT3%2BIH0fHNGT4LqSzg%2FSQfzgH5PcQjGyvnSTBX2FrCTx8AeJEYXA7JmVBKyg3EYyxjUXKb4w7AmPmFodtboWApo2AZP5XBQQAI00sZ%2BD2o8tWz73y97NlpaiBF7h8AG9sRQ9RJdCZmz2uiJFQnuYoxnWcy%2Bczv9%2BuFqr6dFIVXQOOy918dA4ivvCTZwrk1wsCSSGwrd6%2B4hqmObd6MgOe%2BOMlLG9axmHsJCU8IvTK7uIrsSNVpuvA%2F8UFznuCkO25H1xijxFlMd2crGSDRAA%2BfUfbq2zC5T%2BkdnCp69h9%2Fe9WxytWcuubBDMAuzu5iXCsSTCn0%2FbBBjqxAQXVMo7lQkd5QQP2x7ftXEzqVm7KRUjr5Sa5sgdKTzi7d1qvccvfbja24fabJj1U3wlSOiywGLBOa%2B%2FQQmTyEJDV0wmEueresPo8iM7DZq1l14IUqHhRFdlaf8r3x1S246hycliweg5%2B%2F3HVdqeK4TlhlGp4GWze%2BF8RlqVPDo8a0mMthx2bH%2Fj2n%2BvU5pJFEKXuvy4Vpjsp5yt6ZO0YpxxDq5Fiv3VDWkVnyWJbpttYFw%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250602T144125Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWE3Z5AVWI2%2F20250602%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=ebee8f9527a92099a0aedb153848efe9c8c691ce9d2fe8ba90e92e0cee1eee99&abstractId=5191297" target="_blank">Detecting Algorithmic Collusion</a> (2025)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/2025/3/28/5021134.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjECYaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQCqkDFFM%2Fv6mkvGK0EWBs5jtcEd20rqLUodt4k%2Bab40igIhAPzU6hjL7d87LVBdGGn5bi4vlh8svLtaU6JDtqeMUo5JKsUFCO7%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3IgxGxnRV9yYCH4f6dU0qmQVldyb9M5PR5P4cNpoImDNxMQm%2FYmN1bXqOz4dfxo7vbbyv8XgFlMgyvkMaqL4gJtzXJfVtaGhFMyXRe5N3GqCTkz%2BIgEkkAenA2LoLafWQg29IpuXGjDyeEzfqDZ8EBZgo7bVHJLMkIofQ31TFP%2FcVe0Yz22V%2F65y5WpmPeshuVwhpHNK0rvfBGL9SGqBtsY3wQmdeV2u4l0QVPeuEDYLJqLUdUqOloTiD7EMF3kwT3oxcoqDcpqgSuyerN7fvDZ70vlGXa%2BCMjRxd%2F2bksKwAZt5pbQ97mM2djb%2FJXjdeGR7FroPXBshL3Z2yk1SrnbUDtYE4fX7QECWW%2Bsz3XZvUQpIru0fTSuaRj2UDlWoat7Aihg913Mt9aeBjg7pLqHUn6mHnX65PwK4yu6LDqc86%2BNCcdv6DcSsF3%2FgdebXgOH%2F2Ch8c3d2Bz4%2FqMPOmHjG76WnvxewbOR%2B1Tm15bVR3JbrvRkhhwNwZbrmUOvmycgUTHuZ0SEfS%2BKtnN6rqrg8jLeIQeNdSmfyRP4fyf%2FluZ4Pmv9GQ4e3%2F0A%2BkuANm0qQb%2BZlde%2FmHe4m3fzeHyzIBunb4hVfNyt%2FuyNsDMLUQ8tFATE%2F674qhaT4y4tARVTwt7p%2B68F1%2BXkH7ICqdU7KZ3a30QJ6GGRqq9AQ%2BZsYNPObrhlmZWp2n2GNfrn%2FeOfzVJQTXcI%2BYaYOmwOnL4ZzszxRFd%2BIewMTdyOECu7cbzW8L0WkqnVIWR1EVO%2FEHbdxAf%2B2F%2BSPR215l3LAIrAVf559lvSOZXK1Hjm3Jcb%2FdorxRA2Pr4qq9syS9cJadZgHvICitEAieQLI%2BoEVg4jwTmQFPcoGdoXCVecTlJCl4Y%2FVC6E5mPY0m5cTR2jo71Ap4gRmGl%2F2vKzDiyvbBBjqwAdpHSvxmX20V7MtnAhXe1iLOWl9%2FyMPkan1bMP2DsTSjGCEDw%2FVeY6tFYjelOxEM%2FEEFuGJxDX%2BKXog4MT%2ByjMWuii3z7Z7zYF3nBv0NuQuSBsEiv01fttJAin5kYNlLjOAaPYpZK21ofT%2B0UskKh1hR5HbxmFg7Y2%2Fxeobz%2BUiR6x7vLEbRaw3oHmTVEETbv2ViiUH2DDXfmBzo3hUMXttggvq5cu2jvQHHkOK4g1RO&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250602T144241Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWE4VGVUWQX%2F20250602%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=7590b24a7e9b8667512eedbf5e0f6a3b05c9e6bbcd07af320ad39c0f2c8fc4fb&abstractId=5021134" target="_blank">Regulating Tech Titans</a> (2025)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/04/10/driving-innovation-with-antitrust/" target="_blank">Driving Innovation with Antitrust</a> (2024)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto & Christopher Yoo, <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=jli" target="_blank">Antitrust at a Crossroads:  The Challenge of Digital Platforms</a> (2024)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto,  <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jbl/vol25/iss3/2/" target="_blank">Can Blockchain Technologies Resolve the U.S. Antitrust Enforcement Problem</a> (2023)</p><p>Giovanna Massarotto, <a href="https://giovannamassarotto.com/book/" target="_blank">Antitrust Settlements: How a Simple Agreement Can Drive the Economy</a> (2019)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#30: Block Chain, Algorithms, and Digital Platforms: Using Computer Science to Improve Antitrust</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>01:53:58</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In this episode, Bilal speaks with Giovanna Massarotto, Academic Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation &amp; Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law, regarding how computer science technologies can help improve and strengthen antitrust enforcement.  Bilal and Giovanna also discuss how antitrust settlements can improve innovation. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In this episode, Bilal speaks with Giovanna Massarotto, Academic Fellow at the Center for Technology, Innovation &amp; Competition (CTIC) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law, regarding how computer science technologies can help improve and strengthen antitrust enforcement.  Bilal and Giovanna also discuss how antitrust settlements can improve innovation. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>29: The Original FTC and Humphrey’s Executor</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Eli Nachmany joins the podcast to discuss his forthcoming article, The Original FTC, and its relevance to President Trump’s purported firing of FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya.  </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/n/eli-nachmany">Eli Nachmany bio</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5145227">The Original FTC </a></p><p><a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/episodes/402-can-trump-fire-ftc-commissioners-at-will">Tech Policy Podcast 402: Can Trump Fire FTC Commissioners at Will?</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 23 May 2025 13:48:52 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/29-the-original-ftc-and-humphreys-executor-Gl1R6rZb</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eli Nachmany joins the podcast to discuss his forthcoming article, The Original FTC, and its relevance to President Trump’s purported firing of FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya.  </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/n/eli-nachmany">Eli Nachmany bio</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5145227">The Original FTC </a></p><p><a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/episodes/402-can-trump-fire-ftc-commissioners-at-will">Tech Policy Podcast 402: Can Trump Fire FTC Commissioners at Will?</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>29: The Original FTC and Humphrey’s Executor</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/7778fbc0-23d9-4900-af0c-af460b97e3b4/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:24:56</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Eli Nachmany joins the podcast to discuss his forthcoming article, The Original FTC, and its relevance to President Trump’s purported firing of FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya.  

Links:

Eli Nachmany bio (https://tinyurl.com/yas3auda)

The Original FTC (https://tinyurl.com/29denu4e)

Tech Policy Podcast 402: Can Trump Fire FTC Commissioners at Will? (https://tinyurl.com/5fuzk7m8)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Eli Nachmany joins the podcast to discuss his forthcoming article, The Original FTC, and its relevance to President Trump’s purported firing of FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya.  

Links:

Eli Nachmany bio (https://tinyurl.com/yas3auda)

The Original FTC (https://tinyurl.com/29denu4e)

Tech Policy Podcast 402: Can Trump Fire FTC Commissioners at Will? (https://tinyurl.com/5fuzk7m8)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>29</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#28: Clarifying the 2023 Merger Guidelines</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://jasandford.com/" target="_blank">Jeremy Sanford</a>, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, formerly of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics and presently at <a href="https://econicpartners.com/" target="_blank">Econic Partners, LLC</a> join the podcast to discuss areas where the 2023 Merger Guidelines could be clarified, without the significant rewrite that the Trump Administration <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ferguson-memo-re-merger-guidelines.pdf" target="_blank">FTC</a> and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1389861/dl?inline" target="_blank">DOJ</a> leadership have indicated is not forthcoming.</p><p>Links:</p><p>Jeremy Sandford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/24/01/03/ssrn_id4678561_code2568284.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEKj%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQDdHCw9DMVQEuDifNZx%2BmROl%2FQaYTToD8ygh6pQGcsrswIhALivsYnNmnynh5zghKK2oAdTQofZgvZ1u%2Ft42cmNMGHzKr0FCFAQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3Igy4g%2B8RNMl6zGJHhoEqmgXBQgrKagrQ7D87LZuZodk8qvWXZq1fHWo7PxZsGVd6tsyL1aJp5Tnqea%2Fe%2F4GR7p3QdpOfB59g%2B8lABu3XSQsYoRmsVvcQBteYnUwlxfM7XnvU3y2wBZQi3o3n5IVufsm7DF%2B0hEFqwPV2AIe6pTSQe9jgXJauA3A4Tm1e%2FCTXwMR22vZR71Tb%2FHF%2FWwzF4MXmGOwsGlxgLufGLz%2FYwAUFeZnO9GjLmrDU2cDEz6XsZNyiXXQUQyDr0Ez4sKi9kHZuFNTTc%2B0sOm8%2Fxy%2BH0lb%2FVaM2GhQQl37vb8ZgdkJJzuE75UZ30Ta%2BPoTSxRC291Wwcs%2BoOJCVcCUek843VWZssnGyISG92RklymOedob8TEELt64eMPL7CvppnEEpWPSZmuacCbKE%2FtNSOYPLAbN01Ws4fkMqdgzUsasScMpdHCv6XCpRBby4RE68bH9TNR6TcFq8uuP92XA4oAJMh%2Bu%2ByYjNgCnklTGrCtBM3AYvwA1FCWWSVI9uzyM4LJ49aV4o1ZDHiGPM7uHIOG2naUc948M9Kyy4KFfdxFiWBFyDVLOF1AnDz28UQebVb572gs0JPZfUhL4kuKvB42qdY5LqWQfFaoMzWe%2FIXz1YvqkOzvCgLuUKAds3oU362i%2B%2FQaldU%2F%2BSj3yTtGDI6dMdr0gVqMuAjh7QAoNjTrgSiR6cIp3Z1Jq0TF%2Bl%2BKG5tkdQ3wTohOR3GMAqv67NJWKaHlNQHjTHrytjMIeQcnlo9fsWPGIyk1fvquhRQ38%2FP64e%2FADxx1Z8b9yoaNbgo9jXJAei%2BwsONvy54zx8vSrrAsR%2BhTYKYENugoq8ev%2BLHeyMU0WD1g4C%2By2XhPYQXOhtGwjwtcKwJJeaJmvJf1cP2dWryOXfxLGijhvQlL4wk7LqwAY6sAHkrY%2BcdkpMQJbc3iwt97IE3mx%2FxN0P%2BR%2BnJIuyfM6bDy6FbDrCV67%2B0zoPpub3Z5bHXqMHqBe%2B0RJAFG5fFCwiWTZlc3G8G1T18uP2tq6POOGahPnJwtpngjsXaUYkisf%2FrAK0%2Bydw8dkXt%2BnlVV1C5BqkAC7r4%2B9pBNxzR0ngLG9Lmt65jiq9%2Bq5vRnvO%2F67m0wvaMoOVNcDWYEPBWA%2FrKePDl8Y%2F4oVK%2FDXg9ZDoTg%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250507T001102Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEV44LVDOX%2F20250507%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=3f4c2e93c19d85d175e7ae47058aaaa2c4925aacae92a23afab2dd2b2ef9b5e2&abstractId=4678561" target="_blank">Economics in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: Three Areas of Concern</a> (Jan. 2024)</p><p>Jeremy Sandford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/source/2025/february/common-ground-political-football.pdf" target="_blank">Common Ground or Political Football: The Role of Guidelines in Merger Analysis</a>, Antitrust Source (Feb. 2025)</p><p>TechFreedom, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Comments-on-ACCC-Draft-Merger-Assessment-Guidelines.pdf" target="_blank">Comments on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines</a>, Australian Competition Commission (Apr. 2025)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 7 May 2025 13:49:55 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/28-clarifying-the-2023-merger-guidelines-t_k84qwf</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://jasandford.com/" target="_blank">Jeremy Sanford</a>, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, formerly of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics and presently at <a href="https://econicpartners.com/" target="_blank">Econic Partners, LLC</a> join the podcast to discuss areas where the 2023 Merger Guidelines could be clarified, without the significant rewrite that the Trump Administration <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/ferguson-memo-re-merger-guidelines.pdf" target="_blank">FTC</a> and <a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/media/1389861/dl?inline" target="_blank">DOJ</a> leadership have indicated is not forthcoming.</p><p>Links:</p><p>Jeremy Sandford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/24/01/03/ssrn_id4678561_code2568284.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjEKj%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJIMEYCIQDdHCw9DMVQEuDifNZx%2BmROl%2FQaYTToD8ygh6pQGcsrswIhALivsYnNmnynh5zghKK2oAdTQofZgvZ1u%2Ft42cmNMGHzKr0FCFAQBBoMMzA4NDc1MzAxMjU3Igy4g%2B8RNMl6zGJHhoEqmgXBQgrKagrQ7D87LZuZodk8qvWXZq1fHWo7PxZsGVd6tsyL1aJp5Tnqea%2Fe%2F4GR7p3QdpOfB59g%2B8lABu3XSQsYoRmsVvcQBteYnUwlxfM7XnvU3y2wBZQi3o3n5IVufsm7DF%2B0hEFqwPV2AIe6pTSQe9jgXJauA3A4Tm1e%2FCTXwMR22vZR71Tb%2FHF%2FWwzF4MXmGOwsGlxgLufGLz%2FYwAUFeZnO9GjLmrDU2cDEz6XsZNyiXXQUQyDr0Ez4sKi9kHZuFNTTc%2B0sOm8%2Fxy%2BH0lb%2FVaM2GhQQl37vb8ZgdkJJzuE75UZ30Ta%2BPoTSxRC291Wwcs%2BoOJCVcCUek843VWZssnGyISG92RklymOedob8TEELt64eMPL7CvppnEEpWPSZmuacCbKE%2FtNSOYPLAbN01Ws4fkMqdgzUsasScMpdHCv6XCpRBby4RE68bH9TNR6TcFq8uuP92XA4oAJMh%2Bu%2ByYjNgCnklTGrCtBM3AYvwA1FCWWSVI9uzyM4LJ49aV4o1ZDHiGPM7uHIOG2naUc948M9Kyy4KFfdxFiWBFyDVLOF1AnDz28UQebVb572gs0JPZfUhL4kuKvB42qdY5LqWQfFaoMzWe%2FIXz1YvqkOzvCgLuUKAds3oU362i%2B%2FQaldU%2F%2BSj3yTtGDI6dMdr0gVqMuAjh7QAoNjTrgSiR6cIp3Z1Jq0TF%2Bl%2BKG5tkdQ3wTohOR3GMAqv67NJWKaHlNQHjTHrytjMIeQcnlo9fsWPGIyk1fvquhRQ38%2FP64e%2FADxx1Z8b9yoaNbgo9jXJAei%2BwsONvy54zx8vSrrAsR%2BhTYKYENugoq8ev%2BLHeyMU0WD1g4C%2By2XhPYQXOhtGwjwtcKwJJeaJmvJf1cP2dWryOXfxLGijhvQlL4wk7LqwAY6sAHkrY%2BcdkpMQJbc3iwt97IE3mx%2FxN0P%2BR%2BnJIuyfM6bDy6FbDrCV67%2B0zoPpub3Z5bHXqMHqBe%2B0RJAFG5fFCwiWTZlc3G8G1T18uP2tq6POOGahPnJwtpngjsXaUYkisf%2FrAK0%2Bydw8dkXt%2BnlVV1C5BqkAC7r4%2B9pBNxzR0ngLG9Lmt65jiq9%2Bq5vRnvO%2F67m0wvaMoOVNcDWYEPBWA%2FrKePDl8Y%2F4oVK%2FDXg9ZDoTg%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250507T001102Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEV44LVDOX%2F20250507%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=3f4c2e93c19d85d175e7ae47058aaaa2c4925aacae92a23afab2dd2b2ef9b5e2&abstractId=4678561" target="_blank">Economics in the 2023 Merger Guidelines: Three Areas of Concern</a> (Jan. 2024)</p><p>Jeremy Sandford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust/source/2025/february/common-ground-political-football.pdf" target="_blank">Common Ground or Political Football: The Role of Guidelines in Merger Analysis</a>, Antitrust Source (Feb. 2025)</p><p>TechFreedom, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Comments-on-ACCC-Draft-Merger-Assessment-Guidelines.pdf" target="_blank">Comments on the Draft Merger Assessment Guidelines</a>, Australian Competition Commission (Apr. 2025)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="72223521" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/529b47dd-02d6-4625-9dfa-d3f829089b07/audio/a2d55852-2424-4410-ae4a-6aee1790932b/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#28: Clarifying the 2023 Merger Guidelines</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/5ad01da5-0b3d-4f22-a913-e46ba4319948/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:15:00</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Jeremy Sanford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, formerly of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics and presently at Econic Partners, LLC join the podcast to discuss areas where the 2023 Merger Guidelines could be clarified, without the significant rewrite that the Trump Administration FTC and DOJ leadership have indicated is not forthcoming.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Jeremy Sanford, Loren Smith, and Nathan Wilson, formerly of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics and presently at Econic Partners, LLC join the podcast to discuss areas where the 2023 Merger Guidelines could be clarified, without the significant rewrite that the Trump Administration FTC and DOJ leadership have indicated is not forthcoming.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>28</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">5a8a9e00-3c76-4494-b0f7-8022afa09375</guid>
      <title>#27: Are Health Care Markets Competitive?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Improving competition in health care markets was a priority of the first Trump administration and it is likely to be a priority of the second Trump administration. Martin (Marty) Gaynor (Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 2013-2014, Special Advisor to AAG Jonathan Kanter, DOJ, 2024) joins the podcast to discuss the state of competition in health care markets, recent FTC and DOJ health care initiatives and offers suggestions for new initiatives. I call for a new set of Health Care hearings, to update the multi-day, multi-issue (and apolitical) effort initiated by the FTC and DOJ in 2003 (including a new report on Health Care Competition).   </p><p>Links:</p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.heinz.cmu.edu/faculty-research/profiles/gaynor-martins">Marty Gaynor</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf">Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2002)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/health-care-competition-law-policy-hearings/completeagenda.pdf">Agenda for Joint FTC/DOJ Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy</a> (2003)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf">Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition</a> (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice) 2004</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf">Emerging Health Care Issues:  Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2009)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf">Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions</a> (Federal Trade Commission Staff Study) (2010)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.pdf">Authorized Generic Drug:  Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2011)</p><p><a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Reforming_Americas_Healthcare_System_Through_Choice_and_Competition.pdf">Reforming America’s Healthcare System Through Choice and Competition</a> (U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor) (2018)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2025 12:52:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/27-are-health-care-markets-competitive-avxocp7U</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Improving competition in health care markets was a priority of the first Trump administration and it is likely to be a priority of the second Trump administration. Martin (Marty) Gaynor (Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 2013-2014, Special Advisor to AAG Jonathan Kanter, DOJ, 2024) joins the podcast to discuss the state of competition in health care markets, recent FTC and DOJ health care initiatives and offers suggestions for new initiatives. I call for a new set of Health Care hearings, to update the multi-day, multi-issue (and apolitical) effort initiated by the FTC and DOJ in 2003 (including a new report on Health Care Competition).   </p><p>Links:</p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.heinz.cmu.edu/faculty-research/profiles/gaynor-martins">Marty Gaynor</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf">Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2002)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/health-care-competition-law-policy-hearings/completeagenda.pdf">Agenda for Joint FTC/DOJ Hearings on Health Care and Competition Law and Policy</a> (2003)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/improving-health-care-dose-competition-report-federal-trade-commission-and-department-justice/040723healthcarerpt.pdf">Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition</a> (Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice) 2004</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf">Emerging Health Care Issues:  Follow-On Biologic Drug Competition</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2009)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf">Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions</a> (Federal Trade Commission Staff Study) (2010)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.pdf">Authorized Generic Drug:  Short-Term Effects and Long-Term Impact</a> (Federal Trade Commission) (2011)</p><p><a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Reforming_Americas_Healthcare_System_Through_Choice_and_Competition.pdf">Reforming America’s Healthcare System Through Choice and Competition</a> (U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and Labor) (2018)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#27: Are Health Care Markets Competitive?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/1681a5f0-63fa-4483-a8cc-b622aac97f38/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:39:08</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Improving competition in health care markets was a priority of the first Trump administration and it is likely to be a priority of the second Trump administration. Martin (Marty) Gaynor (Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 2013-2014, Special Advisor to AAG Jonathan Kanter, DOJ, 2024) joins the podcast to discuss the state of competition in health care markets, recent FTC and DOJ health care initiatives and offers suggestions for new initiatives. I call for a new set of Health Care hearings, to update the multi-day, multi-issue (and apolitical) effort initiated by the FTC and DOJ in 2003 (including a new report on Health Care Competition).   </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Improving competition in health care markets was a priority of the first Trump administration and it is likely to be a priority of the second Trump administration. Martin (Marty) Gaynor (Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 2013-2014, Special Advisor to AAG Jonathan Kanter, DOJ, 2024) joins the podcast to discuss the state of competition in health care markets, recent FTC and DOJ health care initiatives and offers suggestions for new initiatives. I call for a new set of Health Care hearings, to update the multi-day, multi-issue (and apolitical) effort initiated by the FTC and DOJ in 2003 (including a new report on Health Care Competition).   </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#26: The CMA Adopts a Growth Agenda: Is this New?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Andrea Coscelli, former CEO of the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority joins the podcast to discuss the Labor Government’s intention to redirect the CMA’s enforcement and policy agenda towards growth.  What does it mean for competition enforcement?  And wasn’t the CMA always supportive of economic growth?</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 22 Apr 2025 12:47:44 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/26-the-cma-adopts-a-growth-agenda-is-this-new-YgAjNHEy</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Andrea Coscelli, former CEO of the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority joins the podcast to discuss the Labor Government’s intention to redirect the CMA’s enforcement and policy agenda towards growth.  What does it mean for competition enforcement?  And wasn’t the CMA always supportive of economic growth?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#26: The CMA Adopts a Growth Agenda: Is this New?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>01:08:28</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Andrea Coscelli, former CEO of the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority joins the podcast to discuss the Labor Government’s intention to redirect the CMA’s enforcement and policy agenda towards growth.  What does it mean for competition enforcement?  And wasn’t the CMA always supportive of economic growth?</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Andrea Coscelli, former CEO of the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority joins the podcast to discuss the Labor Government’s intention to redirect the CMA’s enforcement and policy agenda towards growth.  What does it mean for competition enforcement?  And wasn’t the CMA always supportive of economic growth?</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>26</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#25 The Foundational Document for President Biden’s Antitrust Agenda:</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Executive Order 14036, <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-14/pdf/2021-15069.pdf"><i>Promoting Competition in the American Economy</i></a> (July 9, 2021) set forth a plan to challenge practices and regulations the Biden Administration believed limited the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.  It substantially expanded President Obama’s Executive Order 13725, <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-04-20/pdf/2016-09346.pdf"><i>Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy</i></a> (April 15, 2016). <a href="https://www.economicliberties.us/hannah-garden-monheit/">Hannah Garden-Monheit</a>, most recently the Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, joins the podcast to discuss implementation of Executive Order 14036 and whether it will (and should) have an impact beyond the Biden Administration.<br /> <br />Links</p><p>Carl Shapiro, Ali Yurukoglu, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32762/w32762.pdf">Trends in Competition in the United States: What Does the Evidence Show?</a> (NBER Working Paper 32762) (Aug. 2024)</p><p><a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/19/fact-sheet-white-house-competition-council-announces-new-actions-to-lower-costs-and-marks-second-anniversary-of-president-bidens-executive-order-on-competition/">White House Competition Council Announces New Actions to Lower Costs and Marks Second Anniversary of President Biden’s Executive Order on Competition</a> (July 19, 2023).</p><p>FTC Commissioner Christine S. Wilson, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1589376/wilson-oecd-2020-remarks.pdf">Competition Policy: Time for a Reset?</a> (Dec. 7, 2020). </p><p>Joseph E. Stiglitz, <a href="https://business.columbia.edu/sites/default/files-efs/imce-uploads/Joseph_Stiglitz/Towards_a_Broader_View_of_Competition_Policy.pdf">Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy</a> (2017)</p><p>FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/982433/ohlhausen_-_does_the_us_economy_lack_competition_8-30-16.pdf">Does the U.S. Economy Lack Competition</a> (2016)</p><p>Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf">Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power </a>(April 2016)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 7 Apr 2025 11:36:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/25-analyzing-bidens-executive-order-on-economic-policy-ofX2lt1b</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Executive Order 14036, <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-07-14/pdf/2021-15069.pdf"><i>Promoting Competition in the American Economy</i></a> (July 9, 2021) set forth a plan to challenge practices and regulations the Biden Administration believed limited the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.  It substantially expanded President Obama’s Executive Order 13725, <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-04-20/pdf/2016-09346.pdf"><i>Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy</i></a> (April 15, 2016). <a href="https://www.economicliberties.us/hannah-garden-monheit/">Hannah Garden-Monheit</a>, most recently the Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, joins the podcast to discuss implementation of Executive Order 14036 and whether it will (and should) have an impact beyond the Biden Administration.<br /> <br />Links</p><p>Carl Shapiro, Ali Yurukoglu, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w32762/w32762.pdf">Trends in Competition in the United States: What Does the Evidence Show?</a> (NBER Working Paper 32762) (Aug. 2024)</p><p><a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/07/19/fact-sheet-white-house-competition-council-announces-new-actions-to-lower-costs-and-marks-second-anniversary-of-president-bidens-executive-order-on-competition/">White House Competition Council Announces New Actions to Lower Costs and Marks Second Anniversary of President Biden’s Executive Order on Competition</a> (July 19, 2023).</p><p>FTC Commissioner Christine S. Wilson, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1589376/wilson-oecd-2020-remarks.pdf">Competition Policy: Time for a Reset?</a> (Dec. 7, 2020). </p><p>Joseph E. Stiglitz, <a href="https://business.columbia.edu/sites/default/files-efs/imce-uploads/Joseph_Stiglitz/Towards_a_Broader_View_of_Competition_Policy.pdf">Towards a Broader View of Competition Policy</a> (2017)</p><p>FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/982433/ohlhausen_-_does_the_us_economy_lack_competition_8-30-16.pdf">Does the U.S. Economy Lack Competition</a> (2016)</p><p>Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief, <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf">Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power </a>(April 2016)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#25 The Foundational Document for President Biden’s Antitrust Agenda:</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>01:07:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Executive Order 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021) set forth a plan to challenge practices and regulations the Biden Administration believed limited the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. It substantially expanded President Obama’s Executive Order 13725, Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy (April 15, 2016). Hannah Garden- Monheit , most recently the Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, joins the podcast to discuss implementation of Executive Order 14036 and whether it will (and should) have an impact beyond the Biden Administration.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Executive Order 14036, Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021) set forth a plan to challenge practices and regulations the Biden Administration believed limited the competitiveness of the U.S. economy. It substantially expanded President Obama’s Executive Order 13725, Steps to Increase Competition and Better Inform Consumers and Workers to Support Continued Growth of the American Economy (April 15, 2016). Hannah Garden- Monheit , most recently the Director of the FTC’s Office of Policy Planning, joins the podcast to discuss implementation of Executive Order 14036 and whether it will (and should) have an impact beyond the Biden Administration.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>25</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#24: Commissioner, I’m Just Not That Into You</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>President Trump has fired FTC Commissioners <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners-staff/rebecca-kelly-slaughter">Rebecca Slaughter</a> and <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners-staff/alvaro-bedoya">Alvaro Bedoya</a> for reasons unrelated to their performance.  The President’s action is clearly inconsistent with <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep295/usrep295602/usrep295602.pdf"><i>Humphrey’s Executor v. United States</i></a><i>, </i>the pillar of the administrative state, and <a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/03/26/the-ftc-firings-are-about-something-bigger-than-policy-or-personnel/?_gl=1*vs0for*_ga*MTEyMjY5OTA4MC4xNzQzMjYyMzY1*_ga_R1FRMJTK15*MTc0MzI2MjM2NC4xLjEuMTc0MzI2MjM3Mi4wLjAuMA..">is (most likely) intended to overturn</a> the limitations on the President’s power to control the “<a href="https://pitt.libguides.com/usgovinfo/independentagencies">independent agencies</a>.” Slaughter and Bedoya have <a href="https://protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Slaughter-v-Trump-Complaint.pdf">filed a lawsuit</a> to be reinstated to the Commission.  </p><p>The podcast is joined by TechFreedom’s Corbin Barthold (host of the <a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/">Tech Policy Podcast</a>) to discuss whether <i>Humphrey’s Executor</i> will be over-ruled. </p><p>Note: This episode was recorded just before the D.C. Circuit issued an <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cadc.41816/gov.uscourts.cadc.41816.01208724995.0_2.pdf">interlocutory order</a> addressing the president’s removal power as to the NLRB and the MSPB. </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/">Tech Policy Podcast</a> (TechFreedom, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/corbin-barthold-5175b470/">Corbin Barthold</a>)</p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1563&context=vlr">The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord</a> (Lauren K. Peay, 2019)</p><p><a href="https://appliedantitrust.com/13_merger_review/0_hsr_clearance/muris_statement_amc11_3_2005.pdf">Comments on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process</a>, Before the <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf">Antitrust Modernization Commission</a> (Timothy J. Muris, Nov. 2005) </p><p><a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/03/26/the-ftc-firings-are-about-something-bigger-than-policy-or-personnel/?_gl=1*vs0for*_ga*MTEyMjY5OTA4MC4xNzQzMjYyMzY1*_ga_R1FRMJTK15*MTc0MzI2MjM2NC4xLjEuMTc0MzI2MjM3Mi4wLjAuMA..">The FTC Firings Are About Something Bigger than Policy or Personnel</a> (<a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/author/jsims/">Joe Sims</a>)</p><p><a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-136/the-executive-power-of-removal/">The Executive Power of Removal</a></p><p><a href="https://www.thebulwark.com/p/will-the-supreme-court-scotus-face-down-donald-trump-or-flinch">Will the Supreme Court Face Down Trump or Flinch?</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2025 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/24-commissioner-im-just-not-that-into-you-e1xojm5h</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President Trump has fired FTC Commissioners <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners-staff/rebecca-kelly-slaughter">Rebecca Slaughter</a> and <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners-staff/alvaro-bedoya">Alvaro Bedoya</a> for reasons unrelated to their performance.  The President’s action is clearly inconsistent with <a href="https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep295/usrep295602/usrep295602.pdf"><i>Humphrey’s Executor v. United States</i></a><i>, </i>the pillar of the administrative state, and <a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/03/26/the-ftc-firings-are-about-something-bigger-than-policy-or-personnel/?_gl=1*vs0for*_ga*MTEyMjY5OTA4MC4xNzQzMjYyMzY1*_ga_R1FRMJTK15*MTc0MzI2MjM2NC4xLjEuMTc0MzI2MjM3Mi4wLjAuMA..">is (most likely) intended to overturn</a> the limitations on the President’s power to control the “<a href="https://pitt.libguides.com/usgovinfo/independentagencies">independent agencies</a>.” Slaughter and Bedoya have <a href="https://protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Slaughter-v-Trump-Complaint.pdf">filed a lawsuit</a> to be reinstated to the Commission.  </p><p>The podcast is joined by TechFreedom’s Corbin Barthold (host of the <a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/">Tech Policy Podcast</a>) to discuss whether <i>Humphrey’s Executor</i> will be over-ruled. </p><p>Note: This episode was recorded just before the D.C. Circuit issued an <a href="https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cadc.41816/gov.uscourts.cadc.41816.01208724995.0_2.pdf">interlocutory order</a> addressing the president’s removal power as to the NLRB and the MSPB. </p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/">Tech Policy Podcast</a> (TechFreedom, <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/corbin-barthold-5175b470/">Corbin Barthold</a>)</p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1563&context=vlr">The Cautionary Tale of the Failed 2002 FTC/DOJ Merger Clearance Accord</a> (Lauren K. Peay, 2019)</p><p><a href="https://appliedantitrust.com/13_merger_review/0_hsr_clearance/muris_statement_amc11_3_2005.pdf">Comments on the FTC-DOJ Clearance Process</a>, Before the <a href="https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf">Antitrust Modernization Commission</a> (Timothy J. Muris, Nov. 2005) </p><p><a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/2025/03/26/the-ftc-firings-are-about-something-bigger-than-policy-or-personnel/?_gl=1*vs0for*_ga*MTEyMjY5OTA4MC4xNzQzMjYyMzY1*_ga_R1FRMJTK15*MTc0MzI2MjM2NC4xLjEuMTc0MzI2MjM3Mi4wLjAuMA..">The FTC Firings Are About Something Bigger than Policy or Personnel</a> (<a href="https://truthonthemarket.com/author/jsims/">Joe Sims</a>)</p><p><a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/print/vol-136/the-executive-power-of-removal/">The Executive Power of Removal</a></p><p><a href="https://www.thebulwark.com/p/will-the-supreme-court-scotus-face-down-donald-trump-or-flinch">Will the Supreme Court Face Down Trump or Flinch?</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#24: Commissioner, I’m Just Not That Into You</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>00:57:57</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>President Trump has fired FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya for reasons unrelated to their performance.  The President’s action is clearly inconsistent with Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the pillar of the administrative state, and is (most likely) intended to overturn the limitations on the President’s power to control the “independent agencies.” Slaughter and Bedoya have filed a lawsuit to be reinstated to the Commission.  

The podcast is joined by TechFreedom’s Corbin Barthold (host of the Tech Policy Podcast) to discuss whether Humphrey’s Executor will be over-ruled. 

Note: This episode was recorded just before the D.C. Circuit issued an interlocutory order addressing the president’s removal power as to the NLRB and the MSPB. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>President Trump has fired FTC Commissioners Rebecca Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya for reasons unrelated to their performance.  The President’s action is clearly inconsistent with Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, the pillar of the administrative state, and is (most likely) intended to overturn the limitations on the President’s power to control the “independent agencies.” Slaughter and Bedoya have filed a lawsuit to be reinstated to the Commission.  

The podcast is joined by TechFreedom’s Corbin Barthold (host of the Tech Policy Podcast) to discuss whether Humphrey’s Executor will be over-ruled. 

Note: This episode was recorded just before the D.C. Circuit issued an interlocutory order addressing the president’s removal power as to the NLRB and the MSPB. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>24</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#23: Should the FTC Survive The Trump Administration?: A Conversation With Bill Kovacic</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.law.gwu.edu/william-e-kovacic" target="_blank">William (Bill) Kovacic</a></p><p>Willliam E. Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf" target="_blank">The Federal Trade Commission at 100:  Into our 2ndCentury</a>, January 2009</p><p>Allison Jones and William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/20/06/04/ssrn_id3619095_code1420951.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T051450Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=a43522a050cf93ec95cd22367bef70645ea2d56cb1e1b1a11e462a56e62bc856&abstractId=3619095" target="_blank">The Institutions of U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Comments for the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on Possible Competition Policy Reforms</a> (April 17, 2020)</p><p>Allison Jones and William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/21/04/08/ssrn_id3822608_code1420951.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T051757Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=54af26adf76323cf358f4ec23784750547455932b88e605c5bd1153aa5d35b29&abstractId=3537523" target="_blank">Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy</a>, 65 Antitrust Bulletin 227 (2020)</p><p>David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/16/05/26/ssrn_id2784751_code2159956.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCICv3bF5NJ9NnwZ0xJ8Dy%2BFsqOUGcPz9vZTkbuplNr40pAiEAw1ha6A1krWQJ3w0iNscHnmVp8AVGeyUPBf1s77OXJgkqxgUI%2Fv%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDPIkHLLkEuaclgUptyqaBQyujMwAkPoKhPT9ZqU%2Bpw4Z7gra3tai9xmzV5tvoxN9VBBsDqN54Umivg3Iz7oAtozwUOW9OoP5D7F9Wd%2B%2B8ybEPS55yipjAtZMGFkQb1tCSeq%2FwYLh1CIRXj3sZ05AxF82XYq1GXEVj%2FiJzJER59he8%2BuWCZ%2FoY9TYlZXpMI9EQfzPHvMlDreksZWFEKoiUmq82mwoHw5B92tIy75rRYAg42jKgMLvxYeUUJ%2F%2F0VdHyzYw8t13Yfqc5Fi2648ts1IorJyPkvZeQRpaRPMi9CEbcb7AdKm%2FJUCYaR%2FjeckNHA8LsyS7GsZ3m1Td%2BhlTxV4JIRrBZeWRCN4wh%2B7CmKz%2F2On%2BRC7C2%2B6aR5869Vn%2BtlsB4QJ45zxx2R96cVaMBiUI7rxzc50%2BmcnXUE8hNbnC%2Fb%2FKpNwE6MhHEX3LeyLz10YGgeCbsdpKSaz30ANb9PmSpk80QJMDdHJnMMEFV%2BL4wDo55InJL8ZMPwL2rQDRLzGir2zWHHKJsNdcIZkJxl7g2%2BavPbLaiqt6zjnq9Ymyzj4h748P481wGpb2JYEjUG8HkBoWo0kygKAZNjxyTufphkDndPgMCnamR%2FPz0n9OBdTJu8GjLyY6bRiW8dli4N0n9BQHhDczD63oUfXU9sSaE9%2FU0f90Fh%2FZPMbkNRRlYOI4O9%2F8sqhbVvlN4%2Bafvh7LTDfOvDqRT%2FbupDp5u0QV%2F3uSYuOjROy8h2uf%2Fa24HpvPzPLj%2FmT3N5rrjdnbZtrlRD2%2F7Ogck5EK0mA7o4liYjLyOq5nykuzmzDhSw%2F%2BOPcR6cCP6y5NYmdba4LAYdnPtYEaqilavXTzl%2BcbYf4FCqmj%2FXaPtHL1tiPON6QEN3qyiALSCmkyyyPptMTu9bnQ%2FjuJ2CYJRzCZjNS%2BBjqxAXRQsjGr%2F8TU1Lkzy4c8PC8aAdmHszMFWKNdqOFkzFSXbJDkjhCBcz0EQvb0kq%2FQi7tO9D%2FM4gFg813COY9ndTEAibFIfHFmihnZ5fZAMlWFe1JiXOMyA8Ji97lvUcn4XUxS6VuJpPZPrdwsrHBTV%2BQ9A7ZEvgRcuFjz9BOB1u%2BFsdZusuRnFg2i630uWOiNi%2Bs9qrE4%2FYZFZNRzDDw63AreXsWBp8%2FU5fSYIcSuVQ3ERQ%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T052033Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEQ4KGB32J%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=8f08a64447b84cf0d044afc59bbb413eba77cdd9485dd41e630f64fa1f5343a0&abstractId=2705931" target="_blank">Can’t Anyone Here Play this Game:  Judging the FTC’s Critics</a>, 83 George Washington Law Review 101 (2016)</p><p>William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/12/03/09/ssrn_id2018710_code810317.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T052456Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=922a903519eb3841cc8645164e02927bfd6a18d5322999a24edc4808649de09d&abstractId=2018710" target="_blank">Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance</a>, 16 George Mason Law Review 903 (Spring 2009)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 2025 12:52:08 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/23-should-the-ftc-survive-the-trump-administration-a-conversation-with-bill-kovacic-SyLlU4lD</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.law.gwu.edu/william-e-kovacic" target="_blank">William (Bill) Kovacic</a></p><p>Willliam E. Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/federal-trade-commission-100-our-second-century/ftc100rpt.pdf" target="_blank">The Federal Trade Commission at 100:  Into our 2ndCentury</a>, January 2009</p><p>Allison Jones and William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/20/06/04/ssrn_id3619095_code1420951.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T051450Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=a43522a050cf93ec95cd22367bef70645ea2d56cb1e1b1a11e462a56e62bc856&abstractId=3619095" target="_blank">The Institutions of U.S. Antitrust Enforcement: Comments for the U.S. House Judiciary Committee on Possible Competition Policy Reforms</a> (April 17, 2020)</p><p>Allison Jones and William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/21/04/08/ssrn_id3822608_code1420951.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T051757Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=54af26adf76323cf358f4ec23784750547455932b88e605c5bd1153aa5d35b29&abstractId=3537523" target="_blank">Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy</a>, 65 Antitrust Bulletin 227 (2020)</p><p>David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/16/05/26/ssrn_id2784751_code2159956.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCICv3bF5NJ9NnwZ0xJ8Dy%2BFsqOUGcPz9vZTkbuplNr40pAiEAw1ha6A1krWQJ3w0iNscHnmVp8AVGeyUPBf1s77OXJgkqxgUI%2Fv%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDPIkHLLkEuaclgUptyqaBQyujMwAkPoKhPT9ZqU%2Bpw4Z7gra3tai9xmzV5tvoxN9VBBsDqN54Umivg3Iz7oAtozwUOW9OoP5D7F9Wd%2B%2B8ybEPS55yipjAtZMGFkQb1tCSeq%2FwYLh1CIRXj3sZ05AxF82XYq1GXEVj%2FiJzJER59he8%2BuWCZ%2FoY9TYlZXpMI9EQfzPHvMlDreksZWFEKoiUmq82mwoHw5B92tIy75rRYAg42jKgMLvxYeUUJ%2F%2F0VdHyzYw8t13Yfqc5Fi2648ts1IorJyPkvZeQRpaRPMi9CEbcb7AdKm%2FJUCYaR%2FjeckNHA8LsyS7GsZ3m1Td%2BhlTxV4JIRrBZeWRCN4wh%2B7CmKz%2F2On%2BRC7C2%2B6aR5869Vn%2BtlsB4QJ45zxx2R96cVaMBiUI7rxzc50%2BmcnXUE8hNbnC%2Fb%2FKpNwE6MhHEX3LeyLz10YGgeCbsdpKSaz30ANb9PmSpk80QJMDdHJnMMEFV%2BL4wDo55InJL8ZMPwL2rQDRLzGir2zWHHKJsNdcIZkJxl7g2%2BavPbLaiqt6zjnq9Ymyzj4h748P481wGpb2JYEjUG8HkBoWo0kygKAZNjxyTufphkDndPgMCnamR%2FPz0n9OBdTJu8GjLyY6bRiW8dli4N0n9BQHhDczD63oUfXU9sSaE9%2FU0f90Fh%2FZPMbkNRRlYOI4O9%2F8sqhbVvlN4%2Bafvh7LTDfOvDqRT%2FbupDp5u0QV%2F3uSYuOjROy8h2uf%2Fa24HpvPzPLj%2FmT3N5rrjdnbZtrlRD2%2F7Ogck5EK0mA7o4liYjLyOq5nykuzmzDhSw%2F%2BOPcR6cCP6y5NYmdba4LAYdnPtYEaqilavXTzl%2BcbYf4FCqmj%2FXaPtHL1tiPON6QEN3qyiALSCmkyyyPptMTu9bnQ%2FjuJ2CYJRzCZjNS%2BBjqxAXRQsjGr%2F8TU1Lkzy4c8PC8aAdmHszMFWKNdqOFkzFSXbJDkjhCBcz0EQvb0kq%2FQi7tO9D%2FM4gFg813COY9ndTEAibFIfHFmihnZ5fZAMlWFe1JiXOMyA8Ji97lvUcn4XUxS6VuJpPZPrdwsrHBTV%2BQ9A7ZEvgRcuFjz9BOB1u%2BFsdZusuRnFg2i630uWOiNi%2Bs9qrE4%2FYZFZNRzDDw63AreXsWBp8%2FU5fSYIcSuVQ3ERQ%3D%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T052033Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEQ4KGB32J%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=8f08a64447b84cf0d044afc59bbb413eba77cdd9485dd41e630f64fa1f5343a0&abstractId=2705931" target="_blank">Can’t Anyone Here Play this Game:  Judging the FTC’s Critics</a>, 83 George Washington Law Review 101 (2016)</p><p>William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://download.ssrn.com/12/03/09/ssrn_id2018710_code810317.pdf?response-content-disposition=inline&X-Amz-Security-Token=IQoJb3JpZ2luX2VjELX%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FwEaCXVzLWVhc3QtMSJHMEUCIQDTkAZ0XzVca1Mh%2Bhbl0sgdT2tSP%2BGtF78H1StW%2Bhlb3AIgQFgvCfq9P%2B0MkyAd15hR9VBkcadWiDJp8OKmeiHBj2QqxwUI%2Ff%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2F%2FARAEGgwzMDg0NzUzMDEyNTciDLzxKQLLTL4NZEmjzyqbBWmc2s1bkl%2FjvPpf1R%2BfvPCQ4lQUJqlxiX15T0pqVbBTqHEigDniOVoY59xGWv4AFvu3p%2FX%2BFUQoU%2FSNYWM%2BoyCzUlKNGzlK83z5QIs41%2BCiGlaNz2sgpD6TLxWTSjW9is4Vbm4RHU1hg9kENcvFe1IRndGE7%2ByNb0ML0K9586s%2BHaQXrJnYEe58F2XGEWso2rs0x5nV2oVQsDz05OJEk%2F4v6tXgLpQ0vhIz3e38lBaRAhAfb9DV%2BKD87kZOo1yDQAAaRtB0e91S3FMQFlB4%2FsBwkKZfNEF5Ql6BB6sjHp5Rd1wl%2BOENBnINkSk%2FEeB0F5DCL44%2BooYtokr9durF03SOhuLppqWu44tWYuWUoSruzVqbk4fQ%2FH6ZsyqO67oEcy%2Fpq1nbpC0q8rbgW4fJKd18In1oV3UvgilivdiOWeGrodgRDWwpMzFP5hXER4HGooV41td2h7jtpgOD%2FIozGu3ZVVrXg7w3cxWFGtJJhcj6DMexbkg80vrruSBEDx2kgnB0HfYDS4ghoL9YvQR47x9sQ0UODgTU8RhKdF%2BF04ZQRgxbwTo4SaRYSuh4DRU%2BTKd9rvNXdnsZwOwRuUpkhgyQQbaoAZaQPx%2BL%2Fdx9m2XgeWHQ3iiWvsMrhrIGsquKmx%2FxqY4ozqnQmOovDL7t9Z3o1VwtBfkVzk5YOUljIOx4Y%2FOLbIuSsQbNjb8JkwxI2dNUS5RKd4lXyiHMfbkAwHyxpYvu7YWLIXGTC0GMeGTK87gdpBG30Uq%2FxbQY0MC7eEYnnOwLV4KtcX2eeAaCu1GMCf9q%2BVyw0JqUtWmky6ROoz948Rvve9ShSWE%2F02lrX5iO%2FHsXaMt3Fhw9cFdEVoosQB4O2FbTV0EBde5Z%2BaOjsSNvKj1uzRaUpsww6v7TvgY6sQEFKzac5R6hmdL9zh1%2FlG5a%2B8u9%2FjYCzXdvw68%2BeHwpMdOxtDnYEwt1%2B%2B71wAv%2BI2%2Bno4MQC1nV5prb763RM50GR1eilsrf6kgqoo0fta86Ow6wZfIxtZkgW9qgAFO5iiS7XFqGuEHDoWnPBOEXZ%2FJWdZoXXFSyPl7%2FLYN4K3UB5a3Yaw%2FHbSYy%2FL69S6YzNgIASOtWJNudycsjdj4nx63bBd3U6P%2Be%2FXTEk8cdype0Kio%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20250315T052456Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=300&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAUPUUPRWEY6IRDU22%2F20250315%2Fus-east-1%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=922a903519eb3841cc8645164e02927bfd6a18d5322999a24edc4808649de09d&abstractId=2018710" target="_blank">Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance</a>, 16 George Mason Law Review 903 (Spring 2009)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#23: Should the FTC Survive The Trump Administration?: A Conversation With Bill Kovacic</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/43b48c27-18ad-4cb9-9e19-e970f4909958/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:41:42</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Critics of the FTC argue its structure is unconstitutional, its mission is duplicative of other federal (and state) agencies, and it is too powerful but ineffective. Podcast host Bilal Sayyed is joined by Bill Kovacic to discuss the case for the FTC as an effective law enforcer and advocate for competition and the protection of consumers from fraudulent, deceptive and unfair conduct, and a policy innovator. 100 minutes of good FTC talk.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Critics of the FTC argue its structure is unconstitutional, its mission is duplicative of other federal (and state) agencies, and it is too powerful but ineffective. Podcast host Bilal Sayyed is joined by Bill Kovacic to discuss the case for the FTC as an effective law enforcer and advocate for competition and the protection of consumers from fraudulent, deceptive and unfair conduct, and a policy innovator. 100 minutes of good FTC talk.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
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      <itunes:episode>23</itunes:episode>
    </item>
    <item>
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      <title># 22:  Should Courts Engage in Multi-Market Balancing?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bio: <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/kathleen-w-bradish/" target="_blank">Kathleen W. Bradish</a></p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/randy-stutz/" target="_blank">Randy Stutz</a></p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/12/03/multi-market-balancing-in-a-new-antitrust-paradigm/" target="_blank">Multi-Market Balancing in a New Antitrust Paradigm</a>, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/" target="_blank">ProMarket</a> (Dec. 3, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-products/type/amicus-briefs/" target="_blank">AAI’s Recent Amicus Briefs</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 26 Feb 2025 17:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/22-should-courts-engage-in-multi-market-balancing-jKnA9UXC</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bio: <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/kathleen-w-bradish/" target="_blank">Kathleen W. Bradish</a></p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/people/randy-stutz/" target="_blank">Randy Stutz</a></p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/12/03/multi-market-balancing-in-a-new-antitrust-paradigm/" target="_blank">Multi-Market Balancing in a New Antitrust Paradigm</a>, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/" target="_blank">ProMarket</a> (Dec. 3, 2024)</p><p><a href="https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/work-products/type/amicus-briefs/" target="_blank">AAI’s Recent Amicus Briefs</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title># 22:  Should Courts Engage in Multi-Market Balancing?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/fd4ca629-c126-4504-866f-64d0b9c0fd81/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:25:35</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Randy Stutz, President of the American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss his recent Pro-Market blog post, Multi-Market Balancing in a New Antitrust Paradigm, and Kathleen Bradish, Vice-President of the American Antitrust Institute, discusses AAI’s recent amicus brief in Epic v. Google, arguing that the 9th Circuit reject balancing out-of-market benefits against in-market harms.  We also discuss some other recent AAI amicus briefs, including two in the algorithmic price-fixing cases, one arguing against Noerr-Pennington protection for fraudulent claims, another arguing against a carve-out of the scope of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act in private litigation. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Randy Stutz, President of the American Antitrust Institute, joins the podcast to discuss his recent Pro-Market blog post, Multi-Market Balancing in a New Antitrust Paradigm, and Kathleen Bradish, Vice-President of the American Antitrust Institute, discusses AAI’s recent amicus brief in Epic v. Google, arguing that the 9th Circuit reject balancing out-of-market benefits against in-market harms.  We also discuss some other recent AAI amicus briefs, including two in the algorithmic price-fixing cases, one arguing against Noerr-Pennington protection for fraudulent claims, another arguing against a carve-out of the scope of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act in private litigation. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>22</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#21: Did the Biden Administration Establish A New Paradigm for Antitrust?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bio:  <a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=41615" target="_blank">Daniel Francis</a></p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/steven-c-salop/" target="_blank">Steve Salop</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/11/25/after-neo-brandeis/" target="_blank">After Neo-Brandeis</a>, <i>ProMarket</i> (Nov. 25, 2024)</p><p>Steve Salop, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/11/26/the-biden-competition-policy-paradigm-has-been-primarily-post-chicagonot-neo-brandeisian/" target="_blank">The Biden Competition Policy Program Has Been Primarily Post-Chicago, Not Neo-Brandeisian</a>, <i>ProMarket</i> (Nov. 26, 2024)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 18 Feb 2025 17:39:46 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/did-the-biden-administration-establish-a-new-paradigm-for-antitrust-HYnd3_hV</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bio:  <a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=41615" target="_blank">Daniel Francis</a></p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/steven-c-salop/" target="_blank">Steve Salop</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/11/25/after-neo-brandeis/" target="_blank">After Neo-Brandeis</a>, <i>ProMarket</i> (Nov. 25, 2024)</p><p>Steve Salop, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2024/11/26/the-biden-competition-policy-paradigm-has-been-primarily-post-chicagonot-neo-brandeisian/" target="_blank">The Biden Competition Policy Program Has Been Primarily Post-Chicago, Not Neo-Brandeisian</a>, <i>ProMarket</i> (Nov. 26, 2024)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#21: Did the Biden Administration Establish A New Paradigm for Antitrust?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/e5ac9073-674c-480d-8a44-71a4919c04a0/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:45:31</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>NYU Law Professor Daniel Francis and Georgetown Law Professor (Emeritus) Steve Salop join the podcast to discuss the Biden Administration’s efforts to redirect and expand the scope of Antitrust Law.  Did the team of Kanter, Khan, and Wu succeed in establishing a new paradigm?</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>NYU Law Professor Daniel Francis and Georgetown Law Professor (Emeritus) Steve Salop join the podcast to discuss the Biden Administration’s efforts to redirect and expand the scope of Antitrust Law.  Did the team of Kanter, Khan, and Wu succeed in establishing a new paradigm?</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>21</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#20: Should We Rethink Antitrust?: A Conversation with Spencer Weber Waller</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Spencer Weber Waller served as a senior advisor to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair Lina Khan (2022) and is the John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He joins the podcast to tackle the podcast’s motivating question:  Whether, and if so, how, should we <i>Rethink Antitrust</i>?</p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/facultyandadministrationprofiles/waller-spencer-weber.shtml" target="_blank">Spencer Weber Waller</a></p><p>Spencer Weber Waller, <a href="https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1440&context=law_review" target="_blank"><i>The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law</i></a>, 52 (1) Conn. L. Rev. 127 (April 2020)</p><p>Spencer Weber Waller, <a href="https://www.fsulawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ANTITRUST-AND-DEMOCRACY.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Antitrust and Democracy</i></a>, 46 Florida State L. Rev. 807 (2019)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 11 Feb 2025 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/should-we-be-rethinking-antitrust-a-conversation-with-spencer-weber-waller-fwC_bx4s</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Spencer Weber Waller served as a senior advisor to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair Lina Khan (2022) and is the John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He joins the podcast to tackle the podcast’s motivating question:  Whether, and if so, how, should we <i>Rethink Antitrust</i>?</p><p>Bio:  <a href="https://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/facultyandadministrationprofiles/waller-spencer-weber.shtml" target="_blank">Spencer Weber Waller</a></p><p>Spencer Weber Waller, <a href="https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1440&context=law_review" target="_blank"><i>The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law</i></a>, 52 (1) Conn. L. Rev. 127 (April 2020)</p><p>Spencer Weber Waller, <a href="https://www.fsulawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ANTITRUST-AND-DEMOCRACY.pdf" target="_blank"><i>Antitrust and Democracy</i></a>, 46 Florida State L. Rev. 807 (2019)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#20: Should We Rethink Antitrust?: A Conversation with Spencer Weber Waller</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/6f47051c-822f-4ad5-98f4-02321abf3b1e/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:09:09</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Spencer Weber Waller served as a senior advisor to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair Lina Khan (2022) and is the John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He joins the podcast to tackle the podcast’s motivating question:  Whether, and if so, how, should we Rethink Antitrust?</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Spencer Weber Waller served as a senior advisor to Federal Trade Commission (FTC) chair Lina Khan (2022) and is the John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Director of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies, and Professor at Loyola University Chicago School of Law. He joins the podcast to tackle the podcast’s motivating question:  Whether, and if so, how, should we Rethink Antitrust?</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>20</itunes:episode>
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    <item>
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      <title>#19: National Champions &amp; Competition Law</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bio, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/people/bill-baer/" target="_blank">Bill Baer</a></p><p>Bill Baer, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2025/01/07/what-the-us-learned-and-the-eu-should-consider-about-national-champions/" target="_blank">What the US Learned and the EU Should Consider About National Champions</a>, ProMarket (Jan. 7, 2025)</p><p>Bill Baer and Jack Malamud, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europe-needs-competition-not-national-champions/" target="_blank">Europe Needs Competition, Not National Champions</a>, Brookings (Jul. 3, 2024)</p><p>William E. Kovacic, FTC Commissioner, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commissioner-william-e.kovacic-whom-chairman-deborah-platt-majoras-and-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-join/0510165kovacicmajorasrosch.pdf" target="_blank">Statement, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin / Boeing Company</a></p><p>William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2757&context=faculty_publications" target="_blank">Competition Policy Retrospective: The Formation of The United Launch Alliance and The Ascent of SpaceX</a>,  27 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 863 (2020)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 4 Feb 2025 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/national-champions-competition-law-_Dt9wIzc</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bio, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/people/bill-baer/" target="_blank">Bill Baer</a></p><p>Bill Baer, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2025/01/07/what-the-us-learned-and-the-eu-should-consider-about-national-champions/" target="_blank">What the US Learned and the EU Should Consider About National Champions</a>, ProMarket (Jan. 7, 2025)</p><p>Bill Baer and Jack Malamud, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/europe-needs-competition-not-national-champions/" target="_blank">Europe Needs Competition, Not National Champions</a>, Brookings (Jul. 3, 2024)</p><p>William E. Kovacic, FTC Commissioner, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commissioner-william-e.kovacic-whom-chairman-deborah-platt-majoras-and-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-join/0510165kovacicmajorasrosch.pdf" target="_blank">Statement, In the Matter of Lockheed Martin / Boeing Company</a></p><p>William E. Kovacic, <a href="https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2757&context=faculty_publications" target="_blank">Competition Policy Retrospective: The Formation of The United Launch Alliance and The Ascent of SpaceX</a>,  27 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 863 (2020)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#19: National Champions &amp; Competition Law</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/29ff21d0-1728-4e4a-a378-b6370f065aa9/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:28:46</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Should the antitrust agencies apply a lower level of scrutiny to mergers or conduct in support of creating or maintaining “national champions.?  Europe is discussing this, and the U.S. has some history in this area, which may become relevant again in the new Trump Administration. Bill Baer, formerly the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Department of Justice and Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, joins the podcast to discuss. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Should the antitrust agencies apply a lower level of scrutiny to mergers or conduct in support of creating or maintaining “national champions.?  Europe is discussing this, and the U.S. has some history in this area, which may become relevant again in the new Trump Administration. Bill Baer, formerly the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, U.S. Department of Justice and Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, joins the podcast to discuss. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>19</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#18: Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><i>U.S. v Microsoft Corp</i>., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2021) was a seminal monopolization case.  Bilal Sayyed discusses the scope of the decision and its continuing relevance with Senior Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a member of the en-banc panel that issued the decision.</p><p>Links</p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/ginsburg_douglas" target="_blank">Douglas H. Ginsburg</a></p><p>Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PUBLISHEDThe-Latest-Legislative-Development-and-Enforcement-Trends-of-the-PRC-Anti-Monopoly-Law.pdf"><i>FTC v. Rambus and the De Facto Causation Standard Under Sherman Section 2</i></a> (Competition Policy International, Columns) (Nov. 2024).</p><p>Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590703"><i>Challenging Consummated Mergers Under Section 2</i></a>, Competition Policy International (May 2020).</p><p>Douglas Melamed, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/North-America-Column-December-2024-Full.pdf"><i>Causation Confusion – A Response to Judge Ginsburg & Wong-Ervin</i></a> (Competition Policy International, Columns) (Dec. 2024).</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 24 Jan 2025 15:35:56 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/18-judge-douglas-ginsburg-on-antitrust-law-and-the-tech-industry-MtsVWQpW</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>U.S. v Microsoft Corp</i>., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2021) was a seminal monopolization case.  Bilal Sayyed discusses the scope of the decision and its continuing relevance with Senior Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a member of the en-banc panel that issued the decision.</p><p>Links</p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/ginsburg_douglas" target="_blank">Douglas H. Ginsburg</a></p><p>Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/PUBLISHEDThe-Latest-Legislative-Development-and-Enforcement-Trends-of-the-PRC-Anti-Monopoly-Law.pdf"><i>FTC v. Rambus and the De Facto Causation Standard Under Sherman Section 2</i></a> (Competition Policy International, Columns) (Nov. 2024).</p><p>Douglas H. Ginsburg & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3590703"><i>Challenging Consummated Mergers Under Section 2</i></a>, Competition Policy International (May 2020).</p><p>Douglas Melamed, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/North-America-Column-December-2024-Full.pdf"><i>Causation Confusion – A Response to Judge Ginsburg & Wong-Ervin</i></a> (Competition Policy International, Columns) (Dec. 2024).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#18: Judge Douglas Ginsburg on Antitrust Law and the Tech Industry</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/b39b031b-dd25-42d5-8378-5e25b633d15d/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:50:18</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>U.S. v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2021) was a seminal monopolization case.  Bilal Sayyed discusses the scope of the decision and its continuing relevance with Senior Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a member of the en-banc panel that issued the decision.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>U.S. v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2021) was a seminal monopolization case.  Bilal Sayyed discusses the scope of the decision and its continuing relevance with Senior Circuit Judge Douglas Ginsburg, a member of the en-banc panel that issued the decision.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>18</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#17: Algorithmic Price Fixing and Price Coordination</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Bio: <a href="https://www.elevecon.com/jay-ezrielev/">Jay Ezrielev</a></p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/g/brandon-gould">Brandon Gould </a></p><p>Jay Ezrielev, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/dojs-war-on-progress-in-rental-markets/">DOJ’s War on Progress in Rental Markets</a>, (CPI, Aug. 5, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould, August Gweon, Cortlin Lannin & Terrell McSweeny, <a href="https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2024/02/competition-and-collusion-in-a-world-of-algorithmic-pricing-antitrust-risks-and-enforcement-trends.pdf">Competition & Collusion in a World of Algorithmic Pricing: Antitrust Risks & Enforcement Trends</a>  (CPI, Feb. 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2024/10/14/new-jersey-court-dismisses-software-price-fixing-claims-against-atlantic-city-casinos/?_gl=1*188ztli*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4wLjE3MzYyNzkxNTUuMC4wLjA.">New Jersey Court Dismisses Software Price-Fixing Claims Against Atlantic City Casinos</a>  (Oct. 4, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon,  <a href="https://www.covcompetition.com/2024/09/state-courts-dismiss-claims-involving-the-use-of-revenue-management-software-in-residential-rental-and-health-insurance-industries/">State Courts Dismiss Claims Involving the Use of Revenue Management Software in Residential Rental and Health Insurance Industries</a> (Sept. 30, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2024/05/28/no-dice-nevada-court-dismisses-with-prejudice-algorithmic-price-fixing-theories-in-vegas-hotels-case/?_gl=1*188ztli*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4wLjE3MzYyNzkxNTUuMC4wLjA.">No Dice: Nevada Court Dismisses with Prejudice Algorithmic Price Fixing Theories in Vegas Hotels Case</a> (May 28, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2023/11/20/brief-stay-vegas-hotel-case-dismissed/?_gl=1*1dxn2za*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4xLjE3MzYyNzkxNzYuMC4wLjA.">Brief Stay: Vegas Hotel Case Dismissed </a>(Nov. 20, 2023) </p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Jan 2025 14:43:42 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/17-algorithmic-price-fixing-and-price-coordination-6EPzmMhe</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Bio: <a href="https://www.elevecon.com/jay-ezrielev/">Jay Ezrielev</a></p><p>Bio: <a href="https://www.cov.com/en/professionals/g/brandon-gould">Brandon Gould </a></p><p>Jay Ezrielev, <a href="https://www.pymnts.com/cpi-posts/dojs-war-on-progress-in-rental-markets/">DOJ’s War on Progress in Rental Markets</a>, (CPI, Aug. 5, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould, August Gweon, Cortlin Lannin & Terrell McSweeny, <a href="https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2024/02/competition-and-collusion-in-a-world-of-algorithmic-pricing-antitrust-risks-and-enforcement-trends.pdf">Competition & Collusion in a World of Algorithmic Pricing: Antitrust Risks & Enforcement Trends</a>  (CPI, Feb. 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2024/10/14/new-jersey-court-dismisses-software-price-fixing-claims-against-atlantic-city-casinos/?_gl=1*188ztli*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4wLjE3MzYyNzkxNTUuMC4wLjA.">New Jersey Court Dismisses Software Price-Fixing Claims Against Atlantic City Casinos</a>  (Oct. 4, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon,  <a href="https://www.covcompetition.com/2024/09/state-courts-dismiss-claims-involving-the-use-of-revenue-management-software-in-residential-rental-and-health-insurance-industries/">State Courts Dismiss Claims Involving the Use of Revenue Management Software in Residential Rental and Health Insurance Industries</a> (Sept. 30, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2024/05/28/no-dice-nevada-court-dismisses-with-prejudice-algorithmic-price-fixing-theories-in-vegas-hotels-case/?_gl=1*188ztli*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4wLjE3MzYyNzkxNTUuMC4wLjA.">No Dice: Nevada Court Dismisses with Prejudice Algorithmic Price Fixing Theories in Vegas Hotels Case</a> (May 28, 2024)</p><p>Brandon Gould & August Gweon, <a href="https://www.insideclassactions.com/2023/11/20/brief-stay-vegas-hotel-case-dismissed/?_gl=1*1dxn2za*_ga*MTc1NTY3NzA0Mi4xNzE2NDAwODAw*_ga_KSNMJSN08X*MTczNjI3OTE1NS45OC4xLjE3MzYyNzkxNzYuMC4wLjA.">Brief Stay: Vegas Hotel Case Dismissed </a>(Nov. 20, 2023) </p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#17: Algorithmic Price Fixing and Price Coordination</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/1c4babce-a7bf-4b51-964e-bc10c93d3648/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:59:13</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Biden administration has been active in challenging algorithmic price fixing and price coordination. But has the administration proposed a workable framework for distinguishing unlawful price fixing, and unlawful information exchange, from efficient and welfare enhancing use of new technologies? Brandon Gould, Special Counsel at Covington, and Jay Ezrielev, Founder of economic consulting firm Elevecon, join the podcast to discuss how the courts and DOJ are applying antitrust law to the growing use of algorithms to provide market participants with recommendations on pricing and output decisions.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Biden administration has been active in challenging algorithmic price fixing and price coordination. But has the administration proposed a workable framework for distinguishing unlawful price fixing, and unlawful information exchange, from efficient and welfare enhancing use of new technologies? Brandon Gould, Special Counsel at Covington, and Jay Ezrielev, Founder of economic consulting firm Elevecon, join the podcast to discuss how the courts and DOJ are applying antitrust law to the growing use of algorithms to provide market participants with recommendations on pricing and output decisions.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>17</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#16: Diana Moss’s Recommendations for a Centrist, Consumer-Based Antitrust Agenda</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Diana Moss has spent the last 25 years advocating for a centrist, consumer- and economics-based antitrust policy. Recently, as Vice President and Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), she has been particularly active, publishing several papers, intending, to my read, to revive an antitrust agenda focused on enforcement that matters to consumers’ pocket-book issues. She sat down with us to discuss.</p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/people/diana-moss/">Diana Moss bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/can-antitrust-be-doing-more-to-protect-consumers/">Can Antitrust Be Doing More to Protect Consumers?</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/PPI-Digital-Competition-Nov24.pdf">In Search of a Competition Policy for the Digital Sector</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/1-FIXING-THE-FIX-UPDATING-POLICY-ON-MERGER-REMEDIES-Diana-L-Moss.pdf">Fixing the Fix: Updating Policies on Merger Remedies</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/PPI-CWA_Competition.pdf">Fixing Uncompetitive Markets: Protecting Working Americans From the High Costs of Market Power</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 10 Dec 2024 15:18:53 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/16-diana-mosss-recommendations-for-a-centrist-consumer-based-antitrust-agenda-BuL4ff_Z</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Diana Moss has spent the last 25 years advocating for a centrist, consumer- and economics-based antitrust policy. Recently, as Vice President and Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), she has been particularly active, publishing several papers, intending, to my read, to revive an antitrust agenda focused on enforcement that matters to consumers’ pocket-book issues. She sat down with us to discuss.</p><p>Links:</p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/people/diana-moss/">Diana Moss bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/can-antitrust-be-doing-more-to-protect-consumers/">Can Antitrust Be Doing More to Protect Consumers?</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/PPI-Digital-Competition-Nov24.pdf">In Search of a Competition Policy for the Digital Sector</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/1-FIXING-THE-FIX-UPDATING-POLICY-ON-MERGER-REMEDIES-Diana-L-Moss.pdf">Fixing the Fix: Updating Policies on Merger Remedies</a></p><p><a href="https://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/PPI-CWA_Competition.pdf">Fixing Uncompetitive Markets: Protecting Working Americans From the High Costs of Market Power</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#16: Diana Moss’s Recommendations for a Centrist, Consumer-Based Antitrust Agenda</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>00:56:37</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Diana Moss has spent the last 25 years advocating for a centrist, consumer- and economics-based antitrust policy. Recently, as Vice President and Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), she has been particularly active, publishing several papers, intending, to my read, to revive an antitrust agenda focused on enforcement that matters to consumers’ pocket-book issues. She sat down with us to discuss.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Diana Moss has spent the last 25 years advocating for a centrist, consumer- and economics-based antitrust policy. Recently, as Vice President and Director of Competition Policy at the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), she has been particularly active, publishing several papers, intending, to my read, to revive an antitrust agenda focused on enforcement that matters to consumers’ pocket-book issues. She sat down with us to discuss.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#15: The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Trump and Biden Administration “Big Tech” monopolization cases rely on the analytical framework set out in the “Microsoft Cases.”  The framework is controversial, but it is controlling precedent in the D.C. Circuit, substantially influenced Judge Mehta’s liability opinion in <i>U.S. v. Google LLC </i>(search) and is almost certain to impact Judge Mehta’s views on the proper remedy in that matter.  </p><p>Bilal is joined by professors Andy Gavil and Harry First—authors of one of the seminal histories of the Microsoft cases—to discuss the history of the case and its continuing relevance to monopolization law and the current “Big Tech” cases.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=19919">Harry First bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://law.howard.edu/andrew-i-gavil">Andrew Gavil bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262533300/the-microsoft-antitrust-cases/">The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition Policy for the Twenty-first Century</a>, Andrew Gavil & Harry First</p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4324570">Antitrust Remedies and the Big Tech Platform Cases</a>, Harry First</p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/07/20/triko-creep/">Trinko Creep</a>, Andrew Gavil, <i>Promarkets</i></p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol168/iss7/7/">Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis</a>, Andrew Gavil and Steve Salop</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/15-the-microsoft-framework-shaping-antitrust-enforcement-today-Zyq8FnOo</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Trump and Biden Administration “Big Tech” monopolization cases rely on the analytical framework set out in the “Microsoft Cases.”  The framework is controversial, but it is controlling precedent in the D.C. Circuit, substantially influenced Judge Mehta’s liability opinion in <i>U.S. v. Google LLC </i>(search) and is almost certain to impact Judge Mehta’s views on the proper remedy in that matter.  </p><p>Bilal is joined by professors Andy Gavil and Harry First—authors of one of the seminal histories of the Microsoft cases—to discuss the history of the case and its continuing relevance to monopolization law and the current “Big Tech” cases.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=19919">Harry First bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://law.howard.edu/andrew-i-gavil">Andrew Gavil bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262533300/the-microsoft-antitrust-cases/">The Microsoft Antitrust Cases: Competition Policy for the Twenty-first Century</a>, Andrew Gavil & Harry First</p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4324570">Antitrust Remedies and the Big Tech Platform Cases</a>, Harry First</p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/07/20/triko-creep/">Trinko Creep</a>, Andrew Gavil, <i>Promarkets</i></p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol168/iss7/7/">Probability, Presumptions and Evidentiary Burdens in Antitrust Analysis</a>, Andrew Gavil and Steve Salop</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#15: The Microsoft Framework: Shaping Antitrust Enforcement Today</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>01:13:47</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Trump and Biden Administration “Big Tech” monopolization cases rely on the analytical framework set out in the “Microsoft Cases.”  The framework is controversial, but it is controlling precedent in the D.C. Circuit, substantially influenced Judge Mehta’s liability opinion in U.S. v. Google LLC (search) and is almost certain to impact Judge Mehta’s views on the proper remedy in that matter.  Bilal is joined by professors Andy Gavil and Harry First—authors of one of the seminal histories of the Microsoft cases—to discuss the history of the case and its continuing relevance to monopolization law and the current “Big Tech” cases.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Trump and Biden Administration “Big Tech” monopolization cases rely on the analytical framework set out in the “Microsoft Cases.”  The framework is controversial, but it is controlling precedent in the D.C. Circuit, substantially influenced Judge Mehta’s liability opinion in U.S. v. Google LLC (search) and is almost certain to impact Judge Mehta’s views on the proper remedy in that matter.  Bilal is joined by professors Andy Gavil and Harry First—authors of one of the seminal histories of the Microsoft cases—to discuss the history of the case and its continuing relevance to monopolization law and the current “Big Tech” cases.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#14: Reimagining Antitrust Beyond Neoliberal and NeoBrandesian Thinking</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>With the second election of Donald Trump, the efforts by the Biden Administration to redirect antitrust policy away towards a neo-Brandesian theory of antitrust is delayed, and may be dead. But, the broader economic concerns that motivated the first Trump Administration (2017-2020) to move away from the more permissive antitrust policies of the Obama Administration are likely to influence the second Trump Administration. Is there an alternative to the neo-liberal and neo-Brandesian policies of the Obama and Biden Administrations? Joseph Coniglio, the director of antitrust and innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), joins the podcast to discuss his new paper, A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://itif.org/person/joseph-v-coniglio/">Joseph Coniglio bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4927126">A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 17:03:13 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/13-reimagining-antitrust-beyond-neoliberal-and-neobrandesian-thinking-7DVFuHaO</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>With the second election of Donald Trump, the efforts by the Biden Administration to redirect antitrust policy away towards a neo-Brandesian theory of antitrust is delayed, and may be dead. But, the broader economic concerns that motivated the first Trump Administration (2017-2020) to move away from the more permissive antitrust policies of the Obama Administration are likely to influence the second Trump Administration. Is there an alternative to the neo-liberal and neo-Brandesian policies of the Obama and Biden Administrations? Joseph Coniglio, the director of antitrust and innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), joins the podcast to discuss his new paper, A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://itif.org/person/joseph-v-coniglio/">Joseph Coniglio bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4927126">A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#14: Reimagining Antitrust Beyond Neoliberal and NeoBrandesian Thinking</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/41b6024d-4710-4c6b-a3c5-cc40d67a93b3/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:58:43</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>With the second election of Donald Trump, the efforts by the Biden Administration to redirect antitrust policy away towards a neo-Brandesian theory of antitrust is delayed, and may be dead. But, the broader economic concerns that motivated the first Trump Administration (2017-2020) to move away from the more permissive antitrust policies of the Obama Administration are likely to influence the second Trump Administration. Is there an alternative to the neo-liberal and neo-Brandesian policies of the Obama and Biden Administrations? Joseph Coniglio, the director of antitrust and innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), joins the podcast to discuss his new paper, A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>With the second election of Donald Trump, the efforts by the Biden Administration to redirect antitrust policy away towards a neo-Brandesian theory of antitrust is delayed, and may be dead. But, the broader economic concerns that motivated the first Trump Administration (2017-2020) to move away from the more permissive antitrust policies of the Obama Administration are likely to influence the second Trump Administration. Is there an alternative to the neo-liberal and neo-Brandesian policies of the Obama and Biden Administrations? Joseph Coniglio, the director of antitrust and innovation at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF), joins the podcast to discuss his new paper, A Theory for All and None: A Neo-schumpeterian Model of Antitrust Law and Political Economy. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#13: Future Markets: Predicting Competition and Innovation</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The 2023 Merger Guidelines have received both praise and criticism. While the guidelines have been criticized, the incorporation of future markets into the guidelines has garnered support. Larry Landman, an expert on the U.S. and EU applications of future markets, joins the podcast to discuss how application of future markets can help identify future competition and innovation effects in mergers.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://laterallink.com/team/lawrence-b-landman/">Lawrence B. Landman profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/refining-future-potential-competition-doctrine-allowing-courts-protect-innovation">Refining Future Potential Competition: The Doctrine Allowing Courts to Protect Innovation</a><br /><a href="https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/refining-future-potential-competition-doctrine-allowing-courts-protect-innovation">Forthcoming (subject to revisions)</a>, Volume 86 Antitrust Law Journal (2025)</p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4379514">Protecting Competition to Innovate is Protecting Competition in Future Markets: Ten Law Review Articles Leave No Doubt, </a>CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Feb. 2023, Vol. 2(2), pp. 55-60. (Five-page summary of 10 previous articles)</p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/07/25/the-revised-us-merger-guidelines-adopt-the-future-markets-model/">The Revised US Merger Guidelines Adopt the Future Markets Model</a>, Promarket (July 25, 2023)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/09/amgencomplaint.pdf">Federal Trade Commission’s AMGEN complaint</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Nov 2024 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/13-future-markets-predicting-competition-and-innovation-J2b7oo7R</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 2023 Merger Guidelines have received both praise and criticism. While the guidelines have been criticized, the incorporation of future markets into the guidelines has garnered support. Larry Landman, an expert on the U.S. and EU applications of future markets, joins the podcast to discuss how application of future markets can help identify future competition and innovation effects in mergers.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://laterallink.com/team/lawrence-b-landman/">Lawrence B. Landman profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/refining-future-potential-competition-doctrine-allowing-courts-protect-innovation">Refining Future Potential Competition: The Doctrine Allowing Courts to Protect Innovation</a><br /><a href="https://competitionlab.gwu.edu/refining-future-potential-competition-doctrine-allowing-courts-protect-innovation">Forthcoming (subject to revisions)</a>, Volume 86 Antitrust Law Journal (2025)</p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4379514">Protecting Competition to Innovate is Protecting Competition in Future Markets: Ten Law Review Articles Leave No Doubt, </a>CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Feb. 2023, Vol. 2(2), pp. 55-60. (Five-page summary of 10 previous articles)</p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/07/25/the-revised-us-merger-guidelines-adopt-the-future-markets-model/">The Revised US Merger Guidelines Adopt the Future Markets Model</a>, Promarket (July 25, 2023)</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2002/09/amgencomplaint.pdf">Federal Trade Commission’s AMGEN complaint</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#13: Future Markets: Predicting Competition and Innovation</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/b5be2ff0-870d-49c6-84a2-aec10786ed68/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:13:06</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The 2023 Merger Guidelines have received both praise and criticism. While the guidelines have been criticized, the incorporation of future markets into the guidelines has garnered support. Larry Landman, an expert on the U.S. and EU applications of future markets, joins the podcast to discuss how application of future markets can help identify future competition and innovation effects in mergers.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The 2023 Merger Guidelines have received both praise and criticism. While the guidelines have been criticized, the incorporation of future markets into the guidelines has garnered support. Larry Landman, an expert on the U.S. and EU applications of future markets, joins the podcast to discuss how application of future markets can help identify future competition and innovation effects in mergers.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#12: The EC Draft Guidelines on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Firms</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The European Commission has released draft guidelines aimed at prohibiting abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, synthesizing insights from various EU court rulings on exclusionary abuse. Critics claim the draft reverts to a presumption-based approach rather than an economic analysis of anticompetitive effects.  Greg Werden, formerly an economist at the DOJ's Antitrust Division, and an authority on US monopolization law, joins us to discuss the draft guidance document. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.mercatus.org/scholars/gregory-j-werden">Greg Werden profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4946326">Comments of Gregory J. Werden on Draft Article 102 Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/EC-2024-Draft-Exclusionary-conduct-guidance.pdf"><strong>European Commission's 2024 Draft Exclusionary Conduct Guidance</strong></a></p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF">2009 EU Policy Statement on Exclusionary Conduct</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 6 Nov 2024 17:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/12-the-ec-draft-guidelines-on-abusive-exclusionary-conduct-by-dominant-firms-p6j6NMst</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The European Commission has released draft guidelines aimed at prohibiting abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, synthesizing insights from various EU court rulings on exclusionary abuse. Critics claim the draft reverts to a presumption-based approach rather than an economic analysis of anticompetitive effects.  Greg Werden, formerly an economist at the DOJ's Antitrust Division, and an authority on US monopolization law, joins us to discuss the draft guidance document. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.mercatus.org/scholars/gregory-j-werden">Greg Werden profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4946326">Comments of Gregory J. Werden on Draft Article 102 Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/EC-2024-Draft-Exclusionary-conduct-guidance.pdf"><strong>European Commission's 2024 Draft Exclusionary Conduct Guidance</strong></a></p><p><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:045:0007:0020:EN:PDF">2009 EU Policy Statement on Exclusionary Conduct</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#12: The EC Draft Guidelines on Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Firms</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/4ebf7719-5917-46c3-a34a-23ac274377bf/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:57:45</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The European Commission has released draft guidelines aimed at prohibiting abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, synthesizing insights from various EU court rulings on exclusionary abuse. Critics claim the draft reverts to a presumption-based approach rather than an economic analysis of anticompetitive effects.  Greg Werden, formerly an economist at the DOJ&apos;s Antitrust Division, and an authority on US monopolization law, joins us to discuss the draft guidance document. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The European Commission has released draft guidelines aimed at prohibiting abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant firms, synthesizing insights from various EU court rulings on exclusionary abuse. Critics claim the draft reverts to a presumption-based approach rather than an economic analysis of anticompetitive effects.  Greg Werden, formerly an economist at the DOJ&apos;s Antitrust Division, and an authority on US monopolization law, joins us to discuss the draft guidance document. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#11: Antitrust Policy Under Scrutiny: A Conversation on Challenges and Future Paths</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration has aggressively redefined antitrust policy, continuing trends initiated during the Trump presidency while contesting mid-20th-century legal developments that favored efficiency justifications. In this discussion, former antitrust officials Bruce Hoffman and Barry Nigro reflect on the potential outcomes of current policies and speculate on the direction future administrations might take, whether it be a continuation or a revision of existing frameworks. They analyze the implications of these shifts for antitrust enforcement and what a potential Harris or Trump administration might prioritize in this critical area of law.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/bruce-hoffman" target="_blank">Bruce Hoffman profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/barry-nigro" target="_blank">Barry Nigro profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-biden-administrations-extensive-review-of-interlocking-directorates-across-the-entire-economy-may-put-your-board-representation-at-risk">The Biden Administration’s “Extensive Review of Interlocking Directorates Across the Entire Economy” May Put Your Board Representation at Risk</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 30 Oct 2024 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/11-antitrust-policy-under-scrutiny-a-conversation-on-challenges-and-future-paths-1iCsb3Rt</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration has aggressively redefined antitrust policy, continuing trends initiated during the Trump presidency while contesting mid-20th-century legal developments that favored efficiency justifications. In this discussion, former antitrust officials Bruce Hoffman and Barry Nigro reflect on the potential outcomes of current policies and speculate on the direction future administrations might take, whether it be a continuation or a revision of existing frameworks. They analyze the implications of these shifts for antitrust enforcement and what a potential Harris or Trump administration might prioritize in this critical area of law.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.clearygottlieb.com/professionals/bruce-hoffman" target="_blank">Bruce Hoffman profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.friedfrank.com/our-people/barry-nigro" target="_blank">Barry Nigro profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/the-biden-administrations-extensive-review-of-interlocking-directorates-across-the-entire-economy-may-put-your-board-representation-at-risk">The Biden Administration’s “Extensive Review of Interlocking Directorates Across the Entire Economy” May Put Your Board Representation at Risk</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#11: Antitrust Policy Under Scrutiny: A Conversation on Challenges and Future Paths</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/b8cd6caf-ee7d-46f8-bbcd-97dca5412471/3000x3000/rethinking-20antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:43:05</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Biden administration has aggressively redefined antitrust policy, continuing trends initiated during the Trump presidency while contesting mid-20th-century legal developments that favored efficiency justifications. In this discussion, former antitrust officials Bruce Hoffman and Barry Nigro reflect on the potential outcomes of current policies and speculate on the direction future administrations might take, whether it be a continuation or a revision of existing frameworks. They analyze the implications of these shifts for antitrust enforcement and what a potential Harris or Trump administration might prioritize in this critical area of law.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Biden administration has aggressively redefined antitrust policy, continuing trends initiated during the Trump presidency while contesting mid-20th-century legal developments that favored efficiency justifications. In this discussion, former antitrust officials Bruce Hoffman and Barry Nigro reflect on the potential outcomes of current policies and speculate on the direction future administrations might take, whether it be a continuation or a revision of existing frameworks. They analyze the implications of these shifts for antitrust enforcement and what a potential Harris or Trump administration might prioritize in this critical area of law.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#10: The Law and Political Economy Project, and its Influence on Antitrust in the Biden Administration</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>In this episode of the Rethinking Antitrust Podcast, we examine the origins of the Biden administration's antitrust initiatives with Todd Zywicki, a prominent law professor at George Mason University and former Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade Commission. As we explore the implications of the Neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust, Todd provides a broader context for understanding the intellectual underpinnings of these changes. Three and a half years into the Biden administration, he and Bilal explore how the administration’s agenda goes beyond antitrust, influencing a new era of governance in the United States.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/zywicki_todd">Todd Zywicki profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4836562">The Law and Political Economy Project: A Critical Analysis</a>, Todd Zywicki</p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4867&context=penn_law_review">Political Content of Antitrust</a>, Robert Pitofsky</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Engman-FTC-Address-1974.pdf">Speech of FTC Chairman Lewis Engman,</a> Detroit 1974</p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/08/archives/ft-c-chief-calls-role-of-agencies-inflationary-ftc-chief-hits-role.html">FTC Chief Calls Role Of Agencies Inflationary</a>, <i>New York Times</i> (1974)</p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 18 Oct 2024 16:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/10-the-law-and-political-economy-project-and-its-influence-on-antitrust-in-the-biden-administration-svKnKINo</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In this episode of the Rethinking Antitrust Podcast, we examine the origins of the Biden administration's antitrust initiatives with Todd Zywicki, a prominent law professor at George Mason University and former Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade Commission. As we explore the implications of the Neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust, Todd provides a broader context for understanding the intellectual underpinnings of these changes. Three and a half years into the Biden administration, he and Bilal explore how the administration’s agenda goes beyond antitrust, influencing a new era of governance in the United States.</p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/zywicki_todd">Todd Zywicki profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4836562">The Law and Political Economy Project: A Critical Analysis</a>, Todd Zywicki</p><p><a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4867&context=penn_law_review">Political Content of Antitrust</a>, Robert Pitofsky</p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Engman-FTC-Address-1974.pdf">Speech of FTC Chairman Lewis Engman,</a> Detroit 1974</p><p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/1974/10/08/archives/ft-c-chief-calls-role-of-agencies-inflationary-ftc-chief-hits-role.html">FTC Chief Calls Role Of Agencies Inflationary</a>, <i>New York Times</i> (1974)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#10: The Law and Political Economy Project, and its Influence on Antitrust in the Biden Administration</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/caa9d23e-c850-4a9e-9041-4d1a5b9a0e5d/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:09:44</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In this episode of the Rethinking Antitrust Podcast, we examine the origins of the Biden administration&apos;s antitrust initiatives with Todd Zywicki, a prominent law professor at George Mason University and former Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade Commission. As we explore the implications of the Neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust, Todd provides a broader context for understanding the intellectual underpinnings of these changes. Three and a half years into the Biden administration, he and Bilal explore how the administration’s agenda goes beyond antitrust, influencing a new era of governance in the United States.

Links

Todd Zywicki profile page

The Law and Political Economy Project: A Critical Analysis, Todd Zywicki

Political Content of Antitrust, Robert Pitofsky

Speech of FTC Chairman Lewis Engman, Detroit 1974

FTC Chief Calls Role Of Agencies Inflationary, New York Times (1974)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In this episode of the Rethinking Antitrust Podcast, we examine the origins of the Biden administration&apos;s antitrust initiatives with Todd Zywicki, a prominent law professor at George Mason University and former Director of the Office of Policy Planning at the Federal Trade Commission. As we explore the implications of the Neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust, Todd provides a broader context for understanding the intellectual underpinnings of these changes. Three and a half years into the Biden administration, he and Bilal explore how the administration’s agenda goes beyond antitrust, influencing a new era of governance in the United States.

Links

Todd Zywicki profile page

The Law and Political Economy Project: A Critical Analysis, Todd Zywicki

Political Content of Antitrust, Robert Pitofsky

Speech of FTC Chairman Lewis Engman, Detroit 1974

FTC Chief Calls Role Of Agencies Inflationary, New York Times (1974)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <title>#9: Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration promised to revitalize antitrust by appointing FTC and DOJ leadership that would reverse the antitrust policies of the previous four decades. Those policies had their birth in the Reagan administration, and while initially controversial, were adopted and adapted by later agency leadership, and in time became the bipartisan antitrust consensus that President Biden called a “failed experiment.” </p><p>President Biden made three high profile antitrust appointments: Jonathan Kanter, an experienced practitioner to lead the Antitrust Division, Tim Wu, a Columbia Law School professor, to serve as a special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy, and Lina Khan, also a Columbia Law school professor, to lead the Commission. We are now over three years into the Biden administration, and it is appropriate to ask whether the Biden administration has succeeded in its efforts to initiate change at the antitrust agencies and antitrust policy?</p><p> I talk with Tim Muris, a former FTC Chairman, and Howard Beales, a former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and get their views. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/m/muris-timothy-j">Timothy Muris profile</a></p><p><a href="https://business.gwu.edu/howard-beales">Howard Beales profile</a></p><p><a href="https://cei.org/studies/achieving-change-at-the-federal-trade-commission/">Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/9-achieving-change-at-the-federal-trade-commission-GKyty8D8</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Biden administration promised to revitalize antitrust by appointing FTC and DOJ leadership that would reverse the antitrust policies of the previous four decades. Those policies had their birth in the Reagan administration, and while initially controversial, were adopted and adapted by later agency leadership, and in time became the bipartisan antitrust consensus that President Biden called a “failed experiment.” </p><p>President Biden made three high profile antitrust appointments: Jonathan Kanter, an experienced practitioner to lead the Antitrust Division, Tim Wu, a Columbia Law School professor, to serve as a special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy, and Lina Khan, also a Columbia Law school professor, to lead the Commission. We are now over three years into the Biden administration, and it is appropriate to ask whether the Biden administration has succeeded in its efforts to initiate change at the antitrust agencies and antitrust policy?</p><p> I talk with Tim Muris, a former FTC Chairman, and Howard Beales, a former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and get their views. </p><p>Links</p><p><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/m/muris-timothy-j">Timothy Muris profile</a></p><p><a href="https://business.gwu.edu/howard-beales">Howard Beales profile</a></p><p><a href="https://cei.org/studies/achieving-change-at-the-federal-trade-commission/">Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#9: Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
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      <itunes:duration>00:55:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Biden administration promised to revitalize antitrust by appointing FTC and DOJ leadership that would reverse the antitrust policies of the previous four decades. Those policies had their birth in the Reagan administration, and while initially controversial, were adopted and adapted by later agency leadership, and in time became the bipartisan antitrust consensus that President Biden called a “failed experiment.” 

President Biden made three high profile antitrust appointments: Jonathan Kanter, an experienced practitioner to lead the Antitrust Division, Tim Wu, a Columbia Law School professor, to serve as a special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy, and Lina  Khan, also a Columbia Law school professor, to lead the Commission. We are now over three years into the Biden administration and it is appropriate to ask whether the Biden administration has succeeded in its efforts to initiate change at the antitrust agencies and antitrust policy?

 I talk with Tim Muris, a former FTC Chairman, and Howard Beales, a former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and get their views. 

Links

Timothy Muris profile (https://tinyurl.com/37ac3h5n)

Howard Beales profile (https://tinyurl.com/4specpx2)

Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission (https://tinyurl.com/a2zjdva6)</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Biden administration promised to revitalize antitrust by appointing FTC and DOJ leadership that would reverse the antitrust policies of the previous four decades. Those policies had their birth in the Reagan administration, and while initially controversial, were adopted and adapted by later agency leadership, and in time became the bipartisan antitrust consensus that President Biden called a “failed experiment.” 

President Biden made three high profile antitrust appointments: Jonathan Kanter, an experienced practitioner to lead the Antitrust Division, Tim Wu, a Columbia Law School professor, to serve as a special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy, and Lina  Khan, also a Columbia Law school professor, to lead the Commission. We are now over three years into the Biden administration and it is appropriate to ask whether the Biden administration has succeeded in its efforts to initiate change at the antitrust agencies and antitrust policy?

 I talk with Tim Muris, a former FTC Chairman, and Howard Beales, a former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, and get their views. 

Links

Timothy Muris profile (https://tinyurl.com/37ac3h5n)

Howard Beales profile (https://tinyurl.com/4specpx2)

Achieving Change at the Federal Trade Commission (https://tinyurl.com/a2zjdva6)</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>9</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#8: Does the FTC Have Authority to Issue Competition Rules?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/maureen-ohlhausen.html">Maureen Ohlhausen Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/thomas-w-merrill">Prof. Thomas W. Merrill Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/ghurwitz">Prof. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.aei.org/profile/peter-j-wallison/">Peter J. Wallison Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/techfreedom-launches-ftc-webinar-series/">Original Program for the Event</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FTC-Non-Competes-TechFreedom-I-Szoka-and-Barthold.pdf">Comments on the Proposed Ban on Non-Compete Agreements</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FTC-UMC-Rulemaking-Authority-TF-Version.pdf">The Constitutional Revolution That Wasn’t: Why the FTC Isn’t a Second National Legislature</a></p><p>Prof. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz: <a href="https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/lawreview/article/view/324/283">Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust</a></p><p>Maureen Ohlhausen: <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/ftc_rulemaking_white_paper_aug12.pdf">Pushing the Limits? A Primer on FTC Competition Rulemaking</a></p><p>Thomas Merrill: <a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1431&context=faculty_scholarship">Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention</a></p><p>Peter Wallison: <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/12/only-the-supreme-court-can-effectively-restrain-the-administrative-state/">Only the Supreme Court Can Effectively Restrain the Administrative State</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jan 2024 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/8-does-the-ftc-have-authority-to-issue-competition-rules-KYj2o_xX</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.wsgr.com/en/people/maureen-ohlhausen.html">Maureen Ohlhausen Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/thomas-w-merrill">Prof. Thomas W. Merrill Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/ghurwitz">Prof. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.aei.org/profile/peter-j-wallison/">Peter J. Wallison Bio Page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/techfreedom-launches-ftc-webinar-series/">Original Program for the Event</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/FTC-Non-Competes-TechFreedom-I-Szoka-and-Barthold.pdf">Comments on the Proposed Ban on Non-Compete Agreements</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/FTC-UMC-Rulemaking-Authority-TF-Version.pdf">The Constitutional Revolution That Wasn’t: Why the FTC Isn’t a Second National Legislature</a></p><p>Prof. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz: <a href="https://lawreview.law.pitt.edu/ojs/lawreview/article/view/324/283">Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust</a></p><p>Maureen Ohlhausen: <a href="https://www.uschamber.com/assets/archived/images/ftc_rulemaking_white_paper_aug12.pdf">Pushing the Limits? A Primer on FTC Competition Rulemaking</a></p><p>Thomas Merrill: <a href="https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1431&context=faculty_scholarship">Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention</a></p><p>Peter Wallison: <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/12/only-the-supreme-court-can-effectively-restrain-the-administrative-state/">Only the Supreme Court Can Effectively Restrain the Administrative State</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#8: Does the FTC Have Authority to Issue Competition Rules?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/bab7ed09-6a6a-40cb-929f-4cad0ddc49e8/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:22:05</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Earlier this month, the Supreme Court heard two cases—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce—that are likely to have an impact on a significant initiative of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In January 2023, the FTC proposed a rule that would prohibit the use of non-compete agreements, treating them as an unfair method of competition. Whether the FTC will succeed in its effort to enact a competition rule may turn on the level of deference the courts grant it to interpret Section 5 and Section 6(g) of the FTC Act. That deference is substantial under the Chevron Doctrine; however, there are signs that the Supreme Court is interested in narrowing and perhaps abandoning the Chevron Doctrine. Both Loper Bright and Relentless give it an opportunity to do so. In October 2021, TechFreedom sponsored a webinar to discuss whether the FTC has authority to issue unfair methods of competition rules. To further the discussion on this important issue, we are re-posting that discussion as an episode.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Earlier this month, the Supreme Court heard two cases—Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Department of Commerce—that are likely to have an impact on a significant initiative of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). In January 2023, the FTC proposed a rule that would prohibit the use of non-compete agreements, treating them as an unfair method of competition. Whether the FTC will succeed in its effort to enact a competition rule may turn on the level of deference the courts grant it to interpret Section 5 and Section 6(g) of the FTC Act. That deference is substantial under the Chevron Doctrine; however, there are signs that the Supreme Court is interested in narrowing and perhaps abandoning the Chevron Doctrine. Both Loper Bright and Relentless give it an opportunity to do so. In October 2021, TechFreedom sponsored a webinar to discuss whether the FTC has authority to issue unfair methods of competition rules. To further the discussion on this important issue, we are re-posting that discussion as an episode.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>8</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#7: Should Revised Merger Guidelines Address Potential &amp; Nascent Competition?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=41615">Daniel Francis profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyer/limarzi-kristen-c/">Kristen Limarzi profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/henrycsu">Henry Su LinkedIn page</a></p><p><a href="https://law.uiowa.edu/people/sean-sullivan">Sean Sullivan profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/w/thomas-wollmann">Thomas Wollmann profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/yun_john_m">John Yun profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/should-revised-merger-guidelines-address-potential-nascent-competition/">Our original press release for this program in January</a></p><p><strong>Bilal Sayyed: </strong><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4308233">Actual Potential Entrants, Emerging Competitors, and the Merger Guidelines: Examples from FTC Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/reports/merger-guidelines-2023">2023 FTC & DOJ jointly issued Merger Guidelines</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Dec 2023 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/7-should-revised-merger-guidelines-address-potential-nascent-competition-LHKOK8p8</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.overview&personid=41615">Daniel Francis profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyer/limarzi-kristen-c/">Kristen Limarzi profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/henrycsu">Henry Su LinkedIn page</a></p><p><a href="https://law.uiowa.edu/people/sean-sullivan">Sean Sullivan profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/w/thomas-wollmann">Thomas Wollmann profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/directory/fulltime/yun_john_m">John Yun profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/should-revised-merger-guidelines-address-potential-nascent-competition/">Our original press release for this program in January</a></p><p><strong>Bilal Sayyed: </strong><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4308233">Actual Potential Entrants, Emerging Competitors, and the Merger Guidelines: Examples from FTC Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/reports/merger-guidelines-2023">2023 FTC & DOJ jointly issued Merger Guidelines</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="107134121" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/30ad71bf-e5a2-4a43-b659-df726697540e/audio/298933c6-ddf3-414e-a24b-b6b5f1579b93/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#7: Should Revised Merger Guidelines Address Potential &amp; Nascent Competition?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/da2a4fc0-a3bd-416d-9e84-be2dd9c4008b/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:51:23</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) released revised merger guidelines. These guidelines replace and supersede the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. One of the most significant revisions in the new merger guidelines is a re-incorporation of theories related to harm from mergers involving a potential competitor. In January of this year, TechFreedom hosted a roundtable discussion on whether revised merger guidelines should address potential competition. To further the discussion on this important issue, we are re-posting that discussion as an episode. As you listen, note that references to the guidelines are usually references to the then enforced guidelines—either the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines or the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Earlier this week, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) released revised merger guidelines. These guidelines replace and supersede the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines. One of the most significant revisions in the new merger guidelines is a re-incorporation of theories related to harm from mergers involving a potential competitor. In January of this year, TechFreedom hosted a roundtable discussion on whether revised merger guidelines should address potential competition. To further the discussion on this important issue, we are re-posting that discussion as an episode. As you listen, note that references to the guidelines are usually references to the then enforced guidelines—either the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines or the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines.</itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>7</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#6: Rethinking Merger Analysis: The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.bakerbotts.com/people/r/rill-james-f">James Rill profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/jbaker/bio">Jonathan Baker profile page </a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/pauldenis">Paul Denis LinkedIn page</a></p><p>Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf">1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a>  </p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/problem-baker-hughes-syufy-role-entry-merger-analysis">The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis </a>(Apr. 25, 1996)</p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/unilateral-competitive-effects-theories-merger-analysis">Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis</a> (Aug. 6, 1996)</p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2513&context=facsch_lawrev">Responding to Developments in Economics and in the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines</a> (2003) </p><p>Paul Denis, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Advances-of-the-1992-Horizontal-Merger-Guidelines-38-Antitrust-Bull-479-1992.pdf">Advances of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a>, (1992)</p><p>Paul Denis, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-Insider_s-Look-at-the-New-Horizontal-Merger-Guidelines.pdf">An Insider’s Look at the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>James F. Rill,  Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1990-03-23-Rill-Report-from-Official-Washington_Merger-Enforcem.pdf">Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice</a> (Mar. 23, 1990), </p><p>James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/media/1045261/dl?inline">60 Minutes with the Honorable James F. Rill</a>  (Apr. 3, 1992)</p><p>Judy Whalley,  Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, After the Herfindahls are Counted; <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/World+Competition/13.3/WOCO1989015">Assessment of Entry and Efficiencies in Merger Enforcement by the Department of Justice</a> (1989) </p><p>Robert D. Willig, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1991/01/1991_bpeamicro_willig.pdf">Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1027101/download">Complaint: U.S. v. Pacific Amphitheatre Partnership, et al.</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/TechFreedom-Comments-Merger-Guidelines-April-21-2022.docx.pdf">TechFreedom comment on the request for information on merger enforcement guidelines (2022)</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">TechFreedom comment on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 21 Nov 2023 17:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/6-the-1992-horizontal-merger-guidelines-0xzxRSrW</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.bakerbotts.com/people/r/rill-james-f">James Rill profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.wcl.american.edu/community/faculty/profile/jbaker/bio">Jonathan Baker profile page </a></p><p><a href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/pauldenis">Paul Denis LinkedIn page</a></p><p>Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2007/07/11/11250.pdf">1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a>  </p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/problem-baker-hughes-syufy-role-entry-merger-analysis">The Problem with Baker Hughes and Syufy: On the Role of Entry in Merger Analysis </a>(Apr. 25, 1996)</p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/speeches/unilateral-competitive-effects-theories-merger-analysis">Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in Merger Analysis</a> (Aug. 6, 1996)</p><p>Jonathan Baker, <a href="https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2513&context=facsch_lawrev">Responding to Developments in Economics and in the Courts: Entry in the Merger Guidelines</a> (2003) </p><p>Paul Denis, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Advances-of-the-1992-Horizontal-Merger-Guidelines-38-Antitrust-Bull-479-1992.pdf">Advances of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a>, (1992)</p><p>Paul Denis, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/An-Insider_s-Look-at-the-New-Horizontal-Merger-Guidelines.pdf">An Insider’s Look at the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>James F. Rill,  Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, <a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/1990-03-23-Rill-Report-from-Official-Washington_Merger-Enforcem.pdf">Merger Enforcement at the Department of Justice</a> (Mar. 23, 1990), </p><p>James F. Rill, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.justice.gov/media/1045261/dl?inline">60 Minutes with the Honorable James F. Rill</a>  (Apr. 3, 1992)</p><p>Judy Whalley,  Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, After the Herfindahls are Counted; <a href="https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/World+Competition/13.3/WOCO1989015">Assessment of Entry and Efficiencies in Merger Enforcement by the Department of Justice</a> (1989) </p><p>Robert D. Willig, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1991/01/1991_bpeamicro_willig.pdf">Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/1027101/download">Complaint: U.S. v. Pacific Amphitheatre Partnership, et al.</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/TechFreedom-Comments-Merger-Guidelines-April-21-2022.docx.pdf">TechFreedom comment on the request for information on merger enforcement guidelines (2022)</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">TechFreedom comment on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="83204947" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/791de587-de6e-42d7-a4ae-b885965f5926/audio/348f4aa4-e279-4f64-9c42-c3ccdd849bc2/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#6: Rethinking Merger Analysis: The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/13b8b32c-9582-4de4-8238-1103fbd59645/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:26:27</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines substantially revised and updated the Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, with respect to the analytic framework the government would use to evaluate horizontal mergers.  The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines revised but did not depart substantially from that analytic framework. Earlier this year, the Biden administration indicated an intention to substantially revise the existing merger guidelines and depart significantly from the analytic framework of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and re-adopt the more structural approach of the Department of Justice’s 1968 and 1982/1984 Merger Guidelines. Host Bilal Sayyed sat down with James Rill (Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 1989-1992), Paul Denis and Jon Baker to discuss what led the antitrust agencies to move away from the structural approach the Biden Administration seems likely to re-adopt.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines substantially revised and updated the Department of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, with respect to the analytic framework the government would use to evaluate horizontal mergers.  The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines revised but did not depart substantially from that analytic framework. Earlier this year, the Biden administration indicated an intention to substantially revise the existing merger guidelines and depart significantly from the analytic framework of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, and re-adopt the more structural approach of the Department of Justice’s 1968 and 1982/1984 Merger Guidelines. Host Bilal Sayyed sat down with James Rill (Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, 1989-1992), Paul Denis and Jon Baker to discuss what led the antitrust agencies to move away from the structural approach the Biden Administration seems likely to re-adopt.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>6</itunes:episode>
    </item>
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      <title>#5: The Google Antitrust Trial — From Inside the Courtroom</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://progresschamber.org/team/adam-kovacevich/">Adam Kovacevich profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://progresschamber.org/team/vidushi-dyall/">Vidushi Dyall profile page</a></p><p>Vidushi Dyall: <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13w4Nv5YCbca73p5KeXomuL7KLz90Hv-9iFyLj6RNuGc/edit#gid=0">DOJ v Google Witness Tracker</a></p><p>Adam Kovacevich & Vidushi Dyall: <a href="https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/seven-takeaways-from-the-justice-departments-antitrust-case-against-google-s-search-deals-eea52e501510">Seven Takeaways from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Case Against Google’s Search Deals</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/episodes/353-the-google-search-antitrust-trial">Tech Policy Podcast Episode #353: The Google Search Antitrust Trial</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Tue, 14 Nov 2023 14:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/5-the-google-antitrust-trial-from-inside-the-courtroom-hN2Cxtwc</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://progresschamber.org/team/adam-kovacevich/">Adam Kovacevich profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://progresschamber.org/team/vidushi-dyall/">Vidushi Dyall profile page</a></p><p>Vidushi Dyall: <a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/13w4Nv5YCbca73p5KeXomuL7KLz90Hv-9iFyLj6RNuGc/edit#gid=0">DOJ v Google Witness Tracker</a></p><p>Adam Kovacevich & Vidushi Dyall: <a href="https://medium.com/chamber-of-progress/seven-takeaways-from-the-justice-departments-antitrust-case-against-google-s-search-deals-eea52e501510">Seven Takeaways from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Case Against Google’s Search Deals</a></p><p>TechFreedom: <a href="https://podcast.techfreedom.org/episodes/353-the-google-search-antitrust-trial">Tech Policy Podcast Episode #353: The Google Search Antitrust Trial</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="59956931" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/e9f443c2-53bb-4ac9-b08b-f034d80cdfcc/audio/d73f7927-0e76-4f95-8033-9adcd2ce327d/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#5: The Google Antitrust Trial — From Inside the Courtroom</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/5a3876d5-d771-4797-99bc-411136ecd515/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:02:15</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In October 2020, the US Department of Justice (DOJ), joined by 11 states, filed a lawsuit alleging that Google had illegally maintained a monopoly in three markets—the market for general search services, search advertising and general search text advertising. After extensive discovery and pre-trial motions, trial began in late September of this year. Adam Kovacevich and Vidushi Dyall, both of the Chamber of Progress, joined the show to give us their take on how the DOJ has presented its case. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In October 2020, the US Department of Justice (DOJ), joined by 11 states, filed a lawsuit alleging that Google had illegally maintained a monopoly in three markets—the market for general search services, search advertising and general search text advertising. After extensive discovery and pre-trial motions, trial began in late September of this year. Adam Kovacevich and Vidushi Dyall, both of the Chamber of Progress, joined the show to give us their take on how the DOJ has presented its case. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>5</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#4: Vertical Mergers</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/steven-c-salop/">Steven Salop bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/jeremy-sandford/">Jeremy Sanford bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4575390">Jeremy Sanford: Comments on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839768">Steve Salop: A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4571388">Steve Salop: Some Comments For Improving the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/09/29/revising-guideline-6-with-evidence-to-establish-a-structural-inference-for-input-foreclosure/">Steven Salop: Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence to Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3351391">Steven Salop: Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf">2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissions-commentary-vertical-merger-enforcement/p180101verticalmergercommentary_1.pdf">2020 Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-doj-merger-guidelines-draft-public-comment">2023 Proposed Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">TechFreedom: Comment on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 27 Oct 2023 13:51:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/4-a-special-focus-on-vertical-mergers-puKhF1ku</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/steven-c-salop/">Steven Salop bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.compasslexecon.com/professionals/jeremy-sandford/">Jeremy Sanford bio page</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4575390">Jeremy Sanford: Comments on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3839768">Steve Salop: A Suggested Revision of the 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4571388">Steve Salop: Some Comments For Improving the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/09/29/revising-guideline-6-with-evidence-to-establish-a-structural-inference-for-input-foreclosure/">Steven Salop: Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence to Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure</a></p><p><a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3351391">Steven Salop: Five Principles for Vertical Merger Enforcement Policy</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf">2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissions-commentary-vertical-merger-enforcement/p180101verticalmergercommentary_1.pdf">2020 Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-doj-merger-guidelines-draft-public-comment">2023 Proposed Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">TechFreedom: Comment on the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
      <enclosure length="86820608" type="audio/mpeg" url="https://cdn.simplecast.com/audio/21f6ae2e-bf19-4d4a-bb87-e5a6919279d6/episodes/edc7e0a8-547f-4eec-ad5d-491d817f7ca2/audio/7e6f16d4-958e-4e5b-ab7a-90f316b36fb7/default_tc.mp3?aid=rss_feed&amp;feed=RHFe8xRj"/>
      <itunes:title>#4: Vertical Mergers</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/d078d76f-cd58-4202-9d89-4834cdd60aa8/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:30:14</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>In June 2020, the Trump administration released the first joint FTC-DOJ vertical merger guidelines. These guidelines, which drew heavily on the input of agency staff, were prepared as an outgrowth of the FTC&apos;s Competition and Consumer protection hearings initiated by then FTC chairman Joe Simons. While the 2020 VMGs received praise from some, others argued the VMGs failed to articulate certain theories of harm, suggesting a pro-defendant bias. In July of this year, the agencies proposed a revised set of merger guidelines, including theories of non-horizontal competitive harm; the draft was met with considerable skepticism, with many suggesting the draft ignores advances in economic learning over the past four-decades, and that the draft relied on case law without a strong foundation in the economics of vertical integration. Steve Salop and Jeremy Sandford join Bilal Sayyed for a discussion of the guidelines on vertical and non-horizontal theories of harm.</itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>In June 2020, the Trump administration released the first joint FTC-DOJ vertical merger guidelines. These guidelines, which drew heavily on the input of agency staff, were prepared as an outgrowth of the FTC&apos;s Competition and Consumer protection hearings initiated by then FTC chairman Joe Simons. While the 2020 VMGs received praise from some, others argued the VMGs failed to articulate certain theories of harm, suggesting a pro-defendant bias. In July of this year, the agencies proposed a revised set of merger guidelines, including theories of non-horizontal competitive harm; the draft was met with considerable skepticism, with many suggesting the draft ignores advances in economic learning over the past four-decades, and that the draft relied on case law without a strong foundation in the economics of vertical integration. Steve Salop and Jeremy Sandford join Bilal Sayyed for a discussion of the guidelines on vertical and non-horizontal theories of harm.</itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>4</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#3: Draft Merger Guidelines: The View of Two Practitioners</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://law.stanford.edu/directory/a-douglas-melamed/">Doug Melamed profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/b/blumenthal-william">William Blumenthal profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">Our comment for the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/TechFreedom-Comments-Merger-Guidelines-April-21-2022.docx.pdf" target="_blank">Our comments for the 2022 RFI on merger enforcement guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/123372/original/CalabresiMelamed.PDF">Doug Melamed: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral </a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines">1968 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines">1982 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm">1984 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11250.htm">1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1997-merger-guidelines">1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project/commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf">2006 Commentary on Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf">2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf">2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissions-commentary-vertical-merger-enforcement/p180101verticalmergercommentary_1.pdf">2020 Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-doj-merger-guidelines-draft-public-comment">2023 Proposed Merger Guidelines</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 13 Oct 2023 13:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (Jared Smith)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/3-merger-guidelines-two-practitioners-discuss-Cp0sxh_g</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://law.stanford.edu/directory/a-douglas-melamed/">Doug Melamed profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://www.sidley.com/en/people/b/blumenthal-william">William Blumenthal profile page</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Bilal-Sayyed-Merger-Guidelines-Comments-9-18-2023.pdf">Our comment for the 2023 proposed draft merger guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://techfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/TechFreedom-Comments-Merger-Guidelines-April-21-2022.docx.pdf" target="_blank">Our comments for the 2022 RFI on merger enforcement guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/123372/original/CalabresiMelamed.PDF">Doug Melamed: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral </a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines">1968 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines">1982 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11249.htm">1984 Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.usdoj.gov/atr/hmerger/11250.htm">1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1997-merger-guidelines">1997 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project/commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch2006.pdf">2006 Commentary on Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf">2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf">2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commissions-commentary-vertical-merger-enforcement/p180101verticalmergercommentary_1.pdf">2020 Commentary on Vertical Merger Enforcement</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-doj-merger-guidelines-draft-public-comment">2023 Proposed Merger Guidelines</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#3: Draft Merger Guidelines: The View of Two Practitioners</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>Jared Smith</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/11034d55-d17a-4ea9-812c-d963cc8128fc/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>00:59:40</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The Merger Guidelines set forth the analytic framework the federal antitrust agencies used to evaluate the reasonably probable competitive effects of mergers, acquisitions and long-term joint ventures. There have been several versions since first released in 1968, all adopting then-current economic analysis of firm behavior as the framework for antitrust merger enforcement policy.  Bill Blumenthal, a former General Counsel of the FTC, and Doug Melamed, a former DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, join the show to discuss whether the proposed revised Merger Guidelines are consistent with current economic learning and legal doctrine, and if the courts will adopt them as a sensible approach to interpreting Section 7 of the Clayton Act. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The Merger Guidelines set forth the analytic framework the federal antitrust agencies used to evaluate the reasonably probable competitive effects of mergers, acquisitions and long-term joint ventures. There have been several versions since first released in 1968, all adopting then-current economic analysis of firm behavior as the framework for antitrust merger enforcement policy.  Bill Blumenthal, a former General Counsel of the FTC, and Doug Melamed, a former DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, join the show to discuss whether the proposed revised Merger Guidelines are consistent with current economic learning and legal doctrine, and if the courts will adopt them as a sensible approach to interpreting Section 7 of the Clayton Act. </itunes:subtitle>
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      <itunes:episode>3</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#2: Do the Proposed Merger Guidelines Promote the Rule of Law?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/merger-challenges-data-1999-%E2%80%93-2003/mdp_0.pdf">Merger Challenges Data, 1999-2003</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2003/040831horizmergersdata96-03.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2003</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-%E2%80%93-2005/p035603horizmergerinvestigationdata1996-2005_0.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2005</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2007/081201hsrmergerdata_0.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2007</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission,<a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2011/130104horizontalmergerreport.pdf"> Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2011</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=504031005120109019121085086121025119016062042032042036011080028094029074070070076124118119019036058121033126007093066083102123028072094051081021118085084078001122085054010073105090127066014122105123103096119069064098118031105067119121087003094115106&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Comments on Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=610126066081069003104092019099123031027087059053021075022007075123068087002084094106062099021118024016045067089004077092125113016091088002016107014015120121008107031033079111100120089124100113064075026098071095116090067067073114005114031123112086021&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Submission in Response to Request for Information on Merger Enforcement</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden & George Hay, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=124083127024117091029119095016091087057013006006039043089019065023003124074087090068056000031041111006030012005111099026073091062074008052087002007090076097115025004025051013094122016017026011102112080005003080105100064071083122110123001071122068117022&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy and Economics</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=716097073084073004116118069098115004010021055002019085109022126066000026002011098115025044098101024070095076107117059059002016088107113093097080103103065068053034054028078024126068081009122124111092069092119031124028123095107025108075030111091&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Market Delineation Algorithms Based on the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm </a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=141119082090096114069118077031065007050013055041044089022119074091085026072106030096036063025103104037062107002074127084120079015075086034086119076092066096007006089028003085103070088107124124080087116113082087020024105023080066087027007066091118066&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Mergers with Weak Competition: Reflections on FTC v. Lundbeck</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Fri, 22 Sep 2023 13:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/2-do-the-proposed-merger-guidelines-promote-the-rule-of-law-IdWUtJzp</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/merger-challenges-data-1999-%E2%80%93-2003/mdp_0.pdf">Merger Challenges Data, 1999-2003</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2003/040831horizmergersdata96-03.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2003</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-%E2%80%93-2005/p035603horizmergerinvestigationdata1996-2005_0.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2005</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2007/081201hsrmergerdata_0.pdf">Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2007</a></p><p>Federal Trade Commission,<a href="https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/horizontal-merger-investigation-data-fiscal-years-1996-2011/130104horizontalmergerreport.pdf"> Horizontal Merger Investigation Data, FY 1996-2011</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=504031005120109019121085086121025119016062042032042036011080028094029074070070076124118119019036058121033126007093066083102123028072094051081021118085084078001122085054010073105090127066014122105123103096119069064098118031105067119121087003094115106&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Comments on Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=610126066081069003104092019099123031027087059053021075022007075123068087002084094106062099021118024016045067089004077092125113016091088002016107014015120121008107031033079111100120089124100113064075026098071095116090067067073114005114031123112086021&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Submission in Response to Request for Information on Merger Enforcement</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden & George Hay, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=124083127024117091029119095016091087057013006006039043089019065023003124074087090068056000031041111006030012005111099026073091062074008052087002007090076097115025004025051013094122016017026011102112080005003080105100064071083122110123001071122068117022&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Horizontal Mergers: Law, Policy and Economics</a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=716097073084073004116118069098115004010021055002019085109022126066000026002011098115025044098101024070095076107117059059002016088107113093097080103103065068053034054028078024126068081009122124111092069092119031124028123095107025108075030111091&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Market Delineation Algorithms Based on the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm </a></p><p>Gregory J. Werden, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=141119082090096114069118077031065007050013055041044089022119074091085026072106030096036063025103104037062107002074127084120079015075086034086119076092066096007006089028003085103070088107124124080087116113082087020024105023080066087027007066091118066&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Mergers with Weak Competition: Reflections on FTC v. Lundbeck</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#2: Do the Proposed Merger Guidelines Promote the Rule of Law?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/3bfd4c17-349b-4ca7-b0e1-540ed7d1ba82/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:48:35</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>Gregory J. Werden worked at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for over 40 years, where he helped prepare numerous enforcement guidelines and over a hundred briefs filed in the appellate courts or the Supreme Court.  Bilal Sayyed (Senior Competition Counsel, TechFreedom) and Greg discuss whether the proposed merger guidelines promote the rule of law, and whether the proposed changes to the merger guidelines are supported by law, antitrust economics, or the antitrust agencies’ experience. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>Gregory J. Werden worked at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice for over 40 years, where he helped prepare numerous enforcement guidelines and over a hundred briefs filed in the appellate courts or the Supreme Court.  Bilal Sayyed (Senior Competition Counsel, TechFreedom) and Greg discuss whether the proposed merger guidelines promote the rule of law, and whether the proposed changes to the merger guidelines are supported by law, antitrust economics, or the antitrust agencies’ experience. </itunes:subtitle>
      <itunes:explicit>false</itunes:explicit>
      <itunes:episodeType>full</itunes:episodeType>
      <itunes:episode>2</itunes:episode>
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      <title>#1: What Should Merger Guidelines Do?</title>
      <description><![CDATA[<p>Eleanor M. Fox, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/08/14/eleanor-fox-a-slice-of-forgotten-history-and-its-light-on-the-future-changing-the-lens-on-antitrust/">A Slice of Forgotten History and Its Light on the Future - Changing the Lens on Antitrust</a></p><p>Eleanor M. Fox,  <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/09/05/eleanor-fox-tackling-the-critics-of-the-draft-merger-guidelines/">Tackling the Critics of the Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=884112031001103096091018116020002024001024032007049053005122120102084116088112090121124025056115114005124120025096097097107101023039056023040023117015097005008094118093008028090091009004096118122113016001117064116086019004014003026122102110079113065119&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Revisiting the Merger Guidelines: Protecting an Enforcement Asset</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=709021124002091091085111109016119125051054034003088001030108071123087065074087029026039118010062037125043098106096012018127017112085069038022029027096027107114000093004007022080098016010026080006012118004002124117127104077066123100087070029118071102119&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Comments on the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./murisgenzymestmt.pdf">In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./thompsongenzymestmt.pdf">Dissenting Statement of FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson</a>, In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./harbourgenzymestmt.pdf">Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour</a>, In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</p><p>Bilal Sayyed, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/08/30/bilal-sayyed-the-draft-merger-guidelines-abandon-the-persuasiveness-of-their-predecessors/">The Draft Merger Guidelines Abandon the Persuasiveness of their Predecessors</a></p>
]]></description>
      <pubDate>Mon, 18 Sep 2023 19:00:33 +0000</pubDate>
      <author>jsmith@techfreedom.org (TechFreedom)</author>
      <link>https://rethinking-antitrust.simplecast.com/episodes/1-what-should-merger-guidelines-do-WcZRDEml</link>
      <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eleanor M. Fox, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/08/14/eleanor-fox-a-slice-of-forgotten-history-and-its-light-on-the-future-changing-the-lens-on-antitrust/">A Slice of Forgotten History and Its Light on the Future - Changing the Lens on Antitrust</a></p><p>Eleanor M. Fox,  <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/09/05/eleanor-fox-tackling-the-critics-of-the-draft-merger-guidelines/">Tackling the Critics of the Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=884112031001103096091018116020002024001024032007049053005122120102084116088112090121124025056115114005124120025096097097107101023039056023040023117015097005008094118093008028090091009004096118122113016001117064116086019004014003026122102110079113065119&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Revisiting the Merger Guidelines: Protecting an Enforcement Asset</a></p><p>Daniel Francis, <a href="https://deliverypdf.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=709021124002091091085111109016119125051054034003088001030108071123087065074087029026039118010062037125043098106096012018127017112085069038022029027096027107114000093004007022080098016010026080006012118004002124117127104077066123100087070029118071102119&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE">Comments on the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines</a></p><p>Statement of FTC Chairman Timothy J. Muris, <a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./murisgenzymestmt.pdf">In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</a></p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./thompsongenzymestmt.pdf">Dissenting Statement of FTC Commissioner Mozelle Thompson</a>, In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</p><p><a href="https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/press-releases/ftc-closes-its-investigation-genzyme-corporations-2001-acquisition-novazyme-pharmaceuticals-inc./harbourgenzymestmt.pdf">Statement of FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour</a>, In the Matter of Genzyme/Novazyme</p><p>Bilal Sayyed, <a href="https://www.promarket.org/2023/08/30/bilal-sayyed-the-draft-merger-guidelines-abandon-the-persuasiveness-of-their-predecessors/">The Draft Merger Guidelines Abandon the Persuasiveness of their Predecessors</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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      <itunes:title>#1: What Should Merger Guidelines Do?</itunes:title>
      <itunes:author>TechFreedom</itunes:author>
      <itunes:image href="https://image.simplecastcdn.com/images/50bb570b-2d48-4cba-8eac-4d8a2c843965/eeb76cd9-18df-43d6-a633-7151440e7eb6/3000x3000/rethinking-antitrust.jpg?aid=rss_feed"/>
      <itunes:duration>01:12:07</itunes:duration>
      <itunes:summary>The merger guidelines set forth the analytic framework the federal antitrust agencies use to evaluate the competitive effects of mergers. The Biden Administration proposes to revise the merger guidelines, releasing a draft of proposed revised merger guidelines in July 2023. Bilal Sayyed (Senior Competition Counsel, TechFreedom) discusses the draft with Eleanor Fox and Daniel Francis whether new merger guidelines were needed, and whether the draft signals significant change in merger policy. Eleanor M. Fox is the Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation Emerita at New York University School of Law. She is an expert in antitrust and competition policy, and teaches, writes, and advises on competition policy in nations around the world and in international organizations. Daniel Francis is an Assistant Professor of Law at NYU. He writes and teaches about regulation and competition, particularly in complex or high-tech markets and is the co-author of Antitrust: Principles, Cases, and Materials (2023), a free antitrust casebook published by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. </itunes:summary>
      <itunes:subtitle>The merger guidelines set forth the analytic framework the federal antitrust agencies use to evaluate the competitive effects of mergers. The Biden Administration proposes to revise the merger guidelines, releasing a draft of proposed revised merger guidelines in July 2023. Bilal Sayyed (Senior Competition Counsel, TechFreedom) discusses the draft with Eleanor Fox and Daniel Francis whether new merger guidelines were needed, and whether the draft signals significant change in merger policy. Eleanor M. Fox is the Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation Emerita at New York University School of Law. She is an expert in antitrust and competition policy, and teaches, writes, and advises on competition policy in nations around the world and in international organizations. Daniel Francis is an Assistant Professor of Law at NYU. He writes and teaches about regulation and competition, particularly in complex or high-tech markets and is the co-author of Antitrust: Principles, Cases, and Materials (2023), a free antitrust casebook published by the ABA Section of Antitrust Law. </itunes:subtitle>
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